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The Social Integration Framework and National Identity  
Relative Deprivation, Social Trust and Pandemic Threat

Inaugural dissertation submitted by Steffen Wamsler

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
Submitted by

Steffen Wamsler

Born December 24, 1991 in Schwäbisch Gmünd, Germany

Bern, June 30, 2022

The faculty accepted this work as dissertation on August 25, 2022 at the request of the two advisors Prof. Dr. Markus Freitag (University of Bern) and Prof. Dr. Carolin Rapp (University of Copenhagen), without wishing to take a position on the view presented therein.



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## Preface

This cumulative dissertation studies the concept of national identity using social integration as a conceptual and analytical lens. Two of the three articles have already been published in scientific journals, while the third is currently being resubmitted after one round of revisions to another journal. Thus, all three articles have already gone through a double-blind peer review process. All statistical analyses were conducted with STATA and SPSS Amos. Datasets and replication files are available either online at the respective journal homepage or upon request.

**Article 1:** Wamsler S, Freitag M, Erhardt J, Filsinger M. (2022) The Pandemic and the Question of National Belonging: Exposure to Covid-19 Threat and Conceptions of Nationhood. *European Journal of Political Research*. Online first. [DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12515](https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12515).

SSCI 5-Year Impact Factor (2021): 6.116; number of reviewers: 2

**Article 2:** Wamsler S (2022) Violated entitlement and the nation: How feelings of relative deprivation shape nationalism and constructive patriotism. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. Online first. [DOI: 10.1177/00207152221103123](https://doi.org/10.1177/00207152221103123).

SSCI 5-Year Impact Factor (2021): 2.966; number of reviewers: 5 (plus two guest editors)

**Article 3:** Wamsler S. Dimensions of social trust and national identity: addressing a multifaceted Relationship. Being resubmitted to *Nations and Nationalism* after one round of revisions.

SSCI 5-Year Impact Factor (2021): 1.888; number of reviewers: 2

Beyond this dissertation project, I also worked on several related projects over the past years. Throughout the present thesis, I repeatedly refer to these works.

- Erhardt J, Freitag M, Wamsler S, Filsinger M. (2022) What drives political support? Evidence from a survey experiment at the onset of the corona crisis. *Contemporary Politics*: online first. [DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2021.2010345](https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2021.2010345)
- Filsinger M, Freitag M, Erhardt J, Wamsler S. (2021) Rally around your fellows: Information and social trust in a real-world experiment during the corona crisis. *The Social Science Journal*: online first. [DOI: 10.1080/03623319.2021.1954463](https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2021.1954463)
- Filsinger M, Wamsler S, Erhardt J, Freitag M. (2021) National identity and populism: The relationship between conceptions of nationhood and populist attitudes. *Nations and Nationalism* 27(3): 656–672. [DOI: 10.1111/nana.12689](https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12689)
- Erhardt J, Freitag M, Filsinger M, Wamsler S. (2021) The Emotional Foundations of Political Support: How Fear and Anger Affect Trust in the Government in Times of the Covid-19 Pandemic. *Swiss Political Science Review* 27(2): 339–352. [DOI: 10.1111/spsr.12462](https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12462)
- Erhardt J, Wamsler S and Freitag M (2021) National identity between democracy and autocracy: a comparative analysis of 24 countries. *European Political Science Review* 13(1): 59–76. [DOI: 10.1017/S1755773920000351](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000351)

## 1. Introduction

National identity is “central to group attachment around the world” (Davidov, 2009: 64; see also Ariely, 2018; Citrin et al., 2001; Greenfeld and Eastwood, 2007; Hjerm, 2001; Lenard and Miller, 2018; Schatz et al., 1999). At the same time, there is a heated discussion about its role in modern societies. One strand of research points at the exclusionary character and heightened negativity towards non-nationals resulting from identifying with a particular nation (Kateb, 2006; Nussbaum, 2002; Pehrson et al., 2009). Others, however, look at its role for the in-group and stress that national identity constitutes the main force of legitimacy for states (Ariely, 2018; Marx, 2005; Mylonas and Tudor, 2021), facilitates societal cohesion through shared norms and values (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Lenard and Miller, 2018; Reeskens and Wright, 2013), or promotes political engagement (Miller, 2000; Rapp, 2020). Further, it brings together society and community (Anderson, 2006) and enables an effective protection of human rights within the borders of nation states (Arendt, 1951). In other words, national identity is seen as the “‘glue’ that holds modern, culturally diverse, societies together” (Miller and Ali, 2014: 238). While the negative views on national identity are only intensified in light of the horrors and atrocities committed in the name of the nation over the past two hundred years, nations also promise social mobility and a sense of solidarity among its members (Calhoun, 2007; Worchel and Coutant, 1997). As such, nations constitute the most crucial units of political action in the contemporary world order and appear unlikely to vanish any time soon (Mylonas and Tudor, 2021; Salzborn, 2019; Sumino, 2021; Vincent, 2013).

In light of this, the present thesis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of these divergent views on national identity and the nation. It puts emphasis on the postulate that national identity is by no means a unidimensional concept, whose causes and consequences are applicable in a uniform way. Instead, national identity is understood best in its various dimensions, which are decisive for shaping outcomes and reacting to influencing factors (cf. Ariely, 2020; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Miller and Ali, 2014; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). To understand this multidimensionality thoroughly, I propose to employ the concept of social integration as a lens for studying national identity. Social integration complements objective measures of social status with subjective perceptions about one’s place in society. In that sense, its main dimensions are belief in and adherence to a shared normative order, frequent interactions with other groups in society, and a feeling of mutual recognition and respect as its main dimensions (Gidron and Hall, 2020). This approach allows for understanding the relationship between national identity and its implications for society as dynamic,

since it may be both cause and consequence depending on the respective setting. It also enables making fine-grained distinctions regarding its different aspects, such as group-based relative deprivation or social trust. In doing so, this socio-integrative framework provides an encompassing account of the changing role of national identity in politics and society across the globe as a strategy to cope with challenges to social integration and a lack of a shared vision for society, which constitute major obstacles to societal and political projects (cf. Gidron and Hall, 2017; Joppke, 2021; Lubbers et al., 2000; Shayo, 2009).

Combining insights from three different journal articles written against this backdrop, this thesis presents three important empirical findings. First, pandemic threat stemming from the novel coronavirus challenges social integration and tends to foster more exclusionary, ethnic-based conceptions of nationhood (Wamsler et al., 2022). Second, group-based relative deprivation is associated with higher levels of nationalism, but not of constructive patriotism (Wamsler, 2022). Third, individuals with stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood are less likely to trust strangers, but more likely to put their trust in individuals sharing important identity traits (article 3). Integrating these articles into a coherent theoretical framework, my thesis provides five contributions to previous literature. First, introducing social integration as a complementary framework for the study of national identity provides ground for capturing the dimensionality of national identity more appropriately and studying the dynamic relationship with different manifestations of social integration both in detail and from a comprehensive point of view. Second, the three empirical articles outlined above present novel findings that expand decisively on extant studies. Third, I advance theoretical reasoning correspondingly and provide novel arguments for the relationship between national identity and pandemic threat, group-based relative deprivation as well as social trust respectively. Fourth, I introduce a fine-grained measurement for conceptions of nationhood that addresses well-known shortcomings in extant works. Finally, I provide an extensive conceptual and empirical overview on previous research to integrate it comprehensively.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I proceed as follows: section 1.1 gives a detailed account on nationalism as an ideology and the emergence of nations in the modern sense to provide the necessary underpinnings in the history of ideas for the subsequent studies. Section 1.2 elaborates on the concept of social identity as the psychological framework for understanding national identity. Section 1.3 discusses the abovementioned dimensions of national identity. Whereas 1.3.1 deals with conceptions of nationhood, 1.3.2 distinguishes between nationalism and (constructive)

patriotism. 1.3.3 summarizes the most important debates in scientific literature and 1.3.4 delineates national identity from other related concepts. Section 1.4 then introduces social integration as a conceptual lens by giving an overview on extant research and elaborating on their interlinkages (1.4.1), offering a fine-grained definition of social integration (1.4.2) and giving an overview on the three articles before providing a more detailed account of the thesis' overall contribution (1.4.3).

## 1.1 Nationalism and the nation

The following chapter gives an account on how the idea of the nation and of nationalism has developed in scholarly literature. Such an account is a crucial prerequisite for obtaining a full-scale understanding of national identity in its entirety. This account includes an elaboration on contemporary definitions, as scientific debates about the origin and nature of both nationalism and the nation remain unresolved until today (Vincent, 2013: 452). Given the vast amount of work and contributions by innumerable scholars from different disciplines like anthropology, history, philosophy, political science, or social psychology, any overview on their development can never be complete, which is why I focus on a selection of the most influential works below.<sup>3</sup>

The earliest scholarly accounts on the origins of the idea of the nation and its nature date back to well-known philosophers and scholars between the late 17<sup>th</sup> and late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Prominent among those are Johann Gottfried Herder, John Stuart Mill, Ernest Renan, or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but also Lord Acton, Giuseppe Mazzini, Jules Michelet, or Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès. While many of their thoughts and ideas have seeped into contemporary studies of the nation and form the basis for recent accounts, it is important to keep in mind that these authors referred to nationalism and the national idea against the backdrop of very specific political developments in their respective time and place (Smith, 1998). This requires particular caution when transferring their insights into a more recent reading in light of underlying political agendas. Later, these scholars were followed by detailed historical accounts of their time (Kedourie, 1966; Kohn, 1944; Meinecke, 1908), before the 1960s witnessed the emergence of comparative studies in light of large-scale

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<sup>3</sup> Importantly, this section uses the term “nationalism” different from the remainder of this thesis. Here, nationalism denotes the ideological framework that gives meaning to the idea of the nation and that constitutes a macropolitical force. Unless stated otherwise, “nationalism” outside of this chapter refers solely to a form of individual-level national identity (cf. Mylonas and Tudor, 2021).

decolonization processes accompanied by numerous nation-building efforts (Almond and Pye, 1965; Deutsch, 1966).

Most contemporary scholars on nationalism and the nation adhere to the so-called modernist paradigm (Mylonas and Tudor, 2021; Smith, 1998), which the present thesis follows. In short, this paradigm maintains that nationalism is a product of modernity as an identifiable period of time (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Ariely, 2012a; Brubaker, 1992, 2020; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Kaldor, 2004; Kohn, 1982 [1965]). One major definition understands the ideology of nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983: 1). Put differently, the nation “is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006: 6). Understanding a nation as limited requires it to have mutually accepted and clearly defined borders separating members from non-members and its sovereignty needs to materialize both in theory and in practice. Nationalism is thus an ideology championed by public elites as a force of profound societal, political, and economic transformation (Abercrombie et al., 1988; Anderson, 2006; Delanty, 1995; Smith, 1998). This means that nations as “territorial political communities” (Smith, 1998: 20) are neither timeless, nor given, but a deliberate outcome of the national idea. Nationalism as a “narrative about turning oppressed inhabitants into citizens” (Larsen, 2017: 971) of such a political community promised an inclusive, liberal, and equal society, where sovereign citizens could participate in the political sphere, often coupled with an appeal to democracy (Delanty, 1995; Fukuyama, 2018; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1998). It was only later in the 19<sup>th</sup> and particularly in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that nationalism became deeply entangled with reactionary, militaristic, or even fascist ideas, which shapes the image of nationalism held by many people today (Delanty, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1992; Vincent, 2013). Beyond this rather broad idea, however, scholars disagree as to the processes and origins leading to this idea. Main proponents in this regard are Gellner (1983), who focuses on the expansion of mass education and the homogenization of local languages and cultures, Anderson (2006), who highlights the spread of printing technology and capitalist order, and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), who emphasize the dissemination of the revolutionary idea in the wake of the American and French Revolutions.

Beyond the driving forces of nationalism, Smith (1998) also identifies four distinct intellectual foundations thereof: Marxism, Freudian crowd psychology, Weberianism, and Durkheimian soci-

ology. Scholars inspired by the materialist focus on class competition of Marxian lore view nationalism as the form that gives shape to the content of class conflict (Connor, 1984; Cummins, 1980). In that sense, there is a profound distinction between progressive nationalisms that weakened feudal or imperialist structures and those that were a mere diversion for the proletariat from advancing the revolution (Smith, 1998: 12). While the ideological underpinnings of nationalism were not of interest to this school of thought, it had a substantial impact on the writings of Anderson (2006) or Hobsbawm (1992) nonetheless. Crowd psychology, on the other hand, focuses on how the national idea made it possible to reconcile people with the “dislocating nature of modernity” (Smith, 1998: 13) caused by the major transformation of traditional communities into modern societies (see also Fromm, 2001; Gellner, 1983; Kashti, 1997; Rietbergen, 2006). Weberian thoughts put emphasis on nationalism as a function of the strive for statehood that dominated centuries of European politics (Smith, 1998). Durkheim, finally, stresses the importance of the nation as a moral community, whose symbols and rituals reaffirmed a collective consciousness taking the shape of a surrogate religion (Brubaker, 2012; Hayes, 1931; Smith, 1998).

Despite these different explanations and intellectual foundations, all these works share the underlying idea that nationalism was responsible for the dominance of nations as both political actors and focal points of individual loyalty. An opposing view to this is taken by the primordial paradigm. The main postulate of this view is that nations are perennial, ethno-cultural communities with certain stable characteristics (Smith, 1998: 22). In that sense, nationalism becomes one major manifestation of individuals’ general desire to belong to a group that is enshrined in human psychology (Ariely, 2018; Geertz, 1973; Huntington, 1996; Smith, 1986; van den Berghe, 1978). The intellectual roots of the primordial paradigm lie in the Romanticist movement that was most prevalent in the German struggle for turning a political entity into a nation state and in writings of Rousseau’s disciple Herder, but also of Fichte, Mazzini, or von Treitschke. These authors champion the idea of the *Volksgeist* as an organic being present in time immemorial as the expression of the nation and its symbiosis with tradition (Kohn, 1982 [1965]; Zimmer, 2003). While these scholars would not object to the idea that modernity had a transformative effect on the national idea, they maintain that “many features of modern nations were [...] well in play before the modern era” (Calhoun, 2007: 2). Given that the deliberate construction of nations as understood by the modernist paradigm has become an “omnipresent truism” (Zimmer, 2003: 173) in scholarly research and that the

main proponents of primordial accounts nowadays are political actors and movements (Smith, 1998: 45), the latter do not play any significant role in the present thesis.

## 1.2 The concept of social identity

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a gradual shift from the macro-level studies introduced above, which understood nationalism as an ideology to individual-level ones focusing on the role that national identity plays for individuals as well as for intergroup relations. As these works draw heavily on Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed a few years earlier (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), the following chapter gives a brief introduction to this major theoretical framework, but also to the idea of social identities more generally, before chapter 1.3 defines the concept of national identity as one particular kind of social identity.

Generally, social and political psychology distinguish between individual- and group-level identities. While the term identity “is a slippery concept” (Citrin et al., 2001: 73; see also Kreckel, 1999), one meaningful definition is that it “is bound up with one’s image of the world, one’s ethical outlook” (Greenfeld and Eastwood, 2007: 256). Consequently, one’s identity reflects the general human need for order and a certain degree of control in understanding the complex and ever-changing outside world (Al Ramiah et al., 2011; Bernhard, 2017; Billig, 1995; Geertz, 1977; Hogg et al., 2010; Sumino, 2021). A social identity then captures this strive for control by means of group membership and distinctions between who is viewed as similar (“us”) and different (“them”) from one’s own in-group (Citrin et al., 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Criteria for such distinctions between in-group and out-group(s) are myriad and happen rather easily beginning with any socialization process in early childhood (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Staub, 1997). These criteria are often referred to as stereotypes, which are based on previous experiences with, but also perceptions of, both in-group and out-group members (Kreckel, 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Importantly, such stereotypes are at first neutral associations between group membership and certain characteristics and not necessarily linked to negative connotations as suggested by the use of the term in everyday language. Finally, social identity always has multiple layers of different identities based on different criteria for group membership (Citrin et al., 2001; Curtis and Miller, 2021; Dittmann and Kopf-Beck, 2019; Greenfeld and Eastwood, 2007; Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Nandi and Platt, 2020). Most of the time, these sometimes conflicting identities are ranked in their importance



to any given individual (Ashmore et al., 2001), but this ranking may change depending on context and other situational factors (Oskooii, 2020).

As such, boundary-making is a universal feature of human society (Fouka and Tabellini, 2021) and the resulting social identities form the “cognitive map that concerns the configuration and structure of one’s self in relation to the social world” (Greenfeld and Eastwood, 2007: 256). Despite earlier works on the importance of group membership for the individual, Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed the first comprehensive account of how and why social identities form. Their main tenet is that each individual strives for a positive image of the self and that this self-image can also be derived from membership in a social group associated with positive esteem (see also Hamidou-Schmidt and Mayer, 2021; Reykowski, 1997). A positive image of the in-group is usually based on a comparison along certain characteristics with other groups (Mummendey et al., 1999). Such comparisons then result in each group’s relative social status (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In a context where status is uncertain, downward comparisons and increased stigmatization of out-group(s) facilitate achieving a positive outcome of status comparison (Al Ramiah et al., 2011; Festinger, 1954; Guimond and Dambrun, 2002). If individuals, however, view their in-group’s status as positive, out-group derogation or hostility are not necessary outcomes of group-based comparison (Al Ramiah et al., 2011; Brewer, 1999). Instead, out-group hostility can be regarded as a result of threat perceptions (Gidron and Hall, 2017). Both actual and perceived threats (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2020) are then drivers of more extreme views on the in-group and out-group(s) with the former likely to be favored even more (Hogg et al., 2010; Scheepers et al., 2006).

On this basis, group-based threat theory became prominent (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Cebanu and Escandell, 2010; Quillian, 1995; Wright, 2011). It maintains that increased competition between groups as a result of closer contact between them and/or competition over some kind of limited resource or status invokes out-group hostility as a defensive, affective reaction to threat (cf. Gidron and Hall, 2020; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2020). An opposing view to out-group hostility stemming from increased contact between groups is taken by intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Green et al., 2020; Pettigrew, 1998). Here, increased contact facilitates exchange between individual members of groups, which then helps reducing negative stereotypes and stigmatization. However, it is also important that this contact occurs sufficiently frequent and is of an overall positive quality (cf. Freitag and Rapp, 2013). Important in this regard is the underlying

assumption that views on in-group and out-group(s) are never fully stable, which allows for a certain degree of malleability of social identity. Social identity thus reflects a social construct that may adapt due to external factors including political events, societal shifts, or socioeconomic conditions (cf. Egan, 2020).

### 1.3 Defining national identity

National identity constitutes one particular manifestation of social identity that is often viewed as superordinate to other social identities (Klandermans et al., 2008). The following chapter sets out to provide a detailed conceptualization of this term going beyond those given in chapters 2-4, which are tailored to the respective cases of the three articles.

Extant literature yields a vast amount of different definitions of national identity that usually focus on different aspects thereof. A prominent approach is to define national identity as the “intensity of feelings and closeness towards one’s own nation” (Davidov, 2009: 65; but also Rapp, 2020; Schatz et al., 1999). This definition emphasizes the affective component of any kind of social identity, thus suggesting that national identity is by no means a purely rational, cognitively structured concept, but manifests on a subconscious level as well (cf. Bergbauer, 2018; Bonikowski, 2016; Helbling et al., 2016). Viewing national identity as distinct from many other kinds of social identity due to its emphasis on territory, it may also be defined as “a sense of belonging to and being a member of a geopolitical entity” (Verdugo and Milne, 2016: 3; but also Lenard and Miller, 2018; Salzborn, 2019; Vincent, 2013). In that sense, national identity represents “the national community’s self-image” (Simonsen, 2016: 1154) as a constructed idea (Anderson, 2006; Kelman, 1997). A more functionalist approach, finally, understands national identity as “a shared belief in the legitimacy of the country’s political system” (Fukuyama, 2018: 8; but also Gellner, 1983; Golder, 2016). This selection of definitions for national identity shows that there is a wide array of possible angles for its analysis. Different scholars frequently use different terminology to capture the same underlying concept (Blank, 2003; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Brubaker, 2004; Davidov, 2009; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Greenfeld, 1999; Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Wimmer, 2017; Zimmer, 2003). This disarray has even led to rather defeatist remarks that the research field is a “conceptual and definitional tangle” (Huddy et al., 2021: 996) and “[a]ny attempt to provide the concept of national identity with a clear and distinct [...] meaning might seem futile” (Kreckel, 1999: 88). Additionally, the general meaning of national identity is constantly in flux (Eugster and Strijbis,

2011; Muldoon et al., 2020), varies between nations (Ariely, 2018; Kunovich, 2009; Pehrson et al., 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010) as well as within nations (Aichholzer et al., 2021; Bonikowski, 2016; Huddy, 2016; Reykowski, 1997).

Against this backdrop, research mostly agrees that each work on national identity should provide a precise definition of its concepts (Lubbers, 2019) and that national identity is best studied in its various dimensions (Ariely, 2018; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Brubaker, 2012; Coenders et al., 2004; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Helbling et al., 2016; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Raijman et al., 2008; Reeskens and Wright, 2013; Staub, 1997). Yet, more recent research has also found that this multidimensionality was not always addressed with sufficient attention (Ariely, 2020; Schmidt and Quandt, 2018). The exact nature of this dimensionality, however, is again subject to unresolved debate. A major strand of research proposes strength and content as the two major dimensions of national identity (Citrin et al., 2001; Eugster and Strijbis, 2011; Helbling et al., 2016; Lenard and Miller, 2018).

The strength dimension, often labeled as national attachment, constitutes the “subjective psychological weight one attaches to an identity” (Curtis and Miller, 2021: 202). In other words, it refers to the importance ascribed to being a member of a given nation by an individual. National pride, in turn, denotes “a specifically positive form of identification with the nation” (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020: 450). Recent research, however, questions the use of this strength dimension in quantitative research, as it is very fluid and difficult to compare (Bellucci et al., 2012; Meitinger, 2018). It is also very challenging to distinguish between the strength of national identity in general and pride in very specific achievements of the nation (Miller and Ali, 2014). Further, the substantive interpretation of strength is contingent on the nature of other dimensions (Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck, 2019), which renders this dimension analytically elusive.

The content dimension signifies the criteria set for being a member of a given social group. In the context of national identity, this then specifies how belonging to a particular nation is conceived (Helbling et al., 2016; Lenard and Miller, 2018; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). As definitions of group membership are at the heart of every kind of intergroup behavior and meaningful study of national identity, I elaborate on this dimension in more detail in section 1.3.1.

In addition to strength and content, extant research also suggests the distinction between nationalism and patriotism as a crucial dimension of national identity (Blank and Schmidt, 2003;

Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Raijman et al., 2008). This dimension denotes how relations between the in-group and relevant out-group(s) are structured. Whereas nationalists tend to hold negative views on out-groups and to regard their own nation as superior to others, patriots do not share this competitive view on group relations with differing views on national out-groups (Davidov, 2009; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Green et al., 2011). Section 1.3.2 provides a more detailed account of this dimension. Employing nationalism-patriotism as a third dimension alongside strength and content has become increasingly established in recent national identity research (Aichholzer et al., 2021; Ariely, 2020, 2021). Extant research also emphasizes that despite clear conceptual distinctions between these dimensions, there may still be an empirical overlap, which nevertheless does not challenge the overall structure of this dimensionality (Davidov, 2009; Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Miller and Ali, 2014).

### 1.3.1 Conceptions of nationhood

The following section gives a detailed account of the dimension of national identity capturing the boundary-making mechanisms that define national belonging. Grounded in the history of ideas dating back to the times of the French Revolution (e.g., Rousseau) and German Romanticism (e.g., Herder), historians have developed the idea that each nation has a distinct conception of national membership (see chapter 1.1). Meinecke (1908) prominently advanced the terms *Staatsnation* (nation of the state) and *Kulturnation* (nation of culture). Whereas a nation conceiving national membership in terms of the former puts adherence to the rules of the national political system and loyalty to the state's institutions into center, the latter draws heavily on the idea of an organic, national culture including language, norms, values, and religion.<sup>4</sup> Expanding on this notion, Kohn (1939, 1944) wrote his seminal works distinguishing between civic and ethnic nations. In his argument, nations with a historically strong bourgeoisie developed a civic understanding revolving around participation in the national political system, whereas those with weaker institutions for political participation rely on an ethnic-based understanding that focuses on having national ancestry and adhering to a wide set of cultural norms and values. As Kohn used the Rhine as the main border to distinguish between these two types of nations, they are also referred to as Eastern and

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<sup>4</sup> Although distinct from national identity, such underlying ideas may also be found in national citizenship regimes, where the *ius soli* (law of the soil) principle grants citizenship to individuals based on attainable criteria, whereas the *ius sanguinis* (law of blood) principle considers national citizenship as an exclusive right for those with national ancestry (Brubaker, 1992; Luong, 2016).

Western identities, which later drew heavy criticism for being overly simplistic and loaded with normative connotations (Brubaker, 1999). Nevertheless, this civic-ethnic framework became dominant for macro-level studies of entire nations for many decades (Brubaker, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1991).

Only more recently did scholars begin to apply this idea to the study of individual-level identity as the more dynamic nature of these conceptions and pronounced differences even within nations became more obvious (Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016). Similarly to previous macro-level studies, ethnic conceptions of nationhood understand national membership as largely given with belonging being set at birth since only those who were born in a particular nation and have national ancestry may be true members of a given nation (Helbling et al., 2016; Ignatieff, 1993; Lenard and Miller, 2018). This conception of national membership as a result of inheritable attributes also means that migrants cannot become full members of another nation (Hochman et al., 2016; Mylonas and Tudor, 2021). Civic conceptions, on the other hand, understand national belonging as (theoretically) achievable by anyone aspiring to become a member of a given nation (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Reeskens and Wright, 2013; Sarrasin et al., 2020). National borders are generally permeable and not set in stone if national membership is defined by engaging in a national *political* culture, respecting its institutions and laws, and by being able to speak the national language(s) as a means of political exchange without connotations of a wider culture (Hadler and Flesken, 2018; Wimmer, 2008). Importantly, civic conceptions do not lead to abolishing borders between nations. Yet, they are decisively less stringent as contrasted to ethnic conceptions with assimilation being always possible (Eugster and Strijbis, 2011; Helbling et al., 2016; Sarrasin et al., 2020), which results in lower prejudice towards outsiders (Pehrson et al., 2009).

This dichotomy of civic and ethnic conceptions, however, is not without its problems. While slightly changing over time, these problems may still be subsumed as done by Brubaker (1999) more than twenty years ago: the normative connotations already touched upon above and a certain degree of analytical ambiguity stemming from using a binary distinction. Discussions about conceptions of nationhood often tend to be normatively loaded with civic conceptions being viewed as societally preferable to ethnic ones due to their general openness to outsiders and a detachment from past atrocities associated with ethnic conceptions particularly in connection with ethnic nationalism (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Markell, 2000; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). In that sense, it is crucial for meaningful research to avoid any suggestions about one kind of identity being

desirable over another. More important for everyday research, however, is the observation that civic and ethnic identities are next to impossible to be put into a sound binary structure. Instead, both resemble ideal types with most individuals as well as entire nations being located spatially somewhere in between (Brubaker, 2004; Eugster and Strijbis, 2011; Kuzio, 2002; Larsen, 2017; Miller and Ali, 2014; Parekh, 1999; Simonsen, 2016; Smith, 1991). Thus, civic and ethnic identities are not mutually exclusive (Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Sarasin et al., 2020). Especially individuals holding ethnic conceptions of nationhood are likely to subscribe to the criteria set out for civic ones (Helbling et al., 2016: 747). To tackle this issue, previous research has come up with several possible pathways. As a direct response to the above, a definition of civic conceptions by the absence of agreement with ethnic criteria seems feasible. The use of rank-ordered items instead of attributing importance to individual items independently is another appealing possibility (Wright, 2011; Wright et al., 2012). A third proposition is to employ a “level of mobilization” as an additional sub-dimension to the civic-ethnic framework (Larsen, 2017). The most promising approach, however, lies in employing a continuous measure ranging from purely civic to purely ethnic (Wamsler et al., 2022). This approach combines a simplicity of interpretation that comes from using a continuum with a decisively greater attention to what lies in between the civic and ethnic ideal points. While it is premature to say which approach might prevail, the binary distinction between civic and ethnic is still in wide use, but equally criticized (Erhardt et al., 2021b; Mylonas and Tudor, 2021; Simonsen and Bonikowski, 2020).

### 1.3.2 Nationalism and patriotism

The second important dimension of national identity refers to the relationship between the national in-group and relevant out-group(s). Here, the most common framework distinguishes between nationalism and patriotism (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Coenders et al., 2004; Davidov, 2009; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Green et al., 2011; Kashti, 1997; Raijman et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2012). Although both concepts are positively related, they each result from different causal (psychological) mechanisms (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Thus, neglecting this distinction would mask crucial differences in terms of both causes and consequences (Ariely, 2020; Huddy et al., 2021; Worchel and Coutant, 1997). Yet, nationalism and patriotism are also somewhat fuzzy concepts due to an often interchangeable use in everyday language, which leads to ongoing scholarly debates and requires a precise definition (cf. Citrin et al., 2001).

“Nationalism is an attachment to a nation characterized by a desire to enhance the nation’s superiority of power *vis à vis* other nations” (Worchel and Coutant, 1997: 191f). In that sense, nationalism reflects an expression of national identity, where the own nation is seen as superior over other nations (Citrin et al., 2001; Ha and Jang, 2015; Huddy, 2016; Huddy et al., 2021; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Verdugo and Milne, 2016). From that sense of superiority (also called chauvinism) follows a competitive worldview with intergroup relations understood as a zero-sum game (Mußotter, 2021). Thus, for the in-group’s status to increase, the derogation of out-groups is a necessary consequence (Schatz et al., 1999). Further features constituting a nationalist identity are the uncritical idealization of one’s own nation and suppression of negative in-group-related feelings (Adorno et al., 1950; Blank and Schmidt, 2003). This results in a high susceptibility to threat perceptions, for example by immigration (Cottam et al., 2010; Green et al., 2011; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). Nationalism also fosters a rather collectivist mindset putting the well-being of the nation over the interests of its individual members (Cottam et al., 2010). Among these different components, perceptions of national superiority and the accompanying derogation of out-groups are the most central parts of nationalism (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Huddy et al., 2021).

As a nationalist identity requires rather strong national boundaries to meet its competitive worldview, it is often linked to objectivist (i.e., mostly ethnic) conceptions of nationhood (Aichholzer et al., 2021; Blank and Schmidt, 2003). However, this combination of the dimensions of national identity is not necessary. Especially in Western Europe, civic nationalism is built on linking a nationalist mindset to more culture-oriented definitions of national belonging (Simonsen and Bonikowski, 2020). Similar to its conceptual progenitor pseudopatriotism (Adorno et al., 1950), nationalism is also closely linked to militarism, ethnocentrism and social-dominance orientation (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Huddy, 2016; Osborne et al., 2017).

As opposed to nationalism, patriotism does not support a competitive worldview recognizing only relative gains of status. Instead, patriotism as such reflects a general love for one’s nation (Huddy, 2016; Johnson, 1997; Kashti, 1997; Schatz and Staub, 1997; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016; Verdugo and Milne, 2016). As a result, there is no clear linkage to chauvinism or out-group derogation (Ariely, 2020; Reykowski, 1997; Sapountzis, 2008) and a balancing of in-group and out-group interests takes place (Raijman et al., 2008). While nationalism represents a rather unidimensional concept (Grigoryan and Ponizovskiy, 2018), patriotism summarizes a rather diverse set of

different components beyond its very general notion. Thus, general patriotism is rather unfit for scholarly study as it lacks the necessary conceptual clarity (Johnson, 1997).

Blind patriotism is characterized by an unquestioning allegiance to the nation (Schatz et al., 1999; Staub, 1997; Sumino, 2021). Thus, it has a substantive overlap with nationalism regarding the uncritical idealization of the own nation and underlying authoritarian traits (Coenders and Scheepers, 2004; Huddy, 2016). Yet, perceptions of national superiority and out-group derogation are not necessary for blind patriots, but may occur nonetheless (Johnson, 1997; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016). Due to its emphasis on national symbols for fostering positive attachment to the nation, it is also dubbed symbolic patriotism (Huddy, 2016; Schatz and Staub, 1997).

Another variant of patriotism was developed in the decades after World War II to reconcile national identity with the atrocities committed in the name of nationalist ideology. Constitutional patriotism describes a decoupling of politics and any reference to cultural homogeneity and ethnicity-based ancestry (Habermas, 1991; Luong, 2016). National pride is constructed through humanist and democratic achievements of the national political system, which ensures the procedural legitimacy deemed necessary for governance in a democratic nation state (cf. Eugster and Strijbis, 2011; Miller, 1995). Yet, scholars have also noted that constitutional patriotism has an inherent tendency to accept the national political system as given and to elevate the own political culture over that of other nation states (Markell, 2000; Müller, 2010).

To avoid this fallacy of national idealization, constructive patriotism (CP) takes constitutional patriotism one step further and puts a critical-constructive engagement with the own nation into the center of this form of national identity. Combining “affective attachment with the capacity and willingness to question, criticize, and work for change” (Schatz and Staub, 1997: 229), CP derives national pride from the nation’s democratic institutions and commitment to humanist values (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Schatz et al., 1999), but maintains a constant desire for positive change and improvement of the nation (Roccas et al., 2008; Staub, 1997; Sumino, 2021). This central tenet of CP has important implications for national identity: ranked comparisons with other nations are rejected (Mummendey et al., 2001), which constitutes a fundamental difference to nationalism. Equally, individuals holding a CP-oriented national identity accept negative emotions towards the own nation (Adorno et al., 1950) and may even withdraw support temporarily if they deem actions in the name of the nation as incompatible with their democratic and humanist ideals (Schatz et al.,



1999; Schatz and Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997). This non-competitive worldview leads to perceptions of threat towards the nation as posed by immigration or from diverse and multicultural societies (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Green et al., 2011; Spry and Hornsey, 2007; Wagner et al., 2012; Willis-Esqueda et al., 2017). The non-submission under national authorities and focus on individual-level evaluations of the nation further detaches CP from the authoritarian roots of nationalism or blind patriotism, as potentially destructive actions in the name of the nation are rejected and allegiance is always conditional (Adorno et al., 1950; Staub, 1997; Sumino, 2021). Taken together, CP provides a form of national identity that is fundamentally distinct from nationalism and provides substantial conceptual and analytical clarity to delineate one from the other.

A recent contribution by Erez and Laborde (2020) expands on the notion of CP and introduces the concept of cosmopolitan patriotism. The authors argue that a patriot with a humanist value orientation like the principles of non-discrimination and non-domination should eventually be concerned with achieving global justice as well (Erez and Laborde, 2020: 192). Combined with the willingness and desire to improve the own nation, this form of national identity should reinforce a cosmopolitan worldview concerned with the welfare of all humans and vice versa. This concept, however, has found little resonance in scholarly research so far, which is why the focus of this dissertation is on CP for reasons outlined in the previous paragraph.

### 1.3.3 Conceptual debates and contributions

The following chapter gives a brief summary on the conceptual debates about national identity and its dimensions in previous research. Simultaneously, it locates the present thesis therein and states to what extent it contributes to the respective case. As outlined in more detail at the beginning of chapter 1.3, there is major disagreement throughout the literature on providing a clear definition for national identity. For this reason, a large part of the introduction to this thesis elaborates on its understanding of national identity. In light of the “conceptual and definitional tangle” (Huddy et al., 2021: 996) any single attempt to come up with one “proper” definition of national identity is doomed to fail. I do not seek to solve this debate within the scope of the present thesis, as this seems more promising in the long run with the further evolution of the research field as such. It should, however, be noted at this point that this debate is likely a main source of mixed or even conflicting results in the field (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Wimmer, 2017), which call for a

constant and careful re-evaluation of existing findings. Yet, the proposed conceptual framework yields one of the most encompassing accounts of a coherent conceptualization of national identity in recent years.

Another debate that this thesis does seek to advance is that on the dimensionality of national identity. As discussed earlier in chapter 1.3, three major dimensions of national identity can be identified in previous research: strength, content, and intergroup relations. In this thesis, I argue that the strength dimension is always contingent on the manifestations of the other two and has been shown to have decisive problems in cross-national research (cf. Bellucci et al., 2012; Dittmann and Kopf-Beck, 2019; Meitinger, 2018; Miller and Ali, 2014). Therefore, I propose to focus on the content dimension that defines criteria for national membership and the dimension distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism. Due to the difficulties with providing a clear-cut definition of general patriotism discussed in section 1.3.2, an explicit focus on constructive patriotism for the sake of conceptual and analytical clarity is most appropriate.

The rigorous distinction between nationalism and CP should also provide a compelling answer to the debate about whether in-group favoritism automatically breeds out-group hostility (cf. Adorno et al., 1950; Ariely, 2012b; Bauer and Hannover, 2020; Brewer, 1999; Green et al., 2011; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Outten et al., 2012). Negative views on national out-groups are inherent in nationalism. For patriotism, however, out-group derogation is possible with regards to blind patriotism, whereas the mindset underlying CP all but rules out a direct causal link between in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. While all kinds of social and thus national identity share a certain amount of in-group favoritism, it is the precise manifestation of the respective identity that gives the context, in which out-group hostility may or may not occur (cf. Kende et al., 2019; Mummendey et al., 2001).

Another longstanding discussion revolves around the malleability of national identity within individuals. Whereas somewhat older research predominantly views identity as an unmoved mover and a stable predisposition (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2004), more recent research points out that changes over time occur and that external factors are indeed causal in bringing them about (Egan, 2020; Fouka and Tabellini, 2021; Mader et al., 2021). While the studies in this thesis cannot make full causal claims due to the structure of the respective data, they provide sound theoretical argu-

ment for how factors like pandemic threat (Wamsler et al., 2022) or group-based relative deprivation (Wamsler, 2022) may shape the different dimensions of national identity or enter in a dynamic relationship with it.

#### 1.3.4 National identity and related concepts

The final part of this conceptual overview sheds light on several mindsets or attitudes that are frequently studied in the context of national identity: authoritarianism, populism, globalization, and European identity or Euroscepticism. Beyond providing a brief conceptual definition of each, I give an account of their main relationship with national identity and its dimensions and delineate them from national identity as understood in the present thesis. While they are without doubt crucial for national identity research as such, this account also explains why these concepts do not play a significant role within the scope of this thesis.

The study of individual-level authoritarianism has a long history in the social sciences (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Pettigrew, 2016). Generally, authoritarianism seeks to obtain collective security at the expense of individual-level autonomy and liberties (Duckitt and Bizumic, 2013). Authoritarianism in turn consists of three distinct sub-dimensions: authoritarian submission under relevant authorities, authoritarian aggression in support of coercive social measures to maintain law and order, and conventionalism as a conformity to established norms and rules (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt and Bizumic, 2013). Research on national identity has long established a link with authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950). Particularly the collectivist and more aggressive worldview of nationalism is appealing to authoritarians (Cottam et al., 2010; Helbling et al., 2016). In that sense, authoritarianism is often understood as causally prior to nationalism (Blank, 2003; Osborne et al., 2017), whereas the reverse is the case for CP (Davidov, 2009). Yet, as authoritarianism is not a primary part of the social integration framework as introduced in section 1.4.2, advancing the relationship between national identity and authoritarianism is not within the scope of the present thesis.

Populism is one of the most prominent concepts in the social sciences in recent years (Akkerman et al., 2016; Berman, 2021; Gidron and Hall, 2020; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Populist attitudes are understood best as a combination of three different components: a Manichean outlook on society that understands society as a moral struggle between good and bad, a

pronounced anti-elitism that pits the common people against vilified elites seeking to exploit the people, and people-centrism, which demands unrestricted popular sovereignty with the inherent assumption of an identifiable, homogenous will of the people (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Mudde, 2007). Recent studies emphasize that all three of these components need to be visible for populist attitudes to be present (Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Wuttke et al., 2020). With regards to national identity, a vast amount of scholarly studies has uncovered close-knit linkages (Custodi, 2020; Filsinger et al., 2021b; Rooduijn et al., 2017; Silva et al., 2022). Again, it is mostly nationalism that is the main subject of study in this regard since its competitive worldview resonates so well with a Manichean outlook on society and anti-elitism, while the assumption of in-group homogeneity is inherent in both as well (Rooduijn, 2014). Yet, populist attitudes are also more prevalent among individuals holding ethnic conceptions of nationhood due to stronger in-group-out-group distinctions, whereas the reverse is the case for definitions of group membership that put stronger emphasis on civic criteria (Filsinger et al., 2021b).

The interlinkage between nationalism and populism is so encompassing as to spark a heated debate among scholars. One group argues for combining nationalism and populism into one coherent framework of national populism (or right-wing populism) (Bonikowski, 2017; Brubaker, 2017, 2020). Others, however, argue that both should be clearly separated conceptually as to not miss out on important differences between the two (Bonikowski et al., 2019; de Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2020). Another group adds authoritarianism to the discussion and argues for using the term authoritarian populism, which includes a nationalist component (Inglehart and Norris, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). In this thesis, I agree with the second perspective and argue that populism and national identity are captured best by treating the two as distinct concepts without questioning their close relationship. Many studies on populism treat nativism (a preference for all things native and a rejection of anything foreign (Betz, 2017)) or hostility towards immigration as equivalent with nationalism (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2016; Mudde, 2007), whereas national identity as such is often neglected (Lubbers, 2019). In a recent contribution, de Cleen and Stavrakakis (2020) make the convincing argument that populism is about vertical boundary-making between the people and elites, whereas national identity draws a horizontal line between different nations. In that sense, I follow the strand of research stating that national populism represents a combination of the two, but not a new concept. Conceptually speaking, national populism merely reflects the sum of its constituent parts, but does not provide additional value (cf. Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006; Sartori,

1970; Wuttke et al., 2020). Thus, populism does not fall within the scope of the present thesis, although it may well be integrated into the theoretical and empirical framework in the future.

The process of globalization as “increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture” (Held et al., 1999: 19) is another concept often connected to national identity. Various scholars maintain that the process of globalization blurs national borders and thus distinctive features of nations (Ariely, 2012a, 2012b, 2021; Smith, 1995). Thus, globalization is seen as one major force the rise of nationalism in many countries as an opposition to the former (Goodhart, 2017; Kaldor, 2004). This backlash against globalization plays a major role in the rise of nationalist and exclusionary identities and contribute to societal cleavages along this line (Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2012). Yet, the scope of the present thesis is set on within-society aspects of social integration. Thus, globalization is not part of its theoretical framework although it may well have an impact on social integration as well (cf. Filsinger, 2022; Gidron and Hall, 2020).

The final concept that is discussed here refers to supranational identities and support for (or resistance to) supranational integration. As such research is mostly (although not exclusively) conducted in the context of the European integration project as the most encompassing example of supranational governance in the world, the labels “European identity” and “Euroscepticism” are prominent in denoting this concept. A substantive strand of research shows that national identity is one of the major predictors of opposition to integration (Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2002). More recent studies, however, challenge the notion that national identity as such was stoking Euroscepticism and emphasize the necessity to distinguish between the distinct dimensions of national identity (Aichholzer et al., 2021; Ariely, 2012a). Whereas nationalism provides a marked obstacle to integration, patriotism or civic conceptions of nationhood are compatible with advancing the European project or even the development of a European identity (Aichholzer et al., 2021: 309). As the scope of this thesis does, similar to globalization, not extend to the question of supranational integration, I do not elaborate on this issue further at this point.

Having established an encompassing conceptualization of national identity and its major dimensions, having discussed ongoing debates in the relevant literature, and delineated national identity from related concepts that do not lie within the scope and theoretical framework of this thesis, I now turn towards introducing social integration as the overarching framework that links the three articles that constitute the present dissertation project.

## 1.4 The conceptual framework of social integration

What are implications of holding one form of national identity for both individuals and respective societies? What factors may explain differences in national identity across individuals and nations? What accounts for potential changes in national identity within individuals? Such questions are at the heart of any empirical research on national identity. While extant research has done a great deal to address many facets thereof, it has done so mostly without an encompassing underlying framework. In the following, I demonstrate how the concept of social integration can provide such a conceptual framework that allows for capturing the societal implications of national identity comprehensively, but simultaneously enables the study of external factors shaping individual-level identity in a dynamic relationship. In a first step, I illustrate the state of the art in several subfields of this research area. Second, I introduce the conceptual framework of social integration to connect these hitherto only loosely intertwined subfields into one coherent approach. I conclude this chapter by taking a closer look at the three articles that constitute this thesis through the lens of social integration and highlight their joint contributions to national identity research.

### 1.4.1 Extant research on the role of national identity for societies

Over the past years, most research dealing with the consequences of national identity for individual-level attitudes and societal outcomes has looked at attitudes towards immigration. As already touched upon in section 1.3.2, nationalism is a major predictor of opposition to immigration due to heightened susceptibility to threat perceptions and the underlying competitive worldview (Green et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2012). For CP, however, the picture is entirely different. Immigration does not evince the same kind of threat perceptions as it does for nationalists, which leads to neutral or even positive immigration attitudes if immigration is understood as a sign for the own nation's attractiveness for outsiders (Finell and Zogmaister, 2015; Spry and Hornsey, 2007; Willis-Esqueda et al., 2017). While a longitudinal study by Wagner et al. (2012) finds no evidence for reverse causality in this relationship, other scholars contend that immigration poses a major driver to the cultural backlash generally associated with the growing visibility of nationalist identities or voting across different countries (Arzheimer, 2009; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008). Further, immigration is often framed as a major threat to national identity in the political discourse (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017; Fukuyama, 2018). Thus, it seems plausible to assume a more complex relationship of mutual affectedness

between national identity and immigration attitudes, with the former shaping the latter, but the latter also activating the former's nationalist dimension.

Another field that has attracted considerable attention by national identity scholars is its relationship with individual-level attitudes towards societal diversity. Previous research has brought forward two distinct theoretical arguments in this regard. Miller (1995, 2000) argues that for a democratic state to function and to be viewed as legitimate, a national identity defined by civic criteria for national membership is key to ensure a sufficient degree of societal cohesion. Putnam (2007) posits that civic-based societies have greater capacity to cope with diversity and to create an integrative vision of society as they are less prone to threat perceptions and put less emphasis on cultural and linguistic homogeneity than ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Taking these two arguments to the empirical test, Reeskens and Wright (2013) find that individuals with ethnic conceptions of nationhood are likely to have lower social capital in the form of generalized trust and associational membership than those holding civic ones. In another study of the Miller thesis, Rapp (2020) shows that naturalized citizens with a strong national identity are more likely to participate in the political system and to trust in the government in Switzerland. Other contributions find more mixed support for this thesis, as the relationship with social trust (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Lenard and Miller, 2018) and solidarity (Rapp, 2022) is highly dependent on the dimension of national identity that is studied and the respective context. These studies on trust, however, understand social trust as a rather unidimensional concept referring solely to generalized trust in unknown strangers and fall short of studying other dimensions of social trust that are equally key to societal cohesion (cf. Bauer and Freitag, 2018; Freitag and Bauer, 2013). Looking at trust in the political system, Berg and Hjerm (2010) find that ethnic conceptions of nationhood are associated with lower levels of political trust, whereas the reverse holds for civic conceptions.

A third research area looks at the relationship between (perceptions of) societal equality and national identity. Individuals feeling relatively deprived against other groups in society are more prone to portray nationalist identities and to support political movements with a strong nationalist appeal (Abrams et al., 2020; Abrams and Grant, 2012; Eller et al., 2020; Grant et al., 2017). Whereas nationalism provides a likely coping strategy for combatting status inferiority from the perspective of social identity theory, CP offers different strategies that do not resonate well with group-based relative deprivation (Wamsler, 2022).

#### 1.4.2 Social integration as a conceptual framework

Each of the research fields outlined in the previous section, provides substantive contributions to our understanding of the role of national identity for societies and for individuals' respective place therein. Yet, I explicitly argue that these contributions would benefit from a joint underlying framework for capturing the relationship between national identity and societal issues. In the following, I elaborate on the added value of taking a more encompassing view that integrates each of these strands in national identity literature into one coherent framework.

The concept of social integration goes back to the main works of Émile Durkheim ([1893] 1964) and denotes to what extent individuals or social groups feel obliged to follow norms, values, and patterns of behavior prevalent in a given social context, but also feel safely embedded in them (Kreckel, 1999; Perrig-Chiello, 2004). While such a shared normative order is always socially constructed (Salzborn, 2019), it provides a relatively stable social order to cope with situations of external threat or internal crisis (Kreckel, 1999). Recently, social integration has also become a major framework combining different approaches for the study of concepts like populism (Gidron and Hall, 2017, 2020; Filsinger, 2022). In this context, the authors go beyond the notion of a shared normative order for defining social integration and add a sufficient quality and quantity of social interactions as well as a feeling of being recognized by society as two further dimensions (Gidron and Hall, 2020: 1031; see also Merton, 1994). Yet, despite this early emphasis on the importance of subjective perceptions, a substantial part of research has focused solely on objective measures like education, occupation, or social networks to describe social integration. Such objective factors, however, do not necessarily coincide or correlate at all with social integration as an outcome of subjective ones (cf. Perrig-Chiello, 2004). Thus, stressing subjective perceptions for understanding social integration offers an answer to the recurrent puzzle why individuals or groups with a relatively low social status are socially integrated, whereas others that should feel well-integrated by objective standards show substantive signs of social disintegration (cf. Pettigrew, 2015). In consequence, I apply the framework of social integration to the study of national identity to offer a fine-grained account of its different aspects' relationship with the distinct dimensions of national identity instead of viewing each of the underlying variables as separate from one another.<sup>5</sup> This, in turn,

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<sup>5</sup> In developing this framework, I am deeply grateful to my esteemed colleague Maximilian Filsinger (Filsinger, 2022). Both of us spent many hours on this idea and its applicability to our respective projects. These thoughts, to which we claim shared credit, provided the foundation for social integration as presented in this thesis.



clears the ground for a deeper understanding of the role that national identity plays for modern societies. Further, social (dis)integration provides the kind of social sorting mechanism that is a major cause for social identities to change as a result of societal shifts or political developments (cf. Egan, 2020).

Obviously, this broad framework of social integration is difficult to study in its entirety. Instead, the study of individual-level or group-based social integration needs to draw on different manifestations of (dis)integration. Beyond abovementioned aspects like openness to outsiders (immigration attitudes) or beliefs in the integrative capacity of society (attitudes towards diversity), research offers several distinct facets of social integration: subjective social status as individual-level “beliefs about where they stand relative to others in society” (Gidron and Hall, 2020: 1031), social isolation as capturing the absence of substantive interactions with other members of society (Gade, 2020; Zavaleta et al., 2017), self-efficacy denoting whether individuals feel that they may have an impact on society and that a certain set of norms is shared among their group (Abrams et al., 2020; Rico et al., 2020) or beliefs in the norm of reciprocity (Berg et al., 1995). Importantly, each of these aspects is linked to each of the three dimensions of social integration to a different degree with some being closer to one particular dimension than to others.

Within the scope of this thesis, however, I focus on two particularly important aspects of social integration, which cover all three dimensions of social integration: perceptions of group-based relative deprivation and social trust. Group-based relative deprivation is defined as a perception that one’s in-group is unfairly disadvantaged against other groups in society, which leads to emotions of anger and resentment (Smith et al., 2012). This concept is thus central to whether individuals believe in a fair and equal society, which is a crucial cornerstone for successful social integration. As such, it captures notions of a shared normative order and perceptions of mutual recognition and respect as proposed by Gidron and Hall (2020). Further, perceptions of relative deprivation are detrimental to fruitful interactions with other groups as feelings of resentment against others foster stronger in-group-out-group demarcations even within societies (Filsinger, 2022; Zubielevitch et al., 2020).

Social trust is the expectation that trustees will refrain from harmful actions against the trustor and act within the limits of a shared interest (Bauer and Freitag, 2018; Gambetta, 1988; Navarro-Carrillo et al., 2018). As a central concept in the social sciences (Delhey et al., 2011; Newton, 2007;

Uslaner, 2002), social trust is key to successful social integration as trust presupposes a shared normative order (Fukuyama, 1995; Warren, 2018), facilitates interactions greatly (Filsinger et al., 2021a; Paxton and Ressler, 2018), and is regarded as a crucial expression of mutual recognition and respect (Jung and Kwon, 2011; Sztompka, 1998).

Beyond these two central aspects of social integration itself, the present thesis also refers to pandemic threat in the context of a successfully integrated society. The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has widespread societal consequences and a decisive impact on perceptions of group-based relative deprivation, social and political trust, and views on out-groups (Erhardt et al., 2021a; Esaisasson et al., 2020; Filsinger and Freitag, 2021; Freitag and Hofstetter, 2022; Kachanoff et al., 2020; Kritzinger et al., 2021; Nielsen and Lindvall, 2021; Reny and Barreto, 2020). By studying pandemic threat in the light of the social integration framework, it is possible to move beyond classical indicators of symbolic or realistic threat like globalization, immigration, or Europeanization for analyzing the role of threat for national identity.

Taken together, studying national identity against the analytical lens of the social integration framework allows for taking a perspective that is at the same time encompassing in its scope, but also detailed in its possibilities to pay attention to fine-grained dimensionalities on both sides of the relationship. Thus, each of the relationships under study can be understood dynamically without being restricted to narrow views, yet also without losing indispensable conceptual rigor. The final part of this chapter gives a brief overview on the three articles that constitute the present thesis.

### 1.4.3 Summary of the three articles

All three articles that constitute the present thesis aim at filling specific gaps in extant research, while simultaneously advancing the overarching goal of the thesis, i.e., to draw on the conceptual framework of social integration for an encompassing study of national identity. As the conclusion in chapter 5 gives a more detailed account of the theoretical and empirical approach of each article, the brief summaries below contain only the most important points that are necessary for understanding their overall objective, the main findings, and their reference to the social integration framework.

Article 1, which I co-authored with Markus Freitag, Julian Erhardt, and Maximilian Filsinger and which is published in the *European Journal of Political Research* (Wamsler et al., 2022) looks at how external threat relates to individuals' understanding of national boundaries. As the advent of the global and unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on various aspects of social integration as well (Esaisasson et al., 2020; Filsinger and Freitag, 2021; Freitag and Hofstetter, 2022; Reny and Barreto, 2020), this article uses this case to shed light on the role of threat perceptions other than established ones like immigration attitudes for national identity. Drawing on the advent of the global and unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic as a major challenge to social integration, it argues that exposure to pandemic threat should activate the behavioral immune system (Murray and Schaller, 2016; Thornhill and Fincher, 2020) to protect one from contagion with a dangerous pathogen. Consequently, boundaries between groups are drawn more narrowly, which strengthens ethnic as opposed to civic conceptions of nationhood. Such attitudes and behaviors deeply rooted in evolutionary psychology, however, exacerbate the compartmentalization of society already brought about by various measures to contain the virus. Additionally, we bring in affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus et al., 2019) that distinguishes between fear and anger as key emotional reactions to threatening situations. Drawing on original survey data from six Western European countries and employing a continuous measure of conceptions of nationhood to address well-known shortcomings in previous literature, we find support for our main hypothesis. Individuals faced with pandemic threat in their immediate environment or even at the regional level are more likely to portray definitions of national group membership that are more ethnic and less civic. The mediation analysis adding affective reactions reveals that only individuals reacting to pandemic threat with anger are more likely to hold more exclusionary conceptions of nationhood, whereas no such relationship can be detected for fearful ones. This finding has far-reaching implications, as pandemic threat is associated with narrower definitions of group membership. A compartmentalization of society into more tight-knit social groups threatens the maintenance of a strong and shared normative order that holds society together. In addition, the social isolation that came as a by-product of containment measures may equally put the foundations of liberal democracy and open society under immense pressure. Thus, Article 1 offers an explanation of social disintegration and increasing polarization as a consequence of both the disease itself as well as measures designed to combat it.

In the second article, which is published in the *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Wamsler, 2022), I expand on previous works linking national identity to group-based relative deprivation (GRD) as a major obstacle to a cohesive, well-integrated society. Distinguishing between nationalism and CP as the relevant intergroup dimension of national identity and drawing on social identity theory and its coping strategies for dealing with status inferiority (Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) to provide a detailed framework linking GRD with national identity. Employing the same, original six-country study as in article 1, I find that while GRD relates to higher levels of nationalism, the reverse is the case for CP. As the theoretical argument focuses explicitly on the dimensionality of national identity instead of focusing on nationalism alone (e.g., Abrams et al., 2020; Abrams and Grant, 2012), this study provides a novel framework describing how national identity may indeed change as a result of manifestations of social disintegration instead of being understood solely as a predictor of other variables. Further, it emphasizes the necessity to distinguish clearly between nationalism and CP in their relationship with this aspect of social integration as both are predicted in entirely different directions.

The third article, which is at the time of writing being resubmitted after one round of revisions to *Nations and Nationalism*, provides a fine-grained linkage between the different dimensions of both national identity and social trust. Previous studies have so far tended to neglect the dimensionality of either the former or the latter, which contributes to decisive disarray in terms of both conceptualization and empirical findings (e.g., Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Lenard and Miller, 2018; Reeskens and Wright, 2013). Additionally, I respond to calls for studying individual-level national identity in combination with its main national-level manifestation (McLaren, 2017). Employing large-scale, comparative data from the latest wave of the European Values Study and a continuous measure of conceptions of nationhood, this paper finds that more ethnic conceptions of nationhood relate to lower trust in strangers. However, this is only the case in nations that are predominantly civic-oriented. A positive link between ethnic conceptions and identity-based trust can be detected regardless of national context, whereas the former's negative link with particularized trust is contrary to expectations, but shows little robustness once context is considered. This article offers another example of how a fine-grained perspective on both national identity and social trust as a major aspect of social integration may advance extant findings and address shortcomings in earlier studies.

Beyond the individual contributions of the respective papers, the present thesis in general adds to the research field in several crucial ways. First, introducing the concept of social integration as an encompassing perspective on national identity emphasizes the necessity to distinguish clearly between the distinct dimensions of national identity as a major manifestation of individual-level social identity. The appropriate dimension of national identity and its respective measurement depend crucially on the research question at hand since different aspects of social integration speak to different identity-related dimensions. Further, the concept of social integration rejects simplified, deterministic notions of national identity as an unmoved mover of other variables. Instead, it shows how identity may shape other attitudes and behaviors, but simultaneously be affected by external factors changing individual-level understanding of the self in relation to others in a dynamic process. Further, the framework of social integration adds to extant accounts of the relationship between threatening situations and national identity by allowing for moving beyond classical, restricted accounts of the former. Second, I present three aspects of social integration that have received insufficient attention or conceptualized too broadly in previous research – pandemic threat that affects both social integration and national identity, group-based relative deprivation, and social trust – and provide substantive empirical results in each case. Third, each of the three articles advances extant theoretical reasoning or introduces entirely novel arguments, as for example for the relationship between pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood or the link between CP and GRD. Fourth, I introduce a continuous measure of conceptions of nationhood that addresses several shortcomings of previous, two-dimensional approaches. Fifth, the conceptual overview in section 1.3 gives a comprehensive account of the current state of the art in national identity research, which has developed in a somewhat disjoint way in recent years.

In the remainder of this thesis, chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain the respective articles that have been shortly introduced above. Chapter 5 gives a brief summary on the overall thesis, discusses some limitations that could not be addressed within its scope and elaborates on potential avenues for future research to expand on findings and theoretical arguments as presented here.

## 2. Article 1: The Pandemic and the Question of National Belonging: Exposure to Covid-19 Threat and Conceptions of Nationhood<sup>6</sup>

### Abstract

Drawing on the behavioral immune system hypothesis, we argue that the prevalence of the Covid-19 pandemic threat in an individual's respective environment relates to exclusive, ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Referring to the affective intelligence theory, we maintain that specific negative emotions are prompted by the perception of being exposed to a pandemic threat, and these emotional states in turn structure political preferences regarding national belonging. Using an original survey in six European countries during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze both the impact of individual Covid-19 experiences and the contextual exposure to a pandemic threat through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to the pandemic is linked to stronger ethnic national identities for both levels of analysis. We also find that anger substantially mediates this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioral immune system appears as a pervasive obstacle to inclusive orientations.

**Keywords:** affective intelligence theory, behavioral immune system hypothesis, conceptions of nationhood, Covid-19, pandemic threat.

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<sup>6</sup> This chapter is identical with an article that I co-authored with Markus Freitag, Julian Erhardt and Maximilian Filsinger and that was published in the *European Journal of Political Research* (Wamsler et al., 2022).

## 1. Introduction

By mid-February 2022, around 405 million people have been infected with the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (Johns Hopkins University, 2021).<sup>7</sup> With the rapid spread of the virus and the decisive shutdown of social and economic activities around the globe, citizens have experienced large-scale exposure to the consequences of such a pandemic not only in terms of risks to their own health and that of their loved ones but also with regard to economic recession and a compartmentalization of everyday life enforced by social distancing measures. Previously open borders regularly crossed by people were closed within days or even hours. Across the globe, political leaders and epidemiologists relied on restricting access to countries for outsiders, sometimes banning citizens from foreign nations. At the same time, out-group negativity rose significantly as demonstrated by anti-Asian hate speech and crime (Dhanani & Franz, 2020; Reny & Barreto, 2020) or the use of racial slurs to denote the origins or particular variants of the virus targeted against e.g., Brazil, China, India, South Africa, or the United Kingdom (van Bavel et al., 2020). In that sense, the exact nature of setting criteria for belonging to national in- and out-groups grew increasingly important.

This is the starting point of our investigation. We want to find out whether exposure to the Covid-19 pandemic threat is reflected in our understanding of national belonging. To evaluate the impact of exposure to the threat posed by the Covid-19 pandemic on conceptions of nationhood, we refer to the behavioral immune system hypothesis (BIS), also known as the parasite stress theory (Murray & Schaller, 2016; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). The behavioral immune system hypothesis links the prevalence of disease-causing parasites to an increased avoidance of unfamiliar out-group targets and to a strengthened cohesion with close in-group targets in order to inhibit contact with pathogens (Ackerman et al., 2018, 3).<sup>8</sup> By focusing on how boundaries between the in-group and out-group(s) are drawn, we study conceptions of nationhood as a major embodiment of group membership across the globe (Ariely, 2018; Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007; Schatz et al., 1999). Given that nation states were the main institutions for combating Covid-19, especially at the onset

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<sup>7</sup> This article was written as part of the research project "The Politics of Public Health Threat" that is financially supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) (grant no. 100017\_204507) and the Berne University Research Foundation (grant no. 25/2020). In this context, reference should also be made to the contributions by Filsinger and Freitag (2022) and Freitag and Hofstetter (2022), who are elaborating theoretically and empirically similar designs within the same research program.

<sup>8</sup> We understand parasites as "infectious disease agents of all types: viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, helminths [...], and arthropods" (Thornhill & Fincher, 2020, p. 167).

of the pandemic, nations should also provide the most relevant in-group in this particular context.<sup>9</sup> Further, we are interested in the mechanisms linking the threat of the pandemic to conceptions of nationhood. Accordingly, we tie together insights of the behavioral immune system hypothesis with the affective intelligence theory (AIT), a common model of emotional processing in political science and sociology (Marcus et al., 2000). We argue that emotions triggered by exposure to the Covid-19 pandemic threat shape how citizens form their conceptions of nationhood.

Using an original survey in six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze the impact of both individual threat experience and exposure to the pandemic at the regional level through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis, which combines both comparative and within-country models, shows that exposure to the pandemic is indeed linked to stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood. This effect proves to be conclusive for both levels of analysis (individual and contextual). We also find that anger is a substantial mediator of this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear, which reflects other recent findings in political psychology referring to emotional responses to threat (Marcus et al., 2019).

Overall, this study contributes to existing research in several ways. First, in the absence of real-world data from global pandemics, direct measurements of health threat exposure by infections are missing. In order to map pathogen exposure, previous studies have focused on the experimental design of (artificially) constructed health threats, exposure to disgust experiences, the creation of macro-level indices of pandemic exposure based on parasite presence in a society or fatalities caused by infectious diseases (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Faulkner et al., 2004; Murray & Schaller, 2016; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014, 2020; Tybur et al., 2014). Consequently, our approach of directly operationalizing Covid-19 exposure puts pandemic threat as such into focus and, for the first time, makes it possible to evaluate how direct perceptions of threat from an infectious disease on a global scale affect definitions of group membership, particularly conceptions of nationhood.

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<sup>9</sup> Although there are other important forms of national identity, such as nationalism or patriotism (Ariely, 2020; Citrin et al., 2001; Davidov, 2009), we focus explicitly on conceptions of nationhood since definitions of group membership are considered vital for a comprehensive understanding of the behavioral immune system hypothesis, and which are as yet understudied (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).



Second, while existing theories mostly aim to account for the impact of fear as one single threat-oriented emotion on political attitudes, we build on the insights of functional neuroscience perspectives and the affective intelligence theory (AIT) and scrutinize the role of fear and anger as two pivotal emotions activated simultaneously, yet distinctly, in threatening situations. Third, while most studies referring to emotional responses to threatening stimuli rely on single country studies, we provide a fitting analysis with a rich, comparative dataset to study the effects of the Coronavirus pandemic. Finally, we offer a theoretical argument for linking pandemic exposure with views on belonging to in- and out-groups that has only tentatively been touched upon by previous research. Consequently, the present study adds a likely crucial explanatory variable to the research field of national identity, which mainly focuses on the impact of issues like globalization, populism, or social status (Ariely, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Kriesi et al., 2006). Indeed, including pathogen avoidance in previous explanations of political values and behaviors has far-reaching implications for our understanding of societal processes since predisposed, evolutionary traits are very stable and deeply enshrined in human psychology even if we are not aware of them most of the time (Aarøe et al., 2017, p. 281).

## **2. Theoretical Framework: Exposure to Pandemic Threat and Conceptions of Nationhood**

Preventing contagion with infectious diseases like Covid-19 and coping with the consequences in case of an infection have been major drivers of human attitudes and behavior since ancestral times (Brown et al., 2016; Faulkner et al., 2004; Gilles et al., 2013; Murray & Schaller, 2016; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). Biological sciences as well as evolutionary psychology demonstrate that the prevalence of infectious diseases and related parasites has led to the development of not only the classical immune system but also of a behavioral one as “a motivational system [...] inhibiting contact with disease-causing parasites” (Murray & Schaller, 2016, p. 76; see also Ackerman et al., 2018). From the viewpoint of natural selection, the “behavioral prophylaxis” (Schaller, 2016, p. 299) provided by this BIS is more efficient than the costly (i.e., resource-intensive) immunological reactions of the body (Ackerman et al., 2018).

Overall, if individuals view themselves as comparatively vulnerable to becoming infected, for example by living in an area of high parasite stress or due to having certain medical conditions, the

BIS is activated, which in turn triggers certain attitudes and ways of behavior by these individuals. This “functional flexibility” (Ackerman et al., 2018; Murray & Schaller, 2016) or context-dependent adoption (Thornhill & Fincher, 2020) incentivizes individuals to hold more negative views of out-groups posing potential infection risks (Aarøe et al., 2017; Ackerman et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2016; Faulkner et al., 2004). Such negativity stems from the notion that members of out-groups often hold different values or patterns of behavior with little compatibility to combat threatening parasites (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006, p. 271). Correspondingly, individuals portray greater loyalty towards one’s in-group, which is unlikely to carry pathogens to which one has not yet become immune, but is likely helpful in mitigating the consequences of an infection (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Sugiyama, 2004; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).

Consequently, the extent of one’s interaction with members of out-groups results from a trade-off between the advantages of interacting with out-groups and the (perceived) risks of contracting potentially dangerous diseases from doing so (Brown et al., 2016; Faulkner et al., 2004; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Oaten et al., 2009; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014, 2020). Importantly, individuals do not deal with this trade-off by ways of a cost-benefit calculation under perfect information. Instead, people rely on cues and heuristics to assess infection risks (Brown et al., 2016, p. 100) and do not even need to be conscious of doing so (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006, p. 280). In case the (perceived) risks of infection are high enough to push this trade-off in this direction, the BIS may activate a set of attitudes and behavior referred to as “assortative sociality” to prevent contagion (Thornhill & Fincher, 2020, p. 169). These attitudes and behaviors include stronger in-group orientations, an aversion to new ideas, and hostility towards outsiders.

The idea of the BIS and its underlying psychological mechanisms have received substantial empirical support, especially regarding more negative attitudes towards out-groups if the prevalence of infectious pathogens is high (Aarøe et al., 2017; Ackerman et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2016; Duncan et al., 2009; Faulkner et al., 2004; Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Gilles et al., 2013; Krings et al., 2012; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014, 2020). Whereas results from previous studies lend clear support to an increased out-group negativity in the face of pathogen stress, research lacks a thorough understanding of whom people actually conceive of as belonging to their respective in- and out-group(s). This is even more astonishing given the established view that definitions of group membership are of paramount importance in this context (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).

To address this research gap, this paper focuses on the relationship between pandemic threat and conceptions of national belonging, which today constitute the major form of group attachment around the world (Davidov, 2009; Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007; Lenard & Miller, 2018; Schatz et al., 1999). Since adaptive immunity is highly localized, out-group members may be (perceived as) hosts to novel parasites to which the immunological defenses of one's in-group are not yet adapted (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). Moreover, out-group members are likely to be unaware of – and thus violating – local rituals, norms, and customs implicitly relevant in preventing infection with local parasites (Kusche & Barker, 2019; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). In this sense, it is imperative to study precisely how delineations between the in-group and out-group(s) are constructed to gain a thorough understanding of the applicability of the behavioral immune system hypothesis.

Although many ways of distinguishing between in- and out-group(s) are conceivable in the context of a pandemic, national membership should be pivotal as it creates borders to combat an infectious disease geographically (limiting the territorial spread), politically (access to health care and large-scale containment measures), and socially (grouping of similar people with shared rituals, values, and norms) as stipulated by the BIS. In the context of the latter, national identity is particularly important for constructing perceptions of sameness (Anderson, 2006; Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007). National membership based on ethnic criteria as a “thick” set of criteria (Berg & Hjerm, 2010) provides many of the cues regarding norms, values, and other disease-inhibiting behaviors aiming to protect oneself and the in-group that have developed over the course of evolution.

Conceptualizing national identity, this source of group membership constitutes one of the most extensively researched topics in the social sciences. Current research addresses the question of its emergence as a product of nationalist movements (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), its lasting impact on modern societies (Calhoun, 2007; Newman, 2000), or the differences between nationalist and patriotic identities (Ariely, 2020; Davidov, 2009; Schatz et al., 1999; Schatz & Staub, 1997). Besides these issues, the content dimension of national identity is decisive for setting the criteria according to which national membership is constructed (Citrin et al., 2001; Helbling et al., 2016).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Although it would without a doubt prove fruitful to study how pandemic exposure may alter these other aspects of national identity or even lead to profound changes, for example in our understanding of the nation and its sovereignty or nationalist attitudes, the present paper focuses precisely on this content dimension to address one specific research

Following the seminal work of Hans Kohn (1939), research on national identity tends to distinguish between ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood, which define what people consider necessary for being a “true” member of any nation. On the one hand, ethnic conceptions of nationhood give priority to objectivist criteria for national belonging, which refer to national ancestry, being born in a country, or adhering to a particular religious belief (Brubaker, 1992; Lenard & Miller, 2018; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). As such criteria are considered largely fixed, ethnic views on nationhood treat national boundaries as generally impermeable and fixed for most individuals (Sarrasin et al., 2020; Wimmer, 2008). In that sense, people are unlikely to change their national belonging over the course of their lives even if they relocate to another nation. Civic conceptions of nationhood, on the other hand, revolve around adherence to an explicitly political culture, its norms and values, and knowledge of the national language (Helbling et al., 2016; Ignatieff, 1993). Such views on nationhood gained prominence in the context of the French Revolution and invite any person interested to join another nation as long as they conform with certain values and take part in the respective nation’s political life irrespective of where they were born or where their ancestors originated from (Habermas, 1994; Luong, 2016). Moreover, a civically-informed notion of the nation conceptually relates to a higher acceptance of immigration and an endorsement of multiculturalism, which is substantially different from ethnic conceptions of nationhood (Ariely, 2020; Simonsen, 2016). Importantly, ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood are mostly ideal types since most people combine elements of both in defining membership to their own nation (Lenard & Miller, 2018; Wright et al., 2012) and this combination may be re-assessed regularly to adapt to developments both within an individual’s mindset and outside their immediate locus of control. To sum up, these differences provide a valid theoretical framework for studying patterns of national boundary-making to define membership of the in-group (Ariely, 2020).

With respect to the relationship between pandemic threat and different conceptions of nationhood, we argue that wariness towards out-group members resulting from the activation of the BIS resonates well with more exclusive conceptions of nationhood. As stipulated by the concept of assortative sociality, members of out-groups are denied the possibility of becoming “true” members of the respective nation due to their lack of national ancestry and their birth in another country. Further, the behavioral immune system may trigger more clear-cut distinctions between in- and

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gap and to maintain conceptual concision. Thus, the following argument is restricted to this particular part of national identity, whereas other, related reasoning is beyond the scope of this study.

out-groups (Murray & Schaller, 2016; Reid et al., 2012), which also supports ethnic conceptions. Consequently, citizens being more exposed to a pathogen-rich environment, such as one hit by the Coronavirus pandemic, should be more inclined to hold ethnic conceptions. As opposed to ethnic views on nationhood, civic views are generally more welcoming towards outsiders aspiring to become part of another nation and consider national boundaries as permeable and flexible. Given that the requirements for joining any nation refer only to political norms and values as well as to the national language, this notion runs somewhat contrary to the desire for cue-based similarity of cultural norms and practices stemming from the heuristics used by the BIS. Consequently, we expect ethnic conceptions of nationhood to be more prevalent in environments with higher exposure to infectious diseases, whereas civic views should be less widespread in such areas.

*H1: Individuals exposed to the Covid-19 pandemic threat are more likely to hold ethnic conceptions of nationhood and are less likely to embrace civic ones.*

Beyond establishing these direct links between pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood, we are interested in potential mediating mechanisms. Here, emotions move into the center of analytical interest. When the BIS perceives an infection risk, it triggers adaptive psychological responses – including the activation of aversive emotional states and cognitive knowledge structures in working memory that expedite behavioral avoidance or the demand for controlling the infectious disease (Schaller & Park, 2011, p. 99; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014, p. 12). Research from political psychology follows neural process theories arguing for a physical location of different emotions in the brain (Gray, 1987). Drawing on these insights, affective intelligence theory posits that three brain systems operate constantly and routinely to sort information we confront (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus et al., 2019). When the first system responds with enthusiasm, it signals that all is well. The second system relies on anxiety to signify the extent to which circumstances are novel or uncertain. A third system focuses on anger signaling that a threat to familiar norms and practices of thought and action exists. These brain systems operate constantly and routinely to sort information we confront. AIT holds that all relevant appraisals are executed simultaneously and largely independently. Thus, rather than feeling angry *or* fearful, individuals feel angry *and* fearful when being confronted with a threat (Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). Whichever system and thus emotion is more

robust, at any given moment, will determine the course of action taken (Brader et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).

Following AIT, we assume that the novelty of the Covid-19 pandemic may cause fear, since what is unknown may also be dangerous, disrupt security, and induce uncertainty. Moreover, fear is linked to a consideration of alternative options to the status quo in the face of uncertainty (Marcus et al., 2019, p. 120). A tightening of membership criteria and a stronger emphasis on exclusive, ethnic views on nationhood poses an important alternative as compared to previously widespread definitions of national membership emphasizing other factors beyond objectivist criteria (Abascal, 2020; Kenworthy & Jones, 2009). Second, we can also anticipate that the detrimental circumstances surrounding the crisis cause anger. This emotional state of aversion arises particularly if we face challenges to central norms that we consider fundamental to the social or political order. The permeability of national borders may be viewed as one major example for such challenges in contemporary societies altering previously existing structures of society (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize that both fear and anger mediate the relationship between exposure to the pandemic threat and the political orientations toward nationhood.

*H2: Feelings of fear and anger mediate the relationship between exposure to the Covid-19 pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood.*

### **3. Data and Method**

To test the theoretical argument outlined in the previous chapter empirically, we rely on original survey data collected during the first peak of the coronavirus pandemic in spring 2020 with approximately 6,000 respondents in six European countries. Taking into account the situation at the onset of the crisis in early spring 2020, the survey includes respondents from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Although all countries selected were strongly affected by the first wave of the pandemic, they vary greatly in their governmental responses to it as well as their levels of infection. Whereas Italy, Spain, and France were hard-hit early and imposed strict lockdown measures, the United Kingdom issued such orders much later and experienced a continuing surge of infections. Germany and Switzerland also employed early lockdown measures,

but mostly managed to contain the outbreak at comparatively low levels. Thus, the sample contains a substantial degree of variation in pandemic exposure. Further, national identity and the boundaries of national membership are a highly salient issue in each of the countries, while each has a very different history in this regard. Thus, results based on this dataset should not be limited to this specific set of countries in the European context. A detailed description of the survey is presented in Table OA1 in the Appendix.

For our dependent variable, conceptions of nationhood, we employ five widely used indicators referring to the importance that respondents place on being born in the respective country, having national ancestry, and being a Christian (the main religion in all countries surveyed) for ethnic conceptions and respecting national political laws and institutions, and being able to speak the respective national language(s) for civic conceptions (Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). In light of previous research on the relatively continuous nature of conceptions of nationhood between two extremes, we combined these five items into one variable. First, based on principal component analysis we distinguished between two factors that reflect earlier research for civic and ethnic conceptions, respectively (see Table OA2).<sup>11</sup> Second, we reversed the civic factor and combined it with the ethnic factor. Consequently, we use a continuous scale that runs from civic conceptions (low values) to ethnic conceptions (high values) with a mean value that locates each respondent between the two ideal points. This allows for obtaining a more fine-grained picture that pays attention to individuals located in between since most people likely combine elements of both ideal types within themselves (Ariely, 2020; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Smith, 1991).

We measure exposure to the Covid-19 pandemic threat both at the individual and contextual level, thus focusing directly on perceptions of pandemic threat (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).<sup>12</sup> In line with previous research, we propose that pandemic threat not only originates from subjective threat experience, but also from pathogen stress within the larger region of an individual (Thornhill & Fincher, 2020). As the pandemic disturbs societal life extensively in the personal environments

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<sup>11</sup> Cronbach's alpha for ethnic conceptions is .81. The Spearman-Brown Prophecy Reliability Estimate (as there are only two items) for civic conceptions is .66.

<sup>12</sup> Contributions referring to disgust sensitivity do not focus directly on perceptions of infection risk but instead on individual differences in the tendency to experience the emotion – disgust – associated with a possible infection risk (Murray & Schaller, 2016). Disgust, however, is subject to conceptual disarray in broader political psychology literature. While in AIT, aversion includes “anger, disgust, contempt, and hatred ... [which signal] the need to confront an adversary” (MacKuen et al., 2010, p. 441), other relevant literature conceptualizes disgust explicitly as an avoidance-orientation and not an emotion that motivates individuals to confront any adversaries as specified in AIT (Kam & Estes, 2016, p. 482).

and communities, it may well be that all individuals living in strongly affected areas, regardless of whether or not they report subjective threat from the virus, are facing pandemic threat. People may not be affected personally but still be exposed to pandemic threat and restrictions to contain the virus in their everyday lives. Thus, we expect that individuals living in areas strongly hit by the pandemic feel more threatened than individuals living in environments with low pandemic threat, irrespective of their personal pandemic-related experiences. For individual-level exposure to pandemic threat, we asked respondents “To what extent do you feel the coronavirus pandemic is a threat to you personally?”<sup>13</sup> For regional-level prevalence of the pandemic in the 105 European regions across the six countries in our survey, we introduce two measures for the severity of the pandemic, i.e., the number of cases and the number of Covid-19-related deaths, both per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>14</sup> We gathered this data from the responsible statistical offices of the respective countries. As these regional-level variables are vastly skewed towards lower values and given the potential for measurement error (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 191), we took the logarithm. This approach should ensure that we can assess pandemic exposure thoroughly and that we are able to draw valid conclusions based on several modeling strategies.

To measure the role of emotions, we rely on the well-known Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scale in its short version (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988). The question reads as follows: “Now we would like to know how you feel. The following words describe different kinds of feelings and emotions. Read every word and mark the intensity on the scale. You have the choice between five gradations. Please indicate how you feel at the moment.” For anger, we use a) upset and b) hostile. For fear we use c) afraid and d) nervous.<sup>15</sup> Although restrictions on the questionnaire size allow for only a limited amount of items per latent construct,

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<sup>13</sup> Aside from this subjective measure of pandemic threat, we also asked respondents how many people they know personally that have been infected with the virus as an alternative measurement signaling pandemic threat. However, a direct measure of subjective threat at the individual level should be more compelling as an indicator of pandemic threat and less prone to measurement error.

<sup>14</sup> The six countries studied consist of 112 regions in total. Due to data availability, our sample contains only 105 of them. The number of respondents per region ranges from 2 (Obwalden, CH) to 250 (North Rhine-Westphalia, GER). With regard to pandemic threat, we have considerable variation between the regions ranging from 9 to over 1,000 cases per inhabitants and 0 to over 112 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. This provides us with leverage for the multilevel analyses.

<sup>15</sup> The short PANAS scale does not include disgust as an emotional state. The adjectives used here are terms describing emotional reactions that fall under the more general dimensions of fear/anxiety and anger/aversion, albeit to different degrees of intensity (other adjectives that have been used in this regard include “uneasy”, “scared”, or “worried” for anxiety and “angry”, “disgusted”, or “resentful” for aversion (Marcus et al., 2000, pp. 152–174). As argued by (Marcus et al., 2019), anger and fear are highly correlated. This is true for the survey we use in this study ( $r=.61$ ). The Spearman-Brown Prophecy Reliability Estimate for anger is .74 and .75 for fear.



confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation supports the notion that fear and anger are correlated, yet distinct, emotional states (see Table OA3). The model fit for the confirmatory factor analysis implies a very good model fit with RMSEA < 0.08 and CFI > 0.9. Given that the strength of factors may vary between countries, we conducted a test for measurement invariance (see Table OA4), which supports full metric invariance that is crucial for a substantive interpretation of our results (cf. Davidov, 2009).

In accordance with previous research, we control for a range of socio-demographic variables that likely affect conceptions of nationhood as well as exposure to the pandemic, such as age, gender, education, income situation, health, migration background, and left-right self-placement (see Table OA5 for summary statistics and OA6 for exact item wording of the main variables). All variables were z-standardized (mean = 0 and variance = 1) to make the respective coefficients comparable. In addition, we collected macro data for all regions to control for variation at the regional level that might affect the relationship between pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood. We use the share of elderly among the population, population density, unemployment rates, and GDP per capita as this set of macro-level control variables contains a wide range of potentially influential predictors linked to the respective region.

To test the first hypothesis, we employ two linear regression models with country-fixed effects and region-clustered standard errors as our respondents are nested within the 105 regions across the six countries surveyed. Adjusting our estimates for country-fixed effects allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between the countries. Besides this comparative approach, we conduct the micro-level analysis separately for each country surveyed to get a better understanding of the relationship that we are interested in. In addition to this individual-level analysis, we conduct a macro-level analysis using random-intercept multilevel models for numbers of both cases and deaths at the level of the respective region.<sup>16</sup>

The final step of our analysis consists of mediation analyses by means of path models to test hypothesis 2 that focusses on the mediating role of fear and anger (Preacher et al., 2010; Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004). This set of models tests the mediation effect of fear and anger simultaneously as stipulated by previous research (Marcus et al., 2019). These structural equation models are based

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<sup>16</sup> Splitting the macro-level study into individual countries is less promising since the number of regions within some countries is too small for a meaningful multilevel analysis.

on maximum likelihood estimations with regionally clustered standard errors and allow us to test whether fear and anger mediate the relationship and whether there are indirect effects of the exposure to pandemic threat on conceptions of nationhood. As with the first set of models, we conduct our mediation analyses using both individual- and regional-level indicators for measuring pandemic threat exposure and split the individual-level analysis for each of the six countries. When using regional-level indicators, we rely on generalized structural equation models (Preacher et al., 2010; Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004).


#### **4. Empirical Results**

Figure 1 shows the results obtained from our first model looking at pandemic threat at the individual level (see Table OA7). The positive coefficient linking higher pandemic threat exposure to ethnic conceptions of nationhood supports our first hypothesis. Individuals perceiving Covid-19 as a higher subjective threat are more likely to view national belonging as based on criteria such as having national ancestry and birth as well as adhering to the Christian religion, indicating an activation of the BIS and its disease-avoidant norms and behaviors. Accordingly, respondents experiencing less subjective pandemic threat are more likely to hold civic conceptions of nationhood that draw on language and political values to define in-group membership and allow for a higher permeability of national borders, which lends support to hypothesis 1. The relationships for our control variables equally point in the expected directions and are in line with previous studies. Right-leaning, less educated individuals with a more adverse income situation, or without a migration background are more likely to hold ethnic conceptions of nationhood.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Running the estimations with infection numbers in respondents' respective personal environments does not alter the results (see Table OA8).

Figure 1: Coefficient plot for individual-level pandemic threat




Estimates are based on the full models as in Table OA7. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

When investigating this relationship across countries (Figure 2), we find that it is significant in Germany, France, and Italy. In Switzerland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the coefficients point in the expected direction but are not significant. Overall, looking at the countries individually supports the main finding from the comparative analysis, but it is also evident that it does not apply equally to the exclusion of other factors, which emphasizes the importance of investigating the nature of this relationship in more detail by means of mediation analysis to uncover underlying patterns.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> We conducted the same analysis for the two factors on ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood separately and for each country (Tables OA9 and OA10). Whereas ethnic conceptions are related to pandemic threat in three countries, there is a significant relationship for civic ones only for Germany. Measuring civic conceptions on their own, however, is conceptually difficult since approval to either of the two items does not preclude approval to the “ethnic” ones (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Thus, civic conceptions on their own are less valid for distinguishing between civic and ethnic conceptions and we refrain from interpreting too much into this particular finding.


Figure 2: Coefficient plot for individual-level pandemic threat by country



Estimates are based on the full models as in Table OA11. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

Figure 3 details the respective results for the multilevel analyses (see Table OA12). At the regional level, we observe that both higher numbers of Covid-19 cases and Covid-19-related fatality rates are significant predictors of more ethnic-based conceptions of nationhood. Individual threat levels remain robust and significant in both models. Including further macro-level control variables (share of elderly among the population, population density, unemployment rates, and GDP per capita) does not change our main results (see Table OA13). To test for a potential sensitivity of our estimates to extreme cases or clusters, we estimated the same models using a jackknifing procedure, i.e., we re-estimated each model several times, removing all respondents from each region once to control for highly influential clusters. The results reflect those found in the base model (see Table OA14).

Figure 3: Coefficient plot for macro-level pandemic threat



Estimates are based on the full models as in Table OA12. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

In a next step, we use mediation analysis to uncover whether the emotional states of fear and anger mediate the relationship between exposure to pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood. We test both micro- and macro-level exposure to the virus as focusing only on the direct relationship between independent and dependent variables has been shown to hamper theory development and overlook potentially important indirect effects (Preacher et al., 2010). Again, we start with exposure to pandemic threat at the individual level as the explanatory variable and test whether negative emotional responses mediate the relationship with conceptions of nationhood. Taking into account that both anger and fear likely occur simultaneously (Marcus et al., 2000), we analyze both emotions in a single, comprehensive model.

Table 1: Combined path models for fear and anger with pandemic threat

	Individual-level threat	Regional-level threat (cases)	Regional-level threat (fatalities)
Total effect	0.048 (0.01)***	0.069 (0.02)**	0.070 (0.02)**
Direct effect	0.036 (0.01)**	0.056 (0.02)**	0.061 (0.02)**
Mediation via Fear			
Indirect effect	-0.005 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Covid-19 threat → Fear	0.273 (0.02)***	0.073 (0.03)**	0.100 (0.02)***
Fear → Civic-Ethnic	-0.018 (0.02)	0.008 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Mediation via Anger			
Indirect effect	0.017 (0.01)***	0.012 (0.00)***	0.009 (0.00)*
Covid-19 threat → Anger	0.134 (0.01)***	0.089 (0.02)***	0.064 (0.03)*
Anger → Civic-Ethnic	0.123 (0.02)***	0.139 (0.02)***	0.143 (0.02)***
N	5,555	5,515	5,515

Clustered standard errors (region) in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$


Table 3 shows the results obtained from our path models to uncover the hypothesized mediation effects. This mediation analysis reveals that the Covid-19 pandemic threat is significantly related to both fear and anger at the individual and contextual levels. In other words, people who feel more threatened by the pandemic are likely to be both more angry and more fearful than those experiencing less pandemic threat. Yet, the results clearly show that these two emotions play decisively different roles. Whereas we do not find any mediation effect for fear, anger is a significant mediator linking pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood. These two findings hold regardless of how we measure pandemic threat.<sup>19</sup>

If we estimate these path models in the six countries separately, the results are largely substantiated. Anger significantly mediates the relationship between immediate pandemic threat and ethnic

<sup>19</sup> Again, we re-estimated the path models for regional Covid-19 cases and deaths using a jackknifing procedure, i.e., we re-estimated each model several times, removing all respondents from each region once to control for highly influential clusters. Equally, the results yield no significant or substantial differences to those shown here (results available upon request).

conceptions of nationhood in Germany, France, Switzerland, Spain, and the United Kingdom (see Figure 4), whereas it is insignificant only in Italy. For fear, the null finding from the full sample remains mostly insignificant and inconclusive. We find a negative indirect effect only in Italy. Taken together, we find substantive evidence that emotional responses in the form of anger affect the relationship between exposure to pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood as argued in hypothesis 2. Fear, however, plays a decisively subordinate role in the context of pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood. This finding reflects recent advances in the role of emotions and the primacy of anger over fear in shaping individuals' political attitudes and behaviors (Marcus et al., 2019). These mediation analyses for the individual countries lend additional support to the hypothesized relationship between pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood, as this main relationship is significant in all but one country once emotional responses to threat are properly accounted for.

Figure 4: Coefficient plot for individual-level mediation analysis by country



Full regression results available upon request. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

Taken together, our empirical analyses reveal a clear relationship between the Covid-19 pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood. Individuals threatened by this infectious disease are more likely to hold ethnic views on national belonging that should be better suited for avoiding the contraction with novel pathogens than civic ones implying a greater permeability of national boundaries. These results support earlier findings that “intergroup bias is [...] [affected] by features of the mind designed to enact approach avoidance mechanisms for negotiating adaptive intergroup relations in a way that would attenuate disease threat” (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006, p. 279). Further, the mediation analyses show that certain emotional states are crucial to understand the relationship between the Covid-19 pandemic and definitions on group membership thoroughly. Here, anger in particular is highly relevant in shaping the relationships between our main variables of interest. The threat of pandemic exposure activates anger, which in turn fosters ethnic conceptions of nationhood.

## **5. Conclusion**

How does the Covid-19 pandemic threat affect views on belonging to in- or out-groups? In this paper, we evaluate whether pandemic threat experience is related to conceptions of nationhood among citizens in six Western European countries. Looking at national membership as today’s most important form of group membership (Davidov, 2009; Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007), we suggest that ethnic conceptions of nationhood stressing the role of “thicker” (Berg & Hjerm, 2010, p. 393) criteria, like national ancestry, beyond the political sphere resonate well with the premise of the BIS. Conversely, civic views on nationhood that deem respecting national political institutions and laws alongside being able to speak the national language as sufficient for being a full member of a nation should be more in conflict with attitudes and behaviors aiming to reduce the risk of contracting infectious diseases. The empirical analyses based on original survey data collected during the early phase of the pandemic support this argument. Individual experiences of pandemic threat as well as macro-level data in the form of both case numbers and fatality rates predict conceptions of nationhood.

In addition, we follow AIT and add key insights regarding emotional responses in threatening situations to the behavioral immune system hypothesis. Focusing on fear and anger as crucial and distinct drivers of people’s response to threat and uncertainty (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus et al.,



2019; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019), we find that anger proves to be a crucial mediator of the relationship between pandemic threat exposure and conceptions of nationhood. Fear, in contrast, appears to play no mediating role if anger is properly accounted for. This crucial finding substantiates recent claims that both scholarly research and political commentators must be careful not to conflate these two emotions reflecting distinct cognitive systems operating largely independently of each other (cf. Marcus et al., 2019). Afraid individuals react very differently to pandemic threat perceptions than angry ones do. Anger drives individuals to confront an adversary and to protect the in-group, reinforcing ethnic conceptions of nationhood as stipulated by the behavioral immune system hypothesis. Fear, however, more likely induces individuals to seek new perspectives and to go through a learning process (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Marcus et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). Consequently, people facing pandemic threat should assess the complexity of the pandemic and the transmission of the virus from a more differentiated point of view that does not lead to a withdrawal into more close-knit social groups and a scapegoating of national out-groups.

Yet, our approach also has limitations requiring further attention. Although our observational data gives important, first-hand evidence on pandemic threat regarding both the individual and contextual levels, we cannot make causal claims as compared to experimental settings in laboratory studies or time-series analyses. While there exists substantial causal evidence that the activation of the BIS has an effect on xenophobia (Aarøe et al., 2017; Faulkner et al., 2004) or in-group favoritism (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), similar studies have not yet been conducted for conceptions of nationhood. We argue that it appears unlikely that people are more likely to contract Covid-19 because they hold more ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Individuals convinced that only those born and raised in their respective countries are true members of their in-group will have comparably closed social environments that are less open towards newcomers. Consequently, such individuals should be less likely to become infected with contagious diseases from out-groups. Evidence that many infections happened among in-group members (family, friends, co-workers, religious communities, associations or sports clubs) indeed supports the main tenets of the BIS (Tybur et al., 2020). If individuals are particularly careful in their dealings with out-group members, they may also systematically underestimate the threat of infections emanating from members of their own in-group since evolutionary developed heuristics lead to misperceptions of infectiousness. While this pattern might call into question the success of the BIS as a means of ensuring protection from a contagious virus like SARS-CoV-2 in modern, large-scale societies, we provide substantive

evidence that it plays a decisive role in shaping people's attitudes and behaviors nonetheless. In sum, we argue that providing first-hand, real-world data on pandemic threat is pivotal to complement previous studies that have provided substantive evidence on the issue of causality (see also Murray & Schaller, 2016; Tybur et al., 2014).

Finally, the countries selected for our original survey do not cover all possible contextual factors that may drive the relationship under study. This is particularly relevant for certain parts of the world where ethnic, religious, or regional identities are much more important than national ones. However, our dataset provides insight into cases with substantial variation, which certainly allows for drawing conclusions more broadly applicable than the six countries studied in this paper.

In conclusion, our results have far-reaching implications for a better understanding of group membership in modern societies. We show how exposure to pandemic threat relates to belonging to the national in-group, thereby providing the first evidence on the validity of the BIS in the context of a novel, yet highly salient, pandemic among citizens, for whom parasite stress and infectious diseases arguably played a minor role for many decades. Our findings corroborate the claim that liberal, open societies – which all surveyed countries claim to be – must combat infectious diseases not only as a matter of public health, but also to ensure their own survival (cf. Thornhill & Fincher, 2020, p. 175). This is even more crucial if the boundaries of social groups become less permeable in the face of pandemic threat and should be equally applicable to other societal groups, where (non-)membership contributes to individuals' social identities beyond national belonging. If belonging to in- and out-groups in general becomes more static, the very foundations of liberal and pluralistic societies are shaken substantially and even democratic governance itself may come under pressure (Erhardt et al., 2021). Given that globalization fosters the presence of diverse ethnic groups across the globe, a continued salience of infectious diseases likely becomes a serious obstacle to societal acceptance of people with different backgrounds (Aarøe et al., 2017). Concern about pathogen prevalence may thus inhibit inclusive societies and exchange across different ethnic groups severely if the mere presence of physically and culturally distinct out-group members may be seen as threatening due to the prevalence of infectious diseases like Covid-19.

The importance of emotions in general and of anger in particular, as shown by the uncovered mediation effects, further stresses that distinct affective responses to threat and uncertainty like fear and anger must not be used interchangeably as they vary decisively in their potential to shape

attitudes and behaviors with regard to a large variety of social sciences concepts (Marcus et al., 2019). Correspondingly, political communication and policy design should always consider the emotional reactions invoked among citizens to avoid backfiring if citizens react with fear or anger to them (cf. Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). This is all the more important given the increasing consensus among leading epidemiologists that globalization may continue to accelerate both the frequency and severity of pandemics over time. Future research might now look for data to gain an even deeper understanding of the role of (other) emotions and to assess the role of the Coronavirus pandemic in shaping other relevant sets of attitudes, such as norm-conformity, authoritarianism, or social conservatism (Brown et al., 2016; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). Another promising avenue for future research will be to examine the role of the Coronavirus pandemic in shaping within-country outgroup-hostility (e.g., rich vs. poor, ethnic majority vs. ethnic minority) or to delve deeper into aspects of national identity not covered by conceptions of nationhood, such as nationalist attitudes or ethnocentrism. Finally, researchers might theorize and study, which contextual factors might play a prominent role in the context of pandemic threat and conceptions of nationhood to explain differences across countries in more detail. Overall, our study gives vital insight into the extent to which the Covid-19 pandemic threat structures feelings of national belonging and initiates avenues for future research on the social and political consequences of the crisis.

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## **Conflicts Of Interest**

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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September 17, 2021

## **The Pandemic and the Question of National Belonging:**

### **Exposure to Covid-19 Threat and Conceptions of Nationhood**

Wamsler, S.; Freitag M.; Erhardt, J.; Filsinger, M.

Online Appendix

Table OA1: Detailed description of the survey

Survey period	April 17, 2020/May 11,2020
Target population	Residents aged 18 years or older in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom
Survey mode	Online
Sample size	6,028 respondents (target sample size: 1,000 per country)
Quotas	Age, Sex, Education (language for Switzerland)
Sampling	Qualtrics access panel
Interview language	German, French, Italian, Spanish, English
Response rate	8.71% (RR5/6 Completion Rate)*
Institute	Qualtrics

\*The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (2016). *Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys*. Online: [https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR\\_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf](https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf) [accessed: October 10, 2020].

Qualtrics collected the data between 17 April and 11 May 2020 through a web-based survey with around 1,000 respondents per country based on quota sampling for sex, age and education. Our full sample consists of 6,028 respondents with an average age of 48 years and of which 49.6 percent are women. Regarding education, all groups are represented with primary and lower secondary education comprising around 25 percent, upper secondary 39 percent and tertiary education around 36 percent of respondents. At the time we conducted our survey, the pandemic was in full swing but the countries were affected to differing degrees. In Germany, for example, cases rose from 141,000 to 171,000 during the field period, while in the United Kingdom, the increase was from 117,000 to 215,000 cases. In Italy, cases rose from 172,000 to 219,000. Switzerland, on the other hand, did not experience such a sharp increase (27,000 to 31,000 cases).

*Table OA2: Factor loadings for conceptions of nationhood*

<b>Items</b>	<b>Ethnic conceptions (factor 1)</b>	<b>Civic conceptions (factor 2)</b>
“To have been born in [country]”	<b>0.85</b>	
“To have [country nationality] ancestry”	<b>0.88</b>	
“To be a Christian”	<b>0.81</b>	
“To respect [country nationality] institutions and laws”		<b>0.90</b>
“To be able to speak [country’s language]”		<b>0.79</b>

Notes: Range of the items is 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important); principal-component factor analysis with promax rotation. Only factor loadings > 0.30 are displayed.

Table OA3: Factor loadings for emotional responses

Items	Fear (factor 1)	Anger (factor 2)
“Afraid”	<b>0.70</b>	
“Nervous”	<b>0.85</b>	
“Upset”		<b>0.83</b>
“Hostile”		<b>0.71</b>

Notes: Confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. Only factor loadings > 0.30 are displayed.

Table OA4: Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis for fear and anger

	$\chi^2$	SRMR	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	AIC
Configural invariance	10.986	.006	.999	.996	.029	62464.571
Metric invariance	98.528	.046	.989	.976	.072	62532.269
Scalar invariance	811.240	.102	.900	.900	.147	63204.982

Notes: SRMR: standardized root mean squared residual; CFI: Comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA: root mean squared error of approximation; AIC: Akaike's information criterion

Table O.A5: Summary statistics of variables used

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Conceptions of nationhood</i>					
Continuous scale (higher → ethnic)	5,555	3.077	0.826	1	6
Subjective pandemic threat	5,555	4.488	1.708	1	7
# of known infections (log)	5,546	0.430	0.642	0	3.714
Age	5,555	48.710	16.634	18	88
Male	5,555	0.510	0.500	0	1
Lower secondary education	5,555	0.250	0.433	0	1
Upper secondary education	5,555	0.389	0.487	0	1
Tertiary education	5,555	0.361	0.480	0	1
Income situation	5,555	2.943	1.082	1	5
Health status	5,555	3.724	0.881	1	5
Migration background	5,555	0.175	0.380	0	1
Left-right self-placement	5,555	4.876	2.332	0	10
<i>Emotions</i>					
Fear (factor)	5,555	-0.017	0.994	-1.138	2.761
Anger (factor)	5,555	-0.016	0.992	-0.846	3.445
<i>Regional-level variables</i>					
Covid-19 cases per 100,000 inhabitants (log)	105	5.019	0.954	2.356	6.987
Covid-19 fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants (log)	105	2.470	1.082	0	4.732
Population density (log)	105	5.253	1.131	3.235	8.890
Share of elderly	105	21.781	4.078	11.09	31.488
Unemployment rate	105	7.886	5.367	0.9	25.22
GDP p.c. (log)	105	10.506	0.453	9.747	12.082

Source: Qualtrics online survey (April 17 to May 11, 2020); Income situation: How do you feel about your household's income nowadays? (It is very difficult to cope on my current income – I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly)”; Health status: How is your health in general? Would you say it is ... (very bad-very good)?; Migration background: Were your parents citizens of [COUNTRY] at the time of their birth? (dichotomized); all values before z-standardization.

Table OA6: Item wording for the main variables

Variable	Question wording
Conceptions of nationhood	<p>Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [member of country]. Others say they are not important. What do you think? How important do you think it is...</p> <p>to have been born in [country]?  to be a Christian?  to respect [country nationality] institutions and laws?  to have [country nationality] ancestry?  to be able to speak [country's language]?</p> <p><i>1 Not important at all to 7 Very important</i></p>
Emotional Responses	<p>Now we would like to know how you feel. The following words describe different kinds of feelings and emotions. Read every word and mark the intensity on the scale. You have the choice between five gradations. Please indicate how you feel at the moment.</p> <p>Upset  Hostile  Nervous  Afraid</p> <p><i>1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Moderately 4 Quite a bit 5 Extremely</i></p>
Subjective pandemic threat	<p>To what extent do you feel the coronavirus pandemic is a threat to you personally? Please indicate using the following scale from 1 “no threat at all” to 7 “very high threat”.</p> <p><i>1 No threat at all to 7 Very high threat</i></p>
Objective Risk Measure	<p>How many people do you personally know that have already tested positive, i.e. been diagnosed with coronavirus?</p> <p><i>Open answer</i></p>



Table O.A7: Regression results for individual-level pandemic threat

	(1)	
	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	
Subjective pandemic threat	0.048	(0.01)***
Age	0.001	(0.02)
Male	0.012	(0.01)
<i>Education</i>		
Upper secondary	-0.059	(0.02)***
Tertiary	-0.128	(0.01)***
Income situation	-0.083	(0.01)***
Health	-0.021	(0.01)
Migration background	-0.063	(0.02)***
Left-right	0.192	(0.01)***
<i>Country</i>		
France	0.021	(0.02)
Italy	0.183	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.028	(0.02)
Spain	0.155	(0.02)***
United Kingdom	0.049	(0.02)*
Constant	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,555	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.117	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education), Germany (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$


Table O48: full regression results for individual-level pandemic threat using infection numbers as alternative measurement

	(1) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	
# of infections personally known (log)	0.024	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
Age	0.004	(0.02)
Male	0.010	(0.01)
<i>Education</i>		
Upper secondary	-0.061	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Tertiary	-0.128	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Income situation	-0.087	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Health	-0.028	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
Migration background	-0.063	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right	0.192	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Country</i>		
France	0.024	(0.02)
Italy	0.184	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	0.022	(0.02)
Spain	0.156	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
United Kingdom	0.052	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>
Constant	-0.000	(0.02)
<i>N</i>	5,546	
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.115	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education), Germany (country)


<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

Figure OA9: Coefficient plot for individual-level pandemic threat by country (ethnic only)



Full regression results available upon request. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

Figure OA10: Coefficient plot for individual-level pandemic threat by country (civic only)



Full regression results available upon request. Displayed are linear regression coefficients with confidence intervals at 90% (black bars) and 95% (light gray bars) levels.

Table O.A11: Regression results for individual-level pandemic threat by country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Germany	France	Italy	Switzer- land	Spain	United Kingdom
	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	<i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>
Subjective threat from	0.092	0.093	0.055	0.008	0.020	0.001
Covid-19	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.03)*	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.049	-0.034	0.108	0.061	-0.038	-0.007
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)**	(0.03)*	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.088	-0.020	0.065	-0.011	0.031	-0.062
	(0.03)*	(0.04)	(0.03)+	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)*
<i>Education</i>						
Upper secondary	-0.140	-0.028	-0.079	-0.146	-0.036	-0.055
	(0.05)*	(0.05)	(0.03)*	(0.05)**	(0.04)	(0.02)*
Tertiary	-0.155	-0.126	-0.089	-0.256	-0.078	-0.161
	(0.05)**	(0.04)**	(0.04)*	(0.05)***	(0.04)*	(0.02)***
Income situation	-0.081	-0.109	-0.066	-0.089	-0.063	-0.088
	(0.03)*	(0.03)**	(0.02)**	(0.02)***	(0.03)+	(0.02)**
Health	-0.035	0.038	-0.034	-0.013	-0.116	0.023
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)***	(0.03)
Migration background	0.027	-0.071	0.039	-0.139	-0.106	-0.044
	(0.04)	(0.02)**	(0.03)	(0.04)**	(0.04)*	(0.03)
Left-right	0.174	0.232	0.191	0.257	0.192	0.124
	(0.03)***	(0.04)***	(0.03)***	(0.04)***	(0.04)***	(0.03)**
Constant	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>N</i>	952	943	894	885	885	996
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.063	0.089	0.070	0.140	0.063	0.044

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table O412: Full regression results from macro-level analyses

	(1) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>		(2) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	
# of regional Covid-19 cases (log)	0.061	(0.03)*		
# of regional Covid-19 deaths (log)			0.068	(0.02)**
Subjective threat from Covid-19	0.057	(0.01)***	0.054	(0.01)***
Age	-0.004	(0.02)	-0.003	(0.02)
Male	0.015	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)
<i>Education</i>				
Upper secondary	-0.141	(0.03)***	-0.135	(0.03)***
Tertiary	-0.289	(0.03)***	-0.287	(0.03)***
Income situation	-0.092	(0.01)***	-0.092	(0.01)***
Health	-0.016	(0.01)	-0.016	(0.01)
Migration background	-0.072	(0.02)***	-0.071	(0.02)***
Left-right	0.190	(0.01)***	0.189	(0.01)***
Constant	0.173	(0.03)***	0.177	(0.03)***
<i>N</i>	5,515		5,515	
# of groups	105		105	
ICC	0.043		0.043	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table O.A13: Full results from macro-level analysis with further control variables

	(1) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>		(2) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	
# of regional Covid-19 cases (log)	0.091	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>		
# of regional Covid-19 deaths (log)			0.062	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>
Subjective threat from Covid-19	0.051	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.049	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.001	(0.02)	0.001	(0.02)
Male	0.013	(0.01)	0.014	(0.01)
<i>Education</i>				
Upper secondary	-0.061	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.059	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Tertiary	-0.132	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.132	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Income situation	-0.089	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.089	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Health	-0.013	(0.01)	-0.014	(0.01)
Migration background	-0.063	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.064	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right	0.192	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.191	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Regional level</i>				
Population density (log)	-0.017	(0.03)	-0.034	(0.03)
Share of elderly	-0.018	(0.03)	-0.054	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>
Unemployment share	0.069	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.072	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>
GDP p. c. (log)	-0.085	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	-0.060	(0.03) <sup>+</sup>
Constant	0.005	(0.02)	0.012	(0.02)
N	5,515		5,515	
# of groups	105		105	
ICC	0.021		0.024	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education)

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

Table O.A14: Replication of the macro-level models using a jackknifing procedure

	(1) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>		(2) <i>Civic-ethnic continuum</i>	
# of regional Covid-19 cases (log)	0.061	(0.03)*		
# of regional Covid-19 deaths (log)			0.068	(0.02)**
Subjective threat from Covid-19	0.057	(0.01)***	0.054	(0.01)***
Age	-0.004	(0.02)	-0.003	(0.02)
Male	0.015	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)
<i>Education</i>				
Upper secondary	-0.069	(0.02)***	-0.066	(0.02)***
Tertiary	-0.139	(0.02)***	-0.138	(0.02)***
Income situation	-0.092	(0.01)***	-0.092	(0.01)***
Health	-0.016	(0.01)	-0.016	(0.01)
Migration background	-0.072	(0.02)***	-0.071	(0.02)***
Left-right	0.190	(0.01)***	0.189	(0.01)***
_cons	0.014	(0.03)	0.021	(0.03)
N	5,515		5,515	
# of groups	105		105	
ICC	0.043		0.043	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: lower secondary (education)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



### 3. Article 2: Violated Entitlement and the Nation: How Feelings of Relative Deprivation Shape Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism<sup>20</sup>

#### Abstract

Perceptions of violated entitlement resulting from group-based relative deprivation shape attitudes and behaviors decisively. Drawing on social identity theory, I hypothesize that nationalism and constructive patriotism portray divergent relationships with subjective feelings of being disadvantaged due to different coping strategies to overcome status inferiority. Employing an original, large-scale survey from six European countries, the results clearly show that group-based relative deprivation is positively linked to nationalism, whereas the reverse holds for constructive patriotism. These results hold irrespective of a wide array of robustness checks. Thus, the present study adds to extant literature by identifying feelings of disadvantage as crucial for predicting nationalism and constructive patriotism, two key manifestations of group membership and in-group identification.

**Keywords:** nationalism, constructive patriotism, relative deprivation, social identity theory, coping strategy

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<sup>20</sup> This chapter is identical with an article that was published in the *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (Wamsler, 2022).

## Introduction

Whether individuals show their support for the respective nation through nationalism or constructive patriotism (CP) is of central importance, as the specific kind of support may both integrate and divide societies (Citrin et al., 2001). Whereas nationalism elevates the own nation over other nations and idealizes its past, present, and future, constructive patriotism is focused on the own nation's democratic and humanist achievements as well as on an equal standing of different nations without derogating others (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Davidov, 2009; Schatz et al., 1999; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016).

To explain this distinction, recent research has identified perceptions of threat to the (social) status of an individual or group to be of particular relevance for social identities and political attitudes (e.g., Gidron and Hall, 2020; Schmuck and Matthes, 2017; Willis-Esqueda et al., 2017). Within this area, the present study focuses on the idea of subjective relative deprivation, which has gained immense attention over the past years. It describes how people react to perceptions of being unfairly disadvantaged against others in society by experiencing a sense of violated entitlement accompanied by feelings of angry resentment in situations that fundamentally threaten their social status and self-esteem (Meuleman et al., 2020; Smith and Huo, 2014; Urbanska and Guimond, 2018). A longstanding strand of scholarly research has repeatedly argued that social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), the major framework for studying social identity in general, and relative deprivation theory complement each other well as in-group identification and perceptions of group-based violated entitlement are inherently linked to each other (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984). Previous studies have provided substantial evidence that relative deprivation may explain behavioral outcomes like nationalist vote choice (Abrams and Grant, 2012; Grant et al., 2017; Urbanska and Guimond, 2018) and that it is linked to right-wing authoritarian or populist attitudes that may coincide with nationalist attitudes (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

Against this backdrop, this study examines how feelings of being unfairly disadvantaged in relation to other groups in society are linked to nationalist sentiments and constructive patriotism. Drawing on both social identity theory and relative deprivation theory, I argue that feelings of subjective group-based relative deprivation may foster nationalist attitudes. This is mainly because nationalist ideas provide a viable and meaningful coping strategy for those suffering from status

inferiority as a result of relative deprivation (cf. Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Further, the comparative nature of feelings of deprivation (Smith et al., 2012) resonates well with views of one's own nation's superiority over other nations and the strong affective reactions to any perceived threat to this superiority inherent in nationalist mindsets (Cottam et al., 2010; Davidov, 2009). Conversely, group-level relative deprivation likely dampens constructive patriotism since its non-comparative and in-group-focused nature (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Schatz et al., 1999) sets the stage for a very different set of available coping strategies to improve one's self-image by means of a temporary withdrawal of support.

Drawing on an original, large-scale survey with about 6,000 respondents conducted in April and May 2020 in six European countries, this study finds that group-level relative deprivation is indeed positively related to nationalist attitudes. The same perceptions, however, relate to constructive patriotism in a negative way, thus showing that these two concepts differ substantially in how they relate to group-based relative deprivation as a threat to their in-group's social status. Further, the analyses show that these relationships are robust across individual countries, various model specifications, and measurement approaches for group-level relative deprivation. In doing so, the present paper contributes to extant literature in two major ways. First, I focus explicitly on nationalism and CP at the attitudinal level, which previous studies on vote choice have left aside. Similarly, blending particular dimensions of either of the two concepts with authoritarian or populist attitudes disregards important conceptual differences. As the empirical results are strongly robust across several measurement and model specifications as well as across different national contexts, this study provides novel, substantial evidence that group-based subjective relative deprivation is a crucial predictor of both nationalism and CP at the attitude level. Second, by including constructive patriotism as a concept distinct from nationalist attitudes, I provide a novel and encompassing theoretical argument for explaining differences between these concepts that many other explanatory variables struggle to account for. Neither nationalism nor CP are unmoved movers, but may change as a result of different factors (e.g., Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016; Feinstein, 2016), which necessitates a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at work here. Further, it supports the claim that feelings of relative deprivation do not uniformly strengthen social identities. Instead, it is vital to take a fine-grained perspective on the particular manifestation of the respective identity.

## Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism

A rich strand of scholarly research has distinguished between nationalist attitudes (sometimes also referred to as national chauvinism) on the one hand and (constructive) patriotism on the other (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Huddy, 2016; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Although both may be understood as “more specific expressions of national identity” (Blank and Schmidt, 2003: 291) or as its “affective dimension” (Citrin et al., 2001: 74), they are fundamentally distinct modes of national support that differ in terms of both their causes and their consequences as well as in their substantive meaning (Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Rapp, 2020). Whether individuals subscribe to one or the other has major consequences for their understanding of intergroup relations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003), attitudes towards out-groups and immigrants (Finell and Zogmaister, 2015; Spry and Hornsey, 2007), or reactions to globalization (Ariely, 2012).

The defining feature of an individual with a nationalist mindset is the conviction that one’s own nation is superior over basically all other nations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Verdugo and Milne, 2016). Other aspects associated with nationalist attitudes are the idealization of the nation and an uncritical acceptance of national authorities (Adorno et al., 1950; Green et al., 2011; Huddy, 2016; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989), whereas out-groups are mostly viewed in a hostile way (Schatz et al., 1999). Finally, nationalist attitudes often go hand in hand with authoritarian and militarist attitudes, although they are not conceptually equivalent (Blank and Schmidt, 2003). In summary, individuals holding nationalist attitudes derogate out-groups *vis-à-vis* the national in-group, which is exalted and over-emphasized.

Constructive patriotism is fundamentally distinct from nationalism and reflects “functionally different psychological dimensions” (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989: 272). The idea behind CP focuses on pride in the nation’s democratic institutions, its humanist ideals, and equality of all societal groups (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Habermas, 1994). The own nation is not idealized and elevated over other nations and negative in-group related feelings are accepted if the nation is not viewed as meeting one’s expectations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Schatz and Staub, 1997). Contrary to nationalism, CP allows for a temporary withdrawal of support and loyalty in such a case (Blank, 2003; Schatz and Staub, 1997; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016). Unlike nationalist attitudes, CP is not related to right-wing authoritarianism (Osborne et al., 2017). Further, CP does not entail a negative view on immigration (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Spry and Hornsey, 2007). Thus,

national pride as the strength of one's national support is not achieved by derogating other nations, whose respective achievements may be highly valued instead, but by congruence between expectations and experiences regarding the own nation.

### **Relative Deprivation, Nationalism, and Constructive Patriotism**

Originally developed in a study among US American soldiers and their promotion practices (Stouffer et al., 1949), the concept of subjective relative deprivation<sup>21</sup> (RD) (cf. Merton, 1957; Pettigrew, 1967; Runciman, 1966) has developed into a powerful pathway for exploring a wide range of political attitudes and behavior (Griffin et al., 2020; Meuleman et al., 2020; Pettigrew, 2015, 2016; Smith et al., 2012; Smith and Huo, 2014). RD refers to “the judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment” (Smith et al., 2012: 203). These subjective evaluations of one's relative status occur either in comparison to relevant others or (expectations of) the self in either past or future, which substantially shape citizens' emotions, cognition and behavior (Mummendey et al., 1999). In light of this, scholars have identified three necessary conditions for relative deprivation to occur: First, an individual needs to make a comparison between her or her own in-group's social status and that of a relevant other individual or group (cognitive appraisal). Second, this comparison must result in the perception of being disadvantaged by that individual. Lastly, this perception of being disadvantaged needs to be viewed as unfair and cause feelings of angry resentment (Smith et al., 2012: 204). Finally, it is important to distinguish between RD based on comparisons between individuals and RD resulting from (perceived) group-based grievances (Runciman, 1966). Group-level relative deprivation (GRD) has been shown to be particularly relevant for societal outcomes, whereas individual-level RD is more important in contexts of individual well-being and health (Abrams and Grant, 2012; Smith et al., 2012).

Despite the prominence of GRD as an explanation for a range of prominent research topics in the social sciences, such as populist attitudes (e.g., Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Marchlewska et al., 2018) or political protest behavior (Brockmann et al., 2009; Graham and

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<sup>21</sup> Some scholars refer to objective relative deprivation as an alternative term to a lower socio-economic status (e.g., Yoxon et al., 2019). Subjective relative deprivation, however, is more useful in the context of attitudes and behavior as it explains the occurrence of feelings of disadvantage even among those whose socio-economic status does not make them deprived by objective standards (Smith and Huo, 2014: 232; see also Gidron and Hall, 2020).

Pettinato, 2002; Power, 2018), only few studies today have linked relative deprivation to nationalist attitudes in a comprehensive way. A series of works has established that support for Scottish independence is fostered by both relative deprivation and social identity (Abrams et al., 2020; Abrams and Grant, 2012; Grant et al., 2017). In this particular context, the authors argue that perceptions of GRD contribute to increased awareness of group-based discrimination and negative intergroup emotions, which result in a demand for social change that is behind vote intentions in the 2014 referendum (Abrams et al., 2020: 427). However, no direct link is established between GRD and nationalism since an attitude as the latter is assumed to be independent of the former. Urbanska and Guimond (2018) take a different approach and demonstrate that GRD predicts voting intentions for the French radical right, but not of other populist parties. Yet, this extant literature looks only at behavioral outcomes and relies on single cases, thus falling short of providing comparative evidence for their theoretical reasoning. Studies on right-wing (populist) movements find relative deprivation to be crucial for garnering support for those parties and political groups (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Yet, they cannot disentangle populism from nationalism sufficiently as the two concepts are easily conflated.<sup>22</sup> While there exists some evidence linking perceptions of GRD to higher levels of nationalism, extant research has thoroughly neglected CP as a distinct mode of national support. Thus, the present study attempts to fill this gap in two ways. First, it provides a theoretical framework for studying the relationship between GRD and nationalist attitudes as a set of attitudes independent of vote choice, which is typically affected by a wide array of variables, and without entangling it with populism as an overlapping, yet distinct, ideological framework. Second, it introduces CP as a concept distinct from nationalism to allow for a comprehensive framework for studying differences between the two.

For this purpose, I draw on both relative deprivation theory as well as on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) to provide a meaningful framework for explaining differences between nationalism and CP. Both theoretical frameworks aim at analyzing intergroup relations and have been shown to complement each other fruitfully (Kessler et al., 1999; Mummendey et al., 1999; Schatz et al., 1999; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984). Intergroup relations are also an integral part of both nationalist attitudes and CP, which makes this theoretical framework particularly well suited for the present study.

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<sup>22</sup> See Bonikowski (2017), Bonikowski et al. (2019), Brubaker (2020), and de Cleen and Stavrakakis (2020) for the ongoing debate on this issue.

Nationalists have a strong inclination to view their own nation in a very positive, idealized light that is less an evaluation of what actually is but a reflection of what should be (Blank, 2003: 262). This inclination results from a conviction that their own nation is superior to other nations (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Davidov, 2009). Such a comparative perspective on the relative status of groups reflects well the cognitive dimension of GRD (Smith et al., 2012). From the perspective of SIT, individuals perceiving their in-group as disadvantaged against other groups are likely to engage in a range of strategies to overcome this situation of inferiority (Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). One such coping strategy is called social creativity and stands for reshaping the categories of comparison in a way to overcome this perceived inferiority of the in-group (Mummendey et al., 1999: 230). In that sense, nationalist ideas should provide a promising means for individuals suffering from GRD to tackle a situation that fundamentally threatens the positive self-esteem they desire. The more idealized view of nationalist in-group superiority, which deflects certain shortcomings of the in-group and elevates it over out-groups categorically and rather irrespective of objective factors (cf. Adorno et al., 1950; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Davidov, 2009; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Schatz et al., 1999) should allow individuals suffering from GRD to stick to a positively idealized image of their in-group. This strategy of idealizing the in-group and of holding a strong conviction of how things should be reflects well the “deep story” that ethnographic literature has found to be pivotal in right-wing discourses to cope with perceptions of an adverse societal environment (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016: 135). Accordingly, the strategy of social competition (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 44) that follows a logic of aggressively improving one’s in-group’s self-image by engaging in intergroup conflict is also compatible with a nationalist mindset with its competitive worldview that views intergroup relations as a zero-sum game. In this vein, nationalist ideas are particularly attractive for low-status individuals and groups (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Shayo, 2009). Guimond and Dambrun (2002) also find that such groups tend to stigmatize and derogate out-groups more than other societal groups do. Thus, stronger nationalist attitudes should result from engaging in particular coping strategies to improve the in-group’s status and to enhance one’s self-esteem in the face of GRD.

Second, the “sense of violated entitlement” (Cook et al., 1977: 312) that defines the affective component of RD is very similar to the nationalist arousal manifesting itself in case of a (perceived) threat to the nation and its well-being (Cottam et al., 2010; Gellner, 1983). In this view, both GRD

and nationalism evoke emotional reactions to situations threatening the in-group's status that complement each other well. A third link between nationalism and GRD is provided by social-dominance orientation (Sidanius et al., 1994). Individuals suffering from GRD are more likely to have stronger preferences for group-based hierarchies (Guimond and Dambrun, 2002), which is the same for those holding nationalist attitudes (Osborne et al., 2017). Aside from these more direct linkages, research has shown that members of national out-groups, such as immigrants, are major comparison groups for evaluating one's relative social status and hence for experiencing group-based relative deprivation (Meuleman et al., 2020; Pettigrew et al., 2008). Since the derogation of and hostility towards out-groups is inherently linked to nationalist attitudes (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Schatz et al., 1999), it seems likely that individuals viewing themselves and their in-group as deprived become more hostile towards out-groups and thus more nationalistic to channel their anger as an affective response. Based on these considerations and in line with other recent research (Abrams et al., 2020; Eller et al., 2020; Gest et al., 2018), I derive my first hypothesis.

*H1: feelings of GRD are positively related to nationalist attitudes.*

Whereas the reasoning above leads to postulating a positive link from GRD to nationalist attitudes, whose underlying argument can be linked to a substantial amount of related literature, the picture looks different when turning to CP, which has received little scholarly attention with regards to GRD. A CP-oriented mindset rejects any comparison with or derogation of out-groups (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Davidov, 2009; Schatz et al., 1999; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016). Thus, feelings of GRD based on such comparisons fit poorly with CP, which lacks the cognitive appraisals drawing on out-group comparisons that are necessary for perceptions of GRD to occur. Yet, as introduced above, GRD is not necessarily a function of comparisons with out-groups but may also follow from failing to achieve an ideal standard for the in-group that its perceived current status fails to meet. The critically-constructive nature of CP, however, runs contrary to any feelings of in-group superiority or idealizations thereof based on either kind of comparison (Schatz and Staub, 1997). For constructive patriots, a positive group-based self-esteem is a result of an evaluation of what is instead of a stylized view of the nation as is the case for nationalist attitudes. Therefore, perceptions of violated entitlement regarding the in-group's social status should result in less pride in the nation, its democratic institutions, its fair treatment of societal groups, etc. In consequence, SIT proposes different coping strategies for CP than for nationalist attitudes. The creative or competitive means of improving one's self-esteem that resonate well with nationalist attitudes hardly



work if national identity is constructed in the form of CP. Instead, perceptions of GRD should trigger a temporary withdrawal of support for this group resulting from a frustration over the in-group's perceived status. This should result in lower levels of CP, as they constitute a perceived failure of the national in-group to meet one's expectations based on democratic and humanist ideals. Such a withdrawal is acceptable for a certain period of time without altering the underlying social identity substantively (Blank, 2003; Staub, 1997). Therefore, I expect perceptions of group-level relative deprivation to lead to lower levels of constructive patriotism.

*H2: feelings of GRD are negatively related to constructive patriotism.*

## **Data and Method**

Before putting the theoretical framework outlined above to the empirical test, I introduce the original dataset employed for this study and present the empirical models. The data stems from an original survey that was conducted between April 17 and May 11, 2020 in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. About 1,000 respondents per country (6,028 in total) were selected using nationally representative quotas on sex, age, and education to match the distribution of these variables among the general population of each country.<sup>23</sup> These countries vary considerably in terms of institutional, economic, or societal background, which should allow for a (to some extent) higher generalizability of results obtained from this set of cases to a broader context. Further, these countries all have their own historical as well as recent experiences and connotations with citizens' relationship to the nation. For example, France is a historically strong nation state that tends to take great pride in its legacy, whereas Germany is a federal state that has been a divided country for four decades and struggles to come to terms with national pride and national identification after the atrocities of National Socialist ideology, which results in a profoundly different manifestation of nationalism and CP at the national level (Brubaker, 1992). Italy also has experienced fascism and additionally has had a right-wing political party as part of the government in recent years. Both Spain and the United Kingdom each have strong regional independence movements challenging the notion of a common nation state. The former, however, experienced

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<sup>23</sup> In the case of Switzerland, language was added to these quotas to account for the different national languages. A more detailed description of the survey may be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.

a long absence of right-wing, nationalist movements in national politics after the Franco dictatorship until very recently, whereas the latter had a far stronger nationalist element in the national political discourse and government over the past years. Switzerland, finally, is strongly federal and multilingual, yet at the same time cherishes its “Swissness” with a national populist party as the strongest political party at the national level (Bernhard, 2017). Regarding societal inequality and public policies to tackle it, the dataset includes countries like France, where the societal idea of *égalité* pushes stronger measures to combat group-based disadvantages, whereas the notion of individual responsibility for one’s fortune plays a stronger role in the United Kingdom or Switzerland. The social market economy of Germany, but also Italy and Spain, occupy a middle ground regarding the societal and political context for GRD. By employing such a diverse number of countries, this dataset enables a thorough test of the proposed relationship between GRD on the one hand and nationalism and CP on the other hand in a variety of well-suited cases. Existing comparative datasets, unfortunately, lack at least one of the crucial items for testing the proposed relationships appropriately.

To measure nationalist attitudes and CP, the dataset includes a total of five items that have been in wide use and are well-suited for cross-national research (ISSP Research Group, 2015). For nationalist attitudes, the items are “Generally speaking, [Country] is a better country than most other countries” and “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country Nationality]”. Both items reflect the notion of the own nation’s superiority over other nations that is central to a nationalist mindset (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Thus, this measurement revolves around the aspect of nationalist attitudes that is clearly distinct from other, related concepts in empirical terms since items on uncritical loyalty or out-group derogation tend to overlap overly with authoritarian or xenophobic attitudes, respectively. To capture CP, respondents were asked “How proud are you of [Country] in the way democracy works?”, “How proud are you of [Country] in its social security system?” and “How proud are you of [Country] in its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?”. Despite both sets of items constituting rather brief measures of nationalist attitudes and CP, they represent an established

approach in a cross-national context and yield greater measurement validity than most other approaches (Davidov, 2009; Mußotter, 2021).<sup>24</sup> Confirmatory factor analysis confirms that the respective sets of items load well onto one factor for nationalism and one for CP in the present dataset as well, thus reflecting the conceptually distinct nature of the two factors as established in previous research (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).<sup>25</sup> Further, a structural equation model testing for measurement invariance supports full metric invariance of the two factors across the six countries ( $CFI > 0.9$ ,  $RMSEA < 0.08$ ), which is crucial for valid analyses across countries (Davidov, 2009).<sup>26</sup>

For subjective group-based relative deprivation, respondents were asked if they agree with four different statements. The first three reflect the cognitive appraisal component of GRD and ask whether respondents experience a general feeling of being undeservingly disadvantaged compared to other groups in general, as well as compared to immigrants or rich people in particular. The fourth item asks if any of these appraisals also leads to a feeling of angry resentment, which addresses the second necessary condition for GRD to occur (Smith et al., 2012).<sup>27</sup> In the analyses, these items were combined into four different variables to reflect the different comparison groups. The first variable uses the mean of all three groups, whereas the other three focus on one specific comparison group each.<sup>28</sup> Employing different comparison groups allows for testing the proposed relationships between GRD and national identity by using distinct measurement approaches that are important from a theoretical point of view as well. Operationalizing GRD with explicit reference to a national in-group (rich people) tests the hypotheses detached from notions of nationality and immigration, whereas the second comparison group (immigrants) puts a national out-group into focus. In accordance with previous research stressing the non-compensatory nature of the two dimensions of GRD (cognitive and affective) (Cook et al., 1977; Guimond and Dambrun, 2002;

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<sup>24</sup> The burgeoning literature on nationalism and CP particularly in the field of political psychology has come up with other measurement approaches as well (e.g., de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Hanson and O'Dwyer, 2019; Schatz et al., 1999). CP, for example, may also be measured using items revolving around a critical perspective on the nation's actions. However, it remains unclear if this actually measures CP itself or other political values and interests (Huddy, 2016: 12). Thus, in order to obtain a previously validated and at the same time brief measure of both nationalism and CP within a very restricted amount of survey space, this study sticks to the present approach that is well-suited to studying both as conceptually as well as empirically distinct concepts.

<sup>25</sup> Since this conceptually distinct nature does not preclude a substantial empirical overlap ( $r = 0.46$ ), I conducted the main analyses including nationalist attitudes and CP as additional control variables for each other as a robustness check. This is presented in more detail in the results section.

<sup>26</sup> Factor loadings and goodness-of-fit indices may be found in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.

<sup>27</sup> Relative deprivation theory consistently argues that a valid measure of GRD needs to include both cognitive and affective dimensions with appropriate target groups for the former (Smith et al., 2012; Smith and Huo, 2014).

<sup>28</sup> Unspecified comparison group: *GRD (general)*, GRD towards immigrants: *GRD (immigrants)*, GRD towards rich people: *GRD (rich people)*, mean of all three comparison groups: *GRD (mean)*.

Mummendey et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2012), the geometric mean between the cognitive and affective dimensions was taken for each variable to obtain a measurement of GRD that is closer to its conceptual structure than a simple additive index (cf. Wuttke et al., 2020).<sup>29</sup> Assessing the scale reliability for the four items yields an adequate Cronbach's alpha across the entire sample as well as for each individual country.<sup>30</sup>

To account for potential confounders of the relationship under study, I rely on a common set of control variables including demographic variables like age, gender, education (age when finished full-time education), income situation, health, occupational status, and residential area. Further, I included respondents' left-right self-placement both as a linear term to proxy political ideology and as a squared term to capture the likely effect of political positions closer to the respective extremes. Further, I account for a potential impact of the coronavirus pandemic that broke out shortly before the survey was fielded on relative deprivation and/or national identity (cf. Esaisasson et al., 2020; Woods et al., 2020) by using the logarithm of the number of confirmed cases that respondents personally know as a proxy for pandemic exposure.<sup>31</sup> To provide an empirical test of the conceptual distinction between populist attitudes, authoritarianism, and the two main concepts of interest, two additional robustness checks include the former two as indices based on previous research (Altemeyer, 1998; Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Mohrenberg et al., 2021). All explanatory variables are z-standardized to obtain comparable coefficients.

As empirical models, I employ linear regression models with country-fixed effects to account for potential unobserved differences between the six countries. Yet, respondents also cluster within the 112 subnational NUTS regions covered by the dataset, which often reflect distinct, regional identities or important differences between peripheral and urban regions. I thus cluster standard errors at the level of regions, which has the further advantage of providing more reliable estimates as compared to the relatively small number of clusters at the country-level (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Donner and Klar, 2000). As all variables of interest are located at the individual level, a fixed-effects model is preferable to a full-fledged multilevel model to keep its structure more

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<sup>29</sup> Summary statistics for all variables can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Figures A1 and A2 show the distribution of the main items of interest across the sample.

<sup>30</sup> Entire sample: 0.80; GER: 0.84; FRA: 0.80; ITA: 0.77; SWI: 0.83; SPA: 0.69; UK: 0.78.

<sup>31</sup> As an alternative measurement, I also used individual-level threat perceptions as posed by the pandemic. The results for this robustness check may be found in Table A7 in the Appendix, whereas A8 shows the same analysis without any of these variables.

parsimonious, while at the same time paying attention to higher-level heterogeneity. Thus, the two sets of models each assess the relationship between GRD and nationalism or CP comprehensively by controlling for likely confounders at the individual level and accounting for likely heterogeneity between the different countries and the clustering of respondents at the regional level.

## Results

In this section, I present the results from the empirical analyses and relate them to the hypotheses derived earlier in this paper. Full regression tables with all control variables may be found in Tables A5 and A6 in the Online Appendix, while the figures below show the results for the main variables of interest. Independent of the different measurement specifications outlined in the previous section, individuals experiencing more subjective GRD are consistently more likely to hold nationalist attitudes, which is in clear support of hypothesis 1 (Figure 1). The coefficient linking GRD to nationalist attitudes is substantial in comparison to most of the control variables with only left-right orientation being stronger. Figure 3 shows the relationship between GRD and nationalist attitudes for all four measurements of the former. While the positive relationship is strongest for GRD experienced in comparison to immigrants – thus confirming the major role of this comparison group in nationalist discourse (e.g. Coenders and Scheepers, 2004; Simonsen and Bonikowski, 2020) – GRD experienced in comparison to an unspecified group or to rich people in society is an equally significant predictor of stronger nationalist attitudes with only marginally smaller coefficients. Taken together, this clearly supports the idea that nationalism may be a crucial coping strategy for people perceiving their in-group as being relatively deprived irrespective of whether this perceived disadvantage is against immigrants or other comparison groups.

Figure 2 shows the results of the same analysis with constructive patriotism as dependent variable. In accordance with hypothesis 2, the results show a consistent, negative link between all four measures of GRD and CP (see Figure 3). Here, the differences between the different indicators are less pronounced but GRD regarding immigrants is a slightly weaker predictor of CP than an unspecified comparison group or rich people in general. This lends support to the notion that a CP-oriented mindset is more focused on the own nation as a whole instead of distinguishing between

national in- and out-groups (cf. Spry and Hornsey, 2007).<sup>32</sup> Compared to the control variables, GRD is a decisively stronger predictor of CP than all of them except for left-right orientation and the squared term thereof. Importantly, all these results hold regardless of if and how the Covid-19 pandemic is accounted for, which is a robust indication that they are applicable to other contextual circumstances as well and that they are not driven by any kind of pandemic threat (see Tables A7 and A8). Whereas nationalist attitudes are likely higher if this kind of threat increases, CP yields no significant relationship in this context.

Since previous research stresses the importance of affective responses in the context of national support (Gellner, 1983; Hochschild, 2016; Marcus et al., 2019; Muldoon et al., 2020), I repeated the same analyses but excluded the item on the affective dimension to examine if these relationships are driven by this item. Tables A9 and A10 show that the results are substantively similar to the full models. Only the relationship between GRD towards rich people and nationalist attitudes turns marginally insignificant. While this additional finding supports the notion that emotions matter particularly in the context of nationalist attitudes, this robustness check substantiates the claim that GRD as such is crucial for predicting both nationalism and CP. As another robustness check, I included each of the two dependent variables as additional predictors of the respective other variable. These models account for the fact that – despite clear conceptual differences – there is substantial empirical overlap between the two concepts ( $r = 0.46$ ).<sup>33</sup> While both nationalist attitudes and CP are highly substantive predictors of each other that increase the amount of explained variance decisively, the main results regarding the relationship of both with GRD hold nonetheless. This clearly supports the idea that GRD may indeed be crucial for distinguishing between these two dimensions of national identity since it predicts the part of their respective variance that they do not have in common. Thus, feelings of violated entitlement account for substantive differences between attitudes of nationalism and constructive patriotism. Further, adding populist or authoritarian attitudes as control variables only marginally affects the main results of the analyses (see Tables A13 and A14). Whereas the coefficient for nationalist attitudes is slightly smaller and significant at the 5% level in the model with populist attitudes, the model with CP as dependent variable portrays only minuscule changes. This robustness check lends further support to the premise that

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<sup>32</sup> As one of the items measuring CP refers to social security, which might be another concept relevant in the context of GRD, I repeated the analyses for each of the three items separately. Overall, there are no substantive differences between them (results available upon request).

<sup>33</sup> See Tables A11 and A12 for full regression results.

both populist and authoritarian mindsets are related to both nationalism and CP, but should not affect their respective relationship with GRD (cf. Brubaker, 2020).

In a final step, I conducted the main analysis for each individual country in the dataset separately to assess if any of the relationships presented in the previous paragraph is contingent on particular national contexts. Tables A15 and A16 show the main coefficients for each of the four main measurements of GRD across all six countries. Overall, 18 of these 24 models support the positive link between GRD and nationalism with perceptions of being disadvantaged against rich people in society being less robust than the other items and Italy portraying a significant relationship only for GRD towards immigrants. For CP, 22 of the 24 models portray the expected negative association with GRD since only GRD towards immigrants turns insignificant in Spain and the United Kingdom. Thus, I find strong support for both hypotheses in the pooled sample as well as when looking at individual countries.

In summary, the empirical models shown in this section support both hypotheses 1 and 2 by demonstrating that group-level relative deprivation serves as an important predictor of both nationalism and constructive patriotism. The robustness of the results across a wide array of models shows that GRD is of crucial importance when distinguishing between these two concepts. Supporting the theoretical framework developed in this paper, I find that whereas nationalism and GRD are consistently related in a positive way, the contrary holds for CP, which shows a robust, negative relationship with perceptions of being treated unfairly *vis-à-vis* other groups in society.

## Discussion and Conclusion

How does subjective group-level relative deprivation relate to nationalism and constructive patriotism? Employing original survey data with quota-sampling that allow for a meaningful measurement of both explanatory and dependent variables, the analysis supports the hypothesis that GRD relates positively to nationalism. In contrast, a negative relationship in accordance with the second hypothesis can be detected for CP. These results are consistent and strongly robust across various alternative modeling approaches, such as including both dependent variables as additional predictors of each other or breaking the analysis down for individual countries. Adding measures of authoritarian or populist attitudes to the models does not alter the main findings, which provides

clear support to the claim that attitudes of both nationalism and CP are predicted by GRD independent of these concepts. Further, the results generally hold irrespective of the relevant comparison group for experiencing GRD or if the affective dimension of GRD is removed from the analysis. The size of the respective coefficients suggests that GRD is among the most substantial predictors of both nationalism and CP throughout all employed models. Consequently, we can conclude that feelings of GRD and nationalist attitudes resonate well with each other given that both rely on the same coping strategies derived from social identity theory in the face of perceived in-group status inferiority, given the comparative worldview underlying them, the very similar emotional reactions to status threat, the preferences for hierarchy-based social order, and a certain degree of out-group hostility defining GRD as well as nationalism. CP, however, has “fundamentally different psychological dimensions” (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989: 272) that run counter to any notions of national superiority, idealization of the in-group, or a competitive view on in-group-out-group relations, which calls for different coping strategies to improve one’s self-image and leads to a decrease in CP when confronted with perceptions of unfair disadvantage, such as a temporary withdrawal of support until the situation of relative deprivation is overcome. This lends further support to earlier studies showing that national attachment or support for the nation can hardly be studied as a unidimensional construct and that research needs to have clear conceptualizations of its various manifestations (Davidov, 2009; Meitinger, 2018; Schatz et al., 1999; Willis-Esqueda et al., 2017). As the study of GRD as a predictor of both nationalism and CP yields decisively different results for the two concepts, this offers crucial insights into understanding their differences both empirically and conceptually.

Yet, there are also issues that could not be covered within the scope of the present study. Particularly social and political trust have been frequently studied in relationship with national attachment or support for the nation (Berg and Hjerm, 2010; Dinesen et al., 2020; Lenard and Miller, 2018). While populist attitudes (Bonikowski, 2017; Bonikowski et al., 2019; Brubaker, 2020; Filsinger et al., 2021; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) and authoritarianism (Blank, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2017; Osborne et al., 2017) do not alter the relationship of interest in a meaningful way, it is beyond the scope of the present study to delve deeper into concepts like right-wing or authoritarian populism that often include aspects of nationalism in particular. Instead, it is the primary aim of the present study to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework to relate both nationalism and CP to GRD in a comprehensive way. Future research might certainly strive to



uncover on both conceptual and empirical grounds if further variables need to be taken into account for a profound analysis of GRD, nationalism, and CP. Naturally, the available data allows for drawing only correlational conclusions instead of testing causal claims or assessing the direction of the relationships. The theoretical reasoning derived from SIT, on which the hypotheses are based, makes it likely that perceptions of GRD are indeed crucial for shaping nationalism and CP. Changes in the latter as a result of other factors have been brought to scholarly attention repeatedly over the past years (Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016; Feinstein, 2016). Previous studies have also shown that group-orientations may be drivers of feelings of GRD in a reciprocal relationship (Zubielevitch et al., 2020). Recent research on right-wing populism, for example, has shown that people holding such attitudes are more sensitive to perceptions of violated entitlement (Bos et al., 2020; Hameleers and Fawzi, 2020). However, it remains unclear if the same holds true for nationalism or CP without references to a populist discourse, which often builds on the element of disadvantage of the common people. Consequently, I refrain from drawing any causal inferences from the empirical analysis or from referring to them outside of the theory section. This issue could be addressed by approaches like panel studies or experimental designs that seek to dive even deeper into the mechanisms underlying the hypotheses outlined here. Finally, despite considerable efforts to achieve a substantive variation of countries under analysis, the sample is of course limited to the (Western) European context. Therefore, it seems to be a promising avenue for future research to obtain appropriate data from other parts of the world, where nationalism and CP are equally relevant issues that are presumably affected by growing societal and economic disparities to enhance the applicability of the theoretical argument further. Given the relative stability of the results when accounting for several measurement approaches and a large amount of unobserved variation by means of clustering individuals within both countries and subnational regions, it seems very likely that the observations from this study apply to a wider context than analyzed here.


The previous paragraph notwithstanding, the present study makes vital contributions to the literature on both relative deprivation as well as nationalism and CP. It presents a novel theoretical framework linking GRD to nationalist attitudes and CP. Previous studies on the relationship between GRD and nationalist ideas have often conflated nationalist attitudes with other terms like national populism or right-wing authoritarianism, which are related, yet distinct, concepts (cf. Bonikowski et al., 2019; Brubaker, 2020). A valid analysis of the relationship between GRD and nationalist attitudes, however, needs to disentangle it from these confounders clearly to see which

variable is driven by perceptions of disadvantage. Constructive patriotism was largely neglected by previous research with regards to GRD. The results clearly support the claim that GRD is a crucial approach for distinguishing between nationalism and CP since previous research has at times struggled to explain why individuals identify with their nation in different ways. A series of robustness checks shows a great deal of consistency in the results, which substantiates the conclusions drawn from the empirical analyses. While it remains to be determined to what extent the results are applicable beyond the immediate context of the employed dataset, how they travel beyond the cases of the countries analyzed here, and how stable they are over time, the present assessment of how GRD predicts both nationalism and CP provides vital stepping stones for future development of the field on both conceptual and empirical grounds.

Beyond the scholarly relevance of my findings, there are also major implications for politics and society. First, the broader issue of support for the nation is a substantial driver of electoral behavior or even support for democratic governance itself (Erhardt et al., 2021; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Thompson, 2021; Urbanska and Guimond, 2018). Accordingly, GRD and perceptions of discrimination may result in certain groups' withdrawal from society as a whole and in people's focusing on in-group-oriented, demarcating social or political engagement (cf. Oskooii, 2020). Therefore, understanding causes and consequences of why people hold different modes of national support is crucial for numerous aspects of a political system. Second, GRD needs to be taken more into the spotlight of societal discussion since the analyses presented here contribute to previous claims that perceptions of unfair treatment constitute a more important societal narrative than established accounts of pocketbook-oriented political behavior or economic hardship for explaining values and attitudes (cf. Mutz, 2018).


## Figures and Tables

Figure 1: coefficient plot for nationalist attitudes with 99% and 95% confidence intervals (see Table A5 for full regression results)




Notes: base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area)

Figure 2: coefficient plot for constructive patriotism with 99% and 95% confidence intervals (see Table A6 for full regression results)



Notes: base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area)

Figure 3: combined coefficient plot for GRD and nationalist attitudes/ constructive patriotism (see Tables A5 and A6 for full regression results)



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# Relative Deprivation and the Nation

## Online Appendix

Table A1: Detailed description of the survey

<i>Survey period</i>	<b>April 17, 2020/May 11,2020</b>
<i>Target population</i>	Residents aged 18 years or older in Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom
<i>Survey mode</i>	Online
<i>Sample size</i>	6,028 respondents (target sample size: 1,000 per country)
<i>Quotas</i>	Age, Sex, Education (language for Switzerland)
<i>Sampling</i>	Qualtrics access panel
<i>Interview language</i>	German, French, Italian, Spanish, English
<i>Response rate</i>	8.71% (RR5/6 Completion Rate)*
<i>Institute</i>	Qualtrics

\*The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (2016). *Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys*. Online: [https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR\\_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf](https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/publications/Standard-Definitions20169theditionfinal.pdf) [accessed: October 10, 2020].

Qualtrics collected the data between 17 April and 11 May 2020 through a web-based survey with around 1,000 respondents per country based on quota sampling for sex, age and education. Our full sample consists of 6,028 respondents with an average age of 48 years (18-30 years: 19%, 30-45: 24%, 45-60: 26%, >60: 31%. UK: 25%, 24%, 23%, 28%) (WKO 2020) and of which 49.6 percent are women. Regarding education, all groups are represented with primary and lower secondary education comprising around 25 percent, upper secondary 39 percent and tertiary education around 36 percent of respondents (OECD 2019). Language in Switzerland: 65% German-speaking, 28% French-speaking, 7% Italian-speaking (slight over-sampling of the latter to ensure a substantive number of cases).

Table A2: Summary statistics and item wording (before standardization)

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Nationalism</i>					
“Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is better than most other countries.”	5,499	3.41	1.04	1	5
“The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].”	5,499	3.16	1.03	1	5
<i>Constructive patriotism</i>					
“How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following: The way democracy works?”	5,499	3.30	1.13	1	5
“- its social security system?”	5,499	3.63	1.08	1	5
“- its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?”	5,499	3.11	1.11	1	5
<i>Group-level subjective relative deprivation</i>					
“People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while other groups have received more than they deserve.”	5,499	3.25	1.18	1	5
“People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while immigrants have received more than they deserve.”	5,499	2.95	1.35	1	5
“People like me have been systematically disadvantaged, while rich people have received more than they deserve.”	5,499	3.60	1.18	1	5
“It bothers me when other groups are undeservedly better off than people like me.”	5,499	3.32	1.16	1	5
<i>Control variables</i>					
“How many people do you personally know that have already tested positive, i.e. been diagnosed with coronavirus?” (log)	5,499	.43	.64	0	3.71
“To what extent do you feel the coronavirus pandemic is a threat to you personally?” (no threat at all – very high threat)	5,499	4.47	1.71	1	7
“How old are you?”	5,499	48.50	16.58	18	88
“Please indicate your sex.” (male)	5,499	.51	.50	0	1
“How old were you when you stopped full-time education?”	5,499	20.26	4.84	0	70
“How do you feel about your household's income nowadays?” (it is very difficult to cope on my current income – I can live comfortably on my current income and can save regularly)	5,499	2.95	1.08	1	5
“How is your health in general? Would you say it is ...” (very bad – very good)	5,499	3.72	.88	1	5

Occupation: laborer or employee	5,499	.38	.48	0	1
Occupation: manual worker	5,499	.06	.24	0	1
Occupation: in public service	5,499	.04	.20	0	1
Occupation: self-employed w/o employees	5,499	.05	.23	0	1
Occupation: self-employed w/ employees	5,499	.02	.12	0	1
Occupation: retired	5,499	.25	.43	0	1
Occupation: student, apprentice	5,499	.05	.21	0	1
Occupation: unemployed	5,499	.11	.31	0	1
Occupation: other	5,499	.04	.19	0	1
"Would you say you live in a rural area or village?"	5,499	.25	.43	0	1
"- small town outside of a metropolitan area?"	5,499	.20	.40	0	1
"- mid-size town outside of a metropolitan area?"	5,499	.19	.39	0	1
"- suburb of a large city?"	5,499	.12	.33	0	1
"- large city?"	5,499	.23	.42	0	1
"In political matters, people talk of "left" and "right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?"	5,499	4.88	2.33	0	10
<i>Populist attitudes</i>					
"The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics."	5,499	3.97	.96	1	5
"Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job."	5,499	2.47	1.19	1	5
"The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people."	5,499	3.71	.97	1	5
"I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician."	5,499	3.31	1.09	1	5
"The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people."	5,499	3.68	.99	1	5
"Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives."	5,499	2.97	1.06	1	5
"You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics."	5,499	2.42	1.13	1	5
"The people I disagree with politically are not evil."	5,499	3.79	1.00	1	5
"The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed."	5,499	2.73	1.01	1	5
<i>Authoritarian attitudes</i>					
"We need strong leaders so that we can live safely in society."	5,499	3.83	1.08	1	5

“The welfare of the national community should take precedence over our own, individual interests.”	5,499	3.71	.95	1	5
“Troublemakers should be made to feel that they are not welcome in society.”	5,499	3.93	1.04	1	5

Note: see Table A17 for a comparison of the distribution of nationalism and CP items with the latest available comparative data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2013.

Figure A1: Density plot for nationalist attitudes






Figure A2: Density plot for constructive patriotism




Table A3: Confirmatory factor analysis for nationalism and constructive patriotism

Items	Nationalism (factor 1)	Constructive Patriotism (factor 2)
“Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is better than most other countries.”	<b>0.83</b>	
“The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].”	<b>0.78</b>	
“How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following: The way democracy works?”		<b>0.79</b>
“- its social security system?”		<b>0.62</b>
“- its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?”		<b>0.82</b>

Notes: standardized factor loadings from confirmatory factor analysis. Model fit indices:  $\chi^2$ : 38.605; RMSEA: 0.038; CFI: 0.997; TLI: 0.992; SRMR: 0.009.

Table A4: Multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis for nationalism and constructive patriotism

	$\chi^2$	SRMR	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	AIC
Configural invariance	122.186	.021	.991	.977	.064	77803.056
Metric invariance	278.939	.055	.978	.966	.078	77929.810
Scalar invariance	1888.030	.104	.830	.841	.168	79488.901

Notes: SRMR: *standardized root mean squared residual*; CFI: *Comparative fit index*; TLI: *Tucker-Lewis index*; RMSEA: *root mean squared error of approximation*; AIC: *Akaike's information criterion*

Table A5: Regression results for nationalist attitudes

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Nationalist attitudes		(3) Nationalist attitudes		(4) Nationalist attitudes	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.076</b>	(0.02)***						
GRD (general)			<b>0.054</b>	(0.02)***				
GRD (immi- grants)					<b>0.142</b>	(0.02)***		
GRD (rich peo- ple)							<b>0.041</b>	(0.01)**
Age	0.044	(0.03)+	0.045	(0.03)+	0.039	(0.03)	0.043	(0.03)+
Male	0.062	(0.01)***	0.063	(0.01)***	0.064	(0.01)***	0.062	(0.01)***
Education	-0.038	(0.01)**	-0.040	(0.01)**	-0.028	(0.01)*	-0.041	(0.01)**
Income situa- tion	0.050	(0.02)**	0.044	(0.02)*	0.062	(0.02)***	0.038	(0.02)*
Health	0.051	(0.02)**	0.049	(0.02)**	0.053	(0.02)**	0.048	(0.02)**
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)
In public ser- vice	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.001	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.046	(0.01)**	-0.047	(0.01)**	-0.042	(0.01)**	-0.048	(0.01)**
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.022	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.01)	-0.021	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.01)
Retired	-0.013	(0.02)	-0.015	(0.02)	-0.011	(0.02)	-0.015	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.015	(0.02)	0.013	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)	0.012	(0.02)
Unemployed	0.006	(0.02)	0.004	(0.02)	0.010	(0.02)	0.004	(0.02)
Other	-0.010	(0.01)	-0.011	(0.01)	-0.010	(0.01)	-0.010	(0.01)
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.029	(0.01)*	0.030	(0.01)*	0.029	(0.01)*	0.029	(0.01)*
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.027	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+
Suburbs	0.040	(0.02)**	0.040	(0.02)*	0.044	(0.02)**	0.039	(0.02)*
Large city	0.055	(0.02)**	0.055	(0.02)**	0.056	(0.02)**	0.054	(0.02)**
Left-right	0.140	(0.05)**	0.140	(0.05)**	0.105	(0.05)*	0.142	(0.05)**
Left-right (sq)	-0.004	(0.04)	0.001	(0.04)	0.001	(0.04)	0.002	(0.04)
Covid-19 pan- demic threat	0.049	(0.02)**	0.050	(0.02)**	0.048	(0.02)**	0.050	(0.02)**
<i>Country</i>								
France	-0.092	(0.02)***	-0.091	(0.02)***	-0.095	(0.02)***	-0.088	(0.02)***
Italy	-0.088	(0.02)***	-0.086	(0.02)***	-0.091	(0.02)***	-0.084	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.072	(0.02)***	0.072	(0.02)***	0.073	(0.02)***	0.072	(0.02)***
Spain	-0.082	(0.03)**	-0.084	(0.03)**	-0.080	(0.03)**	-0.082	(0.03)**
United King- dom	-0.022	(0.02)	-0.022	(0.02)	-0.018	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.02)
_cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.063		0.060		0.074		0.059	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Regression results for constructive patriotism

	(1) Constructive patriotism		(2) Constructive patriotism		(3) Constructive patriotism		(4) Constructive patriotism	
GRD (mean)	<b>-0.185</b>	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>						
GRD (general)			<b>-0.183</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>				
GRD (immi- grants)					<b>-0.138</b>	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>		
GRD (rich peo- ple)							<b>-0.166</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.015	(0.02)	0.009	(0.02)	0.021	(0.02)	0.017	(0.02)
Male	0.063	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.063	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.061	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.064	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Education	-0.029	(0.02) <sup>+</sup>	-0.027	(0.02) <sup>+</sup>	-0.033	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.024	(0.02)
Income situa- tion	0.082	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.080	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.104	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.093	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.079	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.080	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.088	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.081	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	-0.026	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.025	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.026	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.027	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
In public ser- vice	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.043	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.043	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.041	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.041	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.009	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.006	(0.01)	-0.010	(0.01)
Retired	-0.012	(0.02)	-0.011	(0.02)	-0.009	(0.02)	-0.011	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.042	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.045	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.042	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.044	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Unemployed	-0.023	(0.02)	-0.021	(0.02)	-0.023	(0.02)	-0.022	(0.02)
Other	-0.037	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.035	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.035	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.037	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.026	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.025	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.026	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.026	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.010	(0.01)	0.009	(0.01)	0.011	(0.01)	0.010	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.041	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.042	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.039	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.043	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Large city	0.045	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.046	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.046	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.046	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>
Left-right	0.220	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.219	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.261	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.205	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right (sq)	-0.175	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.181	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.199	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.181	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Covid-19 pan- demic threat	0.025	(0.02)	0.025	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)
<i>Country</i>								
France	-0.010	(0.02)	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.019	(0.02)	-0.016	(0.02)
Italy	-0.164	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.164	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.172	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.167	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	0.088	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.089	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.086	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.088	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>
Spain	-0.046	(0.04)	-0.041	(0.04)	-0.047	(0.04)	-0.047	(0.04)
United King- dom	-0.045	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.046	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.047	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.043	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>
_cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.143		0.142		0.130		0.138	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A7: Regression results for Covid-19 subjective threat as an alternative measurement

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Construc- tive patriot- ism	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.068</b>	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	<b>-0.232</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.033	(0.03)	0.003	(0.02)
Male	0.064	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.068	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Education	-0.036	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.042	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Income situa- tion	0.047	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.063	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.066	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.096	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Occupation</i>				
Manual worker	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.022	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
In public ser- vice	0.001	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.044	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.039	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.020	(0.01)	-0.010	(0.01)
Retired	-0.009	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.016	(0.02)	0.037	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Unemployed	0.004	(0.01)	-0.022	(0.02)
Other	-0.015	(0.01)	-0.032	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Residential area</i>				
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.027	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	0.024	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.025	(0.02)	0.007	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.038	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.034	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Large city	0.051	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.036	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>
Left-right	0.126	(0.04) <sup>**</sup>	0.229	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right (sq)	0.013	(0.04)	-0.174	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Covid-19 sub- jective threat	0.067	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.094	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Country</i>				
France	-0.093	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.017	(0.02)
Italy	-0.084	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.175	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	0.085	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.101	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Spain	-0.082	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	-0.038	(0.04)
United King- dom	-0.020	(0.02)	-0.056	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>
_cons	-0.000	(0.02)	-0.000	(0.02)
N	5615		5615	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.064		0.162	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Regression results without Covid-19 pandemic threat

	(1) Nationalist attitudes	(2) Construc- tive patriot- ism
GRD (mean)	<b>0.075</b> (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	<b>-0.223</b> (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.036 (0.03)	0.008 (0.02)
Male	0.061 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.063 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Education	-0.035 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.040 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>
Income situa- tion	0.045 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.060 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.056 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.082 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Occupation</i>		
Manual worker	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.026 (0.01) <sup>+</sup>
In public ser- vice	0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.047 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.043 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.020 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Retired	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.013 (0.02)	0.033 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Unemployed	-0.000 (0.02)	-0.027 (0.02) <sup>+</sup>
Other	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.033 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Residential area</i>		
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.028 (0.01) <sup>+</sup>	0.025 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.027 (0.02) <sup>+</sup>	0.010 (0.01)
Suburbs	0.038 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.034 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Large city	0.053 (0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.040 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>
Left-right	0.123 (0.04) <sup>**</sup>	0.225 (0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right (sq)	0.016 (0.04)	-0.171 (0.04) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Country</i>		
France	-0.084 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.004 (0.02)
Italy	-0.075 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.163 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	0.081 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.094 (0.03) <sup>***</sup>
Spain	-0.072 (0.03) <sup>*</sup>	-0.023 (0.04)
United King- dom	-0.012 (0.02)	-0.046 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>
_cons	-0.000 (0.02)	-0.000 (0.02)
N	5,615	5,615
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.154

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Regression results for nationalist attitudes without affective dimension of GRD

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Nationalist attitudes		(3) Nationalist attitudes		(4) Nationalist attitudes	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.079</b>	(0.02)***						
GRD (general)			<b>0.035</b>	(0.02)*				
GRD (immi- grants)					<b>0.144</b>	(0.02)***		
GRD (rich peo- ple)							0.002	(0.02)
Age	0.044	(0.03)+	0.045	(0.03)+	0.037	(0.03)	0.042	(0.03)+
Male	0.062	(0.01)***	0.062	(0.01)***	0.064	(0.01)***	0.063	(0.01)***
Education	-0.035	(0.01)*	-0.040	(0.01)**	-0.025	(0.01)+	-0.042	(0.01)**
Income situa- tion	0.053	(0.02)**	0.039	(0.02)*	0.059	(0.02)***	0.027	(0.02)
Health	0.051	(0.02)**	0.047	(0.02)**	0.051	(0.02)**	0.044	(0.02)**
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.009	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)
In public ser- vice	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.001	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.047	(0.01)**	-0.049	(0.01)***	-0.043	(0.01)**	-0.050	(0.01)***
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.021	(0.01)	-0.024	(0.01)	-0.021	(0.01)	-0.025	(0.01)+
Retired	-0.016	(0.02)	-0.017	(0.02)	-0.013	(0.02)	-0.017	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.017	(0.02)	0.011	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)	0.010	(0.02)
Unemployed	0.005	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)	0.008	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)
Other	-0.012	(0.01)	-0.012	(0.01)	-0.011	(0.01)	-0.011	(0.01)
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.031	(0.01)*	0.030	(0.01)*	0.031	(0.01)*	0.030	(0.01)*
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.028	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+	0.027	(0.02)+
Suburbs	0.042	(0.02)**	0.040	(0.02)*	0.046	(0.02)**	0.039	(0.02)*
Large city	0.057	(0.02)**	0.055	(0.02)**	0.058	(0.02)***	0.054	(0.02)**
Left-right	0.138	(0.05)**	0.139	(0.05)**	0.101	(0.05)*	0.136	(0.05)**
Left-right (sq)	-0.004	(0.04)	0.003	(0.04)	-0.003	(0.04)	0.009	(0.04)
Covid-19 pan- demic threat	0.050	(0.02)**	0.051	(0.02)**	0.048	(0.02)**	0.051	(0.02)**
<i>Country</i>								
France	-0.092	(0.02)***	-0.089	(0.02)***	-0.092	(0.02)***	-0.085	(0.02)***
Italy	-0.085	(0.02)***	-0.083	(0.02)***	-0.086	(0.02)***	-0.080	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.072	(0.02)***	0.072	(0.02)***	0.075	(0.02)***	0.073	(0.02)***
Spain	-0.087	(0.03)**	-0.086	(0.03)**	-0.082	(0.03)**	-0.083	(0.03)**
United King- dom	-0.020	(0.02)	-0.022	(0.02)	-0.016	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.02)
_cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.063		0.059		0.074		0.058	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A10: Regression results for constructive patriotism without affective dimension of GRD

	(1) Constructive Patriotism		(2) Constructive Patriotism		(3) Constructive Patriotism		(4) Constructive Patriotism	
GRD (mean)	<b>-0.221</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>						
GRD (general)			<b>-0.194</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>				
GRD (immi- grants)					<b>-0.145</b>	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>		
GRD (rich peo- ple)							<b>-0.181</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.014	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)	0.023	(0.02)	0.017	(0.02)
Male	0.065	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.064	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.062	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.068	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Education	-0.040	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.030	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.036	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.027	(0.02) <sup>+</sup>
Income situa- tion	0.064	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.073	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.106	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.091	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.078	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.081	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.089	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.082	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	-0.024	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.023	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.025	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.026	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
In public ser- vice	-0.006	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.042	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.037	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.041	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.037	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.012	(0.01)	-0.009	(0.01)	-0.006	(0.01)	-0.012	(0.01)
Retired	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.006	(0.02)	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.004	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.036	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.046	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.041	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.045	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Unemployed	-0.022	(0.02)	-0.016	(0.02)	-0.021	(0.02)	-0.020	(0.02)
Other	-0.033	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.031	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.034	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.034	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.023	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	0.023	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	0.024	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.025	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	0.008	(0.01)	0.008	(0.01)	0.011	(0.01)	0.007	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.035	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.038	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.037	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.040	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Large city	0.040	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.041	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.044	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.044	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>
Left-right	0.225	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.213	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.266	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	0.184	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right (sq)	-0.171	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.176	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.196	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.176	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>
Covid-19 pan- demic threat	0.025	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)	0.024	(0.02)	0.023	(0.02)
<i>Country</i>								
France	-0.009	(0.02)	-0.006	(0.02)	-0.022	(0.02)	-0.019	(0.02)
Italy	-0.168	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.169	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.177	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.174	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	0.088	(0.03) <sup>***</sup>	0.089	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.084	(0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.090	(0.03) <sup>***</sup>
Spain	-0.032	(0.04)	-0.026	(0.04)	-0.044	(0.04)	-0.034	(0.04)
United King- dom	-0.052	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.050	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.050	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.046	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>
_cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.153		0.144		0.131		0.143	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Ger-  
many (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



Table A11: Full regression results for nationalist attitudes with constructive patriotism as additional control variable

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Nationalist attitudes		(3) Nationalist attitudes		(4) Nationalist attitudes	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.167</b>	(0.01)***						
GRD (general)			<b>0.143</b>	(0.01)***				
GRD (immigrants)					<b>0.209</b>	(0.02)***		
GRD (rich)							<b>0.121</b>	(0.01)***
Constructive patriotism	0.489	(0.02)***	0.485	(0.02)***	0.487	(0.01)***	0.480	(0.02)***
Age	0.036	(0.02)+	0.040	(0.02)+	0.029	(0.02)	0.035	(0.02)+
Male	0.031	(0.01)*	0.032	(0.01)**	0.035	(0.01)**	0.032	(0.01)*
Education	-0.024	(0.01)+	-0.027	(0.01)*	-0.012	(0.01)	-0.029	(0.01)*
Income situation	0.009	(0.01)	0.005	(0.02)	0.011	(0.01)	-0.006	(0.01)
Health	0.012	(0.01)	0.010	(0.01)	0.010	(0.01)	0.009	(0.01)
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)	0.006	(0.01)	0.005	(0.01)
In public service	-0.001	(0.01)	-0.001	(0.01)	0.002	(0.01)	-0.002	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.025	(0.01)+	-0.027	(0.01)*	-0.022	(0.01)+	-0.029	(0.01)*
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.018	(0.01)	-0.019	(0.01)	-0.018	(0.01)	-0.018	(0.01)
Retired	-0.008	(0.02)	-0.009	(0.02)	-0.006	(0.02)	-0.010	(0.02)
Student or apprentice	-0.005	(0.02)	-0.009	(0.02)	0.003	(0.02)	-0.009	(0.02)
Unemployed	0.017	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)	0.021	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)
Other	0.008	(0.01)	0.006	(0.01)	0.007	(0.01)	0.007	(0.01)
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town outside metropolitan area	0.017	(0.01)	0.017	(0.01)	0.017	(0.01)	0.017	(0.01)
Mid-size town outside metropolitan area	0.022	(0.01)	0.023	(0.01)	0.021	(0.01)	0.022	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.020	(0.01)	0.019	(0.01)	0.025	(0.01)+	0.019	(0.01)
Large city	0.033	(0.01)*	0.033	(0.01)*	0.034	(0.01)*	0.032	(0.01)*
Left-right	0.033	(0.04)	0.034	(0.04)	-0.022	(0.04)	0.044	(0.04)
Left-right (sq)	0.082	(0.04)*	0.089	(0.04)*	0.098	(0.04)*	0.089	(0.04)*
Covid-19 pandemic threat	0.037	(0.01)**	0.038	(0.01)**	0.037	(0.01)**	0.039	(0.01)**
<i>Country</i>								
France	-0.087	(0.01)***	-0.088	(0.01)***	-0.086	(0.01)***	-0.081	(0.01)***
Italy	-0.008	(0.02)	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.007	(0.02)	-0.004	(0.02)
Switzerland	0.029	(0.01)*	0.029	(0.01)*	0.031	(0.01)*	0.030	(0.01)*
Spain	-0.059	(0.01)***	-0.064	(0.01)***	-0.057	(0.01)***	-0.060	(0.01)***
United Kingdom	0.000	(0.01)	-0.000	(0.01)	0.005	(0.01)	-0.002	(0.01)
_cons	-0.000	(0.01)	-0.000	(0.01)	0.000	(0.01)	-0.000	(0.01)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.268		0.262		0.280		0.258	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Germany (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A12: Full regression results for constructive patriotism with nationalist attitudes as additional control variable

	(1) Constructive patriotism		(2) Constructive patriotism		(3) Constructive patriotism		(4) Constructive patriotism	
GRD (mean)	<b>-0.219</b>	(0.01)***						
GRD (general)			<b>-0.207</b>	(0.01)***				
GRD (immi- grants)					<b>-0.202</b>	(0.02)***		
GRD (rich)							<b>-0.184</b>	(0.01)***
Nationalist atti- tudes	0.447	(0.02)***	0.443	(0.02)***	0.457	(0.02)***	0.440	(0.02)***
Age	-0.005	(0.01)	-0.011	(0.01)	0.003	(0.01)	-0.002	(0.01)
Male	0.035	(0.01)**	0.035	(0.01)**	0.032	(0.01)*	0.037	(0.01)**
Education	-0.012	(0.01)	-0.009	(0.01)	-0.020	(0.01)	-0.006	(0.01)
Income situa- tion	0.060	(0.01)***	0.060	(0.01)***	0.076	(0.01)***	0.076	(0.01)***
Health	0.056	(0.01)***	0.058	(0.01)***	0.064	(0.01)***	0.060	(0.01)***
<i>Occupation</i>								
Manual worker	-0.023	(0.01)	-0.022	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.01)	-0.023	(0.01)
In public ser- vice	-0.002	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.006	(0.01)	-0.001	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.023	(0.01)+	-0.022	(0.01)+	-0.022	(0.01)+	-0.020	(0.01)
Self-employed w/ employees	0.001	(0.01)	0.002	(0.01)	0.003	(0.01)	-0.000	(0.01)
Retired	-0.006	(0.02)	-0.005	(0.02)	-0.004	(0.02)	-0.004	(0.02)
Student or ap- prentice	0.035	(0.01)***	0.040	(0.01)***	0.031	(0.01)**	0.039	(0.01)***
Unemployed	-0.026	(0.01)+	-0.023	(0.01)	-0.027	(0.01)+	-0.024	(0.01)
Other	-0.032	(0.01)**	-0.031	(0.01)**	-0.030	(0.01)**	-0.033	(0.01)**
<i>Residential area</i>								
Small town out- side metropoli- tan area	0.013	(0.01)	0.012	(0.01)	0.013	(0.01)	0.014	(0.01)
Mid-size town outside metro- politan area	-0.002	(0.01)	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.001	(0.01)	-0.002	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.023	(0.01)+	0.024	(0.01)+	0.019	(0.01)	0.026	(0.01)*
Large city	0.021	(0.01)	0.021	(0.01)	0.020	(0.01)	0.023	(0.01)
Left-right	0.157	(0.04)***	0.157	(0.04)***	0.213	(0.04)***	0.143	(0.04)***
Left-right (sq)	-0.174	(0.04)***	-0.181	(0.04)***	-0.200	(0.04)***	-0.182	(0.04)***
Covid-19 pan- demic threat	0.003	(0.01)	0.003	(0.01)	0.001	(0.01)	0.002	(0.01)
<i>Country</i>								
France	0.031	(0.02)	0.034	(0.02)	0.025	(0.02)	0.023	(0.02)
Italy	-0.124	(0.02)***	-0.126	(0.02)***	-0.130	(0.02)***	-0.130	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.055	(0.02)**	0.057	(0.02)**	0.053	(0.02)*	0.057	(0.02)**
Spain	-0.009	(0.03)	-0.004	(0.03)	-0.010	(0.03)	-0.010	(0.03)
United King- dom	-0.036	(0.02)*	-0.036	(0.02)*	-0.039	(0.02)*	-0.033	(0.02)+
_cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
N	5,499		5,499		5,499		5,499	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.331		0.326		0.323		0.320	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Germany (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A13: Regression results for nationalism and CP with populist attitudes as additional control variable

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Constructive patriotism	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.033</b>	(0.02)*	<b>-0.211</b>	(0.02)***
Populist attitudes	0.193	(0.01)***	0.116	(0.02)***
Age	0.054	(0.02)*	0.021	(0.02)
Male	0.053	(0.01)***	0.058	(0.01)***
Education	-0.037	(0.01)**	-0.029	(0.02)+
Income situation	0.057	(0.02)**	0.087	(0.02)***
Health	0.045	(0.02)**	0.075	(0.02)***
<i>Occupation</i>				
Manual worker	-0.011	(0.01)	-0.028	(0.01)*
In public service	0.004	(0.01)	0.000	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.039	(0.01)**	-0.039	(0.01)**
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.020	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)
Retired	-0.012	(0.02)	-0.011	(0.02)
Student or apprentice	0.019	(0.02)	0.044	(0.01)***
Unemployed	0.011	(0.02)	-0.020	(0.02)
Other	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.035	(0.01)**
<i>Residential area</i>				
Small town outside metropolitan area	0.026	(0.01)+	0.024	(0.01)+
Mid-size town outside metropolitan area	0.026	(0.02)+	0.009	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.039	(0.01)**	0.040	(0.01)**
Large city	0.050	(0.02)**	0.042	(0.02)**
Left-right	0.191	(0.04)***	0.250	(0.04)***
Left-right (sq)	-0.060	(0.04)	-0.209	(0.04)***
Covid-19 pandemic threat	0.035	(0.02)*	0.017	(0.02)
<i>Country</i>				
France	-0.097	(0.02)***	-0.013	(0.02)
Italy	-0.079	(0.02)***	-0.159	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.088	(0.02)***	0.097	(0.03)***
Spain	-0.088	(0.03)**	-0.049	(0.04)
United Kingdom	-0.026	(0.02)+	-0.048	(0.02)*
cons	-0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
<i>N</i>	5,499		5,499	
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.096		0.155	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Germany (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A14: Regression results for nationalism and CP with authoritarian attitudes as additional control variable

	(1) Nationalist attitudes		(2) Constructive patriotism	
GRD (mean)	<b>0.042</b>	(0.02)**	<b>-0.205</b>	(0.02)***
Authoritarian attitudes	0.200	(0.02)***	0.119	(0.02)***
Age	0.004	(0.03)	-0.009	(0.02)
Male	0.055	(0.01)***	0.059	(0.01)***
Education	-0.032	(0.01)*	-0.025	(0.02) <sup>+</sup>
Income situation	0.053	(0.02)**	0.084	(0.02)***
Health	0.046	(0.02)**	0.076	(0.02)***
<i>Occupation</i>				
Manual worker	-0.004	(0.01)	-0.024	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>
In public service	-0.003	(0.01)	-0.004	(0.01)
Self-employed w/o employees	-0.039	(0.01)**	-0.039	(0.01)**
Self-employed w/ employees	-0.019	(0.01)	-0.008	(0.01)
Retired	-0.013	(0.02)	-0.012	(0.02)
Student or apprentice	0.021	(0.02)	0.045	(0.01)***
Unemployed	0.012	(0.02)	-0.019	(0.02)
Other	-0.007	(0.01)	-0.035	(0.01)**
<i>Residential area</i>				
Small town outside metropolitan area	0.030	(0.01)*	0.026	(0.01)*
Mid-size town outside metropolitan area	0.026	(0.02) <sup>+</sup>	0.010	(0.01)
Suburbs	0.041	(0.01)**	0.041	(0.01)**
Large city	0.056	(0.02)**	0.046	(0.02)**
Left-right	0.092	(0.05)*	0.191	(0.04)***
Left-right (sq)	-0.004	(0.04)	-0.175	(0.04)***
Covid-19 pandemic threat	0.046	(0.02)**	0.023	(0.02)
<i>Country</i>				
France	-0.109	(0.02)***	-0.020	(0.02)
Italy	-0.079	(0.02)***	-0.159	(0.02)***
Switzerland	0.076	(0.02)***	0.090	(0.03)***
Spain	-0.095	(0.03)***	-0.054	(0.04)
United Kingdom	-0.036	(0.02)*	-0.053	(0.02)*
cons	0.000	(0.02)	0.000	(0.02)
<i>N</i>	5,499		5,499	
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.096		0.155	

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses; base categories: laborer/ employee (occupation), small town or village (residential area) Germany (country)

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A15: Country-specific analyses for nationalist attitudes

	(1) Ger- many	(2) France	(3) Italy	(4) Swit- zerland	(5) Spain	(6) United King- dom
GRD (mean)	<b>0.128</b> (0.04)*	<b>0.077</b> (0.02)*	0.036 (0.05)	<b>0.062</b> (0.03)+	<b>0.088</b> (0.02)*	<b>0.097</b> (0.04)*
GRD (general)	<b>0.093</b> (0.04)*	<b>0.073</b> (0.03)*	0.029 (0.04)	0.036 (0.03)	<b>0.098</b> (0.03)*	<b>0.115</b> (0.06)+
GRD (immi- grants)	<b>0.138</b> (0.04)**	<b>0.078</b> (0.02)**	<b>0.116</b> (0.05)*	<b>0.104</b> (0.04)**	<b>0.187</b> (0.03)**	<b>0.228</b> (0.04)**
GRD (rich)	<b>0.114</b> (0.04)**	<b>0.069</b> (0.08)*	0.001 (0.05)	0.043 (0.04)	<b>0.039</b> (0.02)+	0.037 (0.03)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	941	927	866	940	865	960

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A16: Country-specific analyses for constructive patriotism

	(1) Ger- many	(2) France	(3) Italy	(4) Swit- zerland	(5) Spain	(6) United King- dom
GRD (mean)	<b>-0.240</b> (0.02)**	<b>-0.209</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.172</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.197</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.078</b> (0.04)*	<b>-0.164</b> (0.04)**
GRD (general)	<b>-0.243</b> (0.02)**	<b>-0.200</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.151</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.203</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.091</b> (0.04)*	<b>-0.173</b> (0.04)**
GRD (immi- grants)	<b>-0.277</b> (0.02)**	<b>-0.182</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.107</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.122</b> (0.04)**	-0.046 (0.04)	-0.046 (0.05)
GRD (rich)	<b>-0.189</b> (0.02)**	<b>-0.175</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.159</b> (0.05)**	<b>-0.185</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.070</b> (0.03)*	<b>-0.163</b> (0.03)**
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	941	927	866	940	865	960

Regionally clustered standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A17: comparison of nationalism and CP items with ISSP 2013

Variable		N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Nationalism</i>						
“Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is better than most other countries.”	Six-country study	4,633	3.43	1.04	1	5
	ISSP 2013	6,442	3.22	1.09	1	5
“The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].”	Six-country study	4,633	3.17	1.03	1	5
	ISSP 2013	6,370	2.88	1.11	1	5
<i>Constructive patriotism</i>						
“How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following: The way democracy works?”	Six-country study	4,633	3.38	1.12	1	5
	ISSP 2013	6,627	3.37	1.14	1	5
“- its social security system?”	Six-country study	4,633	3.72	1.05	1	5
	ISSP 2013	6,490	3.71	1.17	1	5
“- its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?”	Six-country study	4,633	3.18	1.10	1	5
	ISSP 2013	6,123	3.25	1.27	1	5

Notes: distribution of variables only for countries included in both surveys (France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom). ISSP scales are reversed to match the six-country study. All variables on a scale from 1 to 5. CP variables from the ISSP are rescaled to a 1-5 scale with no middle category. ISSP values are adjusted for unequal number of respondents per country.



#### 4. Article 3: Dimensions of social trust and national identity: addressing a multifaceted relationship<sup>34</sup>

##### **Abstract**

Social trust is crucial for the functioning of societies and states as well as for the well-being of individuals. In this paper, I expand on previous literature and scrutinize the role of definitions of group membership in the form of national belonging as a key predictor of three distinct dimensions of social trust: particularized trust, trust in strangers and identity-based trust. Drawing on recent data from the European Values Study, I find that stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood are consistently related to higher identity-based trust, whereas the reverse holds for trust in strangers. This relationship, however, must be qualified regarding majority conceptions at the respective national level. Results for particularized trust, however, point towards a more complicated relationship than outlined in the theoretical expectations. Thus, this paper contributes to extant literature by presenting a comprehensive argument linking all three dimensions to conceptions of nationhood challenging simplified notions of generalized trust. Further, I go beyond extant studies by analyzing conceptions of nationhood at both the individual level and nationwide.

**Keywords:** social trust, particularized trust, trust in strangers, identity-based trust, national identity, conceptions of nationhood

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<sup>34</sup> This chapter is identical to a manuscript that is currently being resubmitted to *Nations and Nationalism* after one round of revisions.

## 1. Introduction

Social trust is an important cornerstone of social capital and the well-being of citizens (Newton 2007; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002). Individuals trusting others in their community are happier and more satisfied with life (Helliwell and Putnam 2004). At the level of groups, high levels of social trust helps overcoming collective action problems and facilitate decision-making (Filsinger et al. 2021; Uslaner 2018). For societies as such, trust is seen as both a prerequisite and an outcome of a functioning democratic society (Paxton 2002; Putnam 1993). Given this theoretical prominence, the concept of trust attracted a burgeoning amount of scholarly attention in empirical research over the past decades (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Freitag and Bauer 2013; Stolle 2002; Torpe and Lolle 2011). One major conclusion based on recent research is that social trust is not a uniform concept that is equally applicable to all kinds of situations and environments. Instead, it is more promising to distinguish between three different dimensions thereof (Bauer and Freitag 2018). Particularized trust is central in interactions with personally known trustees with whom we have substantive, first-hand experience. Trust in strangers plays out in situations, where no knowledge of the relevant other is present that allows for assessing risks of trust decisions. Identity-based trust denotes situations, where we have no personal experience with trustees, but we know about shared identity traits that allow for cue-based decisions that increase our confidence based on shared belonging to a social group.<sup>35</sup>

In terms of explaining diverging levels of social trust across individuals, previous research has (among a wide range of other variables) increasingly paid attention to national identities as today's most eminent manifestation of social identities in general (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Lenard and Miller 2018; Reeskens and Wright 2013). This strand of research has consistently shown that the different dimensions of national identity are vital for explaining individual-level differences in social trust since identities shape the way we think about other people.<sup>36</sup> The most well-known argument in this context is put forward by David Miller, who stipulates that a civic national identity built on a shared political culture is crucial for creating trust that transcends narrow, cue-based

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<sup>35</sup> Distinct from social trust is political trust. The trustees here are political institutions and its actors. Although both kinds of trust tend to be correlated, it is important to clearly delineate one from the other to obtain necessary conceptual clarity (Newton 2007; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Uslaner 2018).

<sup>36</sup> For political trust, Berg and Hjerm (2010) have found that conceptions of nationhood affect this kind of trust as well. Whereas a civic national identity likely fosters political trust, an ethnic one that is based on more closed criteria tends to decrease it.

forms of social trust. Such generalized trust encompasses unknown strangers even if they do not belong to the in-group and is vital for the functioning of a democratic society (Miller 1995, 2000; Miller and Ali 2014). It is claimed that shared identification along civic criteria fosters social trust and increases its radius to out-groups as beliefs in reciprocity and mutual solidarity go beyond one's immediate social environment (Miller and Ali 2014, 240), which renders national identity an important source of social trust. Research building on this Miller thesis (e.g., Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Reeskens and Wright 2013) has mostly neglected that social trust is multidimensional and that generalized trust by itself is insufficient for a comprehensive view on the relationship between national identity and social trust (Bauer and Freitag 2018). Although this simplified view on social trust is common for comparative research (Newton and Zmerli 2011, 171), it neglects the other two dimensions that are crucial for understanding trust comprehensively. As "trust is situation-specific" (Bauer and Freitag, 2018, 16), trusting people in general is does not suffice in accounting for the particular context, in which a trust decision takes place. Instead, it is of paramount importance to look at levels of trust in situations, where trustor and trustee know each other personally as well as at contexts, in which both sides are not acquainted, yet share a relevant trait of their social identity. For example, some individuals may portray a high level of trust in people they know, but may be highly hesitant to believe in the trustworthiness of unknown strangers as a matter of principle. Moreover, relying only on single-item measurements like the "do you think that most people can be trusted" item that tends to yield different results across cultural and linguistic contexts or may even incline respondents to think about personal acquaintances instead of unknown strangers when answering this question (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011) as in earlier research may well lead to biased results. Thus, extant studies on the relationship between national identity and social trust remain incomplete as their narrow focus is insufficient for grasping the full picture of how definitions of group membership may drive distinct dimensions of citizens' trust in each other.

Against this backdrop, it is the aim of the present study to address this research gap by moving beyond generalized trust. It asks how each of social trust's distinct dimensions relate to conceptions of nationhood as a major embodiment of group membership in the form of national identity and if these individual-level linkages depend on overall conceptions at the country level. Based on a comprehensive theoretical framework and expanding on previous studies, I argue that particularized trust should be unrelated to national membership criteria, whereas trust in strangers should be

weaker for individuals holding ethnic conceptions that emphasize national ancestry and birth for defining in-group membership. Identity-based trust, on the other hand, should be higher among those holding exactly these exclusive criteria. Drawing on 28 countries from the latest available wave of the European Values Study from 2017/18 and employing linear regression models, I find an overall negative relationship between stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood and particularized trust. This association, however, is only applicable in countries with an average-level identity very close to the civic ideal type. In accordance with previous research and hypothesis 2, more ethnic views on national belonging are negatively related to trust in strangers, although multi-level models taking into the account the national average of these conceptions reveal that this only holds for individuals living in predominantly civic-oriented nations. Stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood relate positively to identity-based trust regardless of the contextual prevalence of identities. These results also hold across different measurement approaches to conceptions of nationhood.

In doing so, the present study contributes to extant literature in two major ways. First, I provide a fine-grained theoretical argument linking conceptions of nationhood to each of the three dimensions of social trust instead of looking at more vague notions of generalized trust only. By introducing detailed hypotheses on the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and each of the three distinct dimensions of social trust, I am able to draw broader conclusions on the relationship between these two concepts than previous studies could do. This is especially true for identity-based trust since this vital dimension of social trust has mostly been overlooked in previous research on the issue at hand. Second, I include country-level conceptions of nationhood into micro-level explanations, which addresses the proposition that finding oneself in a national minority or majority regarding one's definitions of national group membership may result in divergent effects thereof. Thus, the present study shows that the kind of national identity that citizens hold is crucial for the level of trust they put in fellow citizens as well as in members of out-groups as national identity serves as an important determinant of the radius of social trust.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I introduce the concepts of social trust and conceptions of nationhood thoroughly before presenting a theoretical argument that links the two in a more encompassing way than previous research has done. Second, I discuss the data and measurement approach employed to study the proposed relationships empirically. Third, the

results from this empirical analysis are presented in detail. The final section discusses these results in light of the hypotheses and concludes with a look ahead.

## **2. Theoretical Argument**

The study of social trust is widely seen as central to the social sciences (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Newton 2007; Uslaner 2002) and pivotal “for the welfare of both individuals and nations” (Torpe and Lolle 2011, 481). Further, social trust embodies a paramount cornerstone of social capital (Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2007; Putnam 2000). In any given social interaction, social trust reflects an expectation “of experiencing behaviors that are favorable to our interests” (Navarro-Carrillo et al. 2018, 2; see also Gambetta 1988; Hardin 2002; Putnam 2000). Importantly, such expectations always depend on the specific circumstances and context, in which a trust decision takes place (Newton 2007). Put differently, the concept of social trust may be understood as “A [...] trusts (judges the trustworthiness of) a trustee B with regard to some behavior X in context Y at time t” (Bauer and Freitag 2018, 16).

Regarding the causes of social trust, earlier research has extensively debated whether trust decisions reflect a self-interest-oriented learning outcome based on experience or whether it is rooted in a stable dispositional base stemming from core personality traits and early childhood experiences (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Hardin 2002; Rosenberg 1956; Stolle 2002). Yet, as repeated experiences may become dispositional over the long run, whereas self-interest alone cannot account for the emergence of trust in the first place, more recent research argues that both approaches are not mutually exclusive, but contingent on each other (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton 2007; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Uslaner 2002).

Another debate revolves around the dimensionality of social trust. Whereas a vast majority of research agrees that social trust is a multidimensional phenomenon, earlier works distinguish primarily between particularized and generalized trust (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Newton 2007; Uslaner 2002). As the relationship between these two dimensions has remained rather vague and contested in definitional terms (Newton and Zmerli 2011, 172), more recent research has come to support a three-dimensional structure of social trust that distinguishes between particularized trust, identity-based trust, and trust in strangers as conceptually and empirically distinct dimensions (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Bauer 2013). Particularized trust refers to trustees that are

personally known to the trustor implying a recurring interaction (Stolle 2002). Thus, particularized trust denotes only trust decisions regarding personal acquaintances like family, friends, neighbors, coworkers or fellow members of associations, but not unknown or remotely known individuals even if they have a certain overlap in their social environment (Freitag and Bauer 2013). As experience plays a more prominent role for particularized as compared to other forms of social trust (Uslaner 2002), this form of trust is especially important for community-bonding (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Newton 2007).

Clearly distinct from particularized trust is trust in strangers.<sup>37</sup> Based mostly on the notion of moralistic trust, trust in strangers denotes trust decisions regarding people that are completely unknown to the trustor who has no previous information on the trustee(s) (Foddy, Platow, and Yamagishi 2009; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Uslaner 2002). Thus, this dimension of social trust refers only to situations, where the radius of trust exceeds limitations of personal knowledge that are pivotal for particularized trust and does not allow for cue-based decision-making as in identity-based trust. Trust in strangers is pivotal for modern, large-scale societies as it contributes strongly to internal cohesion and the overcoming of societal divisions (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Navarro-Carrillo et al. 2018; Newton 2007; Putnam 2000) and depends less on idiosyncratic experiences and more on a general disposition to trust other people (Freitag and Bauer 2013).

The notion of identity-based trust has its roots in social-identity theory (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979) and rests upon identification and categorization processes. Individuals exhibit identity-based trust towards others that are not personally known, yet share certain relevant traits of their social identity (Freitag and Bauer 2013; Kenworthy and Jones 2009; Stolle 2002). In this regard, identity-based trust may also be viewed as group-based trust in strangers as trustors lack personal experience, but have knowledge of trustees' group membership to partly substitute this lack of first-hand information (Foddy, Platow, and Yamagishi 2009). Still, identity-based trust stems to some extent from experience with other people sharing the same identity traits, which then serves as a cue for judging their trustworthiness (Freitag and Bauer 2013). This existence of some extent of previous information on the trustee(s) by the trustor constitutes the decisive conceptual

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<sup>37</sup> Most research on social trust tends to use trust in strangers and generalized trust interchangeably. However, to avoid terminological confusion with the more simplified conceptualization of generalized trust in earlier research (e.g., Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Miller and Ali 2014; Reeskens and Wright 2013), I refer to trust in strangers only for the theoretical argument.

difference between identity-based trust and trust in strangers, which has received substantial empirical support (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Bauer 2013; Navarro-Carrillo et al. 2018; Wollebaek, Lundåsen, and Trägårdh 2012). Put together, social trust is understood best as a three-dimensional concept that entails particularized, trust in strangers, and identity-based trust as clearly distinct components. Regarding its relationship with national identity, however, previous research has focused solely on generalized trust that may conflate these distinct dimensions into a single, crude concept (cf. Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Lenard and Miller 2018; Reeskens and Wright 2013). Such an approach, however, misses out on crucial conceptual differences between the different dimensions of social trust that a comprehensive theoretical framework needs to consider.

National identity represents today's most important form of group attachment and social identity around the world and is deeply enshrined into human psychology (Ariely 2018; Davidov 2009; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). Generally spoken, national identity may be described as a degree of perceived sameness among members of any particular nation and an in-group attachment following from this (Greenfeld and Eastwood 2007; Rapp 2020). Although to a varying degree, almost all individuals in modern societies hold such an attachment (Miller and Ali 2014, 241). Scholarly research, however, agrees that this rather vague term is studied best in its dimensions to obtain meaningful conceptual clarity (Blank and Schmidt 2003; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016; Kunovich 2009). One major dimension of national identity describes the relationship between national in- and out-groups and is closely linked to the terms nationalism and (constructive) patriotism (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Davidov 2009; Green et al. 2011; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Schatz and Staub 1997). Although this distinction is vital for studying intergroup relations, it is less well-suited for the study of social trust, where definitions of group membership and modes of in-group identification are of primary importance (cf. Lenard and Miller 2018; Stolle 2002).

Therefore, the present study focuses on the boundary-making mechanisms that define belonging to the national in-group. Following the works of Brubaker (1992) and Greenfeld (1992), these "symbolic boundaries" (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 167) are generally described as ranging between "ethnic" or "civic". Ethnic conceptions of nationhood refer to objectivist criteria like ethnicity, descent, or religion for defining membership in a particular nation (Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016; Lenard and Miller 2018; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Shulman 2002). In this view, national

membership is seen as given and largely stable since these criteria can hardly change over the lifetime of any individual, which renders national borders mostly impermeable (Sarrasin, Green, and van Assche 2020; Wimmer 2008). Thus, individuals conceiving nationhood in ethnic terms are also less open to immigration and societal diversity in general (Ignatieff 1993; Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 2009; Reeskens and Wright 2013). Civic conceptions of nationhood, on the other hand, derive national membership from adherence to national political values and institutions as well as a national language as a means of exchange among citizens (Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). Such a conception of nationhood emphasizes an individual's choice in national belonging and rejects the objectivist criteria that are central to an ethnic identity (Lenard and Miller 2018; Luong 2016). Consequently, civic views are comparably open to changes in group membership as long as those aspiring to join the nation adopt the set of political values that defines the nation (Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016). Although originally developed as a two-dimensional framework at the level of entire nations (Brubaker 1992; Kohn 1944), research on individual-level conceptions of nationhood has long stated that both ideal types exist only in theory (Brubaker 1999; Kuzio 2002). Most individuals combine elements of civic and ethnic criteria for defining national belonging (Miller and Ali 2014; Parekh 1999; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Sarrasin, Green, and van Assche 2020; Wamsler et al. 2022) and may thus be located at an identifiable point on a continuum between the two ideal types.

Having established this conceptual overview on both national identity and social trust in their respective dimensions, I now turn towards presenting a fine-grained theoretical argument on how the former may account for different dimensions of the latter. Early literature on particularized trust suggests that ethnic conceptions of nationhood should promote narrow, in-group-oriented forms of trust. Uslander (2002), for example, argues that stronger particularized trust relates to a wariness of strangers and largely negative views on outsiders (see also Putnam 2000). This view, however, stems from the prevailing notion at the time of particularized trust as the simple opposite of generalized trust that uses heuristics like ethnicity or geographical/ cultural proximity as basis for trust decisions (cf. Stolle 2002).<sup>38</sup> Yet, if we apply this notion to the more recent, fine-grained advances in the study of social trust outlined above, it becomes evident that cue-based categorization and identification belong to identity-based and not to particularized trust, which encompasses

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<sup>38</sup> More recent studies on the relationship between national identity and social trust have focused on generalized trust only and neglected particularized trust in this context (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Reeskens and Wright 2013).



trust in people that are personally known (family, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc.) and not those that are unknown, yet belong to the same in-group, such as a nation. If individuals may judge the trustworthiness of other people based on personal knowledge and update them according to direct experience, they should not need to rely on cues of group membership to evaluate others' trustworthiness since they can make more informed decisions. Further, in the case of immediate acquaintances, trustees are not required to hold similar traits in terms of cultural proximity, as previous, direct experience provides more precise indicators. Consequently, conceptions of nationhood are unlikely to be among factors for evaluating trust in direct, personal acquaintances. Thus, a more fine-grained proposition for the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and trust in personal acquaintances would lead to a hypothesis postulating no systematic link between these two concepts.

*Hypothesis 1: conceptions of nationhood are unrelated to particularized trust.*

Looking at trust in strangers, the argument follows suggestions from previous literature. Trust in strangers implies tolerance of out-groups and acceptance of others (Rotter 1971; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002). This rather integrative view on society rejects the exclusion of others based on objectivist traits, which results from the outlook on in-group-out-group relations that stem from holding civic conceptions of nationhood (Helbling, Reeskens, and Wright 2016; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010).<sup>39</sup> In a similar vein, scholars suggest that civic national identities are a necessary condition for trust in strangers to emerge in the first place as it transcends national boundaries that are only viewed as permeable with this kind of views on national belonging (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Miller 1995; Miller and Ali 2014; Reeskens and Wright 2013). Accordingly, deeming respect of the national political culture and institutions as sufficient for being a full member of any given nation should lead to the “weak ties” that build an encompassing form of trust in large-scale societies (Berg and Hjerm 2010; Granovetter 1973; Lenard and Miller 2018; Newton 2007; Stolle 2002). Another mechanism is provided by the concept of social tolerance. Those holding civic views on national belonging are likely to be more positive and tolerant towards outsiders (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Tolerance of outsiders, especially across ethnic boundaries does in turn foster trust

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<sup>39</sup> This is not to say that civic conceptions of nationhood are inclusive irrespective of other factors. Recent research clearly shows that civic nationalism may well turn out hostile and denigrating towards certain out-groups (Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020; Tamir 2019). However, this requires a particular kind of national identity that draws strongly on the kind of perceived in-group superiority that is inherent in nationalist ideology, which constitutes a different dimension of national identity than conceptions of nationhood (Davidov 2009; Blank and Schmidt 2003).

in strangers (Korol and Bevelander 2021; Rydgren and Ruth 2013). The idea behind ethnic conceptions of nationhood, however, runs counter to this notion of trust. Definitions of group membership based on objectivist criteria tend to draw sharper delineations between in-group and outsiders, which likely decreases trust in unknown strangers as has been repeatedly shown in previous research (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Lenard and Miller 2018; Reeskens and Wright 2013; Stolle 2002). Consequently, hypothesis 2 states that civic conceptions of nationhood likely foster trust in strangers that includes outsiders beyond the radius of one's own in-group.

*Hypothesis 2: civic conceptions of nationhood are positively related to trust in strangers.*

The relationship between conceptions of nationhood and identity-based trust requires further attention since it has not been addressed thoroughly by previous research. Extant studies have so far focused on differences in levels of social trust between individuals and groups sharing relevant identity traits and those that do not (Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002). Thus, it remains an open question how definitions of group membership may account for different levels of identity-based trust. Generally, a positive regard of one's own in-group is inherent in both civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood as both offer a sufficient amount of shared traits for establishing in-group trust (Lenard and Miller 2018). However, research also suggests that a higher number of shared traits may foster a stronger in-group identification (Brewer 1981; Foddy, Platow, and Yamagishi 2009; Freitag and Bauer 2013; Messick and Kramer 2001). Stronger in-group identification should further lead to stronger in-group trust (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Stolle 2002). Therefore, "thick", ethnic conceptions of nationhood that provide identification along more traits than "weak", civic ones do (Berg and Hjerm 2010; Lenard and Miller 2018) should likely lead to stronger identity-based trust as delineations between in- and out-group are more explicitly defined. Put differently, citizens drawing more narrow lines for defining membership of their respective nation should also be more likely to do the same when it comes to trust decisions. This reflects earlier findings that ethnicity is particularly important in the context of group-based trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Brewer 1981; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011), as superficial cues for national belonging strengthen the particular affective reactions linked to this specific dimension of social trust (Navarro-Carrillo et al. 2018). Further, individuals with ethnic conceptions of nationhood are less likely to engage in intergroup exchange, which is often seen as a prerequisite for building trust across group boundaries (cf. Allport 1954; Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 2009; Pettigrew 1998; Reeskens

and Wright 2013). In summary, it seems likely that identity-based trust is more prevalent among those holding more ethnic conceptions of nationhood than among those with civic ones.

*Hypothesis 3: ethnic conceptions of nationhood are positively related to identity-based trust.*

### 3. Data and Method

To put the theoretical framework presented above to an empirical test, I rely on the latest wave of the European Values Study<sup>40</sup> (EVS) from 2017/18, which contains a set of 28 European countries<sup>41</sup> and includes a wide range of variables that are relevant for the purpose of this study. Further, this rich, comparative dataset provides an established data source that allows for speaking directly to previous studies drawing on the same base (e.g., Reeskens and Wright 2013).

For the dependent variable, social trust, the EVS comes with several widely used items (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Bauer 2013). Particularized trust is measured as respondents' trust in a) their own family, b) their neighbors and c) personal acquaintances. Trust in strangers or generalized trust is derived from responses on a) trust in people met for the first time and b) if most people can be trusted. For identity-based trust, I use trust in people a) of another nationality and b) of another religion. Although there are also other sources of group-based trust like social class or occupation (Freitag and Bauer 2013), it is important to use appropriate target groups to retain identity-based trust as a meaningful concept (Lenard and Miller 2018). In order to obtain consistency across the three models, I reversed these two items to reflect identity-based trust along the propositions of previous literature (Freitag and Bauer 2013). To check if the three-dimensional structure of social trust established using previous EVS data holds in the recent wave, I conducted confirmatory factor analysis using all seven items in three different models using one, two, or three dimensions of trust, respectively. Table A1 shows relevant model fit indices for all these models

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<sup>40</sup> EVS (2020): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS2017). [GESIS Data Archive](#), Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 4.0.0.

<sup>41</sup> These countries are Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, North Macedonia, and the United Kingdom. Portugal does not offer all necessary items, whereas Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia were excluded as they cannot be considered full democracies by both [Freedom House](#) and [Polity IV](#), which leads to a substantially different understanding of civic conceptions of nationhood (Erhardt, Wamsler, and Freitag 2021).

and show that the three-dimensional model is preferable in all cases. Additionally, Table A2 portrays the factor coefficients for this model.

Conceptions of nationhood as the main explanatory variable are measured by employing five widespread indicators for the criteria defining national membership. These criteria are the importance that respondents put on being born in the respective country, having national ancestry, respecting national political institutions and being able to speak the national language(s) (e.g., Reeskens and Hooghe 2010).<sup>42</sup> Given that recent research argues that ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood are understood best not as two distinct concepts but as a relatively continuous sphere, where individuals may subscribe to different indicators to a varying extent (Kunovich 2009, see also Ariely 2020; Brubaker 1999; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Smith 1991), the operationalization was conducted in the following way: First, the items on political institutions and language that reflect more civic conceptions of nationhood were reversed to highlight differences between the two sets of items. Second, all four items were combined into one continuous, additive index so that higher values represent a primarily ethnic view on national belonging, whereas lower values show ones that are more civic (see also McLaren 2017).<sup>43</sup> To assess if any of the hypothesized relationships is contingent on this particular measurement approach, I employ two further measurements for conceptions of nationhood as a robustness check. First, I reduce the continuous range between the civic and ethnic ideal types to obtain a categorical outcome. For that purpose, the value of the civic factor is subtracted from the ethnic factor. Thus, a value below zero denotes respondents with primarily civic conceptions of nationhood. Values larger than zero reflect primarily ethnic-oriented respondents respectively. Values of exactly zero are removed from this particular robustness check. This variable is then recoded into a binary dummy for civic (0) and ethnic (1). The second alternative operationalization looks at the two factors for civic and ethnic individually. While the main continuous operationalization is preferable to these two approaches from a conceptual point of view, the latter contribute to assessing the results' robustness nonetheless.

In addition to these main variables of interest, the models contain a number of control variables that likely affect both conceptions of nationhood and social trust (Erhardt, Wamsler, and Freitag

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<sup>42</sup> The EVS also contains an item on the importance of adhering to the national culture. As this item cannot be attributed clearly to either civic or ethnic conceptions of nationhood, it is not included in the following analyses (cf. Erhardt, Wamsler, and Freitag 2021; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). See Table A3 for the respective factor analysis.

<sup>43</sup> See Figure A1 for a distribution plot.

2021; Reeskens and Wright 2013). These variables include age, sex, education, income situation, state of personal health, migration background, and left-right self-placement as a general indicator of political ideology. Summary statistics and exact item wording may be found in Table A4. In a second step, I add attitudes towards immigration as an additional control variable, since they have been shown to matter substantively for both trust in non-in-group members and for conceptions of nationhood (e.g., Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Herreros and Criado 2009; Lenard and Miller 2018; Pellegrini et al. 2021). These attitudes are measured as a combined index of three items on respondents' belief that immigrants 1) take away jobs, 2) increase crime rates, and 3) put a strain on the national welfare system. A third model then takes a closer look at the respective contexts that may be crucial for individual-level trust decisions (Newton and Zmerli 2011). In particular, I scrutinize the role of national-level conceptions of nationhood that have been shown to matter as a contextual driver of the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and political trust (McLaren 2017). To that end, I use the mean value of the civic-ethnic continuum for each country separately to take this into account. This approach further captures variation across countries that were previously ascribed to differences between Eastern and Western Europe, yet in a more fine-grained and less biased way than employing a crude dummy variable (cf. Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Shulman 2002). All variables of interest were z-standardized to obtain comparable coefficients. Sampling weights provided by the EVS are used throughout the analyses to reduce potential biases resulting from the sampling strategy.

For the main model, I rely on linear regression models with country-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the different countries. As a first robustness check, I scrutinize the respective items for social trust individually. This is to address known issues with the validity of the “most people can be trusted” item in the context of social trust across different cultural and linguistic contexts (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011) as well as to account for the very skewed distribution of responses on the item of trust in one's own family, where more than 80% of all respondents report complete trust, which sets this item apart from the other two items employed in the same factor. In a second stage, the same models are replicated including immigration attitudes as an additional control variable. Third, I conduct a multi-level analysis using fixed effects with a cross-level interaction between individual-

level and nationwide conceptions of nationhood to study the latter's likely contextual role. Consequently, the empirical strategy presented here should allow for drawing valid and encompassing conclusions regarding the research question and hypotheses outlined above.

#### **4. Empirical results**

Table 1 summarizes the results from the full models for each of the three dimensions of social trust. In contrast to hypothesis 1, higher particularized trust is significantly related to more civic conceptions of nationhood. This signals that those with higher levels of trust in their immediate environment in the form of their family members, neighbors, or other personal acquaintances are less likely to deem having national ancestry and being born in the respective country as important for being a full member of the respective nation. For the second hypothesis, the results provide clear support as those holding predominantly ethnic conceptions of nationhood are significantly less likely to put their faith in people that they have no previous experience with or knowledge about. Thus, the results from the latest EVS wave are in line with earlier findings on the relationship between generalized trust and national identity (Lenard and Miller 2018; Reeskens and Wright 2013). Looking at identity-based trust, the positive relationship between conceptions of nationhood and identity-based trust lends clear support to the third hypothesis. Respondents with stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood are more likely to portray this cue-based form of social trust as opposed to those putting a stronger emphasis on civic criteria for national belonging. These results are largely supported by the two alternative measurement approaches for conceptions of nationhood (Tables A5-7), which lends further support to these findings. Nevertheless, these robustness checks provide two additional findings. First, the negative relationship uncovered in the first model is driven by a positive association between civic conceptions of nationhood and particularized trust, whereas the same coefficient is insignificant in the model including only ethnic conceptions. Second, there is a negative relationship between both individual factors and generalized trust and a positive one for identity-based trust. However, the coefficient is roughly three times larger for ethnic conceptions of and generalized trust and about four times larger regarding identity-based trust. This is particularly important for supporting the theoretical argument behind hypothesis 3.

Regarding the relevant control variables, the results are overall in accordance with previous literature. Older, female respondents with higher education and income reporting a good state of

personal health and lacking a migration background are more trusting in general but hold lower levels of identity-based trust. The same holds for individuals leaning more towards the political left.

Looking at the magnitude of the respective coefficients, the substantially strongest association is found between conceptions of nationhood and identity-based trust. Moving from the lower to the upper end of the continuous scale accounts for an increase of 91 percentage points of its standard deviation. For generalized trust, the same step across the range stands for a decrease of 63 percentage points of one standard deviation. The association for particularized trust is somewhat less substantive with only 29 percentage points of one standard deviation explained.

Table 1: regression results for main model

	(1) Particularized trust		(2) Trust in strangers		(3) Identity-based trust	
Conceptions of nation-hood	<b>-0.045</b>	(0.02)**	<b>-0.102</b>	(0.02)***	<b>0.143</b>	(0.02)***
Age	0.181	(0.01)***	0.121	(0.01)***	-0.102	(0.01)***
Male	-0.020	(0.01)*	-0.011	(0.01)	0.032	(0.01)**
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	0.015	(0.02)	0.007	(0.02)	0.019	(0.03)
Lower secondary	0.036	(0.01)*	0.022	(0.02)	0.028	(0.04)
Upper secondary	0.076	(0.02)**	0.066	(0.03)*	-0.029	(0.06)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.040	(0.01)**	0.057	(0.02)**	-0.029	(0.03)
Short-cycle tertiary	0.060	(0.02)***	0.065	(0.03)*	-0.038	(0.03)
Bachelor or equivalent	0.076	(0.02)***	0.125	(0.02)***	-0.059	(0.04)
Master or equivalent	0.078	(0.02)***	0.156	(0.03)***	-0.096	(0.04)*
Doctoral or equivalent	0.021	(0.01)+	0.052	(0.01)**	-0.022	(0.02)
Income	0.081	(0.01)***	0.092	(0.01)***	-0.054	(0.01)***
Health	0.152	(0.01)***	0.110	(0.01)***	-0.077	(0.01)***
Migration background	-0.036	(0.01)***	-0.023	(0.01)**	-0.044	(0.01)***
Left-right	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.074	(0.02)***	0.077	(0.02)***
<i>Country</i>						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.023	(0.00)***	-0.041	(0.00)***	-0.011	(0.00)***
Bulgaria	-0.031	(0.00)***	-0.047	(0.00)***	0.016	(0.00)***
Croatia	-0.025	(0.00)***	-0.030	(0.00)***	-0.033	(0.00)***
Czech Republic	-0.008	(0.00)***	-0.024	(0.00)***	0.017	(0.00)***
Denmark	0.066	(0.00)***	0.076	(0.00)***	-0.075	(0.00)***
Estonia	0.002	(0.00)***	-0.006	(0.00)***	-0.010	(0.00)***
Finland	0.040	(0.00)***	0.055	(0.00)***	-0.067	(0.00)***
France	-0.076	(0.00)***	-0.097	(0.00)***	-0.097	(0.00)***
Germany	-0.071	(0.00)***	-0.086	(0.01)***	-0.029	(0.00)***
Hungary	0.019	(0.00)***	-0.006	(0.00)+	-0.041	(0.00)***
Iceland	0.001	(0.00)***	0.008	(0.00)***	-0.017	(0.00)***
Italy	-0.135	(0.00)***	-0.070	(0.00)***	-0.045	(0.00)***
Lithuania	-0.010	(0.00)***	-0.011	(0.00)***	0.015	(0.00)***
Montenegro	-0.004	(0.00)***	0.003	(0.00)*	-0.008	(0.00)***
Netherlands	0.096	(0.00)***	0.099	(0.00)***	-0.115	(0.00)***
Norway	0.033	(0.00)***	0.042	(0.00)***	-0.056	(0.00)***
Poland	-0.113	(0.00)***	-0.050	(0.01)***	-0.030	(0.01)***
Romania	-0.117	(0.00)***	-0.093	(0.01)***	0.040	(0.01)***
Serbia	-0.028	(0.00)***	-0.047	(0.00)***	0.017	(0.00)***
Slovakia	-0.022	(0.00)***	-0.023	(0.00)***	0.016	(0.00)***
Slovenia	-0.014	(0.00)***	-0.037	(0.00)***	0.017	(0.00)***
Spain	0.009	(0.00)**	0.019	(0.00)***	-0.090	(0.01)***
Sweden	0.053	(0.00)***	0.080	(0.00)***	-0.114	(0.00)***
Switzerland	-0.040	(0.00)***	0.010	(0.00)**	-0.035	(0.00)***
Ukraine	-0.060	(0.00)***	-0.084	(0.01)***	0.039	(0.01)***
North Macedonia	-0.010	(0.00)***	-0.027	(0.00)***	-0.003	(0.00)*
United Kingdom	0.065	(0.00)***	0.026	(0.00)***	-0.191	(0.00)***
_cons	0.000	(0.00)***	0.000	(0.00)***	0.000	(0.00)***
N	32,570		32,034		30,818	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.160		0.189		0.172	

Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$




Having obtained the results from the full models using the respective indices for the three dimensions of social trust, the second part of the empirical analysis scrutinizes the same models using single-item measurement for the three dimensions of social trust (Figure 1).<sup>44</sup> This robustness check is to uncover if there are any differences between the items constituting the three dimensions of social trust that may be clouded by the factor analysis. Further, these analyses might help to get a better understanding of the results for particularized trust that do not back hypothesis 1. For particularized trust, there are indeed differences between the three items that constitute this most narrow form of social trust. The negative association from the previous model is clearly supported by the item on trust in personal acquaintances. Similarly, more ethnic conceptions of nationhood are negatively linked to trust in one's own family as well, albeit significant only at the 10%-level. This finding is notable nonetheless, as there is so little variation in this peculiar item. The same relationship, however, does not hold for respondents' trust in their neighbors, which weakens the consistency of the general relationship. For trust in strangers, the results show little difference between the often criticized "most people can be trusted" item and the one that explicitly asks about trust in people met for the first time. For identity-based trust, there are hardly any differences between the two items asking about respondents' trust in particular out-groups, which reflects the very high similarity of the two items as shown in factor analyses. Thus, the analyses for the individual items reflecting the different dimensions of social trust substantiate the findings reported in the previous paragraph supporting hypotheses 2 and 3, whereas the consistency of the unexpected negative relationship between particularized trust and stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood is somewhat weakened.

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<sup>44</sup> See Table A8 for full regression results.

Figure 1: coefficient plot for individual trust items




Notes: portrayed are 99% (gray) and 95% (black) confidence intervals. Models estimated including all relevant control variables as in Table A8.

The final part of the empirical analysis looks at the two further models introduced in the previous section that incorporate further explanatory variables into the main models. Controlling for respondents’ overall attitudes towards immigration does not alter the main relationship between conceptions of nationhood and social trust substantially (see Table A9). As can be expected, more negative immigration attitudes portray a negative relationship towards generalized, but also with particularized trust, while identity-based trust tends to be stronger among these citizens. The coefficients for all three dimensions of social trust do somewhat drop in size yet remain highly significant. Although the amount of explained variation certainly increases for all three models, this does not necessarily imply a decisive role of immigration attitudes in shaping the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and social trust. I return to this point in the concluding section.

The second set of models analyzes if the main relationships may be affected by the average level of conceptions of nationhood within each country. Finding oneself as part of a national minority

or majority when it comes to definitions of group membership may have a decisive impact on how they are linked to trust (McLaren 2017). Mixed-effects models with cross-level interactions between individual-level and nationwide conceptions of nationhood are overall supportive of the previous analyses, but they also yield important nuances allowing for a more comprehensive understanding thereof (see Figure 2). First, the negative association between more ethnic conceptions of nationhood and particularized trust only holds in countries where average-level conceptions are very close to the civic ideal type. While the negative relationship from the first set of models holds nonetheless, its applicability is thus limited to a very narrow set of countries. For trust in strangers, there is a significant moderation effect as well. The negative relationship between holding more ethnic conceptions of nationhood and trust in strangers is significant only in countries, where more civic conceptions prevail on average. Thus, only individuals living in countries, where they find their objectivist criteria for defining national belonging in a minority position are more likely to portray lower levels of trust in unknown strangers. For the third dimension of social trust, identity-based trust, the prevalence of nationwide conceptions of nationhood does not have a moderation effect. The decreasing significance of the main relationship towards the upper end of the scale is likely only due to a stark decrease of cases in this area.

Figure 2: Cross-level interaction between individual-level and nationwide conceptions of nationhood



Notes: portrayed are 95% confidence intervals. Full estimates results may be found in Table A10.

Overall, the empirical patterns portray a consistent pattern. The models show decisive support for hypotheses 2 and 3 as more ethnic conceptions of nationhood predict lower trust in strangers and higher identity-based social trust irrespective of their operationalization or additional explanatory variables. The former relationship, however, is substantively moderated by conceptions of nationhood at the national level as it holds only for those with stronger ethnic views in countries that are predominantly civic-oriented. There is no such moderation effect for identity-based trust. For particularized trust, the picture is less clear. Whereas the main model yields a negative relationship with conceptions of nationhood, a closer look at the different indicators of this dimension of social trust shows that it is not robust across all of them. Measuring conceptions of nationhood by distinguishing between two different factors reveals that this relationship is driven by the more

civic side of the overall continuum. Further, the moderation analysis including nationwide conceptions indicates that the relationship only holds in countries dominated by almost ideal-typically civic definitions of group membership that exist only in theory (Brubaker 1999; Kuzio 2002).

## **5. Discussion and Conclusion**

Is the relationship between national identity in the form of conceptions of nationhood and social trust as straightforward as previously claimed? In this paper, I focus on the dimensionality of social trust and argue that extant research fell short of taking a comprehensive perspective on how distinct aspects of social trust portray divergent relationships with ethnic conceptions of nationhood emphasizing blood and birth for constructing national belonging and civic ones revolving around the national political culture and its language. Clearly distinguishing between particularized trust, trust in strangers, and identity-based trust instead of referring only to a vague notion of generalized trust allows for a comprehensive and detailed argument. In the theoretical framework, I suggest that conceptions of nationhood are unrelated to particularized trust, which encompasses personal relationships with family, friends, neighbors, etc. This is because heuristics for group membership should not have an impact on trust decisions regarding directly known individuals. For trust in strangers, I second previous literature by stating that trust decisions in the context of entirely unknown or unspecified strangers should have a more favorable outcome if people hold civic conceptions of nationhood than if they hold ethnic ones (Lenard and Miller 2018; Miller 1995; Reeskens and Wright 2013). The third dimension of social trust, identity-based trust, which relies on shared group membership for fostering trust, should be stronger for those with predominantly ethnic conceptions as opposed to civic ones since the former draws on more, thicker cues than the latter.

The empirical analysis of 28 countries from the latest EVS wave from 2017/18 using linear regression models shows interesting results. First, stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood portray a negative relationship with particularized trust in the main model. While this finding is contrary to the theoretical expectations summarized in hypothesis 1, the robustness check using the factors for civic and ethnic conceptions in separate models offers a potential explanation in this regard. As this negative association is a result of the positive relationship between civic conceptions and particularized trust, a plausible mechanism is offered by looking at this relationship the other

way around. Individuals that do not trust even their immediate environment are unlikely to hold in-group definitions that are permeable (i.e., civic) as they do not see themselves as part of a shared normative order, which lies at the core of putting your trust in other people (cf. Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002; Warren 2018). Further, this association only holds if average country-level conceptions are very close to the civic ideal type. Looking at the second and third hypothesis, the results are more in line with the theoretical reasoning. Supporting previous studies, I find that more ethnic conceptions of nationhood are a negative predictor of trust in unknown strangers. Yet, including macro-level conceptions into the model also shows that this relationship is significant only for individuals living in strongly civic-oriented nations, i.e., where their ethnic national identities constitute a nationwide minority. For identity-based trust, there is robust support for the third hypothesis irrespective of whether national means are included into the model. The results for both trust in strangers and identity-based trust hold irrespective of their measurement using either indices or individual items and the coefficients are substantive in size as compared to relevant control variables. Further, these results are robust after including immigration attitudes as a distinct, yet still related, concept into the analysis.

Yet, the present study is not without its limitations. The first is certainly that the present data does not allow for any kind of solid, causal identification. Although previous research suggests that social trust may well be the result of different conceptions of nationhood (Gustavsson and Stendahl 2020; Lenard and Miller 2018; Miller 1995; Miller and Ali 2014; Reeskens and Wright 2013), other kinds of empirical associations cannot be ruled out entirely by a correlational design. However, it remains highly plausible that social trust as a value orientation driven by both dispositional factors as well as previous experiences (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Hooghe 2007; Uslaner 2002) may be affected by a deeply enshrined psychological mindset like national identity. Certainly, it is also possible that the relationship between national identity and social trust is more bi-directional than proposed in the theoretical argument. Yet, even if the part of national identity that may change as a result of other factors (e.g., Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Feinstein 2016) is also affected by the different dimensions of social trust, the overall framework should remain applicable. Second, the decreasing size of relevant coefficients after including attitudes towards immigration might call for further investigation. While this might indicate a mediation effect by the latter, this needs to be theorized in a more encompassing way as these attitudes should be causally subsequent to more stable value orientations like national identity and social trust. In a

similar vein, previous research has identified the crucial importance of ethnic diversity in the context of immigration attitudes and social trust (Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020; Gundelach and Manatschal 2017; Ziller, Wright, and Hewstone 2019). The present data, however, do not allow for incorporating this into the analysis. Finally, there is conceptual disagreement on the established measure of identity-based trust by using items on out-group (dis)trust. While this might be empirically appropriate (cf. Freitag and Bauer 2013), lower trust in out-group(s) does not need to translate directly into higher in-group trust (Brewer 1999; Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020). To address this issue thoroughly, however, the EVS dataset does not offer the necessary items, while large-scale, comparative data that use a different measurement approach is scant so far.

Nevertheless, this paper adds to extant studies in two very important ways. First, it presents an encompassing, yet fine-grained, theoretical argument establishing conceptions of nationhood as an important predictor of the different dimensions of social trust. Thus, it supports earlier studies advocating a three-dimensional structure thereof and opposes approaches analyzing trust by means of single-item measurements (Bauer and Freitag 2018; Freitag and Bauer 2013). Establishing identity-based trust as a fundamentally distinct dimension between particularized trust and trust in strangers has the potential to alter existing claims on the nature of social trust fundamentally. In consequence, one main message from this study is that crude measurements of social trust without paying heed to its dimensionality are insufficient for fully grasping the complex relationship between national identity and social trust thoroughly. Further, the analysis shows that national context is crucial for moderating this association. This calls into question previous propositions of a universal applicability of the likely positive impact of civic conceptions of nationhood on generalized trust or trust in strangers. Future research might look more closely into this moderation effect to obtain a more fine-grained picture thereof. Further, it should clarify what is behind the unexpected relationship between conceptions of nationhood and particularized trust or if there are further country-level factors to be considered. Taken together, this work presents an encompassing argument that social identities matter decisively for different levels of social trust and that a careful examination of these distinct relationships is fruitful for understanding social trust as a fundamental part of daily social life. Crucially, such an understanding has further implications for nature of society. Promoting civic as opposed to ethnic conceptions of national belonging may help building

societal cohesion and supporting open, inclusive social order that is not defined by narrow in-group-out-group demarcations and reaches out to members and non-members alike.



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# Dimensions of social trust and national identity: addressing a multifaceted relationship

## Online Appendix

*Table A1: model fit for social trust (EVS 2017/18)*

Model	Chi-squared	RMSEA	TLI	CFI	AIC
A: One Dimension	15199.637	0.163	0.796	0.864	463123.885
B: Two Dimensions	8001.674	0.123	0.885	0.929	455927.922
C: Three Dimensions	1059.479	0.048	0.982	0.991	448989.727

Notes: N = 40,914; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; CFI = comparative fit index; AIC = Akaike information criterion.

*Table A2: standardized coefficients from confirmatory factor analysis (EVS 2017/18)*

Items	Particularized Trust	Trust in strangers	Identity-based Trust
“Trust in family”	<b>0.31</b>		
“Trust in neighbors”	<b>0.72</b>		
“Trust in personal acquaintances”	<b>0.73</b>		
“Trust in a generalized other”		<b>0.57</b>	
“Trust in people met for first time”		<b>0.82</b>	
“Trust in people with other nationality”			<b>0.92</b>
“Trust in people with other religion”			<b>0.91</b>

Notes: Range of the items is 1 (do not trust at all) to 4 (trust completely); confirmatory factor analysis with maximum-likelihood estimation.

*Table A3: principal component analysis for conceptions of nationhood (EVS 2017/18)*

Items	Ethnic	Civic
“Having national ancestry”	<b>0.93</b>	
“Being born in country”	<b>0.91</b>	
“Respecting national political institutions and laws”		<b>0.90</b>
“Speaking national language(s)”		<b>0.74</b>

Notes: Range of the items is 1 (do not trust at all) to 4 (trust completely); principal component analysis with promax rotation. Blank spaces represent factor loadings < 0.3.



Table A4: summary statistics for individual-level variables (before standardization)

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Social trust</i>					
Particularized trust	32,034	3.40	.44	1	4
Trust in strangers	32,034	1.42	.55	0.5	2.5
Identity-based trust	30,818	2.28	.71	1	4
Trust in family	32,972	3.83	.42	1	4
Trust in neighbors	32,733	3.06	.70	1	4
Trust in personal acquaintances	32,919	3.30	.64	1	4
Trust in generalized other	32,599	.45	.50	0	1
Trust in people met for first time	32,453	2.38	.76	1	4
Trust in other nationality	31,322	2.27	.74	1	4
Trust in other religion	31,117	2.29	.75	1	4
<i>Conceptions of nationhood</i>					
Continuous scale (higher → ethnic	32,034	1.63	.37	.80	3.20
Age	32,034	50.82	17.32	18	82
Male	32,034	.47	.50	0	1
<i>Education</i>					
Primary	32,034	.04	.20	0	1
Lower secondary	32,034	.14	.34	0	1
Upper secondary	32,034	.39	.49	0	1
Post-secondary non tertiary	32,034	.05	.22	0	1
Short-cycle tertiary	32,034	.08	.27	0	1
Bachelor or equivalent	32,034	.13	.35	0	1
Master or equivalent	32,034	.15	.35	0	1
Doctoral or equivalent	32,034	.01	.11	0	1
Household income	32,034	2.85	2.07	.01	12.51
Health status	32,034	3.83	.91	1	5
Migration background	32,034	.15	.36	0	1
Left-right self-placement	32,034	5.40	2.24	1	10
Immigration attitudes (index)	31,446	.00	.97	-2.09	1.65
KOF index of globalization	31,980	84.41	6.15	67.91	91.17
GDP per capita (log)	31,980	10.26	.87	7.88	11.29
Net migration rate	31,980	8.30	18.77	-57.95	36.94
Unemployment rate	31,980	7.13	4.14	2.74	20.47

Note: summary statistics for explanatory variables are based on the first model using particularized trust as dependent variable. Trust in generalized other: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (can’t be too careful – most people can be trusted)”; conceptions of nationhood: “Some people say the following things are important for being truly [country nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To have been born in [country], to respect [country nationality]’s political institutions and laws, to have [country nationality] ancestry, to be able to speak [country language] (not at all important – very important); immigration attitudes: Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? “Immigrants take jobs away from the [country nationality]”, “Immigrants make crime problems worse”, “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system”.

Figure A1: distribution of conceptions of nationhood (continuous measure)




Table A5: full regression results using a categorical measure for conceptions of nationhood

	(1) Particularized trust		(2) Trust in strangers		(3) Identity-based trust	
Conceptions of nationhood (categorical)	<b>-0.022</b>	(0.01)*	<b>-0.022</b>	(0.01)+	<b>0.070</b>	(0.01)***
Age	0.182	(0.01)***	0.121	(0.01)***	-0.110	(0.01)***
Male	-0.022	(0.01)**	-0.009	(0.02)	0.042	(0.01)***
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	-0.008	(0.02)	0.060	(0.02)**	-0.029	(0.03)
Lower secondary	0.004	(0.02)	0.092	(0.03)*	-0.040	(0.04)
Upper secondary	0.025	(0.02)	0.174	(0.05)**	-0.128	(0.06)*
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.013	(0.01)	0.114	(0.02)***	-0.076	(0.03)*
Short-cycle tertiary	0.039	(0.02)+	0.141	(0.04)***	-0.104	(0.04)**
Bachelor or equivalent	0.054	(0.02)*	0.214	(0.03)***	-0.137	(0.04)**
Master or equivalent	0.056	(0.02)*	0.263	(0.04)***	-0.196	(0.05)***
Doctoral or equivalent	0.014	(0.01)	0.098	(0.02)***	-0.064	(0.02)***
Income	0.083	(0.01)***	0.095	(0.01)***	-0.054	(0.01)***
Health	0.146	(0.01)***	0.107	(0.01)***	-0.085	(0.01)***
Migration background	-0.038	(0.01)***	-0.018	(0.01)+	-0.054	(0.01)***
Left-right	-0.011	(0.01)	-0.095	(0.02)***	0.097	(0.02)***
<i>Country</i>						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.026	(0.00)***	-0.041	(0.00)***	0.003	(0.00)**
Bulgaria	-0.031	(0.00)***	-0.039	(0.00)***	0.015	(0.00)***
Croatia	-0.025	(0.00)***	-0.031	(0.00)***	-0.029	(0.00)***
Czech Republic	-0.022	(0.00)***	-0.033	(0.00)***	0.023	(0.00)***
Denmark	0.070	(0.00)***	0.086	(0.00)***	-0.085	(0.00)***
Estonia	0.000	(0.00)	-0.006	(0.00)***	-0.007	(0.00)***
Finland	0.039	(0.00)***	0.062	(0.00)***	-0.068	(0.00)***
France	-0.077	(0.00)***	-0.074	(0.00)***	-0.122	(0.00)***
Germany	-0.083	(0.00)***	-0.071	(0.01)***	-0.035	(0.00)***
Hungary	0.001	(0.00)	-0.007	(0.00)***	-0.039	(0.00)***
Iceland	0.000	(0.00)	0.009	(0.00)***	-0.018	(0.00)***
Italy	-0.141	(0.00)***	-0.073	(0.00)***	-0.024	(0.00)***
Lithuania	-0.009	(0.00)***	-0.011	(0.00)***	0.013	(0.00)***
Montenegro	-0.007	(0.00)***	-0.002	(0.00)*	-0.003	(0.00)***
Netherlands	0.104	(0.00)***	0.118	(0.00)***	-0.131	(0.00)***
Norway	0.034	(0.00)***	0.051	(0.00)***	-0.064	(0.00)***
Poland	-0.106	(0.00)***	-0.065	(0.01)***	-0.004	(0.00)
Romania	-0.117	(0.00)***	-0.082	(0.00)***	0.040	(0.00)***
Serbia	-0.027	(0.00)***	-0.045	(0.00)***	0.018	(0.00)***
Slovakia	-0.020	(0.00)***	-0.030	(0.00)***	0.018	(0.00)***
Slovenia	-0.015	(0.00)***	-0.039	(0.00)***	0.019	(0.00)***
Spain	-0.009	(0.00)**	0.001	(0.00)	-0.062	(0.00)***
Sweden	0.061	(0.00)***	0.102	(0.00)***	-0.143	(0.00)***
Switzerland	-0.045	(0.00)***	0.016	(0.00)***	-0.039	(0.00)***
Ukraine	-0.075	(0.00)***	-0.105	(0.01)***	0.070	(0.00)***
North Macedonia	-0.013	(0.00)***	-0.030	(0.00)***	0.001	(0.00)*
United Kingdom	0.057	(0.00)***	0.029	(0.01)***	-0.182	(0.00)***
_cons	0.000	(0.00)***	-0.000	(0.00)***	-0.000	(0.00)***
N	24,844		24,462		23,524	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.163		0.190		0.165	

Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A6: full regression results using only civic conceptions of nationhood

	(1) Particularized trust		(2) Trust in strangers		(3) Identity-based trust	
Civic conceptions of nationhood	<b>0.029</b>	(0.01)**	<b>-0.045</b>	(0.02)**	<b>0.046</b>	(0.02)**
Age	0.178	(0.01)***	0.124	(0.02)***	-0.106	(0.01)***
Male	-0.020	(0.01)*	-0.012	(0.01)	0.035	(0.01)**
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	0.018	(0.02)	0.012	(0.02)	0.020	(0.04)
Lower secondary	0.042	(0.02)*	0.035	(0.02)	0.019	(0.05)
Upper secondary	0.085	(0.02)**	0.083	(0.03)*	-0.043	(0.06)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.043	(0.01)**	0.069	(0.02)***	-0.041	(0.03)
Short-cycle tertiary	0.068	(0.02)***	0.081	(0.03)**	-0.053	(0.04)
Bachelor or equivalent	0.085	(0.02)***	0.142	(0.02)***	-0.076	(0.04)+
Master or equivalent	0.089	(0.02)***	0.180	(0.04)***	-0.121	(0.04)*
Doctoral or equivalent	0.025	(0.01)*	0.061	(0.01)***	-0.032	(0.02)+
Income	0.086	(0.01)***	0.099	(0.01)***	-0.067	(0.01)***
Health	0.151	(0.01)***	0.112	(0.01)***	-0.081	(0.01)***
Migration background	-0.031	(0.01)***	-0.011	(0.01)	-0.060	(0.01)***
Left-right	-0.016	(0.01)+	-0.077	(0.02)***	0.084	(0.02)***
<i>Country</i>						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.025	(0.00)***	-0.052	(0.00)***	0.003	(0.00)**
Bulgaria	-0.035	(0.00)***	-0.058	(0.00)***	0.031	(0.00)***
Croatia	-0.025	(0.00)***	-0.038	(0.00)***	-0.023	(0.00)***
Czech Republic	-0.010	(0.00)***	-0.032	(0.00)***	0.028	(0.00)***
Denmark	0.066	(0.00)***	0.077	(0.00)***	-0.076	(0.00)***
Estonia	0.002	(0.00)***	-0.008	(0.00)***	-0.007	(0.00)***
Finland	0.040	(0.00)***	0.052	(0.00)***	-0.062	(0.00)***
France	-0.075	(0.00)***	-0.090	(0.00)***	-0.105	(0.00)***
Germany	-0.069	(0.00)***	-0.071	(0.00)***	-0.047	(0.00)***
Hungary	0.016	(0.00)***	-0.013	(0.00)***	-0.031	(0.00)***
Iceland	0.001	(0.00)***	0.007	(0.00)***	-0.017	(0.00)***
Italy	-0.138	(0.00)***	-0.079	(0.00)***	-0.031	(0.00)***
Lithuania	-0.012	(0.00)***	-0.019	(0.00)***	0.026	(0.00)***
Montenegro	-0.005	(0.00)***	-0.002	(0.00)**	-0.002	(0.00)**
Netherlands	0.097	(0.00)***	0.104	(0.00)***	-0.122	(0.00)***
Norway	0.033	(0.00)***	0.045	(0.00)***	-0.059	(0.00)***
Poland	-0.120	(0.00)***	-0.078	(0.00)***	0.007	(0.00)+
Romania	-0.121	(0.00)***	-0.106	(0.00)***	0.058	(0.00)***
Serbia	-0.030	(0.00)***	-0.060	(0.00)***	0.033	(0.00)***
Slovakia	-0.024	(0.00)***	-0.030	(0.00)***	0.026	(0.00)***
Slovenia	-0.015	(0.00)***	-0.037	(0.00)***	0.017	(0.00)***
Spain	0.007	(0.00)**	0.002	(0.00)	-0.070	(0.00)***
Sweden	0.057	(0.00)***	0.089	(0.00)***	-0.127	(0.00)***
Switzerland	-0.041	(0.00)***	0.010	(0.00)**	-0.034	(0.00)***
Ukraine	-0.064	(0.00)***	-0.119	(0.01)***	0.083	(0.00)***
North Macedonia	-0.012	(0.00)***	-0.032	(0.00)***	0.004	(0.00)***
United Kingdom	0.061	(0.00)***	0.017	(0.01)**	-0.180	(0.00)***
_cons	-0.000	(0.00)***	-0.000	(0.00)***	0.000	(0.00)***
N	32,744		32,191		30,957	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.158		0.182		0.160	

Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A7: full regression results using only ethnic conceptions of nationhood

	(1) Particularized trust		(2) Trust in strangers		(3) Identity-based trust	
Ethnic conceptions of nationhood	-0.023	(0.02)	<b>-0.127</b>	(0.03)***	<b>0.170</b>	(0.02)***
Age	0.182	(0.01)***	0.128	(0.01)***	-0.111	(0.01)***
Male	-0.020	(0.01)*	-0.011	(0.01)	0.031	(0.01)**
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	0.014	(0.02)	0.005	(0.02)	0.020	(0.04)
Lower secondary	0.036	(0.01)*	0.016	(0.02)	0.032	(0.05)
Upper secondary	0.077	(0.02)**	0.056	(0.03)+	-0.020	(0.06)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.041	(0.01)**	0.051	(0.01)**	-0.024	(0.03)
Short-cycle tertiary	0.061	(0.01)***	0.058	(0.02)*	-0.033	(0.04)
Bachelor or equivalent	0.078	(0.02)***	0.116	(0.02)***	-0.051	(0.04)
Master or equivalent	0.080	(0.02)***	0.145	(0.03)***	-0.085	(0.04)+
Doctoral or equivalent	0.022	(0.01)+	0.049	(0.01)**	-0.020	(0.02)
Income	0.082	(0.01)***	0.090	(0.01)***	-0.053	(0.01)***
Health	0.153	(0.01)***	0.110	(0.01)***	-0.078	(0.01)***
Migration background	-0.034	(0.01)***	-0.028	(0.01)**	-0.038	(0.01)***
Left-right	-0.008	(0.01)	-0.062	(0.02)***	0.062	(0.02)**
<i>Country</i>						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0.025	(0.00)***	-0.044	(0.00)***	-0.008	(0.00)**
Bulgaria	-0.033	(0.00)***	-0.045	(0.00)***	0.013	(0.00)**
Croatia	-0.026	(0.00)***	-0.032	(0.00)***	-0.030	(0.00)***
Czech Republic	-0.010	(0.00)***	-0.023	(0.00)***	0.016	(0.00)***
Denmark	0.066	(0.00)***	0.076	(0.00)***	-0.076	(0.00)***
Estonia	0.002	(0.00)**	-0.006	(0.00)***	-0.009	(0.00)***
Finland	0.040	(0.00)***	0.054	(0.00)***	-0.065	(0.00)***
France	-0.074	(0.00)***	-0.095	(0.00)***	-0.101	(0.00)***
Germany	-0.067	(0.00)***	-0.084	(0.01)***	-0.033	(0.00)***
Hungary	0.017	(0.00)***	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.043	(0.00)***
Iceland	0.001	(0.00)**	0.007	(0.00)***	-0.016	(0.00)***
Italy	-0.137	(0.00)***	-0.070	(0.00)***	-0.046	(0.00)***
Lithuania	-0.012	(0.00)***	-0.011	(0.00)***	0.016	(0.00)***
Montenegro	-0.005	(0.00)***	0.001	(0.00)+	-0.006	(0.00)***
Netherlands	0.097	(0.00)***	0.098	(0.00)***	-0.115	(0.00)***
Norway	0.034	(0.00)***	0.043	(0.00)***	-0.058	(0.00)***
Poland	-0.118	(0.01)***	-0.051	(0.01)***	-0.029	(0.01)***
Romania	-0.120	(0.00)***	-0.091	(0.01)***	0.038	(0.01)***
Serbia	-0.031	(0.00)***	-0.049	(0.00)***	0.020	(0.00)***
Slovakia	-0.023	(0.00)***	-0.022	(0.00)***	0.015	(0.00)***
Slovenia	-0.014	(0.00)***	-0.036	(0.00)***	0.015	(0.00)***
Spain	0.006	(0.00)+	0.014	(0.00)***	-0.084	(0.01)***
Sweden	0.055	(0.00)***	0.077	(0.00)***	-0.111	(0.00)***
Switzerland	-0.040	(0.00)***	0.011	(0.00)***	-0.037	(0.00)***
Ukraine	-0.067	(0.00)***	-0.092	(0.01)***	0.049	(0.00)***
North Macedonia	-0.011	(0.00)***	-0.027	(0.00)***	-0.003	(0.00)*
United Kingdom	0.063	(0.00)***	0.026	(0.00)***	-0.193	(0.00)***
_cons	0.000	(0.00)***	-0.000	(0.00)***	-0.000	(0.00)***
N	32,650		32,097		30,874	
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.158		0.193		0.179	

Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A8: full regression results for individual trust items

	(1) Trust in fam- ily	(2) Trust in neighbors	(3) Trust in per- sonal ac- quaintances	(4) Trust in gen- eralized other	(5) Trust in peo- ple met for the first time	(6) Trust in other reli- gion (rev)	(7) Trust in other nation (rev)
Conceptions of nationhood	<b>-0.018</b> (0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.028 (0.02)	<b>-0.051</b> (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	<b>-0.105</b> (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	<b>-0.074</b> (0.02) <sup>**</sup>	<b>0.132</b> (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	<b>0.137</b> (0.02) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.042 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.232 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.095 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.056 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.132 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.097 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.099 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Male	-0.017 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.018 (0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	0.034 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.029 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Education</i>							
Primary	0.013 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.009 (0.03)	-0.015 (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)	0.018 (0.03)	0.008 (0.04)
Lower secondary	0.040 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.020 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	-0.008 (0.03)	0.025 (0.02)	0.027 (0.04)	0.015 (0.05)
Upper secondary	0.048 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.047 (0.03) <sup>+</sup>	0.073 (0.03) <sup>*</sup>	0.017 (0.05)	0.066 (0.03) <sup>*</sup>	-0.015 (0.05)	-0.060 (0.07)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.034 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.026 (0.02)	0.033 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.033 (0.02)	0.049 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.025 (0.02)	-0.041 (0.03)
Short-cycle ter- tiary	0.058 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.042 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.039 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.044 (0.03)	0.055 (0.03) <sup>*</sup>	-0.028 (0.03)	-0.055 (0.04)
Bachelor or equivalent	0.054 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.057 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.060 (0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.105 (0.03) <sup>**</sup>	0.096 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.052 (0.03) <sup>+</sup>	-0.073 (0.04)
Master or equiv- alent	0.058 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.053 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.062 (0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.133 (0.04) <sup>**</sup>	0.121 (0.03) <sup>***</sup>	-0.081 (0.03) <sup>*</sup>	-0.117 (0.05) <sup>*</sup>
Doctoral or equivalent	0.014 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.021 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.043 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.040 (0.02) <sup>*</sup>	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.031 (0.02)
Income	0.052 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.097 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.030 (0.02)	0.087 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.069 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.051 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.052 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.120 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.124 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.098 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.090 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.097 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.070 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.079 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Migration back- ground	-0.023 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.029 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.028 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.020 (0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.017 (0.01) <sup>*</sup>	-0.036 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.049 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Left-right	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.087 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.047 (0.01) <sup>**</sup>	0.074 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.074 (0.02) <sup>***</sup>
<i>Country</i>							
Bosnia and Herze- govina	0.016 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.021 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.036 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.047 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.028 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.014 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.008 (0.00) <sup>**</sup>
Bulgaria	0.028 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.051 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.027 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.053 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.032 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.010 (0.00) <sup>**</sup>	0.020 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Croatia	-0.003 (0.00) <sup>**</sup>	-0.029 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.017 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.047 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.012 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.033 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.032 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Czech Republic	0.011 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.012 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.009 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.057 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.004 (0.00) <sup>+</sup>	0.004 (0.00) <sup>*</sup>	0.028 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Denmark	0.018 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.042 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.080 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.047 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.077 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.070 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.075 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Estonia	0.009 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.003 (0.00) <sup>**</sup>	0.002 (0.00) <sup>*</sup>	-0.009 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.002 (0.00) <sup>*</sup>	-0.008 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.013 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Finland	0.012 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.038 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.035 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.048 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.046 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.067 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.061 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
France	-0.115 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.080 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.011 (0.00) <sup>**</sup>	-0.139 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.047 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.096 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.092 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Germany	0.001 (0.00)	-0.084 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.060 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.059 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.084 (0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.037 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.021 (0.00) <sup>***</sup>

Hungary	0.040 (0.00)***	0.027 (0.00)***	-0.018 (0.00)***	-0.035 (0.00)***	0.015 (0.00)***	-0.053 (0.00)***	-0.026 (0.00)***
Iceland	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)**	0.004 (0.00)***	0.005 (0.00)**	0.007 (0.00)***	-0.017 (0.00)**	-0.016 (0.00)**
Italy	0.026 (0.00)***	-0.083 (0.00)***	-0.210 (0.00)***	-0.086 (0.00)***	-0.046 (0.00)***	-0.047 (0.00)***	-0.042 (0.00)***
Lithuania	-0.008 (0.00)***	0.002 (0.00)	-0.021 (0.00)***	-0.008 (0.00)**	-0.008 (0.00)**	0.014 (0.00)***	0.014 (0.00)***
Montenegro	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.007 (0.00)***	-0.001 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)**	-0.009 (0.00)***	-0.006 (0.00)***
Netherlands	0.007 (0.00)***	0.087 (0.00)***	0.104 (0.00)***	0.042 (0.00)**	0.113 (0.00)***	-0.118 (0.00)**	-0.105 (0.00)**
Norway	0.008 (0.00)***	0.013 (0.00)***	0.049 (0.00)***	0.033 (0.00)**	0.038 (0.00)***	-0.054 (0.00)**	-0.054 (0.00)**
Poland	-0.081 (0.00)***	-0.067 (0.01)**	-0.106 (0.01)***	-0.069 (0.00)**	-0.026 (0.01)**	-0.030 (0.01)***	-0.029 (0.01)***
Romania	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.115 (0.00)***	-0.117 (0.00)***	-0.080 (0.00)***	-0.080 (0.01)***	0.025 (0.00)***	0.050 (0.01)***
Serbia	0.019 (0.00)***	-0.033 (0.00)**	-0.035 (0.00)***	-0.050 (0.00)**	-0.035 (0.00)***	0.013 (0.00)**	0.018 (0.00)***
Slovakia	-0.008 (0.00)***	-0.006 (0.00)**	-0.031 (0.00)***	-0.035 (0.00)**	-0.011 (0.00)***	-0.001 (0.00)	0.031 (0.00)***
Slovenia	0.005 (0.00)***	-0.018 (0.00)**	-0.013 (0.00)***	-0.027 (0.00)**	-0.034 (0.00)***	0.015 (0.00)***	0.015 (0.00)***
Spain	0.018 (0.00)***	-0.032 (0.00)***	0.044 (0.00)***	-0.025 (0.00)**	0.041 (0.00)***	-0.084 (0.01)***	-0.092 (0.01)***
Sweden	0.019 (0.00)***	0.042 (0.00)**	0.051 (0.00)***	0.031 (0.00)**	0.093 (0.00)***	-0.106 (0.00)**	-0.112 (0.00)**
Switzerland	-0.027 (0.00)***	-0.048 (0.00)**	-0.012 (0.00)*	0.006 (0.00)+	0.011 (0.00)**	-0.035 (0.00)***	-0.035 (0.00)***
Ukraine	0.046 (0.01)***	-0.031 (0.01)**	-0.125 (0.01)***	-0.084 (0.00)**	-0.066 (0.01)***	0.024 (0.00)**	0.045 (0.01)***
North Macedonia	0.008 (0.00)***	-0.007 (0.00)**	-0.019 (0.00)***	-0.033 (0.00)**	-0.017 (0.00)***	-0.006 (0.00)***	0.000 (0.00)
United Kingdom	0.031 (0.00)***	-0.021 (0.00)**	0.140 (0.00)***	-0.058 (0.00)**	0.074 (0.00)***	-0.197 (0.00)**	-0.173 (0.00)***
_cons	0.000 (0.00)***	0.000 (0.00)**	0.000 (0.00)***	0.000 (0.00)**	0.000 (0.00)***	-0.000 (0.00)**	-0.000 (0.00)***
N	32,972	32,733	32,919	32,599	32,453	31,117	31,322
adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.123	0.187	0.158	0.140	0.146	0.170

Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A9: regression results including immigration attitudes as an additional control variable

	(1) Particularized trust		(2) Trust in strangers		(3) Identity-based trust	
Conceptions of nation- hood	<b>-0.023</b>	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	<b>-0.058</b>	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	<b>0.094</b>	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Immigration attitudes	-0.091	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.200	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	0.228	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Age	0.182	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.126	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.105	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Male	-0.016	(0.01) <sup>+</sup>	-0.004	(0.01)	0.024	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	0.013	(0.02)	0.015	(0.02)	0.019	(0.04)
Lower secondary	0.034	(0.02) <sup>*</sup>	0.027	(0.02)	0.033	(0.05)
Upper secondary	0.072	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.069	(0.04) <sup>+</sup>	-0.011	(0.06)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.036	(0.01) <sup>*</sup>	0.055	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	-0.018	(0.03)
Short-cycle tertiary	0.055	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.060	(0.03) <sup>*</sup>	-0.023	(0.04)
Bachelor or equiva- lent	0.070	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.114	(0.02) <sup>***</sup>	-0.031	(0.04)
Master or equivalent	0.065	(0.02) <sup>**</sup>	0.135	(0.04) <sup>***</sup>	-0.060	(0.05)
Doctoral or equiva- lent	0.016	(0.01)	0.050	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.012	(0.02)
Income	0.075	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.083	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.045	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Health	0.148	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.097	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.065	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>
Migration background	-0.045	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.041	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.023	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
Left-right	0.006	(0.01)	-0.040	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.038	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>
<i>Country</i>						
Bosnia and Herze- govina	-0.027	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.050	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.000	(0.00)
Bulgaria	-0.033	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.050	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.021	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Croatia	-0.030	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.039	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.021	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Czech Republic	-0.008	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.022	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.015	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Denmark	0.064	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.073	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.072	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Estonia	0.000	(0.00)	-0.009	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.006	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Finland	0.033	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.042	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.052	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
France	-0.098	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.136	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.052	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Germany	-0.085	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.110	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.005	(0.01)
Hungary	0.016	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.007	(0.00) <sup>*</sup>	-0.040	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Iceland	-0.001	(0.00) <sup>*</sup>	0.003	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.011	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Italy	-0.148	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.090	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.024	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Lithuania	-0.012	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.015	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.021	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Montenegro	-0.005	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.004	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Netherlands	0.090	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.088	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.103	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Norway	0.030	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.036	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.050	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Poland	-0.128	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.084	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.011	(0.00) <sup>*</sup>
Romania	-0.131	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.111	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.061	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Serbia	-0.034	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.057	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.027	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Slovakia	-0.024	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.026	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.019	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Slovenia	-0.016	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.043	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.022	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Spain	-0.014	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.025	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	-0.041	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Sweden	0.045	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.065	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.098	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Switzerland	-0.043	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.006	(0.00) <sup>+</sup>	-0.031	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
Ukraine	-0.075	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.114	(0.01) <sup>***</sup>	0.072	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
North Macedonia	-0.014	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.034	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.005	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
United Kingdom	0.039	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.023	(0.01) <sup>**</sup>	-0.138	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
_cons	-0.000	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	0.000	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>	-0.000	(0.00) <sup>***</sup>
N	31446		30963		29881	



adj. $R^2$	0.167	0.221	0.213
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Clustered standard errors (country) in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education), Austria (country)  
<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

*Table A10: full regression results for multi-level analysis using fixed effects*

	(1) Particularized trust	(2) Trust in strangers	(3) Identity-based trust
Conceptions of nationhood	<b>-0.042</b> (0.01)**	<b>-0.096</b> (0.02)**	<b>0.141</b> (0.02)**
National-level mean c. o. n.	<b>-0.176</b> (0.04)**	<b>-0.224</b> (0.05)**	<b>0.178</b> (0.04)**
Individual-level#country-level	<b>0.030</b> (0.01)*	<b>0.061</b> (0.01)**	-0.017 (0.01)
Age	0.182 (0.01)**	0.123 (0.01)**	-0.103 (0.01)**
Male	-0.020 (0.01)*	-0.011 (0.01)	0.031 (0.01)**
Education			
Primary	0.015 (0.02)	0.008 (0.02)	0.018 (0.03)
Lower secondary	0.036 (0.01)*	0.023 (0.02)	0.028 (0.04)
Upper secondary	0.078 (0.02)**	0.070 (0.03)*	-0.029 (0.06)
Post-secondary non tertiary	0.041 (0.01)**	0.057 (0.01)**	-0.028 (0.03)
Short-cycle tertiary	0.061 (0.01)**	0.066 (0.03)**	-0.039 (0.03)
Bachelor or equivalent	0.078 (0.02)**	0.127 (0.02)**	-0.059 (0.04) <sup>+</sup>
Master or equivalent	0.079 (0.02)**	0.158 (0.03)**	-0.096 (0.04)*
Doctoral or equivalent	0.021 (0.01) <sup>+</sup>	0.052 (0.01)**	-0.022 (0.02)
Income	0.079 (0.01)**	0.089 (0.01)**	-0.053 (0.01)**
Health	0.152 (0.01)**	0.110 (0.01)**	-0.077 (0.01)**
Migration background	-0.037 (0.01)**	-0.025 (0.01)**	-0.044 (0.01)**
Left-right	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.072 (0.02)**	0.077 (0.02)**
_cons	0.085 (0.06)	0.066 (0.06)	-0.008 (0.05)
N	32,570	32,034	30,818
# of groups	28	28	28

Robust standard errors in parentheses; base categories: less than primary (education)

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , <sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.01$ , <sup>\*\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.001$

## 5. Conclusion

What are the implications of individuals' holding one kind of identity or another for society? In this thesis, I propose to employ the framework of social integration as a conceptual lens to study this relationship in a fine-grained way that also allows for a more dynamic understanding of complex interlinkages. In this final chapter, I first present the main results of the three articles once more before reflecting in more detail on the general contribution of this thesis. After, I discuss some limitations of the present thesis that could not be addressed within its scope. Finally, I take a look ahead and elaborate on promising avenues for future research as well as on the implications of my findings for society, politics, and scholarly research.

### 5.1 Findings and contribution

As introduced in 1.3.4, Article 1 looks at the role of pandemic threat for individual-level conceptions of nationhood (Wamsler et al., 2022). Its main argument draws on the behavioral immune system hypothesis, which was developed in the fields of evolutionary biology and psychology (Murray and Schaller, 2016; Thornhill and Fincher, 2014), but has also been applied to the social sciences (Aarøe et al., 2017, 2020). This hypothesis maintains that individuals faced with the threat of contracting infectious pathogens activate a set of attitudes and behaviors developed evolutionarily to avoid any such pathogen, which has previously been linked to increased hostility towards outsiders or authoritarian and conservative attitudes (Aarøe et al., 2017; Murray et al., 2013; Navarrete and Fessler, 2006). We apply this reasoning to national identity with a focus on conceptions of nationhood, as definitions of group membership were lacking in previous accounts of the behavioral immune system. Following our argument, individuals facing higher levels of pandemic threat should be more likely to hold ethnic as opposed to civic conceptions. This is because the former follow stricter, more tangible group boundaries, which should resonate well with the idea of the behavioral immune system. Civic conceptions, however, are more welcoming of outsiders, which individuals threatened with pathogen stress should perceive as less suitable or even counterproductive to avoid infection. In addition to this main hypothesis, we incorporate affective intelligence theory, a framework for studying emotional processing in political psychology, into our theoretical argument. Affective intelligence theory maintains that threatening situations trigger two distinct emotional reactions at the same time: fear and anger. Whichever prevails within a given individual

is crucial as both emotions lead to entirely different coping mechanisms with threat. Whereas fear motivates people to seek alternatives to the threatening status quo, anger is associated with a confrontational approach to tackling a given threat (Marcus et al., 2019).

To test our argument empirically, we rely on an original survey representative for age, sex, and education conducted in six Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) shortly after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in April and May 2020. As our data contains both individual-level and regional-level indicators of pandemic threat, we are able to test our hypotheses on both levels. Further, we employ a continuous measure of conceptions of nationhood that is closer to extant conceptualization and addresses well-known shortcomings of measurement in previous literature. These main models are followed by a detailed mediation analysis to grasp the role of emotional reactions to pandemic threat. In accordance with our hypothesis, we find that pandemic threat is indeed positively related to stronger ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Our mediation analyses further reveal that it is only anger, but not fear, that activates this relationship. Thus, article 1 offers four important contributions to the study of the societal impact of pandemic threat. First, we provide original, first-hand measures of pandemic threat, whereas previous literature (luckily) had to rely on indirect measures or experimental stimuli given the absence of global pandemics for many decades prior to COVID-19. Second, the incorporation of emotions into the theoretical framework allows for combining interdisciplinary insights into a coherent study that provides robust and substantive evidence that fear and anger must not be conflated in either scholarly or political discussions on threat. Third, we provide large-scale, comparative evidence, where previous research had to rely on far smaller samples often faced with issues of representativeness. Fourth, we fill a substantial gap in both theoretical and empirical research on the behavioral immune system by providing a novel argument that puts definitions of group membership into focus, while extant research has primarily looked at attitudes towards out-groups or in-group favoritism.

Whereas Article 1 focuses on an explanatory variable that relates to both national identity, but also threatens social integration, Article 2 sheds light on the role of social disintegration in the form of group-based relative deprivation for nationalism and constructive patriotism respectively (Wamsler, 2022). While one strand of research has consistently demonstrated that nationalism is higher among individuals that perceive their in-group as being treated unfairly by other groups in society (Abrams et al., 2020; Abrams and Grant, 2012; Urbanska and Guimond, 2018), these studies

have so far lacked a comprehensive account for nationalism as a form of identity and focused more on nationalist vote choice. A theory of the relationship between GRD and CP has been all but missing so far. To address this research gap, I build on social identity theory and understand both nationalism and CP as the outcome of different coping strategies in the face of status inferiority. The more aggressive, competitive worldview underlying nationalism and the idealization of the in-group and its perceived superiority resonate well with the coping strategy of social competition (cf. Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Further, the affective component of GRD fits easily to the nationalist arousal that is described as following a perceived violation of the nation's interests (cf. Cottam et al., 2010; Gellner, 1983). Third, both GRD and nationalism are linked to higher levels of social dominance orientation as a preference for strict social hierarchies (cf. Guimond and Dambrun, 2002; Osborne et al., 2017; Sidanius et al., 1994). CP, however, rejects any idealization of the in-group and notions of its superiority (Schatz et al., 1999; Sekerdej and Roccas, 2016). Equally, the cognitive appraisals are fundamentally different from the case of nationalism. Instead, constructive patriots are more likely to withdraw support for the nation for some time if they perceive their in-group as being systematically disadvantaged leading to lower levels of manifest CP.

Empirically, Article 2 relies on the same original six-country study as Article 1. This rich dataset contains more detailed indicators for GRD, nationalism, and CP simultaneously than previous comparative datasets do. Linear regression models with country-fixed effects show that GRD is positively related to nationalism, whereas the reverse holds for CP. This support for both hypotheses is robust across a large number of robustness checks and substantive in size given that national identity does not fluctuate easily. Thus, Article 2 offers two major contributions to extant research. First, I provide an explicit theoretical account for both nationalism and CP as manifestations of individual-level national identity instead of focusing on either one or conflating it with other variables like vote choice or right-wing populism. Thus, I emphasize the necessity to draw a clear-cut distinction between nationalism and CP even in the face of a moderate empirical correlation. Second, I introduce a novel theoretical argument for linking GRD with CP, which has been neglected in previous research.

Article 3 has the aim to update previous findings on the relationship between social trust and conceptions of nationhood with an explicit focus on the dimensionality of both. Previous studies have too often focused exclusively on generalized trust or trust in strangers, thereby neglected

particularized trust in personal contacts and especially identity-based trust, which is directed towards unknown individuals who nevertheless share important traits of their social identity like nationality or language. In accordance with previous studies (Gustavsson and Stendahl, 2020; Reeskens and Wright, 2013), I argue that individuals with more ethnic conceptions of nationhood should be less prone to trust entirely unknown strangers than those with more civic conceptions. For particularized trust, however, I argue that extant research (e.g., Uslaner, 2002) has not paid enough attention to its differences with identity-based trust. As heuristics like national identity are irrelevant for deciding whether to trust a person that is personally known, I expect a non-significant relationship between particularized trust and conceptions of nationhood. For identity-based trust, I theorize that the positive relationship between both civic and ethnic conceptions with this third dimension of social trust, which has been established in previous research (Lenard and Miller, 2018) should be stronger among individuals with more ethnic conceptions. This is because this exclusionary, objectivist definition of group membership constructs boundaries using more, “thicker” criteria (Berg and Hjerm, 2010) than more superficial, “thinner” civic ones do.

For the empirical analysis, I draw on the latest wave of the European Values Study from 2017/18. As this dataset contains all necessary items and a previous wave has been used for the study of this relationship before (Reeskens and Wright, 2013), it should increase the comparability with these results and allow for more direct generalization. As in Article 1, I propose the use of a continuous measure for conceptions of nationhood as more appropriate, but test the robustness of the results with two-dimensional measures as well. Further, I respond to recent calls for including national-level manifestations of national identity into certain analyses to capture the role of the national context and between-country differences (McLaren, 2017). Overall, I find a negative relationship between particularized trust and more ethnic conceptions of nationhood. This unexpected finding could be explained by turning the argument around is stressing that individuals lacking trust in their immediate environment are also less likely to hold inclusive, civic conceptions or nationhood. Yet, this notion based on the social integration framework certainly warrants further future investigation. The inclusion of the national context into the model weakens the robustness of this relationship without rendering it fully insignificant. For trust in strangers, I find the expected negative relationship with stronger ethnic conceptions. However, the moderation model also shows that this relationship is only significant in countries where stronger civic conceptions are more prevalent, which casts some doubt on the generalizability of previous arguments (Miller, 1995;

Putnam, 2007). Looking at identity-based trust, the results indicate a clear positive relationship in accordance with the third hypothesis. This relationship holds irrespective of the national context. Taken together, Article 3 adds to extant literature by moving beyond generalized trust as the only dimension of social trust studied in relation to national identity and by showing that the dimensionality of this major aspect of social integration is paramount for understanding its links to social identity comprehensively. Further, it advances the long-standing debate on the appropriate measurement of conceptions of nationhood by highlighting differences between approaches.

Aside of the individual articles and their respective contributions, the present thesis offers five contributions to the relevant literature that stem either from the combination of the articles or from the guiding conceptual framework as such. First, I demonstrate how social integration offers a conceptual lens, through which the interlinkages between national identity and different societal phenomena can be understood in a more comprehensive and detailed, way. As shown in chapter 1.4.2, many concepts like social trust or group-based relative deprivation, but also subjective social status, social isolation, self-efficacy, or norms of reciprocity can be studied as part of the same overarching framework, which allows not only for linking each of them to national identity, but also for capturing their connections with each other thoroughly. The three articles constitute examples for such a common underlying understanding. Whereas pandemic exposure threatens social integration in general, group-based relative deprivation and social trust speak to the same three dimensions of social integration, but from a different point of view. Thus, studying both in relationship with national identity allows for paying close attention to the mechanisms at work, but also for uncovering differences in the link between each specific manifestation of social (dis)integration and the respective dimension of national identity. Given that a meaningful study of national identity requires the focus on a particular dimension to align with the research question under study, the latter aspect is especially crucial. Whereas group-based relative deprivation arguably matters most for intergroup relations as manifest in the distinction between nationalism and (constructive) patriotism, social trust is most often studied with reference to conceptions of nationhood.

Second, the three articles provide novel empirical evidence complementing extant research and filling important gaps therein. Article 1 provides the first in-depth analysis of the relationship between pandemic threat and definitions of group membership in advanced societies. Further, it sheds light on the mediating role of affective responses. Article 2 advances previous findings on the role of group-based relative deprivation for explaining nationalist identities and provides first

evidence on how CP is predicted accordingly. Article 3 adds to extant studies on the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and generalized trust, while bringing forth a complementary analysis of particularized and identity-based trust.

Third, all three empirical articles are accompanied by advances in the respective underlying theoretical argument. Article 1 does not only offer a detailed account of how pandemic threat may affect definitions of group membership in the form of conceptions of nationhood, but it also integrates insights from political psychology on the role of affective responses with the behavioral immune system hypothesis, which was originally developed in evolutionary biology, and demonstrates the use of such interdisciplinary approaches for the social sciences. Article 2 adds coping strategies based on social identity theory as a mechanism to the relationship between GRD and nationalism and applies this reasoning to present a novel hypothesis on the link between GRD and CP. Article 3, finally, advances the theoretical argument linking conceptions of nationhood and social trust by providing an updated argument for particularized trust and novel reasoning for the role of identity-based trust.

Fourth, Articles 1 and 3 introduce a continuous measure of conceptions of nationhood. Such an approach has been advocated conceptually for a long time (Brubaker, 2004; Kunovich, 2009; Miller and Ali, 2014; Parekh, 1999), but has not been reflected in empirical research. As opposed to established two-dimensional measures, a continuous operationalization captures the notion that civic and ethnic are mere ideal types and that almost all individuals combine elements of both in their views on who is a member of their respective nation.

Fifth, this thesis offers a comprehensive overview on the state of the art in current national identity research. The explicit focus in this overview lies of course on the conceptual part. Yet, given the vast conceptual tangle and widespread misunderstanding in the literature (Huddy, 2016; Huddy et al., 2021; Kreckel, 1999; Wimmer, 2017; Zimmer, 2003), a thorough account of what national identity is and what it means is of crucial importance for both theoretical and empirical advances in the field.

## 5.2 Limitations

Nations are “imagined as [...] inherently limited” (Anderson, 2006: 6). The same is true for this thesis. Given its scope, conceptual focus, and the nature of the available data, there are four important limitations that I discuss below. The first broad one revolves around its conceptual focus. Despite my claim that social integration as an analytical lens provides much added value to the study of national identity, this can only partly be demonstrated within the scope of a single thesis. Both national identity and social integration are such encompassing concepts that it would need many different studies for the framework’s benefit to become manifest beyond dispute. Therefore, this thesis offers several snapshots on the dynamic relationship between both as to provide a substantial steppingstone for adding other aspects of social integration (as discussed in section 1.4.2) like subjective social status or social isolation into the theoretical and empirical framework and for looking at the respective relationships from both sides. Only additional future research should enable the social integration framework to realize its full potential as an analytical point of view.

Further limitations concern the nature of the data available within the context of this thesis. Both the original six-country study employed in Articles 1 and 2 as well as the European Values Study in Article 3 constitute only cross-sectional, observational data at one single point in time. The second limitation thus refers to the impossibility to model time trends or to study if the observed relationships spell out differently at another time. Similarly, it is not possible to provide an empirical test of potentially dynamic or mutually reinforcing relationships as is for example theoretically plausible in the case of GRD and nationalism or patriotism. Yet, such results are crucial to validate the applicability of the theoretical argument(s) further. This leads directly to the third limitation, which is the geographical restriction of the sample under study. The six-country study contains only comparably wealthy, Western European countries with relatively stable democratic institutions. While each of them also has its very particular and distinct legacies of national identity as well as different roles of the concept in contemporary societies, the sample can naturally not ascertain if the same relationships can be detected in places of the world, where socio-economic conditions and historical legacies are markedly different. As most of the theoretical arguments in the three articles are not restricted to contextual conditions *per se*, a broadening of the sample(s) under study is another promising pathway for subsequent research.

The fourth limitation also follows from the structure of the data. Although almost every theoretical argument dealing with national identity is inherently causal in its ambition, none of the



present data sources allows for drawing valid, empirical causal claims. For example, while it is theoretically plausible that pandemic threat affects conceptions of nationhood, the research design itself cannot rule out reverse causality or any other kind of correlational relationship. This also demonstrates the importance of a sound and convincing theoretical approach, which is ideally complemented by an empirical design to test the proposed structure of cause and consequence thoroughly.

### 5.3 Avenues for future research and societal implications

Abovementioned limitations notwithstanding, the present thesis offers promising pathways for future research and has major implications for society as such. As already hinted at in the previous chapter, one such pathway lies in extending the empirical study of the social integration framework to its other aspects that did not find sufficient attention here. Subjective social status, for example is often linked to nationalism (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Lubbers et al., 2000; Shayo, 2009). Faced with a low subjective social status and lacking other social identities that may bolster this status, individuals should be more likely portray a nationalist identity to cope with this status inferiority. On the other hand, individuals with a high social status might be more likely to be more nationalist or patriotic given that their nation ensures their prosperity and welfare. Another example is social isolation. While empirical evidence is scarce, previous research theorizes that those feeling isolated from society and thus lacking the shared normative order that is at the core of social integration may be more likely to support the radical right as the combination of nationalist and populist elements (Rydgren, 2009). Regarding norms of reciprocity, it appears plausible that particularly constructive patriots react positively to perceiving their nation as portraying strong norms of reciprocity, which reflects their positive image of humanity.

Another issue for future research to tackle is the availability of data fit for answering causal question empirically. While a broadening of the scope of data in both geographical and temporal terms is also a worthwhile endeavor, the lack of sound, causal results is probably the most pressing issue in national identity research. Given that the social integration framework emphasizes that the different dimensions of national identity are not only *cause*, but also *consequence* of other relevant variables, it is crucial to obtain valid results regarding the *direction* of a particular relationship and to study if and which contextual factors may matter here. Whether such data stem from controlled,

experimental settings under laboratory conditions, well-designed survey experiments, or panel data depends on the respective research question. It is, however, crucial that any such approach follows the necessary methodological rigor so as not to endanger any causal claim from the relevant data.

In line with the argument presented in Article 1, a comprehensive study of the role of affective responses in shaping the interlinkages between national identity and (threats to) social integration may be a further fruitful avenue. As extant research shows, individuals react very differently to distinct emotional stimuli, which is decisive for how a situation is being dealt with (Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).

To sum up, I would like to take a look at the implications of the present thesis for society and politics. First of all, it is important for any debate about the role of national identity in contemporary societies to have a thorough understanding of its meaning. Whereas some manifestations of national identity may be preferable from a normative perspective to achieve desirable societal outcomes, others are more detrimental in this regard. In-group identification, for example, is a necessary prerequisite for a functioning democratic system as it provides the diffuse support without which modes of governance that lack other sources of legitimacy cannot function (cf. Easton, 1975; Fukuyama, 2018; Miller and Ali, 2014). As national identity is unlikely to vanish any time soon as today's major form of social identity with nation states comprising the major political actors in the world (Calhoun, 2007; Mylonas and Tudor, 2021), such a fine-grained understanding is crucial to avoid past mistakes in dealing with citizens' identification. Further, it is vital to understand that national identity is not an unmoved mover that individuals acquire during childhood and that remains stable over the course of adult life (cf. Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016; Egan, 2020). Instead, identity is in constant flux (Eugster and Strijbis, 2011; Muldoon et al., 2020), which necessitates emphasis not only on its consequences for societies, but also on its causes. Doing so by means of the framework of social integration would allow for understanding why less desirable manifestations of national identity are often found among individuals or groups disintegrating from society as a whole and for providing political answers to tackle these processes that threaten the very core of open liberal societies and democratic governance.

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## 7. Declaration of independent work

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen benutzt habe. Alle Koautorenschaften sowie alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus Quellen entnommen wurden, habe ich als solche gekennzeichnet. Mir ist bekannt, dass andernfalls der Senat gemäß Artikel 36 Absatz 1 Buchstabe o des Gesetzes vom 5. September 1996 über die Universität zum Entzug des aufgrund dieser Arbeit verliehenen Titels berechtigt ist.

Bern, 30.06.2022 – Steffen Wamsler