In Search of the "Why" behind Campaign Professionalisation: Explaining the Degree and Profile of Campaign Professionalisation by an Empirical Analysis of 23 Swiss Cantonal Election Campaigns

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Introduction

What is the research interest of this dissertation?

The professionalisation of political campaigning in general and of election campaigning in particular has become a popular subject of research, especially among European scholars. Studies have analysed form, degree and causes of professionalised campaigning in single case studies (cf. for example Gibson & Römmele 2009; Strömbäck 2009; Lisi 2011) as well as from a comparative perspective (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012). Nevertheless, two fundamental research desiderata still remain.

The first concerns the theoretical foundation of the research area. In the existing research it remains unclear what the "bigger story" behind campaign professionalisation is, why campaign professionalisation is measured and analysed as it is, and how the phenomenon fits a larger theoretical framework. I argue that this lack of theoretical foundation is a millstone around the neck of campaign professionalisation research as it hinders a more profound understanding of the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation, and in particular, why campaign professionalisation occurs and by which factors it is influenced. Furthermore, the repeated critique that professionalisation researchers leave unclear the validity of the measuring instruments for professionalised campaigning ("professionalisation indices") can be traced back to the restraints of theoretical substantiation. As it remains uncertain, from a theoretical perspective, why the respective indicators are included in the professionalisation indices, the existing indices have been criticised for not being exhaustive, for leaving the matter of the legitimacy of the individual indicators unclear, for only applying to election campaigning and not to political communication in general, and for being time bound (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 13f.). Furthermore, "theoretically and empirically, it is unclear if an additive index adequately reflects degrees of professional campaigning" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165). Rather, single components may "have to be weighted accordingly – or perhaps intentional withdrawing of components may sometimes be a better indicator for professional campaigning than adding up the elements" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165).

The second research desideratum concerns the "why" behind campaign professionalisation, that is, the factors that influence and explain campaign professionalisation. Existing results concerning the circumstances under which campaign professionalisation occurs are currently unsatisfactory, or, as Tenscher and colleagues put it, "the hunt for good explanatory variables continues" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). While a wide range of explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation has been raised from hypothetical perspectives, there have only been a handful of studies which systematically test potential explanatory factors. The results of these studies were partially contradictory and their interpretation has remained cursory. What is more, existing research suggests that there are at least two groups of explanatory variables: those located at the level of the party and those at the systemic level. As Strömbäck (2007: 98) asserts:

> *„In other words, party behaviour at any point in time should be perceived as a combination of systemic and environmental factors, and internal factors tied to specific party types and party goals. In the context of political campaigning, the degree of professionalisation can partly be explained by systemic and environmental factors – some of which affect all parties roughly to the same extent – and internal factors – which vary across parties within a particular political system."*

However, it remains unclear from existing research how the systemic and party levels are related. In which way do factors from both levels interact? Do the systemic factors determine a framework in which the party level factors have an effect; or is it the other way round?

How, might the reader wonder, do these research desiderata matter, other than in regard to scientific discourse within a rather confined research area? I argue that elucidating the "bigger picture" and the theoretical framework of campaign professionalisation, as well as determining the conditions by which campaigns become professionalised, is not only of scientific interest but has become a topic of concern from a democratic and participatory point of view. On the one hand, the professionalisation of election campaigning is considered a necessity, as well as a vehicle for the hopes and expectations of political parties. Parties feel the need to keep pace with modernisation and developments in new communication technologies, and they must also cope with tendencies towards nonalignment and ever-weaker bounds between parties and the electorate. As Holtz-Bacha argues, today's political actors must use all available strategic and technological communication techniques and instruments in order to survive within an age of excessive

supply of information and the rival, and potentially more interesting offers of the media, as well as to ensure legitimacy for their action (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15f.). When the number of swing voters and late deciders increase election campaigns become more important for political parties. Professionalised campaign communication involving more direct communication with voters and party members, and utilising a wide and targeted variety of campaign instruments, is necessary and expected in order to facilitate the mobilisation of the electorate and the party members.

On the other hand, there are concerns among scholars that campaign professionalisation might not be the cure, but rather the cause of increasing electoral abstentions if it encompasses an increasing reliance on mass media, direct mail and commercial telephone banks (cf. Green & Smith 2003: 324). Maarek raises similar concerns (2004: 220): "The final long-term drawback resulting from the excessive professionalisation of political communication forms part of the explanation for the recent decline in voting turnout in many countries." Scepticism is also formed due to the growing centralisation of campaign responsibility in the hands of a small group of party officials and/or professional campaigners, and to the exclusion of party members from campaigning procedures: "Would it lead to – and is it a cause of – heightened levels of distrust and disenchantment as the parties, led by professionals, fight it out? (…) Will greater professionalisation drive away the committed amateur?" (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 23). Therefore, from the perspective of inner-party and civic democracy and participation, it is still unclear whether campaign professionalisation is a necessary and successful strategy for parties by which to re-establish and reinforce their relation to their voters and members in an environment for campaigning that is apparently becoming more challenging, or whether it is one of the reasons for more problematic mobilisation and turnout. Hence, it is crucial to understand why, for which purpose and under which circumstances parties turn to professionalise their election campaigns.

Tying in with the described research desiderata and accounting for the social and political relevance of the topic, this dissertation aims to make two contributions to campaign professionalisation research. The first contribution is to propose a theoretical foundation. I will argue that sociological neo-institutionalism is a valuable theoretical foundation for campaign professionalisation and that fruitful and important insights can be gained for

professionalisation research by analysing and conceptualising campaign professionalisation from a neo-institutionalist perspective. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, the professionalisation of election campaigns can be defined as the process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to the real or perceived changes and expectations of the relevant environments for campaigning, in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from these environments. While existing research generally understands the professionalisation of election campaigns to be the result of parties adapting to "new and continually changing circumstances" (Negrine 2007: 29; cf. also Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15f.), I argue based on a sociological neo-institutionalism framework that four relevant electoral environments can be differentiated: the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. It can be deduced by drawing on a sociological neo-institutionalism framework that first, election campaigns are not necessarily professionalised to the same degree in relation to all four relevant electoral environments, and, second, that different environments provide different pressures and incentives to adapt campaign activities in accordance with institutional expectations. Hence, an aggregated or additive measurement instrument (or, in other words, an aggregated professionalisation index) bears the risk of creating inaccurate results, both with regard to the degree of professionalisation of election campaigns, and in relation to the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation (i.e., the independent variables or explanatory factors in correlational terms). Therefore, I propose to measure campaign professionalisation by utilising differentiated indices, in contrast to existing studies which group all indicators, and endeavour to capture the parties' adaptations to changes in their environments (or in other words, their campaign professionalisation), by combining them in one professionalisation index.

The second contribution of my dissertation is to shed light on the explanatory factors for professionalised election campaigning, by analysing these factors in relation to both campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept (i.e., measured by an aggregated professionalisation index) as well as in regard to the four most relevant electoral environments constituted by the voters, members, media, and other parties. Factors on both the systemic and the party level will be included in the analysis.

How will this dissertation proceed in order to tackle the research interest?

In order to tackle this two-fold research interest, the present dissertation draws on a combination of three methods. First, semi-structured interviews with the campaign managers of the five major Swiss parties in five cantons (i.e., the regional entities below the national level) were conducted, focusing on campaign communication and organisation during the last campaign for the elections to the cantonal parliament. This resulted in a sample of 23 cantonal election campaigns as two cantonal party branches refused to reveal details about their campaigns. The Swiss cantons are of particular value to comparative research, forming as Vatter puts it, an "extraordinary research laboratory within a small space" (Vatter 2007: 148). Belonging to the same national entity of Switzerland, the 26 Swiss cantons nevertheless differ considerably with regard to their political systems, socio-economic structures and political legacies (cf. Vatter 2007: 148). Hence, the cantons concurrently offer a strong degree of comparative equivalence and variation in context factors. Data from various cantons thus provides ideal grounds for a comparative analysis across different contexts (cf. Lachat & Sciarini 2002: 45).

Second, the interview transcripts were content analysed using five different codebooks. The first contained indicators for campaign professionalisation with the coding procedure resulting in index scores for each of the 23 campaigns on an aggregated professionalisation index. The other four codebooks, one for each relevant electoral environment, resulted in an index score for each of the 23 campaigns on the four indices reflecting the degree of professionalisation with regard to the environments constituted by the voters, the members, the media and other parties.

Finally, the resulting data was analysed with the help of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), which is the most advanced among the so-called set theoretic methods. The main reasons for choosing QCA as a method for data analysis are the following. First, it is particularly suitable for analysing complex causal patterns in the presence of few cases (cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343). This is an extremely valuable feature for the research purposes of this dissertation as we have a medium number of 23 cases at hand, and are interested in discovering which factors, at both the party and systemic level, influence campaign professionalisation as well as how they may interact. QCA allows for testing combinations of explanatory variables, for revealing necessary and sufficient conditions for

professionalised campaigning, and for revealing differing explanatory patterns. Second, the relation between the outcome (i.e., the dependent variable in correlational analysis terms) and the causal conditions (i.e., the independent variables) can be modelled as subset/superset relations. I will confirm what this means, and why it is important, through the course of this study. Third, the version fuzzy set (fs) QCA allows the calibration of both the causal conditions and the outcome. This means that the set membership of the 23 cases in both the outcome and the causal conditions can be refined based on empirical and theoretical evidence, resulting in a multi value scale (we will see in Chapter 5.2 what this means exactly). When dealing with degrees of campaign professionalisation, this reflects the empirical reality of the data better than a dichotomous measurement, which only differentiates between professionalised and non-professionalised campaigns. Five analyses will be conducted for five different outcomes: campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and campaign professionalisation in relation to each of the four electoral environments. The causal conditions which were chosen to be tested in the analysis based on theoretical reasoning and existing research, will be the same in each analysis:

- The campaign is organised in a large canton.
- The campaign is organised in an urbanised canton.
- The campaign is organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament.
- The campaign is organised by a right-wing party.
- The campaign is organised by a catch-all party.

Based on the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, it is assumed that there are different combinations of causal conditions (or, in other words, different causal paths) that produce professionalisation as an aggregated concept and campaign professionalisation with regard to each of the environments.

What are the central findings of this dissertation?

This dissertation will reveal that, based on the theoretical foundation provided by sociological neo-institutionalism, the professionalisation of election campaigns can be defined as a process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to the real or perceived changes and expectations of the relevant environments for campaigning, in order to ensure receiving on-going support and legitimacy from these environments. The most relevant environments for campaigning are constituted by the voters, members, media, and other parties. The empirical analysis that is performed with fsQCA, in order to explain campaign professionalisation in the 23 cantonal election campaigns in my sample, will show that there are different causal paths leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and with regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments:

- The solution formula leading to *campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept* is dominated by the condition *being organised in a large canton*, which produces the outcome in combination with the conditions *being organised by a non-right-wing party*, *being organised by a non-catch-all party* and *not being organised in a competitive environment*. When the campaign does not take place in a large canton, professionalised campaigns are still organised as an adaptation to a changing environment for campaigning, when a combination of incentives, at both the systemic (*urbanised and competitive environments*) and party level (*being organised by a catch-all party*), reinforce the pressures to adapt to these changes.

- An *urban environment* is a key incentive at the systemic level for organising a campaign that is professionalised with regard to the *environment constituted by the voters*. What is more, the causal conditions *being organised in a competitive canton* and *being organised in a large canton* context enhance the urgency to professionalise the campaigns with regard to the environment of the voters. At the party level, *catch-all parties* are under stronger pressure to professionalise their campaigns in regard to the voters. *Non-catch-all parties* also organise campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters but require stronger incentives at the systemic level (the campaign has to be organised in a large, urban, and competitive canton) to do so. *Non-right-wing parties* are more inclined than right-wing parties to professionalise their campaigns with regard to voters.

- Adapting election campaigns to changes in the *environment constituted by the members* (which are similar to those concerning the voters and include declining numbers of party members and more difficult mobilisation) is important, first, for *non-right-wing parties in a non-urban environment in large cantons* and, second, when the election takes place in an *urban and large canton*. For *catch-all parties,* professionalising the campaign with regard to the members is more urgent when the campaign is organised in a *competitive and urban environment*.

- Professionalising the campaign with regard to the *environment constituted by the media* is more important to *catch-all parties,* especially the case when the campaign is organised in an *urban context*, as well as when the campaign is organised in a *large canton*, or in a *competitive environment*. *Non-right-wing parties* professionalise their campaign with regard to the media when the campaign has to address a large and scattered audience in a *large canton* even if there is *no competitive situation* in the cantonal parliament. *Right-wing parties* require more environmental incentives in order to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the media. They must be faced with a competitive situation in an *urban environment* and target a large and scattered audience in a *large canton*.

- Due to the small number of cases in the outcome set, the analysis was able to explain only a certain aspect of campaign professionalisation in regard to the *environment constituted by other parties*. *Catch-all parties* are not protected from competition and therefore professionalise their campaign with regard to other parties when the campaign takes place in a *competitive and urban environment*.

The results confirm that campaign professionalisation is a strategy that parties rely on in order to adapt to challenges they are confronted with due to changes in the four most relevant electoral environments. What is more, the results clearly show that each environment provokes a different adaptation due to the different incentives and expectations it presents for a campaign. In conjunction, the theoretical reasoning and empirical results of the present dissertation suggest that campaign professionalisation should be considered a differentiated concept and hence be measured with differentiated indices.

How is this dissertation structured?

The remainder of this dissertation is structured in three parts. Part I presents the theoretical foundation of this study. Chapter 1 aims to familiarise the reader with the central topic of this study: the professionalisation of election campaigning. First, I offer a brief recapitulation of the origins of the notion "professionalisation" and how it became established within political communication terminology (Chapter 1.1). The second part of the chapter outlines how professionalisation has been defined and measured in existing research (Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), while also clarifying the differentiation between the professionalisation of election campaigning and political marketing (Chapter 1.2.3). Finally, a synthesis of this chapter draws on conclusions gained by considering the existing definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation and explains how the present dissertation will be applied to them. The synthesis also identifies some interesting, but until now neglected, aspects of the existing research and shows how this dissertation will pursue these loose ends (Chapter 1.3). Chapter 2 draws on sociological neo-institutionalism in order to propose a theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of election campaigning. In Chapter 2.1, the reader is offered an introduction to the theoretical approach constituted by sociological neo-institutionalism. Campaign professionalisation will then be considered from a neo-institutionalist perspective and three main conclusions are drawn (Chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.3). It will be suggested that by professionalising their campaigns parties adapt to real or perceived pressures to change in relation to their four most important electoral environments (voters, members, media and other parties). For reason of argument, the causal conditions that influence campaign professionalisation will be briefly introduced here and then discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. Summing up the theoretical reasoning presented to this point, I finally propose a definition for the professionalisation of election campaigns (Chapter 2.2.4). Chapter 2.3 turns to the measurement of campaign professionalisation and first discusses two conclusions that follow from theoretical insights presented thus far and from existing research: measurement of campaign professionalisation should differentiate between environments (Chapter 2.3.1) and take the context that the campaign is organised in into consideration (Chapter 2.3.2). Chapter 2.3.3 then presents the measuring instrument for campaign professionalisation to be used in this study. The first part of this dissertation

concludes with Chapter 3, which focuses on the causal conditions for campaign professionalisation. After presenting the current state of research engaged with outlining the explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation (3.1), the five causal conditions that will be analysed in this study are introduced, including their theoretical substantiation (Chapters 3.2 and 3.3; an overview of the operationalisation and calibration of these causal conditions can be found in Chapter 7). The hypotheses underlying this study are presented in Chapter 3.4. Finally, Chapter 3.5 utilises two schemes in order to visualise the general theoretical model underlying the present dissertation as well as the hypothesised relations between the outcome (the professionalisation of election campaigning) and the causal conditions.

The database and methodological approach are presented in Part II. Chapter 4 describes the database for the outcome and how it was created by conducting semi-structured interviews and a content analysis of the interview transcripts (Chapter 4.1). Chapter 4.2 describes the database for the causal conditions that was established with the help of secondary data (Chapter 4.2). Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach for the data analysis of the study in hand, that is fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). As readers may not be familiar with this approach, Chapter 5 offers a methodological introduction to fsQCA.

Part III focuses on the empirical heart of this study. Before turning to the analysis of the conditions that influence the professionalisation of Swiss cantonal election campaigns (Chapter 8), Chapter 6 and 7 present descriptive results in regard to campaign professionalisation in the 23 campaigns included in this study. Chapter 6 shows how campaign professionalisation is used as a strategy of adaptation to environmental challenges from the perspectives of the campaign managers in the cantonal election campaigns included in the present study. Chapter 7 indicates to what degree campaigns are professionalised on an aggregate level (Chapter 7.1) and in relation to the four relevant electoral environments (Chapter 7.2). The results are discussed from the perspective of both the indicators (in order to determine which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in this study) (Chapter 7.3) and that of the campaigns (comparing the index scores that the individual campaigns achieved with regard to professionalisation as an aggregated concept

and with regard to each of the four environments) (Chapter 7.4). Following the same approach applied in Chapter 2.3.1, the results are then analysed to determine which environments the cantonal election campaigns have been professionalised towards most intensively (Chapter 7.5).

Chapter 8 begins with an explanation of how the principles and method of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) are applied in order to extract causal formulas that lead to professionalised campaigning in the 23 cantonal election campaigns of this study (Chapter 8.1). Chapter 8.1.1 stipulates the conceptual basis of the research design by outlining how the professionalisation of election campaigns, as well as the conditions influencing them, can be modelled as subset/superset relations. The subsequent chapters focus on the calibration of the outcome (Chapter 8.1.2) and of the causal conditions (Chapter 8.1.3). These subjects of inquiry are included at this point in the dissertation because, as the reader will surmise, the application of the method is so closely linked to the results of the analysis that both can be better comprehended when presented in direct sequence. Chapter 8.2 provides the results of the fsQCA analysis for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept, stating both the necessary (Chapter 8.2.1) and sufficient conditions (Chapter 8.2.2). Chapter 8.3 does the same for the four differentiated outcomes: the necessary and sufficient conditions for professionalisation are conveyed in regard to the electoral environments constituted by the voters (Chapter 8.3.1), members (Chapter 8.3.2), media (Chapter 8.3.3) and other parties (Chapter 8.3.4). Chapter 8.4 gives and overview over the results and they are discussed in Chapter 8.5.

The conclusion provides a summary of the proceedings of the study and its core findings. Critical discussion is offered concerning both the theoretical and methodological approaches of this dissertation, while also addressing the validity of the causal paths leading to campaign professionalisation in other contexts, as well as considering the central question of whether campaign professionalisation should be conceptualised and measured by differentiation per environment rather than in an aggregated manner. Finally, limitations of the present study as well as challenges and perspectives for future research are discussed.

Part I: Theoretical Foundation

1. Professionalisation of election campaigns – a rather fuzzy concept

This chapter aims to familiarise the reader with the central topic of this study: the professionalisation of election campaigning. The chapter first briefly recapitulates the origins of the notion of "professionalisation" and how this concept has been assimilated into political communication terminology (Chapter 1.1). The second section illustrates how professionalisation has been defined and measured in the existing research (Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), as well as clarifying the differentiation between the professionalisation of election campaigning and political marketing (Chapter 1.2.3). Finally, a synthesis of this chapter draws a conclusion from the existing definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation and explains how the dissertation will engage with these existing definitions and operationalisations. The chapter's synthesis also identifies some noteworthy, yet until recently neglected, aspects of the existing research and asserts how this dissertation will pursue these loose ends (Chapter 1.3).

1.1 A brief history of the term

Before presenting a brief history of the origin of the term *professionalisation* three general remarks regarding the term must be made. First, as election campaigns have been transformed throughout the last few decades, changes in campaign communication and organisation have become widely recognised realities and actively studied topics of research. Several notions have been employed to describe processes of change in electoral campaigning: *modernisation* (see e.g. Swanson & Mancini 1996; Römmele 2005), *Americanisation* (see e.g. Swanson & Mancini 1996, Römmele 2005; Plasser 2000, 2002), *political marketing*[1] (see e.g. Strömbäck 2007; Lees-Marshment 2001), and the transformation from labour intensive to *capital-intensive* campaigns (cf. Farrell 1996: 168). In recent years, a coherent branch of research has evolved around the notion of *professionalisation.* Since this dissertation engages with the findings and desiderata of this branch of research, it will also employ the term *professionalisation*. However, the author remains open to other, or better, terms for describing changes in election campaigning.

[1] Amongst these notions, professionalisation and political marketing have been used most extensively. As both notions appear to encapsulate different concepts, I will elaborate further on the differentiation of professionalisation and political marketing in Chapter 1.2.3.

Second, as the term professionalisation has become a popular identifier for describing changes and trends in election campaigning, its scholarly use by far exceeds the work undertaken concerning its conceptual and operational definition. In other words, the term professionalisation is occasionally used without describing what exactly the researcher means by the term, how he or she defines it, or how the term has been operationalised (this is the case, for example, in Maarek 2004, 2007). Articles and books of this kind are not included in the present dissertation and therefore do not appear in the following discussion of the present state of research. This makes the elaboration of the state of research less comprehensive, regrettably, but without knowing how campaign professionalisation is conceptualised, defined and measured in the studies we are concerned with it is impossible to evaluate if they address the same phenomenon. This makes it difficult to coordinate with the research, bringing about the risk of relating to findings and insights that were reached by way of theoretical and conceptual premises different from the present study.

Third, readers will note that the empirical analysis in the present study measures campaign professionalisation at only one point in time. Subsequently, this study does not retrace the professionalisation of election campaigns in the five sample cantons over time. It will, however, analyse how professionalised the campaigns were during the time of this study as well as clarify the different degrees and profiles of campaign professionalisation. Therefore, in the context of this dissertation, professionalisation must be examined in relation to the degree by which it is applied to a current campaign, not as a reconstruction of the process within a specific time frame. Zucker (1977: 728) argued, in regard to the term institutionalisation, that

> *"(…) institutionalization is both a process and a property variable. It is the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less taken-for-granted part of the social reality."*

The same logic may be applied to the term professionalisation. Hence, this dissertation deals with professionalisation as a property variable of Swiss cantonal election campaigns as it analyses and explains the different levels and profiles of professionalisation that cantonal election campaigns engage in. Readers who are German fluent may also wish to refer to Donges (2008: 114ff.) who applies the two-fold conceptualisation of process and state to the term "*Medialisierung*" (medialisation).

The existing research dealing with the professionalisation of election campaigning originates primarily from the work of European scholars, perhaps as Strömbäck notes, because "campaigns in the United States are more advanced than in other countries, and because it is hence more or less taken for granted that political campaigns in the United States have become professionalised" (Strömbäck 2009: 96). Professionalisation is originally a sociological term, which refers to the process in which an occupation becomes a profession. While the inclusion of professionals (such as spin doctors, public relations consultants, etc.) in election campaigns is indeed part of all existing operationalisations of professionalisation, the concept of professionalised campaigns (as far as we can speak of *one* concept, cf. Chapter 1.2) goes far beyond this aspect. This is in large part due to the fact that professionalism among European parties more often originates from within the party organisation than from without (cf. e.g. Esser et al. 2000: 212). Mancini thereby concluded that, „in most European countries, because of their different cultural and political contexts, the management of the campaign is rarely consigned to outside professionals who are not part of the party apparatus" (Mancini 1999: 238). While the overall level of campaign centralisation, with campaign tasks and decisions centralised in the hands of a small but powerful group of campaign managers, is not necessarily lower than in the United States, this "overall management typically is assigned to someone within or close to the party" (Mancini 1999: 238):

> *„In some cases, party bureaucrats themselves try to master the new technologies and skills needed to operate successfully in the competitive arena. In the meantime, they seek the support of external technicians for specific tasks and goals." (Mancini 1999: 243)*

Whereas we may assume that this characteristic would have changed over time, more recent case studies suggest that political communication experts employed in campaigns are in the majority of cases, party members, party officers, or at least persons in some way affiliated to the particular party (for the German case cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14; for Greece cf. Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 19). "The difference is that their political marketing techniques have been adapted to the new communication landscape." (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 19)

Thus, in view of the fact that the inclusion of external professionals does not alone effectively account for the development of campaigns in the European context, scholars have broadened their analysis of professionalisation and now focus "less on measuring the

competence and skills of individual members and more on the shifts taking place in the overall ethos of the organization and the tools and resources that are typically relied upon" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 268). To be precise, it is mainly the characteristics of campaign organisation and communication that are drawn upon when analysing campaign professionalisation. However, presently there is no commonly accepted definition of professionalised campaigning. Rather, three "trends" are apparent within scholarship applied to the concept of campaign professionalisation. First, thus far, there have been few attempts to offer a concise, coherent definition of campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 1.2). Second, scholars have attempted to encapsulate campaign professionalisation via its components by proposing operationalisations regarding the measurement of campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 1.2.1). In the majority of cases these operationalisations are not accompanied by a more general definition of campaign professionalisation. Third, professionalisation is described as an adaptation to a changing environment in relation to campaign communication, often without specifying the exact form or characteristics of this adaptation (see Chapter 1.2.2).

1.2 Definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation

Strömbäck (2007: 54), to date, has proposed the most comprehensive definition of professionalised political campaigning:

> *„Professionalized political campaigning is characterized by being permanent, although with varying intensity; by the central campaign headquarters being able to coordinate the messages and the management of the campaign; and by using expertise in analyzing and reaching out to members, target groups and stakeholders, in analyzing its own and competitors' weaknesses and strengths and making use of that knowledge, and in news management."*

In a later article, Strömbäck applies a condensed version of this definition by contending that, "it appears reasonable to think of the professionalisation of political campaigning mainly in terms of the use of different sophisticated campaign techniques, the use of expertise in applying these campaign techniques and the management of political campaigning" (Strömbäck 2009: 97). Referring to Lilleker and Negrine (2002), Strömbäck and colleagues furthermore conclude that, "in fact, the essence of professionalization can be described as the 'specialization of tasks' and the 'increased use of experts' (Lilleker and

Negrine, 2002: 102)" (Strömbäck et al. 2013: 43). In an earlier definition, Esser and colleagues focus on management and expertise by defining campaign professionalisation as "(1) central planning and controlling of all campaign communication activities as a part of an integrated communication strategy that follows the pattern of commercial PR and advertising campaigns; (2) employment of professional experts in PR, marketing, advertising and polling in spite of relying on non-professional party members" (Esser et al. 2000: 212). Tenscher defines professionalised campaigning as a permanent and strategic management of communication (cf. Tenscher 2008: 110; cf. Tenscher 2011: 68). Holtz-Bacha identifies professionalisation as an intensive use of a multitude of campaign instruments (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14) and the use of all available strategic and technological communication instruments (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15).

1.2.1 The operational definitions: professionalisation indices

Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) and Tenscher (2007, 2011) have proposed operational definitions or *professionalisation indices*. Strömbäck's (2007, 2009) indices are based on the index formulated by Gibson and Römmele. Tenscher, Mykkänen and Moring (2012) utilise an index very similar to the one proposed by Tenscher. Both groups of indices focus mainly on aspects of campaign communication and organisation and contain similarities, for example, in the stressing of the meaning of so-called direct communication ("narrowcasting" (Tenscher), "use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside target groups", "use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups", (Gibson & Römmele)), opposition research, and the externalisation or outsourcing of headquarters and consultants. However overall, the two solutions for operationalising campaign professionalisation contain so many different indicators that they could scarcely come to the same results if applied to the same case.

Gibson and Römmele's motivation to propose an index for measuring campaign professionalisation was to provide a tool that included, "indicators that adequately capture the concept of professionalized campaigning in a broader generic sense" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 269), thereby allowing for systematic and comprehensive comparative analyses of campaign professionalisation. They proposed to employ the following

indicators by which to measure campaign professionalisation (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2001: 39; cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285):

- Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside target groups
- Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups
- Presence of an internal Internet communication system
- E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates
- Outside headquarters
- Continuous campaigning
- Use of outside public relations/media consultants
- Use of computerized databases
- Use of opinion polling
- Conducting opposition research

Strömbäck argues that most of the items in the index proposed by Gibson and Römmele "concern the use of expertise in applying the marketing techniques that should be available to campaigns in most present-day democracies" (Strömbäck 2007: 55). Strömbäck therefore proposes a *Professionalised Campaign Index* based on the index formulated by Gibson and Römmele. The index, however, is somewhat modified to better fit the Swedish case (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54):

- Use of campaign controlled opinion polling
- Use of campaign controlled focus groups
- Use of computerised databases
- Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in news management/public relations
- Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in analysing public opinion

- Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in advertisements
- Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in voter segmentation
- Use of direct mail to target groups
- Use of direct mail to own members or campaign volunteers
- Use of telemarketing for contacting target groups
- Use of telemarketing for contacting own members or campaign volunteers
- Conducting semi-independent research of strengths and weaknesses of their own campaign
- Conducting opposition research
- Use of rapid rebuttal-unit
- Presence and use of an internal Internet communication system
- Presence and use of an external Internet communication system
- E-mail sign-up or subscription lists for regular news updates/news letters
- Continuous campaigning
- Centralised campaign headquarters able to coordinate the management of the campaign

In a subsequent study, Strömbäck uses an index to measure campaign professionalisation that is more similar to the original index proposed by Gibson & Römmele (2001, 2009). Strömbäck (2009: 101) includes the following indicators:

- Use of telemarketing
- Use of direct mail
- E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters
- Outside headquarters

- Use of external public relations/media consultants
- Use of computerised databases
- Use of opinion polling
- Use of focus groups
- Opposition research
- Research of one's own party or campaign
- Continuous campaigning

Tenscher and colleagues argue that in order to measure campaign professionalisation, "a model is needed that is independent of temporal or spatial conditions, allows international and longitudinal comparisons, and adequately reflects differences in the campaign efforts of political parties" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 148). They propose an additive index (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012: 161ff.) formerly introduced by Tenscher in his 2007 and 2011 articles (which then still included the indicators degree of privatisation and degree of negative campaigning) (cf. Tenscher 2007: 70; cf. Tenscher 2011: 72). The more the following elements are integrated into an election campaign, the more the campaign can be regarded as "professional" (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012: 148):

- Size of election campaign budget (election campaign expenditures of each individual party per eligible voter)
- Staff size (number of institutionalised permanent and temporary staff members involved in the planning, organization, and implementation of the election campaign at the national level)
- Degree of centralisation of campaign organisation (degree of the centralisation of the campaign management (i.e., the organisational, strategic, and thematic orientation) in the hands of party leaders on the national level)
- Degree of externalization (basis of the number of temporary dedicated agencies and political consultants/experts occupied with general and/or specific election

campaign jobs, such as advertising, news and event management, media planning, opinion polling, targeting, Internet campaign, etc.)

- Differentiation of internal communication structures (existence and the use of "new" communication media for internal campaign communication and the mobilisation of party members)

- Nature and degree of feedback (use of two methods employed to test planned campaign techniques and to measure target group-specific and representative opinions)

- Degree of opposition research (development of independent structures for the monitoring of political opponents)

- Campaign duration (overall duration of the preparation, the planning, and the implementation of the campaign up to Election Day)

- Degree of targeting (number of target groups that have been identified by the party and are to be specifically contacted and mobilised)

- Degree of narrowcasting activities (number of activities aiming at direct communication with target groups)

- Relevance of paid media (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of different advertising media based on a 5-point scale questionnaire (1 = completely unimportant to 5 = very important))

- Relevance of free media (subjective assessment done by the campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of the presence of their party or their front-runner in different media formats based on a 5-point scale questionnaire (1 = completely unimportant to 5 = very important))

- Relevance of talk shows (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of the presence of their front-runner (1) in political talk shows and (2) in entertainment and other

non-political talk shows based on a 5-point scale questionnaire (1 = completely unimportant to 5 = very important))

- Degree of event and news management (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to assess the degree of the management of media oriented "pseudo-events" in the party's campaign)

- Degree of personalisation (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to assess the significance of their front-runner compared to issues in the party's campaign)

While Tenscher and colleagues proposed using the indicators in an additive manner, they go on to propose that, "theoretically and empirically, it is unclear if an additive index adequately reflects degrees of professional campaigning" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165; see also Tenscher 2007: 70). "Perhaps single components have to be weighted accordingly – or perhaps intentional withdrawing of components may sometimes be a better indicator for professional campaigning than adding up the elements." (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165) Tenscher and colleagues also remark that "although campaign managers' answers (the subjective dimension), in combination with the measurement of some objective information, seem to be an appropriate way to tackle the phenomenon of campaign professionalism, the set of indicators still has to be controlled for validity" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 160). They propose to continue with an additive, but standardised, index "as long as these questions of external validity are open" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165).

1.2.2 Campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to a changing environment

Several scholars dealing with the professionalisation of election campaigning conceptualise it as a process of adaptation to a changing environment of political communication. For some scholars, adaptation to a changing environment is the theoretical background of campaign professionalisation, or the main reason why campaigns become professionalised. For others, as we will see, adapting the campaign to a changing environment also is the essential component for *defining* the concept of campaign professionalisation (this is especially the case for the definitions by Negrine (2007) and Holtz-Bacha (2007)).

According to Tenscher, the professionalisation of political campaigning is a set of transformations that can be modelled as a necessary or even inevitable reaction to what can be subsumed by the modernisation process. Widespread changes in the political, socio-cultural and mass media environment of political action, such as individualisation and secularisation, de-ideologisation of the electorate, the growing complexity of political decision making processes and the differentiation of mass media lead to changes in the way political actors communicate (cf. Tenscher 2007: 67). Tenscher and colleagues similarly refer to "changes and adaptations" that are "often assembled under the catchword 'professionalisation'" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 145).

Lilleker and Negrine, while expressing scepticism in their 2002 article concerning the term *professionalisation,* argue that "the growing awareness of the need to 'professionalize' political communication (…) may be little more than the longer term process by which political systems and political actors adapt to the emergence of new media of communication as well as to the increasing specialization of tasks common in modern societies" (Lilleker & Negrine 2002: 307f). Negrine picks up this idea in a later article by stating that "from the perspective of the political party, the professionalisation of political communication can be deemed to be the process of adaption by which they change their structures and practices in order to meet new and continually changing circumstances and their use of experts in order to achieve their goals" (Negrine 2007: 34). Negrine further explains that professionalisation may be considered a process of reflection and learning that leads to improvement and change. To be a professional, or to act in a professional manner, therefore means to engage in a set of practices that are accepted, at particular moments in time, as 'the standards of the best' and that are acknowledged to be the most appropriate for those circumstances (cf. Negrine 2007: 29). He specifies that transitions or transformations are, at the least, taking place in relation to "the ways in which political parties (…) communicate with their particular constituencies, i.e. displaying a more professional style or manner in the ways they communicate" (Negrine 2007: 33), "the nature and structure of the organisation, i.e. displaying a more professional organisational structure in how they organise their communication activities" (Negrine 2007: 33), and "the ways in which they use experts or 'professionals' from outside the organisation, be it a

political party or government body, to lend support or direct the nature and content of communication", as well as in relation to "the labour market" (Negrine 2007: 33).

A similar argumentation is followed by Holtz-Bacha (2007: 63):

> *"(…) professionalisation of political communication is a process of adaptation to, and as such a necessary consequence of, changes in the political system on the one side and the media system on the other and in the relationship of the two systems. These changes follow from the modernisation of society, which is a development that is still going on and will take place in similar political systems sooner or later. Professionalisation in this sense is a general and not culture-bound concept. Its actual appearance and the degree of professionalisation in a given country are however dependent on a country's specific social and political structures and processes."*

While employing a less definition-like character in their argument, Esser and colleagues make similar references, stating that, "the need to professionalize campaign communication management can be traced back to changes in voting behaviour (i.e. dealignment) and changes in the media (i.e. expansion and diversification of mass media and the domination of politics through mass-communicated messages)" (Esser et al. 2000: 212).

Papathanassopoulos and colleagues also propose that an important drive behind campaign professionalisation is "the need to confront a changing electorate with no particular allegiances, as well as the need to find ways to persuade and mobilise them" (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 11).

1.2.3 Professionalisation versus political marketing

Like the professionalisation of election campaigning, the concept of political marketing has gained increasing attention in the field of political communication research. While the two concepts may bear a certain resemblance, it is of crucial importance to differentiate between political marketing and the professionalisation of election campaigns from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. In fact, they should be treated as "two separate dimensions" (Strömbäck 2007: 62). As I have observed in Chapter 1.2.1, the definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation are mainly comprised of the characteristics of campaign communication and organisation. Political marketing, however, goes beyond these aspects and equally impacts the objectives and justifications underlying a campaign. As Strömbäck has convincingly argued, "the use of expertise in applying

marketing techniques is not viewed as the same as being politically market-oriented" (Strömbäck 2007: 55). Meaning, that while parties may include elements of political marketing in their campaign communication and organisation, it does not necessarily follow that the campaign will be market-oriented in principle: "political marketing is the application of marketing principles and procedures – not just marketing techniques and activities" (Strömbäck 2007: 56). The essence of political marketing is that it is not only formulated by an intention to *sell* a political product (like a manifesto) to the voters with the help of marketing techniques, but also to *design* this political product in a way that will be successful, as it will be ""in response to the needs and wants of people or groups targeted by the producers – the organizations or campaigns" (Strömbäck 2007: 56). Political marketing implies that parties determine their behaviour in response to voter demands and design their 'product' to suit the electorate (cf. Lees-Marshment 2001: 698). It is thereby concerned with "market intelligence, needs management, the design of the political product, and how political organizations and actors behave in relation to their markets, not just about campaigning." (Strömbäck 2007: 57) Therefore, the concept of political marketing has much broader applications than the concept of campaign professionalisation (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 63).

It is important to note that in this dissertation analysis is confined to the subject of campaign professionalisation, leaving aside the concept of political marketing. This study is explicitly situated in tracking existing research on the professionalisation of election campaigns, both theoretically and empirically. Thus, the empirical section will analyse characteristics of the communication and organisation of the 23 campaigns under study here, all formulated to contribute to successfully *selling*, in marketing terms, a political product. Yet, aspects such as market intelligence and product adjustment that would have to be analysed in order to assess whether a party is not only *sales*, but also *market-oriented,* are left out of the analysis.

1.3 Synthesis

From the preceding chapters we have observed that developments in campaign communication and organisation have been subsumed by political communication researchers utilising the concept of campaign professionalisation, thereby establishing a coherent research branch. However, two rather different approaches to defining the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation have emerged. First, attempts to define campaign professionalisation via certain campaign characteristics are assembled by way of additive indices. Often lacking from these approaches is a theoretical framework, one that reveals the wider context behind the indices. Securing the definition of professionalisation to the existence of very specific indicators has, not surprisingly, brought about substantial criticism. The comprehensiveness of existing indices in measuring campaign professionalisation has particularly been brought into question, due to allowing the legitimacy of individual indicators to remain unclear, for only applying criteria to election campaigning and not to political communication in general, for being time bound, and for being applicable only to party centred and not candidate centred campaigns (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 13f). Strömbäck, himself utilising an index, notes that, "it should be recognised that the list of dependent variables that make up the Professionalised Campaign Index is not exhaustive" (Strömbäck 2009: 113). "Other existing campaign techniques could be included, and new campaign techniques will certainly develop that should be incorporated in future versions of the index" (Strömbäck 2009: 113). Holtz-Bacha additionally remarks that linking professionalisation to the engagement of a broad range of campaign instruments and techniques forces the concept to be very dependent upon whether parties have enough resources to employ all of these instruments. Thus, it may become virtually impossible for smaller parties, generally operating with small budgets, to conduct a professionalised campaign. Thereby, available resources would then become the only explanatory variable for campaign professionalisation (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14).

The strength of utilising an operational definition of campaign professionalisation via certain indicators should be apparent: indices allow the measurement of campaign professionalisation and yield comparable results. Measuring campaign professionalisation by an index appears to be a scientific necessity if we want to move beyond the qualitative description of single cases and demand the production of comparable results.

Secondly, there are approaches that define campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to the changing environment of election campaigning. These approaches frequently fail to specify how these adaptations are formulated and by which indicators or characteristics they may be identified and measured. A criticism directed at the conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation as an adaptation is its failing as a definition, existing as a term which remains little more than a "self-defining, catch-all buzzword employed to explain the recent changes in political communication" (Lilleker & Negrine 2002: 305; cf. also Donges 2008: 224f). The strength of the definition of campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to changing environments is a universal applicability, not limited to spatial or temporal contexts. By addressing the embeddedness of parties into several environments, which influence how election campaigns are designed, this approach reveals at least a bit of the 'bigger picture' or even of the theoretical foundation of campaign professionalisation, even if this is not elaborated upon further.

I argue in Chapter 2 that both approaches to defining campaign professionalisation can be merged by conceptualising the professionalisation of election campaigns as an adaptation to changes in the relevant environments for election campaigning, with characteristics or indicators of professionalised campaigning being manifestations of this adaptation.

What is more, two very noteworthy aspects concerning the conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to a changing environment implicitly emerge from the existing research, but have not yet been elaborated upon in further detail. These aspects merit further inquiry: first, while there is a broad consensus among researchers concerning the establishment of a general concept of the professionalisation of election campaigning as an adaptation of campaigns to a changing environment, the theoretical and empirical implications this might have for professionalisation research has, regrettably, not been discussed in further detail. As campaign professionalisation research has, thus far, been a rather weakly theorised research area, no efforts have yet been made to use the perspective of professionalisation as an adaptation in order to develop a theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation research. Subsequently, if we take a closer look at the interpretations of scholars presented in this chapter, it becomes clear that they mention several *different* environments that campaigns are adapted to. Tenscher refers to the political, socio-cultural and mass media environment (cf. Tenscher 2007: 67), while Lilleker

and Negrine mention the "emergence of new media of communication and (…) the increasing specialization of tasks common in modern societies" (Lilleker & Negrine 2002: 307f). Holtz-Bacha refers to "changes in the political system on the one side and the media system on the other and in the relationship of the two systems media" (Holtz-Bacha 2007: 63). Esser and colleagues similarly mention "changes in the media" (Esser et al. 2000: 212), as well as changes in voting behaviour, which is also raised by Papathanassopoulos and colleagues (cf. Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 11). Picking up these two interrelated strands in Chapter 2, I will further elaborate on the existence of several differentiable environments for electoral campaigning, by proposing a theoretical foundation for professionalisation research based on this reasoning.

Second, a characteristic that merits elaboration in further detail is the subjectivity that appears to be inherent to the concept of campaign professionalisation. Papathanassopoulos and colleagues argue that "[the idea of professionalisation of political communication] suggests the creation of a more 'rational' and more streamlined organisational structure or a more 'appropriate' set of practices" (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 10). The authors also note that "what is deemed 'rational' and 'appropriate' may be time bound" and that "what is deemed to be 'appropriate' professional behaviour is never fixed" (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 24). Negrine states, following a similar argument, that "to be a professional or to act in a professional manner thus means to engage in a set of practices that are accepted, at particular moments in time, as 'the standards of the best' and acknowledged to be the most appropriate in those circumstances" (Negrine 2007: 29). This means that from the position of a party, leading a professionalised campaign requires following the standards of what is currently accepted as rational and appropriate in campaigning as well as complying with the standards of best practice. Connecting with this argumentation, and situating my reasoning within sociological neo-institutionalism, I will argue in Chapter 2.2 that campaign professionalisation must be conceptualised as an adaptation of campaigns, by which parties respond to pressures and changes in their electoral environments by employing methods they consider rational and appropriate.

2. Proposing a theoretical foundation

As we recall from Chapter 1.2.2, campaign professionalisation research refers to the changes in parties' environments as the reason for the professionalisation of electoral campaigning. Several environments such as the voters, media, etc., have been identified to be the source of changes in campaigning. However, this reasoning has not been elaborated upon or theoretically validated. The argument of this dissertation is that by drawing on sociological neo-institutionalism I may further refine and confirm the concept of campaign professionalisation as a response to changing environments for election campaigning. In this chapter, I will draw on sociological neo-institutionalism in order to propose a theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of election campaigning.[2] In Chapter 2.1, the reader is presented with an introduction to sociological neo-institutionalism as a theoretical approach. Campaign professionalisation will then be considered from a neo-institutionalist perspective and three main conclusions are drawn (Chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.3). It will be suggested that by professionalising their campaigns parties adapt to real or perceived pressures to change in relation to their four most important electoral environments (voters, members, media and other parties). For reason of argument, the causal conditions that influence campaign professionalisation will be briefly introduced here and then discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. Summing up the theoretical reasoning presented to this point, I finally propose a definition for the professionalisation of election campaigns (Chapter 2.2.4). Chapter 2.3 turns to the measurement of campaign professionalisation and first discusses two conclusions that follow from theoretical insights presented thus far and from existing research: measurement of campaign professionalisation should differentiate between environments (Chapter 2.3.1) and take the context that the campaign is organised in into consideration (Chapter 2.3.2). Chapter 2.3.3 then presents the measuring instrument for campaign professionalisation to be used in this study.

[2] Several theoretical approaches describe the relation between parties and their environments. They range from conceptions of parties as completely dependent from and determined in their actions by changes their environment to parties as strategic actors. The sociological neo-institutionalism models parties to be embedded in and inextricably entangled with their institutional environments. At the same time, the sociological neo-institutionalism recognises that pressures and incentives from the institutional environment of the parties have to be processed by them and parties have a certain margin to decide whether an adaptation to the environment is considered necessary or whether opting out would also be in order. Because of this dualism of context-induced and independent action, the sociological neo-institutionalism is evaluated and proposed in this dissertation as a useful and plausible theoretical foundation for campaign professionalisation.

2.1 Sociological neo-institutionalism

Throughout the past 40 years, institutions as a subject of research have gained increasing attention within the social sciences and economics. As a critical response to rational choice approaches, several neo-institutionalist research areas have emerged focusing on the role of institutions in social, political and economic processes (for an overview cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 2ff). Sociological neo-institutionalism is based on the central reasoning that organisations are embedded in institutional environments, adapting to and accommodating, the inherent expectations of environments in order to survive.

Neo-institutionalist understanding of how an 'institution' may be defined is broad and comprehensive. Ultimately, it covers all forms of (permanently) reproduced social practices, which have been empirically proven to be meaningful for organisations (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18). While a systematisation of institutions is lacking, several forms of institutions have proved to be important (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18). Among these are institutional entities such as the state and professional bodies, which provide guidance to organisations operating in specific environments by way of laws, rules and constraints. Moreover, even abstract points of reference like values and norms, as well as commonplace and even unconscious routines of action, also function as institutions, which organisations accommodate in their structures and action (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18). Examples of environments in which these kinds of institutions are inherent, and which therefore provide rules and constraints for how organisations are designed include legislation and politics, other organisations (as peers or partners), the sciences, consultancy, public opinion, and relevant stakeholders (clients, shareholders, professional associations, trade unions) (cf. Hasse 2013: 71). The embeddedness perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism suggests that organisations, first, adapt to existing environmental influences and second, are willing to change if a discrepancy between organisation and environment occurs (cf. Hasse 2013: 73). Hence, the environmental context and those institutions integrated within this context, largely determine how those organisations embedded within these institutions are designed and structured, as well as how they act (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18).

The works of Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and Zucker (1977) may be considered the core scholarship within sociological neo-institutionalism (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 13; Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18). Their propositions are introduced in subsequent paragraphs, followed by a more general discussion of the principles of sociological neo-institutionalism.

The aim of Meyer's and Rowan's (1977) seminal article, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony", was to suggest what accounts for formal organisational structures. While Meyer and Rowan propose that, "the observation is not new that organizations are structured by phenomena in their environments and tend to become isomorphic with them" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 346), they offer an alternative explanation for the parallelism between organisations and their environments. While the prevailing argument has been that formal organisations become matched with their environments through technical and exchange interdependencies, Meyer and Rowan argue, based on Berger and Luckmann's (1967) "The Social Construction of Reality", that "organizations structurally reflect socially constructed reality" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 346). The central argument of the paper is that "the formal structures of many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341). Meyer and Rowan argue that institutionalised rules are inherent in the environments of organisations. They define these institutionalised rules as "classifications built into society as reciprocated typifications or interpretations" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341) which came to assume an institution-like character, in that they are either simply taken for granted or supported by public opinion or the force of law (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341). Institutionalised rules can take the form of products, services, techniques, policies, and programs (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340). Organisations seek conformity with institutionalised rules and strive to incorporate them by forming their structures in order to become isomorphic with them.

According to Meyer and Rowan, the main reason why organisations adapt to institutionalised rules is not due to the demands of technical or economic efficiency or the goal of performance accomplishment. Rather, organisations incorporate institutional rules to gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects: "organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized

concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340). "Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures." (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340) Thus, institutionalised rules, "function as powerful myths and many organizations adopt them ceremonially" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340). As Meyer and Rowan argue, "by designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). A formal structure that reflects institutional rules protects an organisation from having its conduct questioned because it acts as an account of its activities (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). "The organization becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its support and secure its survival" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). Therefore, a failure to incorporate institutionalised elements of structure, "is negligent and irrational; the continued flow of support is threatened and internal dissidents are strengthened" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350).

Meyer and Rowan (1977: 344) offer several examples consolidating their approach and argue that,

> *"(…) technical procedures of production, accounting, personnel selection, or data processing become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational ends. Quite apart from their possible efficiency, such institutionalized techniques establish an organization as appropriate, rational, and modern. Their use displays responsibility and avoids claims of negligence."*

Similarly, "the rise of professionalized economics makes it useful for organizations to incorporate groups of economists and econometric analyses" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350). Econometric analyses help to legitimate an organisation's plans in the eyes of investors, customers, or internal participants, even if they are unable to read and comprehend them (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350). Such analyses may also function as retrospective excuses. Even if an economic venture fails, managers can still "demonstrate to investors, stockholders, and superiors that procedures were prudent and that decisions were made by rational means" (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350).

Meyer and Rowan thereby explain why organisations adapt to their environments, while leaving open the processes that lead to parallelism between organisation and environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) fill this gap by differentiating three mechanisms or processes

by which an organisation conforms to institutional expectations. In doing so, they adopt a more organisation-centred perspective of organisational environments than Meyer and Rowan. While Meyer and Rowan employ a more macro-sociological perspective on the environment (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 198), DiMaggio and Powell stress the role of other organisations as a part of an organisation's environment. According to DiMaggio and Powell, organisations "respond to an environment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organizations' responses" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 149). Hence, DiMaggio and Powell stress not only the parallelism between organisation and environment, but in addition argue, "that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 147). DiMaggio and Powell argue that three *isomorphic* processes can be analytically differentiated (while acknowledging that they are not necessarily empirically distinct): the coercive, mimetic, and normative (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150).

Coercive isomorphism results, first, from both formal and informal pressures that organisations exert on other organisations, which are dependent upon them. Second, it arises from the cultural expectations of the society within which organisations function. Coercive isomorphism may be felt as a force, but also as a persuasion or invitation to be linked in collusion (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150). Examples of the direct and explicit imposition of organisational models on dependent organisations can be found in government mandates within which, "manufacturers adopt new pollution control technologies to conform to environmental regulations" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150). Outside the governmental arena, for example, "a variety of service infrastructures, often provided by monopolistic firms – for example, telecommunications and transportation – exert common pressures over the organizations that use them" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). A less explicit example is, "the need to lodge responsibility and managerial authority at least ceremonially in a formally defined role in order to interact with hierarchical organizations," which acts as a "constant obstacle to the maintenance of egalitarian or collectivist organizational forms" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151).

Mimetic isomorphic processes can be traced back to uncertainty, which is a powerful force that encourages imitation. Organisations may feel the incentive to model themselves after other

organisations in situations where organisational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when there is a general uncertainty created by the environment (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Mimetic behaviour can be an economical option for an organisation in the search for an approach to a problem (be it related to an ambiguous cause or an unclear solution), since a, "problematic search may yield a viable solution with little expense" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Therefore, faced with uncertainty, organisations "tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). As an example of "the most dramatic instances of modelling" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151) the two researchers mention, "the efforts of Japan's modernizers in the late nineteenth century to model new governmental initiatives on apparently successful western prototypes" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Equally, within the category of mimetic processes, DiMaggio and Powell refer to the fact that with regard to organisational structures, "despite considerable search for diversity there is relatively little variation to be selected from" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). This is the case for large organisations, which are forced to choose from a relatively small number of major consulting firms that "spread a few organizational models throughout the land" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152).

Normative pressures towards isomorphism primarily stem from professionalisation (understood as the "collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152)). Within this reasoning, there are two sources for isomorphism. The first source is the "resting of formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). For example, "universities and professional training institutions are important centers for the development of organizational norms among professional managers and their staff" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). Second, is the "growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse rapidly" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152), for example, professional and trade associations functioning as vehicles "for the definition and promulgation of normative rules about organizational and professional behaviour" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152).

In retrospect, Zucker's 1977 article, "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence" has come to be recognised as a complementary approach within sociological neo-institutionalism, introducing the concept of *cognitive change* into its framework (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18). In her article Zucker aims to provide an adequate explanation of cultural persistence. She opts for an experimental design and "investigates the effect of different degrees of institutionalization in constructed realities on cultural persistence in three distinct experiments, each focusing on a different aspect of persistence" (Zucker 1977: 727). The three different aspects of persistence are transmission from one generation to the next, maintenance of the culture, and resistance to attempts to change (cf. Zucker 1977: 727). An important element in Zucker's argument is that an institutional status is not simply either present or absent, but that different degrees of institutionalisation exist: "acts are not simply either institutionalized or not institutionalized" (Zucker 1977: 728). "The meaning of an act may be perceived as more or less exterior and objective, depending on the situation in which the act is performed and/or depending on the position and role occupied by the actor." (Zucker 1977: 728) Regarding cultural persistence, Zucker proposes that the higher the degree of institutionalisation, higher also will be the degree of transmission, maintenance, and resistance.

To summarise Zucker's experimental design, she tested whether participants judgment standard of the autokinetic effect[3] are influenced by settings that are institutionalised to varying degrees. While the experiment utilised was the same in all three versions, different instructions (or different "cover stories" (Hasse & Krücken 1999: 20)) were read to the participants at the beginning of the experiment. In the *personal influence condition* participants were informed that the study involved problem solving in groups and were presented to each other as private persons. In the *organisational context condition* the study was presented as being an inquiry into problem solving in model organisations and participants were paired into two-member organisations. The *office condition* was built on the *operational context condition* but additionally appointed an office ("Light Operator") to one of the participants. Furthermore, participants were no longer introduced by name but as, "Member 1," etc. In this manner, Zucker operationalised different levels of institutionalisation, with the office

[3] The autokinetic effect is a visual illusion in which the judgment standard of the apparent movement of a pinpoint of light in a dark room is particular to the individual. It has therefore been used to analyse processes of opinion formation in groups.

condition representing the highest degree of institutionalisation. Zucker (1977: 742) then proposed that:

> *"(…) the findings reported in three experiments provide strong and consistent support for the predicted relationship between degrees of institutionalization and cultural persistence. As predicted, it was found that the greater the degree of institutionalization, the greater the generational uniformity of cultural understandings, the greater the maintenance without direct social control, and the greater the resistance to change through personal influence."*

Zucker's article therefore complements the neo-institutionalist framework by stressing the importance of individual patterns of perception and information processing for the regulation of social action. Environmental expectations and rules must be processed, whether by individuals or small groups (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18). In contrast to the macro-sociological perspective on the relation between organisation and environments in Meyer and Rowan's and DiMaggio and Powell's work, Zucker's work represents the micro-foundation (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18) of neo-institutionalism. Furthermore, Zucker's work is important in sociological neo-institutionalism as it challenges the assumption that rules must be either institutionalised or not institutionalised and suggests that there are different degrees of institutionalisation. Therefore, researchers have assumed, based on Zucker's work, that the efficacy of institutionalised rules may differ over time (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 22).

Based on these three foundations of sociological neo-institutionalism a coherent research area has been consolidated throughout the last four decades. It is important to note that sociological neo-institutionalism should be considered a research programme and theoretical approach, rather than a consistent theory of society such as systems theory (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 195). As Hasse and Krücken remark, sociological neo-institutionalism lacks a consistent examination of its conceptual foundations and central notions, a fact readily acknowledged by neo-institutionalist researchers (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 195).

Hasse and Krücken identify three features (*Wesensmerkmale*) which are characteristic of sociological neo-institutionalism and that differentiate it from other institutionalist research. Firstly, sociological neo-institutionalism stresses the importance institutional factors in the organisational environment have for the reproduction of organisations (as

elaborated by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983))[4] (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 63). Social processes or obligations that have come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341) and that are considered rational become myths pertaining to how organisations should design their formal structure and their actions. Organisational action is inextricably entangled with organisational environment(s) (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 19) and organisations strive to accommodate their societal environment. Therefore, they adapt to the rational myths inherent within them. What organisations do, and how they are structured, may therefore be considered reflections of, or responses to, rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider environment (cf. Powell & Colyvas 2008: 975).

The second characteristic of sociological neo-institutionalism is that it underlines the importance of taken-for-granted assumptions, and therefore, of active forms of perception and the interpretation of institutional factors (as elaborated by Zucker (1977)) (Hasse & Krücken 1999: 63). This leads to the premise that institutionalisation is "the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real" (Zucker 1977: 728) and that, as a logical consequence, "at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as a more or less taken-for-granted part of the social reality" (Zucker 1977: 728). Scott (1987: 496) concluded, drawing on the works of Zucker (1977) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), that:

> *"The common feature in all of these definitions is that institutionalization is viewed as the social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality – a conception whose validity is seen as independent of the actor's own views or actions but is taken for granted as defining the 'way things are' and/or the 'way things are to be done'."*

This means that once social structures or activities are institutionalised and have become, as DiMaggio and Powell put it, "taken for granted expectations" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 10), not accommodating them becomes a tough choice for organisations, because it would mean acting against the "rules of appropriateness" (March & Olsen 1984: 741). However, it can be assumed, drawing from Zucker's work, that there are different degrees of institutionalisation and that the regulating effect of institutions differs according to this degree. First, processes, structures and practices exist that are institutionalised to such a

[4] This macro-perspective and the micro-foundation following from the work of Zucker (1977) complement each other and constitute the spectrum of neo-institutionalism (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 64).

degree that it seems practically unthinkable not to comply with them and any alternatives appear to be beyond reasonable imagination. Second, there are institutions that act upon positive or negative incentives that follow on from compliance or non-compliance. Acting in compliance with the institution becomes a question of consideration and choice. Other institutions rather resemble traditions and conventions. Non-compliance with them may create friction and the need to justify actions, but will not likely create outrage or result in punishment (cf. Hasse 2013: 67f.). The degree of institutionalisation, as the binding force of processes, structures and practices, can evolve over time. What may have been self-evident decades ago may today be subject to explicit incentives; what was once sanctioned may today merely constitute a traditional status. In extreme cases, institutions may vanish while others emerge (cf. Hasse 2013: 68).

The third characteristic of sociological neo-institutionalism is that it relativises the importance of explicit norms as the rules and regulations of modern society (Hasse & Krücken 1999: 64). Neo-institutionalists argue that it is not (primarily) 'hard' factors such as laws, regulations, technological preconditions, budgets and resources that shape the behaviour and decisions of organisations, rather that 'soft' factors like values, norms and standards of good practice are the crucially influencing factors upon organisations. Accordance to these factors may be recommended to organisations by the professions and consultants, learned from successful competitors (cf. Hasse 2013: 72), or, to put it more generally, may be perceived to be what relevant environments demand and expect from the organisation. Sociological neo-institutionalism therefore, "shows how organizational behaviours are responses not solely to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures (e.g., pressures from regulatory agencies, such as the state and the professions, and pressures from general social expectations and the actions of leading organisations)" (Greenwood & Hinings 1996: 1025). The driving force behind organisations' choices is thus not efficiency or technical performance, but rather to receive legitimacy and support from the environments they are embedded within. In a neo-institutional context legitimacy is a result of social attribution by several actors in the environment of the organisation, namely stakeholders (e.g. customers, employees, voters), moral authorities (e.g. scientists or social movements) or the public sphere (such as the press and social media) (cf. Hasse 2013: 69). Therefore, organisations' choices do not necessarily represent the most efficient

or rational option, but rather reflect what *appears* to be the most rational option in relation to the expectations an organisation may feel confronted by (i.e., as Meyer and Rowan argued, rational myths).

While Meyer and Rowan (1977), "theorized about the general effects of rationalized institutional structure as though there were only one such structure" (Scott 1987: 498), "through the use of many and diverse examples (…) they underscored [the] multiplicity and diversity of institutional sources and belief systems found in modern societies" (Scott 1987: 498). More recent research has followed this insight and "moved away from a conception of *the* institutional environment to one of multiple institutional environments" (Scott 1987: 498). Therefore, a challenge for organisations rests in the fact that they are embedded, not only in one but several, institutional environments whose expectations, rules and requirements, "may be in competition if not in conflict" (Scott 1991: 167). According to Scott, organisations, "may be expected to exercise 'strategic choice' (see Child 1972) in relating to their institutional environments" (Scott 1991: 170), while "the choices available to organizations may range (...) to, at the extreme, selecting the type of institutional environment with which to connect" (Scott 1991: 170). From an organisational perspective, the possibility to decide which expectations to meet is certainly a source of freedom and independence, but it may also become a source of insecurity. Following DiMaggio and Powell's argumentation that other organisations constitute a part of an organisation's environment, and that mimetic isomorphic processes can be traced back to uncertainty, several neo-institutionalist researchers have argued that, as a means to overcome insecurity, organisations adjust to other organisations that are considered successful, exemplary and efficient. Hasse and Krücken argue that neo-institutionalist analyses of markets and competition stress processes of reciprocal orientation between competitors. The providers of similar products orient their strategies according to the strategies of their competitors (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 45). DiMaggio and Powell transfer this logic to the individual level: "Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing so they seek guidance from the experiences of others in comparable situations and by reference to standards of obligation" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 10).

As we have seen, sociological neo-institutionalism implies that organisations tend to be similar (*isomorphism*) and that there are two reasons for this. First, organisations that are

embedded in the same environments are confronted with the same expectations and should respond similarly to them. The second source of isomorphism is mimetic behaviour as a strategy to face uncertainty. Despite this tendency towards isomorphism, sociological neo-institutionalism leaves room for organisations to react differently to institutional expectations. This approach acknowledges that the trend towards isomorphism can be refracted by factors specific to single organisations, such as age and history, micropolitical interests, convictions and opinions that involved persons have, but also functional requirements and routines (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200). The approach also recognises that systemic differences between groups of organisations may occur (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200). These can, first, stem from certain particularities such as differences between organisations belonging to different industrial sectors. Second, systemic differences may arise due to regulative frameworks and thus may occur, for example, between organisations based in different locations. Third, systemic differences can be traced back to organisational specialists and consultants. Exerting a certain amount of normative pressure on organisations to follow their assumed standards of good practice (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983), organisational specialists and consultants often only address a certain type of organisation (like medium-sized enterprises, universities, the public sector, etc.) (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200).

In the following chapter, I will show that three conclusions can be drawn from transferring these insights from neo-institutionalism to campaign professionalisation: First, combining the macro-sociological perspective on organisations and their environments and the organisational sociological perspective in neo-institutionalism, parties can be expected to design their campaign practices and structures in compliance with perceived expectations from the environments that they are embedded in. Second, if there are differences in the design of campaign practices and structures, these can be explained by explanatory factors at the systemic and at the party level. Third, the most important environments that parties are embedded in during election campaigns are the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. Fourth, campaign professionalisation can be defined as the parties' adaptation to expectations from and changes in these relevant environments.

2.2 Campaign professionalisation from a neo-institutionalist perspective

2.2.1 Parties adapt to expectations from their relevant enviroments

Following the macro-sociological perspective on organisations and their environments as originally proposed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), I argue that political parties are embedded within several environments and that their structures and practices are inextricably bound with these environments. During election campaigns, the most relevant environments for parties from this perspective are the voters, party members and the media (see Chapter 2.2.3 for detailed argument). Parties design their campaign practices and structures in compliance with institutions fundamental to these environments, perceive expectations to comply with these institutions (hereafter referred to as institutional expectations) and take actions (which they consider to be appropriate) in order to gain support and legitimacy from these environments. Consolidating this macro-sociological perspective with the organisational sociological perspective proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), I add a fourth environment that is crucial for parties during election campaigns: other parties. Monitoring other parties' campaigns is a means to reduce uncertainty as to the design of an effective campaign and it is an easy way to stay abreast of developments and innovations in campaign strategy. From the theoretical perspective of neo-institutionalism, campaigns are designed in accordance with institutions and the expectations inherent to relevant environments, as well as based on the example of successful peers and competitors (cf. Donges 2008: 225).

I choose the macro-sociological perspective within sociological neo-institutionalism (focusing on the relation between organisation and environments) over the micro-foundation (stressing the role of the individual processing environmental expectations) as a theoretical framework of this study for the following reasons. The database for the subsequent comparative analysis of campaign professionalisation consists (as we will see in further detail in Chapter 4) of Swiss cantonal (i.e. regional) election campaigns. The cantonal party branches only have limited human and financial resources. Most of the staff that work for the parties during an election campaign are volunteers. In Switzerland, where even national parliamentarians – at least officially – execute their political functions as volunteers (*Milizparlament*), this is not considered a shortcoming, but is rather appreciated

in what could be called a *culture of amateurism*. While most parties have a professional – in the sense of 'paid' – head of office who normally also takes an important part in the organisation of the cantonal election campaigns, these persons usually are not trained campaign specialists, spin doctors, etc. Rather, they are all-rounders who perform a wide range of tasks for the party and who usually get trained on the job. How their predecessors designed and organised campaigns and what other parties do can be assumed to be important sources of knowledge for them. What is more, participant observations of the organisational campaign activities in the cantonal parties (carried out during the preparation of the project that provides the data for the present dissertation) showed that the election campaigns were organised by groups of party members who made decisions in a team. The margin of action for the individual campaign manager in the cantonal party branches is hence rather small and cannot be expected to exceed the latitude of the party's financial and ideological framework. Strom's (1990: 574f.) estimation of the margin of action for party leaders can also be assumed to be true for the cantonal campaign managers:

> *"Regardless of their own preferences, [party] leaders are constrained by the organizational properties of their parties. That is to say, they have to take into account the preferences of other individuals in their party organization, and their hands may also be tied to varying degrees by the institutional environment in which their parties operate."*

I therefore assume that parties are, via the individual perceptions of the party officials and campaign managers, definitively able to perceive, process and react to expectations and influences from their environments (cf. Zucker 1977; cf. also Jun 2000: 348). Campaign professionalisation is not *action without agents*. However, due to the constraining influence of the parties as organisations and to the specific situation of the Swiss cantonal party branches described above, the analysis of the factors responsible for differences in the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation will include party characteristics, but will not take characteristics of individual campaign managers into consideration as explanatory factors.

Real or perceived changes in the relevant environments for campaigning urge parties to react and to adapt their campaigns accordingly in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy. These changes can consist, for example, in changing or additional environmental expectations, which for their part are rooted in manifest changes in the environments themselves. Changes can also concern the institutional status of a campaign

structure or a campaign practice. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, parties cannot elude changing institutional expectations and rational myths for longer periods. However, they have a certain margin of action and selectivity in deciding which institutional expectations they want to follow. We can thus assume that campaign professionalisation mirrors real and perceived institutional expectations to election campaigning, without degrading political parties to purely reactive adaptors (*Adaptierer*) (cf. Bukow 2009: 218).

If we take the emergence of social media in the electoral environment that is formed by the media as an example, parties have to decide which way of adapting to this change is most appropriate. We can expect that there will be parties that actively use social media in their campaigns because they want to gain additional young voters. Others may not think social media will be of immediate use to them but may rather be "motivated by conformity pressures or a concern to appear up-to-date" (Scott 1987: 504). Another group of parties may decide to ignore social media for the upcoming election and put them on their to-do-list for the next one. What is more, the degree of institutionalisation of social media in election campaigning can also be expected to change over time – and so can parties' reactions to it. While we can imagine a first phase in which there is an incentive to include social media in the election campaign because it could result in some extra votes, social media might reach very high user rates and prove to be an effective tool in say, environmental activists' campaigns, so that it might become unthinkable for political parties not to include social media in their campaign instruments.

Hence, the sociological neo-institutionalism also allows us to theoretically corroborate the subjectivity that existing research finds to be inherent in the concept of campaign professionalisation. Whether certain campaign practices or ways to organise the campaign can be considered *best practice* or the *most professional* way to go and thus be included or excluded from campaign professionalisation indices has been an unanswered question among professionalisation scholars – a fact that becomes obvious not least in the different versions of campaign professionalisation indices. When modelling campaign professionalisation as a party's response to environmental expectations however, it becomes less important whether this response can objectively be considered to be *the best* or *the most professional* one. The important insight from sociological neo-institutionalism is that campaigns are designed in accordance to that which parties *perceive* to be most

appropriate in order to gain legitimacy and support from their environments. Characteristics of professionalised election campaigning – including the elements of campaign communication and campaign organisation that existing research assembled in the professionalisation indices – can then be modelled as manifestations of what the parties consider to be an appropriate adaptation. Furthermore, the design of an election campaign is constrained by financial budgets, by law and by political culture (I will return to this last point in Chapter 2.3.3). I thus conclude, in accordance with Strömbäck and colleagues, that "the use of campaign strategies and tactics should be conceived of as a matter of perceived utility in combination with the costs and need for expertise associated with them (Shaw, 2006), within the confines of the regulatory environment and the political culture in which political parties operate (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Lees-Marshment et al., 2010)" (Strömbäck et al. 2013: 43).

By complying with what they perceive to be state of the art campaigning, parties also protect themselves against criticism and the need for justification. In case the party performs poorly at the polls, party officials can still argue that they tried everything deemed possible and that adverse conditions must be blamed for the result (see also Schimank 2002: 49).

The theoretical perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism on campaign professionalisation also allows corroboration of the fact that campaigns, which display characteristics of professionalised campaigning, are not necessarily the most successful or efficient campaigns. Altogether, professionalisation of election campaigns can thus, rather than solely being associated with efficiency or best practice, be considered a rational myth or, as Green and Smith put it, "professionally crafted communication is a way to demonstrate one's seriousness of purpose" (Green and Smith 2003: 335).

By the same token, the neo-institutional perspective on campaign professionalisation takes into consideration that it depends on different political cultures and formal rules. While the campaign professionalisation index by Tenscher (2007, 2012; see Chapter 1.2.1) implicitly includes televised campaign activities (relevance of paid and free media, relevance of talk shows) as indicators for professionalised campaigning, there are several countries that do not allow political advertising on television (Switzerland is one of them). The neo-

institutional perspective supports Strömbäck's evaluation that "this does not, however, mean that campaigns in such countries, by definition, are less professionalized" (Strömbäck 2007: 52).

2.2.2 Explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation are located on the party level and on the systemic level

The margin of action that parties have with regard to campaign professionalisation from this theoretical perspective also allows one to model and explain differences with regard to the degree and profile of professionalised campaigning between parties or regional entities (countries, federated states, etc.). For the present study, this means that the basic assumption is that all cantonal campaigns included in this study should display the same characteristics of professionalised campaigning due to the trend towards isomorphism induced by similar environmental expectations and mimetic behaviour caused by uncertainty (see Chapter 2.2.3 for a detailed discussion of environmental changes and expectations). If, however, the trend towards isomorphism in campaign professionalisation between cantonal election campaigns is refracted, this is due to factors on two levels: the systemic level and the party level. This is, first, in line with existing professionalisation research where professionalisation is discussed to differ with regard to the systemic environment in which the campaign takes place (cf. e.g. Tenscher et al. 2012) and with regard to the characteristics of the party that organises the campaign (cf. e.g. Gibson & Römmele 2001, 2009; Strömbäck 2007). As Strömbäck (2007: 98) posits,

> *"party behaviour at any point in time should be perceived as a combination of systemic and environmental factors, and internal factors tied to specific party types and party goals. In the context of political campaigning, the degree of professionalisation can partly be explained by systemic and environmental factors – some of which affect all parties roughly to the same extent – and internal factors – which vary across parties within a particular political system."*

Thus, while the reasons why parties professionalise their campaigns in the first place have to be located in the parties' relevant electoral environments, the degree and profile of professionalisation in a given campaign is determined both by factors at the immediate systemic (or environmental) level as well as on the party level.

Second, the existence of explanatory factors on the party level and at the systemic level is also in line with Hasse and Krücken (2005: 200), arguing that sectorial particularities like differences between organisations belonging to different industrial sectors are comparable to differences between parties belonging to different ideological families. Systemic differences that are due to different regulative frameworks and occur, for example between organisations at different locations, (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200) can be compared to differences between campaigns that were organised in cantons with different regulative and geographical characteristics.

To be more precise, I expect that if the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation differs between cantonal election campaigns, the differences will be caused by the size of the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness of the political situation in the canton where the campaigns took place (explanatory factors at the systemic level), the political position of the left-right political spectrum and the status as a catch-all party of the party that organised the campaign (explanatory factors at the party level). If I find that there are differences in regard to the degree and profile of professionalised campaigning between the cantonal election campaigns that cannot be explained by the systemic or the party level, one possible explanation might be that the differences are influenced by characteristics that Hasse and Krücken identified to be specific to single organisations (age and history, micropolitical interests, convictions and opinions of the involved persons, functional requirements and routines) (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200). For a detailed discussion of the explanatory factors – or, in correct QCA terms that will be introduced at a later point, of the causal conditions – that will be tested in this study please refer to Chapter 3.

2.2.3 Political parties and their changing environments in election campaigns

In Chapter 2.2.1, I modelled professionalisation of election campaigns to be the process during which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in the relevant environments for campaigning in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from the environments. These environments are the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. In the following, I will outline why it is those four environments that are

most relevant for parties during election campaigns. Second, I will discuss which changes took place in the four environments that parties adapt to by professionalising their campaigns.

As it goes without saying, the central objective of parties during election campaigns is to motivate and to convince as many potential voters as possible to vote for them. The electoral environment formed by potential voters is the most obvious relevant environment for political parties in election campaigns. However, it is not the only one. The central arena in which to create public attention for their positions during election campaigns is the media, which allows for maximising the number of potential voters that are reached by the campaign. Political organisations react to structural changes in the media system since the media are an essential part of their environment (cf. Donges 2008: 31). Papathanassopoulos therefore found the professionalisation of political communication to be "inextricably bound up with developments in the media" (Papathanassopoulos 2007: 11). Electoral success depends on whether parties adapt as adequately as possible to the voters and the media (cf. Strohmeier 2004: 51). What is more, electoral campaigns also have an internal function and aim at mobilising and activating the membership (cf. Jarren & Donges 2011: 218). Even members that do not wish to participate actively in the party's activities are relevant as a part of the electoral environment formed by the members and supporters, because they have to be convinced of new party objectives and strategies (cf. Donges 2008: 148). Finally, an important electoral environment is constituted by other parties; that is, a party's competitors and peers (cf. for e.g. Bukow 2009: 219). Parties do not organise their election campaigns in a self-governed way, but always take the communication strategies of other parties into account – be it the communication strategies they observe or the strategies they ascribe to their competitors (cf. Jarren & Donges 2011: 224).

Strömbäck has argued that although "political parties are often implicitly assumed to have only one strategic goal – electoral victory – and being active in only one arena – the electoral arena" (Strömbäck 2007: 59), "political parties in moderate or extreme multi-party systems, theoretically, (…) are active in at least four different arenas" (Strömbäck 2007: 59). These four arenas are the parliamentary arena, the electoral arena, the internal arena and the media arena and parties pursue strategic goals in all of them (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 59). If

we assume that from the strategic perspective of the parties the most important actors in these arenas during election campaigns are other parties (parliamentary arena), potential voters (electoral arena), the members (internal arena), and the media (media arena), Strömbäck's four arenas become congruent with the four electoral environments that were identified to be most relevant for parties during election campaigns in the preceding paragraph.

Now, which general developments did or do take place in these environments – resulting in changing or additional environmental expectations and changing institutional statuses of campaign structures or practices – that might induce political parties to adapt their election campaigns to them?

In the electoral environment formed by the voters, electioneering has become more complex and contested. This is, on the one hand, due to a growing number of voters that do not have any or only a weak party affiliation. This tendency seems to occur in the majority of western European democracies (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 15) as a consequence of underlying processes like individualisation, secularisation, and de-ideologisation (cf. e.g. Tenscher 2007: 67). The weakening of traditional ties with the parties "has not only reduced the impact of party identification on electoral choice, but has also led citizens to rely more heavily on information delivered during the electoral campaigns when making up their minds" (Lachat & Sciarini 2002: 41). What is more, as the definitive election decision is more and more often made only at a late stage of the campaign, the window of opportunity for the parties to gain attention and support is becoming larger (cf. Tenscher 2011: 88). From the perspective of the parties, this means that campaigning becomes more important and that there is more at stake – more voters to win, as well as to lose. Mair and colleagues argue that even in contexts where voting shares have been relatively stable, parties have noticed that the support of their voters depends more and more on their ability to react strategically and organisationally to new challenges. Parties have to make a bigger effort and to prepare their campaigns more thoroughly to maintain their existing voter support (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 14). According to Römmele, parties can no longer count on the wholehearted loyalty of 'their' voters and supporters, but have to earn this loyalty with attractive political products and merits. This also means that they have to maximise their communication with the electorate (cf. Römmele 2005: 30). Hence, election

campaigning in the media is becoming more important. Parties feel growing pressure to present themselves in the mediated public sphere (cf. paragraph on the environment formed by the media) and to make maximum use of the media for political communication in order to bind their clientele and to compensate weakening party identification (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 252). The higher the share of swing voters or the weaker the overall party identification is, the more the external, mediated party communication becomes extended and the more professionalised must the parties present themselves in their campaigns (cf. Römmele 2005: 47).

Yet, increasing the intensity of their campaigns can indeed be a means by which parties can influence voter behaviour. In the case of Switzerland, Lachat and Sciarini (2002: 55) found that the patterns of opinion formation vary with campaign intensity, as very intense campaigning prompted even party identifiers to use new information to reassess their partisan preferences. To sum up, I assume that parties perceive, on the one hand, a certain pressure to extend their campaigns in order to reach more potential voters and over a larger period of time. On the other hand, parties might conclude that they need to intensify their campaigns in order to react to the more problematic mobilisation of the individual voter, for example by communicating more directly to the voters and by providing campaign communication that is tailored and focused to specific target groups.

The changes that were outlined for the environment constituted by the voters generally also apply to the environment constituted by the members. The decreasing party identification leads to decreasing numbers of party members. The members that remain have become harder to mobilise and, as it has been noted for the voters, the support of the members can no longer be taken for granted but has to be earned (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 261). The pressures resulting for the parties that have been formulated for the environment of the voters can thus be transferred to the environment of the members: Parties perceive a certain pressure to communicate even more with their members and supporters during election campaigns and with as many of them as possible. They also need to communicate more directly and specifically with their members in order to mobilise them to actively participate in the campaign and – a more modest objective – to really go the polls on Election Day.

In the electoral environment formed by the media, two main changes have been taking place – and are still going on respectively – that severely affect election campaigning. These are on the one hand *mediation* and *mediatisation* (or *medialisation)* processes, and on the other hand technological change, including the introduction and establishment of the so called new media and social media. Mediation of politics "refers to a situation in which the media have become the most important source of information and vehicles of communication between the governors and the governed" (Strömbäck 2008: 230). It is of less importance what type of media is dominant – whether radio, newspapers, television, or the Internet – the important characteristic of mediated politics is that "the media constitute the most important channels for information exchanges and communication between the people and political actors" (Strömbäck 2008: 231). The mediation of politics is thus not new but rather an "old phenomenon" (Strömbäck 2008: 230). It is, however, an old phenomenon that nonetheless has tremendous importance for election campaigning. Election campaigning via the media, or, in other words, the presence of parties in the media during election campaigns, can be considered a highly institutionalised practice. We can assume that (at least in the context of most western European and US elections) campaigning that does not include a presence in the media is practically unthinkable. In addition to that, this highly institutionalised campaign practice has recently gained even more importance from the perspective of the parties due to decreasing party affiliations and a higher number of swing voters (cf. the paragraph on the environments of members and voters in this chapter). What is more, political parties have been found to increasingly adapt their communication strategies to the logic of the media (which is one dimension of the multidimensional concept of *mediatisation,* see e.g. Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011). The adaptation of political language to the media's commercial patterns has been observed with regard to the communication outlook of political actors, the communication techniques that are used and the content of political discourse (cf. Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999). More concretely, adaption to media logic may affect, for example, the timing in which parties present information to the media (before editorial deadlines, at any time including weekends, etc.), the format of the information (sound bites instead of lengthy statements, catchy quotes, etc.), but also the style in which information is presented (simplification, polarisation, intensification, personalisation, etc. (cf. Strömbäck 2008: 233). While it is at least questionable whether mediatisation – as a comprehensive and aggregated

phenomenon – of political communication in general, and of election campaigning in particular, has reached the same degrees of institutionalisation and pervasiveness as mediation, there are nevertheless very strong incentives for parties to adapt their campaign communication to media logic. Assuming that parties want to, first, place their campaign communication contents in the media, and, second, have their content reproduced one-to-one or at least with minimal alterations, there is a strong incentive to present content that is compatible to media logic with regard to style, form and timing.

Beyond the processes of mediation and mediatisation the technological change in the environment of the media – bringing along new forms of mediated communication via the so-called new media and social media – challenges political parties to react. Karlsen suggests that, "technological development is identified as a driving force behind the professionalization of campaigning in general and the increasing involvement of campaign professionals in particular" (Karlsen 2010: 193). Be it the broad establishment of the social media, with Facebook leading the way, or the possibility to produce seemingly personal letters in no time and at high scale – on the one hand, the technological change has offered parties *new possibilities* to mobilise members and voters. On the other hand, these new means of communication also put *pressure and insecurity* on political parties. Integrating all possible channels of communication into the campaign can soon become too costly and time-consuming, especially for parties with limited resources. The effectiveness of new forms of communication for election campaigns may still be unclear and integrating them into the campaign may turn out to be a waste of effort. Yet, not including new communication channels may also have negative consequences that are difficult to predict – a decisive mobilisation potential might be left untapped, or an image of not being a "modern" party, of not keeping up with the times, might be produced (see also the short discussion of the example of Facebook in Chapter 2.2.1).

When the level of competition between parties increases due to weaker party affiliations and a higher share of swing voters, the importance of the environment formed by the other parties increases likewise. As they compete for the same potential voters, parties begin to observe and copy, or adapt to each other (*mimetic* behaviour) (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 261; cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 192). What is more, the closer the competition is, the more important becomes both the external communication in the struggle for public attention as

well as the internal maintenance of member support (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 262). But which media, or more generally, which channels of communication from the large pool of possible options are best? Is campaigning on Facebook really necessary? Do other parties cooperate with a public relations bureau in their campaign? As parties seek answers to these questions and wish to reduce uncertainty, they turn to observe the strategies of their competitors and peers in order to copy them, if they deem them to be promising or successful. With regard to specific questions like the use of communication channels in election campaigns, as well as more generally, we can assume that "the more uncertain the relationship between means and ends the greater the extent to which an organization will model itself after organizations it perceives to be successful" (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 154).

To sum up, changes and alterations in the four most relevant environments for election campaigning demand reactions and – ultimately – adaptions by political parties in Western Europe. I assume that these changes also affect Swiss parties and Swiss cantonal election campaigns (a detailed discussion of the Swiss context will follow in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 presents how professionalisation is used as a strategy of adaptation from the perspective of the cantonal campaign managers). What is more, as we remember from Chapter 2.1, being embedded not only in one, but several institutional environments whose expectations, rules and requirements "may be in competition if not in conflict" (Scott 1991: 167) poses a challenge to parties. According to Scott, organisations may therefore "be expected to exercise 'strategic choice' (see Child 1972) in relating to their institutional environments" (Scott 1991: 170), while "the choices available to organizations may range (...) to, at the extreme, selecting the type of institutional environment with which to connect" (Scott 1991: 170). Transferring this rationale to the concept of campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to changing environments, I argue that election campaigns are not necessarily equally adapted to *all* electoral environments (and not to the *same degree*). Rather, election campaigns become professionalised with regard to those environmental expectations that a party perceives to be most urgent in the specific context of the election, against the background of its goals or its ideology, etc. However, existing professionalisation indices combine all indicators – which refer to different relevant environments – in one index. They measure an overall degree of campaign

professionalisation. An aggregated index cannot differentiate in what regard, or in relation to which, electoral environment a party has professionalised its campaign. This might create inaccurate results, if we imagine that a party may have professionalised its campaigns very strongly with regard to the voters and the members, but not in regard to the media and to other parties. In an aggregated index, this party would only achieve a medium degree of professionalisation, obscuring the selective adaptation to two environments. Consequently, an aggregated measurement may hamper the analysis of the causal conditions for different degrees and profiles of campaign professionalisation. I therefore propose to measure campaign professionalisation with four different indices – one for each electoral environment (for a detailed presentation of the measurement instrument see Chapter 2.3).

2.2.4 Summing up: Defining campaign professionalisation

Based on the theoretical reasoning that has been presented in the preceding chapters, I propose to define campaign professionalisation as follows:

Professionalisation of election campaigns is the process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and institutional expectations from, the relevant environments for campaigning in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from these environments. The most relevant environments for campaigning are constituted by the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. Professionalisation is also the degree to which election campaigns are professionalised at a certain point in time (cf. Zucker 1977). Professionalisation with regard to the four electoral environments should be analysed separately, because different environments exert different expectations and pressures on the campaigns, so that there are different causal conditions for each environment. Campaign professionalisation becomes manifest in several characteristics of campaign communication and campaign organisation. These characteristics or indicators for campaign professionalisation are dependent from the regulative, systemic and cultural environment in which the campaigns are planned and realised. In contrast to political marketing, professionalisation mainly encompasses characteristics of campaign communication and organisation that are meant to contribute to the success of *selling* a

political product, in marketing terms, while political marketing goes beyond these aspects and equally affects the objectives and the justification underlying the campaign and implies that parties determine their behaviour in response to voter demands and design their "products" to suit the electorate (cf. Lees-Marshment 2001: 698).

Strömbäck (2007: 53) formulated, as expectations to a definition of professionalised political campaigning, that it "should focus on the planning for and the conduct of campaigns, and not on system-specific factors that the campaigns themselves cannot control". What is more, "the definition should be operationalizable in order to make comparative studies possible" (Strömbäck 2007: 53). With the underlying logic of professionalised campaigning as an adaption to the expectations of the electoral environments that becomes manifest in several characteristics of campaign communication and campaign organisation, the definition proposed here complies in principle with the first demand to focus on the planning for and the conduct of campaigns. However, it depends strongly on how campaign professionalisation will be operationalised, that is, which indicators of professionalised campaigning are included in the measurement. The proposed definition partly complies with the second demand that it should be operationalisable in order to make comparative studies possible, because it proposes a common theoretical framework and analytical perspective for comparative analyses. However, it implies a context-specific operationalisation of campaign professionalisation, making comparability a difficult matter.

To sum up, this definition adds to existing research in three ways. Based on the theoretical foundation of sociological neo-institutionalism two central characteristics of campaign professionalisation that emerged from existing research can be integrated into the conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation. The first concerns the existence of several *different* environments for election campaigning. While there is a broad consensus in existing research about the general concept of professionalisation of election campaigning as an adaptation of campaigns to a changing environment, and while scholars have mentioned different environments that campaigns are adapted to, these aspects had not yet been drawn on in order to build a theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation. Sociological neo-institutionalism allows for the theoretical substantiation of both aspects (i.e., professionalisation as an adaptation to changing environments and the differentiability

of environments) and the integration of them into a theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation. The second aspect concerns the amount of subjectivity that seemed to be inherent in the concept of campaign professionalisation from existing research but had not yet been theoretically substantiated. By conceptualising campaign professionalisation as an adaption of parties by which they react to pressures and changes in their relevant electoral environments in ways that they consider to be the most rational and appropriate (i.e., a rational myth), sociological neo-institutionalism also allows for the theoretical integration and substantiation of the subjectivity aspect.

Finally, the proposed conceptualisation provides a common, context-independent theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation. Based on the presented definition, campaign professionalisation can be treated as a functional equivalent in different contexts as it has the same meaning and purpose in each context. This is a fundamental requirement of comparative research. At the same time, the neo-institutional perspective reinforces an emic operationalisation of campaign professionalisation as it underlines the importance of context factors and a context-adequate measurement. Therefore, it clearly represents a step away from a comparable measurement rather than a move towards it. Depending on the research interest this can also be regarded a disadvantage, especially for larger comparative research projects that aim at collecting and comparing data on campaign communication from different countries or other regional contexts. To conclude, the neo-institutionalist perspective contributes to defining campaign professionalisation in a functional equivalent way, but it does not contribute to elaborating a comparable measurement and operationalisation of campaign professionalisation.

The following chapter will propose a measurement instrument for the context of the Swiss cantonal election campaigns that are analysed in this study, discuss why an emic measurement is preferred over an etic one and provide a rationale for each indicator.

2.3 Measuring campaign professionalisation

2.3.1 Measurement should differentiate between environments

Which consequences for the measurement of campaign professionalisation follow from the neo-institutional perspective? First, it was deducted utilising the neo-institutionalist theoretical foundation of this study that election campaigns are not necessarily professionalised to the same degree with regard to all four relevant electoral environments, and that different environments provide different pressures and incentives to adapt campaigns activities in accordance to institutional expectations. Hence, an aggregated measurement instrument (or, in other words, an aggregated professionalisation index) bears the risk of creating inaccurate results, both with regard to the degree of professionalisation of election campaigns and with regard to the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation (the independent variables or explanatory factors in correlational terms). Therefore, I propose to measure campaign professionalisation with four different indices – one for each electoral environment.

Based on this insight, I argue that the indicators that have been assembled to date in aggregated indices (mainly the CAMPROF index by Gibson & Römmele, its modified version by Strömbäck and the index by Tenscher (and colleagues)) can be differentiated and refer in fact to the four relevant electoral environments constituted by the media, the members, the voters and other parties. Hence, it should be possible to re-assemble the indicators in four different environment-related indices and to re-evaluate existing studies with regard to the environments that the campaigns have been adapted to the most. To date, there has only been a moderate number of studies that assess the degree and profile of professionalisation in a systematic and comparable way. Those are on the one hand Gibson and Römmele (2009), who apply their CAMPROF index (see chapter 1.2.1) to the German election to the federal parliament of 2005. Strömbäck (2009) uses a modified version of the CAMPROF index to measure the professionalisation of the election to the Swedish national parliament in 2006. Tenscher (2007, 2011) applies his professionalisation index to the German election to the federal parliament of 2005 and 2009. Lisi (2011) measures the degree of professionalisation of the Portuguese campaigns in the 2009 general election by using the index from Strömbäck (2009) (though leaving out the indicator

"research of own party or campaign" and labelling the parties' activities to conduct opposition research "negative campaign" (cf. Lisi 2011: 121)). Tenscher and colleagues (2012) analyse campaign professionalisation in the campaigns for the European Parliamentary Elections in 2009 organised by several parties in Germany, Austria, Finland and Sweden. As this latter study does not reveal the results for each indicator separately it will not be included in the following meta-analysis.

For the purpose of this limited meta-analysis of campaign professionalisation differentiated by environment, the indicators that were included in the respective studies were assigned to the four electoral environments of the voters, the members, the media, and other parties (see Chapter 2.2.3.) and the scores that each party reached for the same indicator were added. Finally, the scores for each indicator belonging to the same environment were added (for an overview see Appendix A)). A weak point of this procedure lies in the fact that the existing indicators put different emphasis on the four environments. Among the ten indicators Gibson and Römmele (2009) include in their measurement instrument there is only one that refers to the environment of the media, namely whether PR or media consultants were involved in the campaign, while among the 17 indicators proposed by Tenscher (2007, 2011), eight refer directly or indirectly to the media. It should also be noted that in contrast to the indicator used in the measurement instrument of this study, existing studies exclusively analyse whether parties monitored rival parties' campaigns but do not take a general monitoring of other parties' campaigns into consideration. What is more, a fewer number of indicators relates to the environment of rival parties than to the other environments. This should be kept in mind when reading the results of this analysis. Despite this, a general overview is offered by the results gained.

Starting with the study by Gibson and Römmele (2009) on the 2005 federal election in Germany, the parties professionalised their campaigns to a similar degree with regard to the voters, the members and the competitive parties (71, 72 and 71 per cent respectively of the maximum scores were achieved by the parties), and to a lesser degree (58 per cent) with regard to the media. As it was mentioned earlier the weaker result for the media should, however, be treated with caution, since there is only one indicator ("use of outside public relations/media consultants") that refers to this environment. If we take a look at the study by Strömbäck (2009), the overall scores are lower than those achieved in the German

elections analysed by Gibson and Römmele (2009) but show a similar pattern. The Swedish campaigns achieved 38 per cent of the maximum score for the environment of the voters, 35 per cent for the members, 29 per cent for the competitive parties and 12 per cent for the media. In the first study conducted by Tenscher (2007) the campaigns for the 2005 German federal election[5] achieved 61 per cent of the maximum score for the environment of the voters, 75 per cent for the members, 68 per cent for the media and 67 per cent for the environment formed by the competitive parties. For the 2009 German federal elections analysed by Tenscher (2011) the scores were 65 per cent for the voters, 69 per cent for the members, 60 per cent for the media and 75 per cent for rival parties. In the study conducted by Lisi (2011) the Portuguese campaigns resulted in 42 per cent of the maximum score for the environment of the voters, 48 per cent for the members, 33 per cent for the environment of the media and 17 per cent for the rival parties.

In order to draw meaningful conclusions from this brief meta-analysis, it would of course be necessary to validate the comparability of the original data and the significance of the results. In addition, more in-depth knowledge would be necessary in order to link the results back to the environmental conditions in Sweden, Germany and Portugal. Some background information about the Swedish case is provided by Strömbäck who reports that the former stability in Swedish voter behaviour has weakened during the last decades as the "proportion of voters switching parties between elections has increased (…) to 31.8 per cent in the 2002 election" (Strömbäck 2009: 105f.) and "the proportion of voters switching party during the election campaign has increased (…) to 19.1 per cent during the same period" (Strömbäck 2009: 106). What is more, the "proportion of late deciders has also increased significantly" (Strömbäck 2009: 106) with 57 per cent of the voters making their final voting decision during the election campaign in 2002. Finally, "party identification has also decreased" (Strömbäck 2009: 106) from 65 per cent (identification) and 39 per cent (strong identification) in 1968 to 40 per cent and 19 per cent respectively in 2002. Strömbäck assumes that "the increasing uncertainty facing parties creates strong incentives for them to professionalise their campaigning" (Strömbäck 2009: 106). Limited as the reliability of this re-assessment of professionalisation per environment may certainly

[5] The campaigns for the elections to the European Parliament analysed by Tenscher were left out of this overview due to comparability considerations, as the campaigns in the remaining studies are national campaigns.

be, I argue that the fact that the Swedish campaigns were professionalised most intensively with regard to the environments constituted by the members and by the voters can be explained by an especially strong incentive for parties to professionalise their campaigns with regard to these two environments.

To sum up, the fact that campaigns have achieved very different degrees of professionalisation with regard to the different environments throughout the five studies further supports the assumption that measurement of professionalisation should differentiate between environments.

2.3.2 Measurement should take the context into consideration

Second, defining professionalisation of election campaigns as the process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and institutional expectations from, their relevant environments means that measurement of campaign professionalisation should take the context into consideration. We remember from Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 that campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to electoral environments becomes manifest in several characteristics of campaign communication and campaign organisation. While the theoretical concept underlying campaign professionalisation is the same in all countries, regions, etc., its manifestation differs depending on the regulative, systemic and cultural environment in which the campaigns are planned and realised.

In all comparative research, researchers have to make sure that they analyse the same construct in all contexts instead of comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Construct equivalence is established "if an equivalent structure of subdimensions can be found in every country [canton, region, etc., S.K.] in question" (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). If this is the case, researchers should opt for the *etic* strategy of operationalisation. Since the construct consists of the same dimensions it can be measured with the same instrument in different contexts. If, however, the researcher's in-depth analysis shows that construct equivalence is missing, the strategy of choice is an *emic* approach. The operationalisation for the measurement of the construct is then developed context-specifically, to "provide for a

highly adequate, culturally specific national [cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] instrument" (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). This procedure "will also be possible if one or more national [cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] instruments already exist and the instruments for the other countries [cantons, regions, etc., S.K.] have to be developed separately" (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). A disadvantage of the emic approach is, however, that "as measurement differs from culture to culture, the integration of the national [cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] results can be very difficult" (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). Quantitative comparisons, like statements about the degree to which a construct occurs in different contexts, are ineligible if the construct has been measured with different indicators and/or different scales.

While using the same measurement instrument for campaign professionalisation in different countries, regions, etc. may produce results that can be integrated more easily and also compared in a quantitative manner the results bear the risk of being inaccurate because they are prone to context-specific distortions. For example, when applying the CAMPROF index developed by Gibson and Römmele to the Swedish elections, Strömbäck found that several indicators ("research of one's own party or campaign", "use of telemarketing") are uncommon in Swedish election campaigns (cf. Strömbäck 2009: 108). If we consider professionalisation to be an adaption to relevant environments, it is context-specific by definition. The lack of these elements in the Swedish campaigns is due to the national political culture and should not be interpreted as indicating a lower overall degree of campaign professionalisation. As Holtz-Bacha notes, by using the example of the German national elections of 2009, the weak role of online campaigning in these elections could be interpreted not as a lack of professionalisation but rather as an adaption to the fact that online communication is still a less effective instrument to reach potential voters in Germany (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 17f.). Strömbäck (2007: 63) concluded similarly that

> *"(…) it would be wrong to view campaigns in countries where the political parties are strong, and where the expertise in polling, news management, and voter segmentation, therefore, is in-house, as inherently less professionalized than in countries where the parties are weaker and where they make more use of outside consultants."*

This study will therefore opt for an emic procedure and use a measurement instrument that is adapted to the context of the Swiss cantonal election campaigns in order to make sure that campaign professionalisation is adequately captured in the campaigns that are included in this study. For the subsequent comparative analysis of cantonal election campaigns I

therefore propose a measurement instrument that is in several ways adapted to the Swiss cantonal conditions.

2.3.3 The measurement instrument

Taking the indices proposed by Gibson and Römmele, Tenscher and Strömbäck (cf. Chapter 1.2.1) as starting points and applying them to the case of the Swiss cantons, the data show that several indicators do not play any role at all in the cantonal campaigns included in this study. This affects, on the one hand, indicators that are very time-consuming or imply a high level of resources. Swiss parties do not receive financial support from the state; and the budgets for the cantonal elections are even lower than for the national elections. Opinion polling (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54; Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), conducting opposition research (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54; Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), the use of a rapid rebuttal-unit (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54), semi-independent research of strengths and weaknesses of the campaign (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54) and the use of campaign controlled focus groups (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54) were not employed in any of the 23 campaigns. It can be assumed that their use by far exceeds the cantonal campaign budgets and resources, as individual cantonal campaign managers suggested. What is more, political advertising on the radio and on television ("paid media" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 163)) is not permitted in Swiss elections.

The absence of further indicators of professionalised campaigns is rooted in Swiss political culture. Telemarketing as a means of campaign communication was not employed in any of the campaigns analysed in this study. In the interviews the campaign managers explained that they do not believe it is a campaign technique that would be accepted by the voters. A survey among party members in the three cantons of Bern, Aargau and Neuchâtel revealed that indeed telephone calls are, together with direct canvassing, the least appreciated way that party members wish to be contacted by their parties. Telephone calls would be accepted only by an average 9% of them as a means of contact with their party (cf. Knocks & Fraefel 2013: 93). From the theoretical perspective of this study that conceptualises campaign professionalisation as the best possible adaption to the political and social environment, there is no incentive for the parties to employ campaign instruments,

strategies or techniques which are not accepted by voters and members, since they would not be of any help.

Another Swiss particularity affects the indicators "externalisation" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), "outside headquarters" and "use of outside public relations/media consultants" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), which could not be found in any of the campaigns. As it is the case in many European countries (cf. Mancini 1999; Holtz-Bacha 2010; Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007; Strömbäck 2007: 63), experts inside the party, that is party members or sympathisers with professional knowledge, carry out the vast majority of the strategic and executive work in election campaigns in Switzerland. What is more, Switzerland has a tradition of a wide range of political and administrative posts not executed by paid staff but rather by volunteers in honorary posts ("*Milizsystem*"). Thus, there has been a culture of professional amateurism in Swiss politics, which is still present today especially at the political levels below the national level. Campaign characteristics which are included in existing indices but were found not to play any role in the cantonal election campaigns due to budgetary and legal constraints and to particularities of the Swiss political culture were thus not included as indicators in the measurement instrument for campaign professionalisation of this study.

Second, those indicators that proved impossible to collect for all parties involved due to confidentiality concerns were also left aside. This concerns questions concerning the campaign budget ("size of election campaign budget" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 161)).

Third, the interviews showed that the conditions for the use of television and radio programmes for campaign communication ("relevance of free media" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 163)) were not comparable between the cantons and were hence not included in the comparative analysis. According to the interviewees, regional television and radio in Aargau offered very few programmes concerning the upcoming election (not even upon the request of the parties), while the Neuchâtel channels seemed to be rather active in offering slots for debates, round-tables, etc. The use of television in the campaign is thus not under the control of the parties, but rather depends on the broadcasters' inclination. As such, the relevance of the free media in the campaign was considered a system-specific factor that

the campaigns themselves cannot control (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 53) and was not included in the measurement instrument.

The presented rationale for leaving out certain indicators that had been included in other analyses of campaign professionalisation from the measurement instrument is closely linked to the theoretical approach to campaign professionalisation that is proposed in this study. Note that from a theoretical approach that does not consider campaign professionalisation a context-specific concept and therefore opts for an etic measurement instrument, the absence of several campaign characteristics (political advertising on television, telemarketing, etc.) would be interpreted as indicators of a lower level of professionalisation of Swiss cantonal campaigns all in all.

In the following, I will discuss the characteristics of campaign organisation and campaign communication that were included as indicators for professionalised campaigning in the measurement instrument of this study. A rationale for each indicator will also be provided. The operationalisation of the presented measurement instrument will be discussed in Chapter 4.1.

The first indicator for professionalised campaigning included in the measurement instrument of this study was whether there was at least *one professional for technical support* (e.g. for the design of the commercial material; or a photographer) mandated in the campaign. Second, it was analysed whether there was at least *one professional for strategic, conceptual or ideological support* (e.g. a public relations agency) mandated in the campaign. All forms of mandating – from hiring in the sense that the professionals received full payment for their services to mandating a volunteer with professional knowledge – are encompassed here. These indicators correspond to the indicators "use of outside public relations/media consultants" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), "use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in news management/public relations; (…) in analyzing public opinion; (…) in advertisements; (…) in voter segmentation" (Strömbäck 2007: 54), and "degree of externalization" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the existing operationalisations of campaign professionalisation. I propose to differentiate between the employment of campaign professionals for technical and for strategy assistance, following Karlsen's (2009: 196) argument that

> *"(...) there is a significant difference between technical services, for example the design of the commercial material, and services that involve influence on the campaign strategy as such. Hence, regarding the type of service provided, I differentiate between technical assistance and strategy assistance. Technical assistance is services that the parties (might) need, but has little influence on strategic planning, for example website design. Strategy assistance covers influence on the campaign strategy, for example the creation of the campaign message."*

From the theoretical perspective of this study, mandating professionals can be considered a means of internal reorganisation which parties seize if they are confronted with pressures and challenges resulting from changes in their relevant electoral environments (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 21). What is more, the mandating of campaign professionals can be expected to follow the same motivation as hiring management consultants: Considerations concerning efficiency and effectiveness left aside, mandating professionals is a means to distinctly demonstrate modern campaign management and ensure internal and external legitimacy (for the argumentation concerning management consultants see Hasse & Krücken 1999: 14).

Third, it was analysed whether *training for candidates and/or party members* in campaign practices or campaign messages were provided on at least one occasion during the campaign. Training could take the form of a course, but also of a manual that was distributed to the candidates and/or the volunteers. This indicator, which is not included in any of the existing measurement instruments, was analysed because the existing indices for campaign professionalisation do not take into account that the candidates play a central role in European campaigns as they carry out most of the campaign communication (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14). This was definitively the case in the cantonal election campaigns according to the interviews with the campaign managers conducted for this dissertation. Thus, training for candidates and/or party members was included as an indicator. In line with the theoretical approach to campaign professionalisation I have adopted, it can be modelled as a further means of internal reorganisation by which the parties react to changes in their electoral environments (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 21).

The fourth indicator for professionalised campaigning included in the measurement instrument of this study was whether there were *campaign headquarters* installed or whether there was a *campaign team* designated for the campaign. This indicator corresponds to the indicators "outside headquarters" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), "centralized campaign headquarters able to coordinate the management of the campaign" (Strömbäck 2007: 54),

and "degree of centralization of campaign organization" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 161). As I proposed earlier, this indicator was adapted to the European and Swiss context respectively and no longer requires externalisation. Mair and colleagues argue that centralising decisions and planning in the hands of campaign experts is a second approach to internal organisational which parties seize if they are confronted with pressures and challenges resulting from changes in their relevant electoral environments (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 21).

Fifth, it was analysed whether the campaign featured a *centrally elaborated basic joint campaign* that was implemented in all constituencies of the cantonal party branch. In addition to the indicator regarding training for candidates and volunteers, this is the second indicator that was not included in existing measurement instruments. It is added due to the particularities of cantonal election campaigns. As I discussed in Chapter 2.2.3, the window of opportunity for election campaigning has become larger from the perspective of the parties as party identification decreases, the number of swing voters increases and electoral decisions tend to be made later. Parties have to make a bigger effort, prepare their campaigns more thoroughly, and intensify their campaigns with regard to potential voters. In Switzerland there are large numbers of commuters whose way to work and back home leads them through different constituencies. At the same time, the regional sub-organisations of the cantonal parties in the constituencies are, in theory, completely independent in their design of their campaign components, be it the graphic design of the posters, the key topics of the campaign or the choice of campaign events. As the campaign work is done on a voluntary basis the party branches in the constituencies cannot be forced to design their campaign in accordance with cantonal guidelines. In order to create memorable campaigns that have recognition value, even for voters who travel through several constituencies, parties have to ensure that their campaigns feature consistent traits like a uniform poster design and uniform key messages. Therefore, a centrally elaborated basic joint campaign that was implemented in all constituencies was included in the measurement instrument as a means to intensify campaigning with regard to potential voters in the Swiss commuter context.

As a sixth indicator for campaign professionalisation it was analysed whether parties opted for *continuous campaigning*, i.e. whether the campaign lasted longer than the 'hot phase' of campaigning (which can differ between countries and elections). As campaigns become more continuous or permanent, the amount of activities like events or mailings goes

beyond the usual sporadic mailings to members and supporters or party officials taking part in panel discussions. Activities meant to inform, convince or bind potential and existing voters take place throughout the year. This indicator corresponds to the indicators "continuous campaigning" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54) and "campaign duration" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the existing operationalisations of campaign professionalisation. Theoretically, this indicator – like the implementation of a joint campaign – reflects changes in the electoral environment formed by the voters, where electioneering has become more complex and contested. As the definitive election decision is increasingly often made only at a late stage of the campaign, the window of opportunity for the parties to gain attention and support is widening and the number of potential voters that could be convinced or lost is growing. Continuous campaigning can thus be considered a reflection of the parties' efforts to make their campaigns more intensive and far reaching in order to to maximise the number of people that are reached by the campaign.

Seventh, it was analysed whether there were means of *online communication*, notably video clips, participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards) and social networks employed at least once during the campaign. Or, in other words, it was analysed whether the cantonal parties made use of the participative and interactive functions of the Internet in their campaigns. This corresponds to the indicator "differentiation of internal communication structures (existence and the use of 'new' communication media for internal campaign communication and the mobilization of party members)" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), while the use of new modes of online campaigning is expanded to the campaign communication in total and is not analysed exclusively for internal campaign communication. Participative and interactive online formats are a means by which parties can "improve the efficiency and scope of their election campaign through 'an architecture of participation'" (Lilleker & Jackson 2011: 97). What is more, "the online user can be mobilised to support a campaign, sign a petition, and reinforce the political messages through social networks" (Lilleker & Jackson 2011: 97). Basic party websites were not included in the analysis as they can be expected to allow mostly for static and hierarchical one-way communication from the parties to the voters and therefore do not have the mobilising potential that participative and interactive formats have been assumed to produce. From the theoretical perspective of

campaign professionalisation, as an adaption to changes in the relevant electoral environments that underlies this study, there are several viable approaches as to why parties include means of online communication in their campaigns. On the one hand, it can be considered a measure to maximise the number of communication channels in the campaign and hence to maximise the number of potential voters that are reached by the campaign. On the other hand, including means of online communication into the campaign can also be the consequence of mimetic behaviour with regard to peer or competitive parties. Theoretically, if a party decides to opt for online campaigning other parties will copy this behaviour, either because they are unsure about their own position towards online campaigning or because they consider the party to be generally successful and thus a good indicator for the potential success of online campaigning. Also, they may not want to stay behind with regard to innovative campaigning and create a competitive disadvantage. What is more, regardless of the actual gain in voter contacts or successful mobilisations, new means of online communication like video clips, participative web content and social networks may be considered a means by which to give the campaign, and thus the party which is organising the campaign, a more modern appearance.

As an eight indicator for campaign professionalisation it was analysed whether means of so-called *direct communication* or narrowcasting, notably direct mail, direct e-mail and text messages, were employed at least once during the campaign. This campaign characteristic corresponds to the indicators "use of direct mail to own members or outside target groups" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), "use of direct mail to target groups", "use of direct mail to own members or campaign volunteers" (Strömbäck 2007: 54), and "degree of narrowcasting activities" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 163) in the existing operationalisations of campaign professionalisation. From the theoretical perspective of this study, the use of direct communication channels or narrowcasting is a means to simultaneously intensify and expand campaign communication with regard to the environments formed by both the voters and party members, where electioneering has become more complex and contested and mobilisation more difficult. Direct mail, direct e-mail and text messages can be sent to a large number of potential voters and supporters and are thus very far reaching means of communication. At the same time, content and messages can be tailored to central target groups. What is more, direct means of communication can be created in a quasi-

personalised manner, using automated signatures or personalised forms of address (cf. Römmele 2005: 40), thereby creating the impression of a more personal and hopefully more mobilising appeal. For the case of Germany, Römmele also found direct mailing to be especially effective where the organisational structures of the parties were underdeveloped and where party identification was at a rather low level (cf. Römmele 2005: 143). Hence, the means of so-called direct communication can also serve as a substitute for face-to-face communication between party members and/or officials in the regional branches and the electorate.

Finally, it was analysed whether the campaign featured *monitoring of the campaign activities of other parties* (at least on one occasion during the campaign). This campaign characteristic is based on the indicators "conducting opposition research" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54) and "degree of opposition research" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the existing operationalisations of campaign professionalisation. Based on the theoretical insights from within sociological neo-institutionalism, this indicator was extended to a general monitoring of the campaign activities of other parties and is not restricted to opposition or rival parties. While there are processes of reciprocal orientation between competitors and providers of similar products (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 45), organisations can equally behave mimetically with regard to organisations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152) – which are not necessarily competitors. From the theoretical perspective of this study, monitoring of the campaign activities of other parties is thus a means by which to react to increasing uncertainty caused by changes in the environments for campaigning, not to miss innovations and to model their own campaign on the campaigns of other – presumably successful – parties.

In order to enable an environment-sensitive measurement, four differentiated indices for campaign professionalisation with regard to the electoral environments constituted by the members, by the voters, by the media and by other parties are created based on the indicators which have been introduced in the preceding paragraphs. For some of the indicators, assigning them to the four environments is an obvious procedure. This is the case for the indicator "monitoring other parties' campaigns", which obviously is a reaction with regard to the environment formed by other parties, rivals as well as peers or partners;

implementing a basic joint campaign for all constituencies serves to make the campaign more recognisable for potential voters as well as for members.

For other indicators, I analysed from the transcripts of the interviews with the campaign managers which of the four electoral environments the campaign characteristic (or indicator) could be assigned to. If, for example, the training that was offered to candidates aimed at improving their skills to canvass voters on the street, the training was coded as professionalisation with regard to the electoral environment formed by the voters. If the training served to prepare the candidates for newspaper interviews or to improve their social media performance, the training was coded as professionalisation with regard to the environment formed by the media. If a professional was mandated explicitly for the purpose of helping with the party's representation in the media (say, an IT specialist who was asked to create a website or to improve an existing one, or a cameraman for the production of video clips), this was also coded as an indicator for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment formed by the media. Text messages that were sent to all listed members were coded as belonging to the environment of the members; if, however, text messages were sent to everyone listed in a commercial address file that was purchased by the party, this was coded as an indicator for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment formed by the voters. The differentiated measurement instruments resulting from this procedure can be found in Chapter 4.1.

The empirical analysis with fsQCA utilised in Chapter 8 tests whether there are different paths that lead to professionalisation with regard to different environments. If this is indeed the case, I argue that this can be interpreted – to begin with, in the theoretical and empirical framework of this dissertation – as evidence that campaign professionalisation should be conceptualised and measured in a differentiated manner (i.e., taking into account the four different electoral environments) rather than considering it an aggregated construct.

3. Causal conditions for campaign professionalisation

The theoretical reasoning of this study suggested that if the trend towards isomorphism in campaign professionalisation (that is, all parties display the same characteristics and the same level of professionalised campaigning) is refracted, this is due to factors on two levels: the systemic level and the party level (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). I briefly discussed that the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation is expected to differ with regard to the size of the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness of the political situation in the canton where the campaigns took place, as well as with regard to the political position on the left-right political spectrum and to the status as a catch-all party of the party that organised the campaign. After presenting the current state of research with regard to influence factors for campaign professionalisation (3.1), the five causal conditions that will be analysed in this study are introduced, including their theoretical derivation (Chapters 3.2 and 3.3; the concrete operationalisation and calibration of the causal conditions can be found in Chapter 8). The hypotheses underlying this study are deduced and presented in Chapter 3.4. Finally, in Chapter 3.5 I will outline the general theoretical model underlying the present dissertation and the hypothesised relations between the outcomes and the causal conditions in two schemes.

3.1 Current state of research

In existing studies that systematically test the influence of explanatory variables on campaign professionalisation, factors at the party level dominate factors at the systemic level. This is due to the fact that the only existing theory on campaign professionalisation, the party-centred theory originally proposed by Gibson and Römmele (2001), focuses on explanatory variables at the party level. While equally recognising that parties are responsive to their external environments, Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) as well as Strömbäck (2007, 2009) have stressed the important role that the parties themselves play in professionalising their campaigns. They have argued theoretically and empirically that parties' decisions and actions are not unalterably determined by their environments, but that parties have a certain capacity for making strategic decisions about their campaign organisation and communication. Gibson and Römmele as well as Strömbäck recognise

that "systemic arrangements remain important" (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 35) and that "the systemic environment needs to be recognised both because it is important and because it is part of the original formulation of the theory (Gibson and Römmele 2001)" (Strömbäck 2009: 107). While factors at the systemic level are included, notably in different compositions, in the schematic illustrations of the model underlying the party-centred theory (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2001: 38; Gibson & Römmele 2009: 281; Strömbäck 2009: 107), these factors are not systematically tested or discussed. Gibson and Römmele (2009) and Strömbäck (2009) explicitly base their analyses on this theory, while the study by Tenscher and colleagues (2012) also includes references to it.

Gibson and Römmele (2009) apply the party-centred theory that they developed in an earlier paper (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2001) to the case of the 2005 German federal election. The study includes the priming variables vote seeking as a primary goal; right-wing ideology, internal centralisation (i.e., hierarchical structure), high level of resources and the intervening variables: external shock (i.e., a heavy electoral defeat) and internal shock (i.e., a change in leadership). These variables are expected to lead to a higher degree of campaign professionalisation. The high scores of the "well-resourced, centralized, vote-seeking" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 283) SPD and CDU on the CAMPROF index and the lowest ranking of the Greens, a "small, less well-resourced left-wing party focusing on intra-party democracy" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 284), are interpreted as affirmations of the presumed effects on campaign professionalisation. The finding that the left-wing SPD scores most highly is interpreted to suggest that "while ideology may influence a party's uptake of professionalized campaigning, electoral performance may be the more important driver" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 284), as the SPD was "the only party to have suffered a significant loss of votes" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 282).

Strömbäck (2009) tested the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning in the context of the 2006 Swedish election. In contrast to Gibson and Römmele (2009) he modelled the variables loss of incumbency, vote loss in the previous election and the changing of the party leader to have the same status as all other independent variables and not as intervening variables like Gibson and Römmele proposed. Comparing the scores the seven parties achieved on the dependent variable (i.e., campaign professionalisation) and on the seven independent variables, Strömbäck concludes that, "while the degree of

professionalised campaigning is indeed shaped by the independent variables suggested by the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning, it is not determined by them" (Strömbäck 2009: 111). While the paper does not provide a detailed discussion of the influence of the individual independent variables, the assumption that right-wing parties produce more professionalised campaigns is implicitly dismissed by concluding that the Social Democrats ran the most professionalised campaign while the Christian Democrats ran a less professionalised campaign than expected (cf. Strömbäck 2009: 111).

Tenscher (2007) compared the campaigns of six German national parties for the federal election of 2005 and the European parliamentary election of 2004 and concluded that the context in which elections take place influences the degree of campaign professionalisation. The campaigns for the federal election, which were much more important from the perspective of the parties, were significantly more professionalised that those of the European parliamentary election, which they considered a second-order election. Tenscher also found differences in campaign professionalisation with regard to the parties (with the campaigns of the two biggest parties being most professionalised), whose significance and theoretical interpretation were, however, not discussed. In his 2011 study, Tenscher added the German federal election of 2009 and the European parliamentary election of 2009 to the existing data set. Comparing the four elections, he concluded that the campaigns have become more professionalised over time and that campaigns for the European parliamentary elections were still less professionalised than those for the federal elections. The four elections do not allow for consistent interpretation with regard to professionalisation differences between right-wing and left-wing parties (cf. Tenscher 2011: 87). As was the case for the federal election of 2005 and the European parliamentary election of 2004, the campaigns of the two biggest parties (SPD and CDU) were most professionalised in the two 2009 elections.

Tenscher and colleagues (2012) tested whether the degree of professionalisation of the campaigns for the European parliamentary election of 2009 by the 28 parties in Austria, Germany, Finland and Sweden differs due to factors on the party level (size of the party, catch-all party, right-wing party, experience of an external or internal shock) and at the systemic level (country, Northern and Central Europe). Based on a comparison of means they found that "central European parties are clearly ahead in building professionalized

campaign structures by comparison with the Northern European parties" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 155). What is more, "the campaign structures of big parties were twice as professionalized compared with small parties" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 155). With regard to the strategic elements of campaign professionalisation, however, "country and party size were not relevant factors in explaining the parties' strategic choices" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 158). Also, "the catch-all dimension, party ideology, and change of party leadership failed to produce the predicted results and seem to be unrelated to campaign professionalism" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). While the study by Tenscher and colleagues was not designed as a test of the party centred theory of campaign professionalism, the researchers conclude that the "analysis produced results that fit quite poorly or only partially with the party centered theory of campaign professionalism (Gibson & Römmele 2001; Strömbäck 2009)" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159).

Hence, while existing research does find variance in campaign professionalisation between parties, countries and elections, there is not yet a consistent interpretation of these – partly unrelated, partly contradictory – findings. Or, to put it more simply, "the search for good explanatory variables continues" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). What is more, it remains unclear from the research conducted to date how the systemic and the party level are related. In which way do factors from both levels interact? Do the systemic factors determine a framework in which the party level factors have an effect? Or is it the other way around?

The aim of the empirical part of this dissertation is to give an answer to these questions based on fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method allows for testing the influence of several explanatory variables (or, in correct QCA terms, causal conditions) at the same time. The analysis will not only reveal whether the factors I hypothesise to be causal conditions for campaign professionalisation are indeed necessary or sufficient conditions for professionalised campaigning, it will also identify whether the conditions produce the outcome (i.e., professionalised campaigning) on their own or in combination with one or several of the other conditions. Also, the analysis will reveal whether there are different combinations of causal conditions that lead to the same outcome. With its foundations in set theory, formal logic, Boolean algebra and fuzzy algebra, QCA has a terminology different from that of standard correlational analysis. It

should therefore be noted that the remainder of this dissertation will refer to "(causal) conditions" (which are comparable to explanatory variables or independent variables in standard or correlational analysis), to the "outcome" (comparable to the dependent variable) and the "solution formula" as well as to the "solution terms" (comparable to the equation in regression analysis).

3.2 Causal conditions on the systemic level

As we remember from Chapter 2.3.3, Römmele (2005: 143) discovered, in the case of Germany, that direct mailing was especially important where the organisational structures of the parties were underdeveloped and where party identification was at a rather low level. We may therefore assume at a more general level that the means of so-called direct communication can serve as a substitute for face-to-face communication between party members and/or officials in the regional branches and the electorate. Similarly, parties and other political organisations with a geographically dispersed audience can be expected to have greater incentive to use the possibilities of online communication (cf. Ward und Gibson 2009: 36). What is more, the necessity to implement a centrally elaborated basic joint campaign in all constituencies increases with the number of constituencies if the risk of a patchy campaign with a low recognition value is to be reduced. In general, one could argue that the bigger a campaign a party needs to control, the more important do the means to control the campaign become – like relying on professional support, making sure that candidates and volunteers are well informed and fit to meet potential voters, as well as relying on skilled and prepared headquarters and campaign teams. I therefore assume that if campaigns and their organising parties are confronted with a changing environment for campaigning and if they face at the same time a large and geographically scattered target audience, a large group of candidates that have to be handled, a greater effort to organise a recognisable campaign in a large number of constituencies, etc., these challenges urge them to adapt the campaign to the changing circumstances by professionalising it in an all-embracing manner. I therefore include the large size of the canton in which the campaign is organised as a causal condition for campaign professionalisation in the fsQCA analysis following in Chapter 8.

The use of the Internet in Switzerland still varies strongly depending on a person's educational background. Currently 95 per cent of Swiss inhabitants with a university diploma and 58 per cent of those who completed only the mandatory nine years of schooling use the Internet several times per week.[6] Combined with the fact that there are more inhabitants with a high educational status in cities than in rural areas,[7] online communication becomes a more promising means of campaign communication in urban than in rural areas in the Swiss context. We can furthermore assume that the degree of individualisation tends to be higher and party affiliations tend to be weaker in urban contexts. Thus, in general, we may assume that an urban electorate will be more heterogeneous and therefore more difficult to reach and mobilise from the strategic perspective of the parties, while voting behaviour is potentially more volatile. Due to these particularities of the urban context the degree of urbanisation of the canton in which the campaign is organised can be expected to have an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation. Being organised in an urban canton is therefore included as a causal condition for a professionalised campaign in the subsequent analysis.

The two causal conditions of the size and level of urbanisation in the context in which a campaign is organised have not been tested in existing studies. Nonetheless, I expect them to have an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation due to the assumed relations between them and several of the indicators for campaign professionalisation that were outlined above.

What is more, I assume that in those cantons where there is no clear domination of one party but rather a competitive situation, that there will be a higher overall degree of campaign professionalisation. Most notably, this is because the higher the degree of competition the more that is at stake for the parties and the more important it is to win as many votes as possible. Similarly, the more that is at stake for the parties the larger the feeling of uncertainty will be for them and the more important it then becomes to monitor the campaign activities of other parties. I will therefore include a high level of competition

[6] Cf. Swiss Federal Statistical Office: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/16/04/key/approche_globale.indicator.30106.301.html?open=7#7

[7] Cf. Swiss Federal Statistical Office: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/thematische_karten/gleichstellungsatlas/ausbildung/bildungstand.html

as a third and last causal condition for campaign professionalisation at the systemic level. In order to assess the majority situations in the cantons, the analysis will draw on the distribution of seats in the cantonal parliaments in the legislative periods before the cantonal elections that are the focus of this study. Concretely, I take the percentage of seats claimed by the strongest party and subtract the percentage of seats claimed by the second strongest party. While this causal condition has not been tested in existing studies, its logic ties in with Tenscher's finding that first-order elections tend to be more professionalised than second-order elections. When the election is more important from the perspective of the parties, either in Tenscher's case because it is a first-order election or, in our case because it is more contested, I assume that this is positively related to the degree of campaign professionalisation.

3.3 Causal conditions on the party level

Existing research on campaign professionalisation has assumed that campaigns organised by catch-all parties are more professionalised than campaigns organised by small or mid-sized parties because "catch-all parties are encouraged to use as many media channels as possible in order to get in touch with their voters, while niche parties might concentrate on a few channels" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 150). What is more, the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning by Gibson and Römmele predicts that parties with a high level of resources – which is the case for catch-all parties rather than for niche parties – will have more professionalised campaigns. Tenscher and colleagues pick up this argument and assume that with regard to professionalised campaign structures, "bigger parties benefit from their size, both in regard to financial resources and the number of party members" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 150). Against this background, being organised by catch-all parties will be included as a causal condition at the party level and tested in the subsequent analysis with fsQCA.

Gibson and Römmele's party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning further states that parties with a right-wing ideology exhibit higher levels of campaign professionalisation than left-wing parties. They underpin their assumption by arguing that "the upward and outward movement of power inherent within professionalisation would meet with less

resistance in an organization with existing norms of internal hierarchy“ (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 37). What is more, “the principles of marketing and use of outside consultancy firms underpinning professionalized campaigning are more consistent with the principles of a right-wing party” (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 37), while “a left-wing or socialist party (...) would be expected to oppose the use of these business-type practices” (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 37). As we remember from Chapter 2.1, most of the existing comparative studies found that the ideological position of the party that organised the campaign has an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation. There is, however, no clear tendency as to whether left-wing or right-wing parties produce more professionalised campaigns. For the purpose of testing the influence of the ideological position of the organising party on the degree of campaign professionalisation in the subsequent analysis I take up Gibson and Römmele's original assumption and include the right-wing ideology of an organising party as a causal condition for campaign professionalisation. As we will see in Chapter 8., the analysis will still be able to indicate – if this is the case – that it was the *absence* of the causal condition right-wing ideology of the organising party that contributed to producing the outcome (i.e., professionalised campaigning).

3.4 Hypotheses

As I proposed in Chapter 2.2, the central assumptions of the present dissertation are the following: All cantonal election campaigns included in this study should display the same characteristics and degree of professionalised campaigning due to the trend towards isomorphism induced by similar institutional expectations stemming from changes in the most relevant environments for campaigning and by mimetic behaviour (i.e., observation and copying of other parties' behaviour) caused by uncertainty as to how to react adequately to these changes. If the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation differs between cantonal election campaigns the differences will be caused by the size of the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness in the cantonal parliament in the canton where the campaigns were organised (causal conditions at the systemic level), as well as by the political position on the left-right political

spectrum and by the status as a catch-all party of the party that organised the campaign (causal conditions on the party level). Previous studies have suggested that explanatory variables interact and may compensate for each other (cf. e.g. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 283f). However, it remains unclear from the research conducted to date as to how exactly the conditions at the systemic and the party level are related. I will therefore perform a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a method for data analysis that has proved to be particularly valuable for analysing complex causal patterns even in the presence of rather few cases (cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343).

What is more, I inferred from the theoretical foundation of this study that election campaigns are not necessarily equally adapted to (or, in other words, professionalised with regard to) all electoral environments, and that the different environments confront the campaigns with different changes and hence with different incentives or conditions to organise a professionalised campaign. Therefore, the following fsQCA will test whether there are different combinations of causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and to campaign professionalisation with regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments. As we will learn in detail in Chapter 5.3 (fs)QCA establishes a causal relation between the causal conditions and the outcome by analysing whether the causal conditions are necessary or sufficient conditions for the outcome. Hypotheses for (fs)QCA should therefore "consist of statements about sufficient and/or necessary conditions" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 400). In the following, statements will be provided in QCA terms that concern, first, the hypothesised relations between the causal conditions and the aggregated concept of professionalisation and second, the hypothesised relations between the causal conditions and each of the environment-related dimensions of professionalisation (voters, members, media, other parties) .

3.4.1 Professionalisation as an aggregated concept

If a causal condition is necessary for an outcome, this means that a causal condition will produce the outcome by itself, or, in other words, that it is the only causal condition that is needed in order to produce the outcome. This is in contrast to sufficient causal conditions,

which produce the outcome in combination with other causal conditions (see Chapter 5.3.4 for a detailed presentation of these principles). Based on existing findings on explanatory variables for campaign professionalisation in which none of the tested variables protruded as having a specifically strong explanatory potential for campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 3.1), I assume that among the five causal conditions that will be included in the analysis none will produce the outcome by itself. This leads to hypothesis 1:

H1: There are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept.

We remember from the discussion of the causal conditions in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 that all three conditions at the systemic level and two conditions at the party level may be assumed to contribute to campaign professionalisation equally. Or, in QCA terms, they can all be expected to be causal conditions for professionalised election campaigns. It is also reasonable – based on existing research – to assume that these conditions probably interact and can counterbalance each other or compensate for each other. However, there are too few empirical findings and theoretical insights as yet to allow for the formulation of assumptions about the precise interactions between these conditions. Hence, no speculative assumptions on specific combinations of conditions will be made and hypothesis 2 is therefore formulated as follows:

H2: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, being organised by a right-wing party and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for professionalised campaigning.

While this approach may appear somewhat under theorised and perhaps little help in explaining the relation between conditions and outcome, standards of good practice in QCA demand that the researcher (as we will see in further detail in chapter 5.3.8) discuss "whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization [i.e., the QCA analysis, S.K.] make sense, both theoretically and empirically" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). Hence, a statement concerning whether or not the previously proposed hypotheses are found to be true or false is not the essential part of presenting the results and it should not be the end point of a QCA. Also, "the solution formula alone should not be taken as demonstrating an underlying causal relationship between the conditions and an outcome" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 412). Therefore, it is in accordance with the methodological

framework of this study that the obtained results – the causal links between the solution formulas and the outcome – are explained and discussed in detail with reference to the theoretical background of the analysis after having obtained them in the empirical analysis – rather than formulating specific causal links based on rather speculative reasoning and merely reporting that they were found to be correct after the analysis. The results will be discussed and interpreted in Chapters 8.2, 8.3 and 8.5.

3.4.2 Professionalisation per environment

Similarly to the assumptions I made concerning the necessary conditions for the aggregated concept of campaign professionalisation, I hypothesise that of the five causal conditions that will be included in the analysis none will produce campaign professionalisation in relation to a specific environment. Hypothesis 3 therefore proposes:

> *H3: There are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to any of the four relevant environments.*

What I stated earlier about the sufficient conditions for professionalisation as an aggregated concept also holds true for professionalisation with regard to the four relevant electoral environments: Formulating hypotheses in the form of precise combinations of causal conditions would be a very speculative undertaking. However, we can formulate more precise assumptions based on the theoretical reasoning behind the causal conditions (see Chapters 3.2 and 3.3) and the indicators for campaign professionalisation (Chapter 2.3.3) by hypothesising which causal conditions will be sufficient conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to a specific environment – either in their presence or in their absence.

As we have seen in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 as well as in Chapter 2.3.3, communicating to and mobilising voters is especially challenging when parties are confronted with a large, rather dispersed and volatile electorate, which is the case in large and/or urbanised cantons. What is more, each vote becomes more important when competition in the cantonal parliament is close and the result of the election is hence more uncertain. Furthermore, including communicative and organisational features and measures into the campaign that are meant

to communicate to and handle a large and diverse electorate is more important to catch-all parties than to small or mid-sized niche or clientele parties. Also, catch-all parties have the financial means to stem rather costly measures like, for example, hiring professionals to conceptualise and realise an online campaign meant to attract young voters. I therefore hypothesise that these conditions will be included in the solution formula for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters. For the environment constituted by the voters I formulate the following hypothesis:

> *H4: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters.*

Drawing on my argument and theoretical reasoning thus far, it may be assumed that professionalising the campaign with regard to the party members is more important when there is a close competition in the cantonal parliament. Faced with a very uncertain election outcome, parties may no longer content themselves with the expectation that their members would vote for them regardless, but rather professionalise their campaigns with regard to the members in order to mobilise them and with the hope of increasing their electoral success. What is more, I hypothesise that differences in the degree of professionalisation with regard to the members can be attributed to the parties' ideological positions. I assume non right-wing parties to organise campaigns that are more professionalised with regard to the members since these tend to have a more important role in left-wing or socialist than in right-wing parties. If parties perceive, for example, that mobilisation in general has become more difficult or have noted that the number of members is declining, left-wing rather than right-wing parties may see a viable solution in paying more attention to the members during election campaigns (e.g. by sending a series of mobilising e-mails to all members). What is more, I propose that campaigns can be expected to be more professionalised with regard to the members in catch-all parties, because members are so numerous that they can actually change an election outcome. Also, the more members there are, the less feasible it becomes to inform, activate or mobilise them via personal communication at party meetings or campaign gatherings and the more

parties then have to rely on (again, possibly costly) the means of so-called direct or online communication. Hypothesis 5 is stated as follows:

> *H5: Being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members.*

I propose furthermore that professionalising the campaign with regard to the media to be more important in large cantons, when campaign communication has to reach more potential voters and where the means of so-called direct communication and online communication can be employed by the parties as substitutes for personal face-to-face communication with a large electorate. What is more, I assume due to the interdependence of internet-use and urbanisation in Switzerland that the means of online communication (like social media) are more widely used and accepted in urbanised cantons (see Chapter 3.2). Also, catch-all parties depend more heavily on the media in order to reach a large electorate and membership base. I therefore propose in hypothesis 6:

> *H6: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media.*

Based on the theoretical reasoning I have presented to this point I expect that professionalising the campaign with regard to other parties is especially important when parties are confronted with a competitive situation. Also, I assume that monitoring other parties' campaigns is more important for smaller parties with smaller budgets, as it may be less expensive to check other parties' campaigns for innovations, "must haves", etc., than to assess and research the possibilities of online campaigning or utilising an effective combination of media. Based on this reasoning, hypothesis 7 is formulated as follows:

> *H7: Being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and not being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties.*

3.5 Schemes

The following schemes show the central assumptions of the present dissertation. Figure 1 depicts the general theoretical framework; Figure 2 visualises the assumption that campaign professionalisation with regard to different environments is explained by different causal paths.

Figure 1: Theoretical model of the present dissertation



Figure 2: Explanation of campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and as a differentiated concept




close competition in the cantonal parliament
non catch-all party
lead to
election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to other parties

Part II: Database and Methodological Approach

4. Database

The Swiss cantons, i.e. the regional entities below the national level, are of particular value to comparative research, because they form, as Vatter puts it, an "extraordinary research laboratory within a small space" (Vatter 2007: 148). Belonging to the same national entity of Switzerland, the 26 Swiss cantons nevertheless differ considerably with regard to their political systems, socio-economic structures and political legacies (cf. Vatter 2007: 148), thus offering a strong degree of comparative equivalence and variation in context factors at the same time. Data from various cantons thus provide ideal grounds for a comparative analysis across different contexts (cf. Lachat & Sciarini 2002: 45). As there was few systematic data on the degree and shape of professionalisation of Swiss cantonal election campaigns available at the time of this dissertation project, I created a database for this study's outcome by conducting 37 semi-structured interviews with the campaign managers of the 23 cantonal parties included in this study (cf. chapter 4.1). The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts were systematically analysed with a codebook covering the indicators for professionalised campaigning that were presented in Chapter 2.3.3. The causal conditions were attributed to the campaigns with the help of secondary data (cf. chapter 4.2).

The resulting database hence consists of 23 cantonal election campaigns that were organised by the cantonal branches of five Swiss parties in five cantons[8]. 23 election campaigns is a reasonable number of cases for performing a data analysis with the help of fsQCA. QCA has been proven to work for settings and populations of interest with an N between 10 and 50 cases (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 12). A smaller number of cases is not excluded but bears the risk of confronting the researcher with QCA's version of the *too many variables too few cases*-problem, that is, limited diversity and logical remainders (see Chapter 5.3.5). While fsQCA is in theory

[8] The data used in this study were collected in the research project „Professionelle Freiwillige? Die Mitgliederkommunikation Schweizer Kantonalparteien in Wahlkämpfen" (*Professional volunteers? The internal communication of Swiss cantonal parties during election campaigns*) that was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (project number 100012-122278) and by the Schweizerische Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft (*Swiss society for the benefit to the public*). While five campaigns in five cantons should of course add up to 25 campaigns, two cantonal sections of the Swiss People's Party (Aargau and Appenzell Ausserrhoden) were unfortunately not willing to give interviews about their campaign communication.

also suitable for larger numbers of cases, it can only be performed in a proper manner if the researcher has a sufficient amount of in-depth knowledge about the cases, as we will see in Chapter 5.2. What is more, standards of good practice require that researchers link the solution formulas obtained by the fsQCA back to the cases and discuss "whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization make sense, both theoretically and empirically" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). Within the framework of this dissertation, these qualitative requirements can best be met with a moderate number of cases, as it would be very time-consuming to assemble in-depth knowledge about, and link the solution formulas back to, for example, 50 cases.

4.1 Database for the outcome

In order to gather information on the campaign organisation and campaign communication in the 23 election campaigns included in this study, 37 designated campaign managers and other persons that had a position of responsibility in the cantonal election campaigns were interviewed. Since the election organisation and the distribution of tasks and responsibilities differ between parties, the interviewees were chosen with a two-step positional approach. First, the cantonal offices of the 23 parties included in the study were contacted in order to find out how the cantonal election campaigns were organised and how the tasks and responsibilities were distributed. Then the interviewees were randomly chosen from the members of the highest electoral organisational entity at the cantonal level and also at the local level, if the local party organisations (i.e., the organisational level below the cantonal party) held a role of responsibility in the electoral organisation. Every interviewee was a campaign manager in that he or she held a role of responsibility in the campaign, but their respective formal roles differed from each other (cantonal secretary, cantonal president, campaign manager, candidate, etc.). While the aim was to conduct two interviews in each cantonal party branch, this did not always prove possible due to restrictions in the availability of the campaign managers. Table 1 gives an overview of the 37 interviews that were conducted.

Table 1: List of interviews

Canton	Date of election	Interview period	Number of interviews				
			Greens	SP	CVP	FDP	SVP
Aargau	8 March 2009	May-August 2009	2	2	2	2	-[9]
Neuchâtel	5 April 2009	June-August 2009	1	2	2	2	2
Bern	28 March 2010	April-July 2010	2	2	1	2	1
Zürich	3 April 2011	May-August 2011	2	1	2	1	2
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3 April 2011	May–July 2011	1	1	1	1	-

The interviews were semi-structured; the questions referred to the electoral organisation and campaign communication. The selection of questions that were relevant for the present dissertation can be found in Appendix B) (translated from German)[10]. The dates of the interviews were fixed so that enough time was given after the elections for the campaign managers to reflect on the campaign, at the same time making sure that the campaign was still sufficiently close to remember it correctly. The interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed.

I then content analysed the interview transcripts (assisted by software for content analysis of qualitative data (MAXQDA)) with a codebook that contained those campaign characteristics that were presented and theoretically substantiated as indicators for campaign professionalisation in Chapter 2.3.3. It should be noted that only activities initiated by or referring to the cantonal parties were coded, but not the aspects that the interviewees mentioned in regard to individual candidates or other party levels. This would affect statements like "Facebook was not an element in our

[9] As it has been mentioned before, the cantonal section of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) in Aargau was not willing to speak about their campaign communication.

[10] Recall that the data used in this study were collected in the research project „Professionelle Freiwillige? Die Mitgliederkommunikation Schweizer Kantonalparteien in Wahlkämpfen" (*Professional volunteers? The internal communication of Swiss cantonal parties during election campaigns*) was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (project number 100012-122278) and by the Schweizerische Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft (*Swiss society for the benefit to the public*).

campaign but individual candidates used it for their personal campaign anyway" (a fictional example). This may have created a limitation in the comprehensiveness of the data, but it was a necessity to ensure its comparability.

In the following, the codebook for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept is presented. The campaign received one point on the aggregated professionalisation index whenever it featured one of the following campaign characteristics:

1. Mandate at least one professional for technical support; examples: design of commercial material, photographer
2. Mandate at least one professional for strategic/conceptual/ideological support; example: public relations agency
3. Provide training for candidates and/or party members in campaign practices or campaign messages on at least at one occasion; examples: organising a course, distribution of a manual
4. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all constituencies of the cantonal party branch
5. Installation of campaign headquarters or a designated campaign team
6. Continuous campaigning
7. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or narrow casting on at least one occasion during the campaign (1 point per means)
    a. Direct mail
    b. Text message
    c. Direct e-mail
8. Employment of the following means of online communication at least once during the campaign (1 point per means)

a. Social networks

b. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards)

c. Video clip/video channel

9. Monitoring campaign activities of other parties at least once during the campaign

While the decision whether campaign characteristics would have to be coded as present or absent did not turn out to be difficult or interpretative for the other indicators, the decision of whether a campaign was a permanent one and hence could be coded as "continuous campaigning" was not so straightforward. It proved to be impossible, for all 23 campaigns included in this study, to obtain reliable and comparable data on the number of months that the campaign was running prior to the elections (as operationalised for the similar indicator "campaign duration" by Tenscher and colleagues (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012: 162)), or on the number of campaign activities the party was engaged in six months prior to the official campaign period (as operationalised by Gibson and Römmele (2009: 271) and Strömbäck (2009: 104)). Hence, in the framework of this study continuous campaigning figures among the "subjectively measured variables" (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 271). A campaign was coded as qualifying as continuous campaigning when, first, the campaign managers stated that the party had engaged in continuous campaigning and this was corroborated by the judgement of the author based on the characterisation of continuous campaigning in Chapter 2.3.3. A campaign was, second, also coded as continuous when the author came to the conclusion that the campaign qualifies as continuous campaigning based on implicit statements by the interviewees. This was necessary because campaign managers may have failed to label the campaign as continuous due to understatement or a poor understanding of the concept, even if activities meant to inform, convince or bind potential and existing voters were reported to take place throughout the entire year and not only during defined campaign phases.

This first phase of the content analysis resulted in a score for each campaign that reflects how professionalised it is on an aggregated level. The maximum score on this aggregated index is 13.

In order to determine the campaigns' degree of professionalisation with regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments, the interview transcripts were content analysed based on four different codebooks (one for each relevant electoral environment). During the coding process, it became obvious that some of the parties' communication activities were directed at both voters and members and that parties did not always differentiate between the two target groups. This was especially the case in regard to the means of online communication – notably Facebook profiles, participative web content (like blogs), and video clips or video channels – which were open to all interested users and were intended both to mobilise members and to attract and convince new potential voters. What is more, some activities affect – by definition – *all* potential voters (i.e., including members), like hiring a PR agency to design a catchy campaign slogan. Thus, several activities had to be coded as belonging to both the members' index and the voters' index. Therefore, an additional variable was included in order to ameliorate the differentiation between the two environments. It was analysed from the interview transcripts whether the campaign mainly targeted members and sympathisers (resulting in the campaigning receiving one point on the index measuring professionalisation with regard to the members) or the wider public (resulting in the campaigning receiving one point on the index measuring professionalisation with regard to the voters). Certainly, some campaign managers stated that the campaign targeted both groups, resulting in one point on both indices. I will discuss the possible consequences of this partially difficult differentiation between the environments formed by the voters and members in the conclusion.

Other indicators that are part of the aggregated professionalisation index were not included in the content analysis aiming to measure the amount of professionalisation in regard to the four electoral environments, because they can be assumed to affect all four relevant electoral environments and would thereby not contribute to a differentiated pattern of campaign professionalisation. This was especially the case

for the indicators that have an organisational character like mandating professionals, installing campaign headquarters and designating a campaign team. If the interviewed campaign managers did not specify for which purpose a professional was mandated or a campaign team was installed, it can be assumed that the commissioning referred to an all-embracing mandate – that is one that includes a strategy to win votes, mobilise members, deal with the media and to monitor (and copy) other parties at the same time.

When assessing how professionalised the 23 cantonal election campaigns are with regard to other parties, the analysis focused on a single variable, notably the monitoring of other parties' campaigns, by following a two-step approach. It was analysed, first, whether a campaign featured the monitoring of other parties' campaigns (resulting in one point on the other parties index), and, second, whether there were consequences drawn from the monitoring that led to the adjustment or adaptation of their own campaign (resulting in an additional point on the other parties' index).

In the following paragraphs the coding schemes for each environment will be displayed in further detail. Again, the campaign received one point on the respective environment-related index whenever it featured one of the following campaign characteristics:

Professionalisation with regard to the voters:

1. Mandate at least one professional to work on the external communication or the contents of the campaign; examples: define the ideological and creative baseline of the campaign, create slogans, create a communication concept

2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion that would allow them to improve their direct contact with potential voters at campaign booths, on the street, etc.

3. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all constituencies of the cantonal party branch that will ensure the campaign is

recognisable to voters (especially for those who live and work in different constituencies)

4. Continuous campaigning

5. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or narrow casting to communicate with voters at least once during the campaign (1 point per means)

    a. Direct mail

    b. Text message

    c. Direct e-mail

6. Employment of the following means of online communication to communicate with voters at least once during the campaign (1 point per means)

    a. Social networks

    b. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards)

    c. Video clip/video channel

7. Identification of the voters as a particular target group of the campaign and the creation of at least one campaign element for this group

Professionalisation with regard to the members:

1. Mandate at least one professional to work on the internal communication or the contents of the campaign; examples: define the ideological and creative baseline of the campaign, create slogans, create a communication concept

2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion that will allow them to improve their mobilisation skills with regard to other members

3. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all constituencies of the cantonal party branch that will ensure the campaign is recognisable by the members (especially for those who live and work in different constituencies)

4. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or narrow casting to communicate with members at least once during the campaign (1 point per means)

    a. Direct mail

    b. Text message

    c. Direct e-mail

5. Employment of the following means of online communication to communicate with members at least once during the campaign (1 point per means)

6. Social networks

    a. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards)

    b. Video clip/video channel

    c. Identification of members as a specific target group of the campaign and the creation of at least one campaign element for this group

Professionalisation with regard to the media:

1. Mandate at least one professional for the purpose of helping with the party's representation in the media (both "old" and "new" media); *examples: mandate an IT specialist to create a new website or improve an existing website; mandate a cameraman to produce video clips*

2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion in order to improve their performance and appearance in the mass media or

in relation to the use of new media (course or manual); *examples: presentation techniques, familiarity with central topics, social media strategies*

Professionalisation with regard to other parties:

1. Monitoring of other parties' campaign activities
2. Adjusting own campaign activities based on the monitoring of other parties' campaign activities

The maximum score on the index reflecting the professionalisation of the campaign with regard to the environment of the voters (voters index) was 11 and the maximum score with regard to the members was 10. In the indices reflecting the professionalisation of the campaign in regard to the media and other parties index, both had a maximum score of 2.

4.2 Database for the causal conditions

The five cantons Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Bern, Neuchâtel and Zürich were included in this study because they offer an interesting pattern of variation across the three causal conditions for campaign professionalisation at the systemic level that will be tested in this study – size of the canton (i.e. population), degree of urbanisation (i.e. the percentage of population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants)[11] and degree of competitiveness (this was operationalised, as we remember from Chapter 3.2, by the percentage of seats claimed by the strongest party minus the percentage of seats claimed by the second strongest party, in the legislative periods before the cantonal elections that are the focus of this paper (cf. Table 2).

[11] This operationalisation was chosen in accordance with the definition of a city by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office that defines a city as a community with more than 10,000 inhabitants (see e.g. Schuler, M., Dessemontet, P., Joye; D. (2005): Eidgenössische Volkszählung 2000. Die Raumgliederungen der Schweiz, http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/news/publikationen.Document.64476.pdf)

Table 2: Causal conditions at the systemic level: Size, degree of urbanisation and competitiveness

Canton	Population[12]	Degree of urbanisation[13]	Difference in seats claimed by strongest and second strongest party[14]
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	53,000	29%	28%
Aargau	611,500	19%	11.43%
Bern	979,800	40%	3.13%
Neuchâtel	172,100	53%	0.87%
Zürich	1,373,100	66%	11.1%

Also, these cantons held elections to the cantonal parliaments within a two-year span of each other. The cantonal campaigns which are analysed in this study were organised on the occasion of the elections to the cantonal parliaments that took place on 8 March, 2009 in the canton of Aargau, on 5 April, 2009 in the canton of Neuchâtel, on 28 March, 2010 in the canton of Bern, and on 3 April, 2011 in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The shift in years is due to the fact that not all elections to the cantonal parliaments take place in the same year.

The five parties included in the study are the GP (Grüne Partei/Green Party), the SP (Sozialdemokratische Partei/Social Democrats), the CVP (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei/Christian Democrats), the FDP (FDP.Die Liberalen/Liberal Democrats) and the SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei/Swiss People's Party). These five parties have been – at least during the last decade (as the recent emergence of new parties will be bringing about changes) – the five major parties at the national

[12] As published for the year 2010 by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_verteilung/kantone__gemeinden.html)

[13] The percentage of the population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants was calculated based on the document "Bilanz der ständigen Wohnbevölkerung (Total) nach Bezirken und Gemeinden, 2009", published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_verteilung/kantone__gemeinden.html).

[14] The difference in the percentages of seats claimed by strongest and by second strongest party was calculated based on the document "Kantonale Parlamentswahlen: Mandatsverteilung nach Parteien und Kanton", published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/02/blank/key/kantonale_parlemente/mandatsverteilung.html). As the cantonal parliaments have different numbers of seats, the difference in the absolute number of seats would not be an appropriate indicator. The legislative periods in question are 2005-2009 in Aargau and Neuchâtel, 2006-2010 in Bern and 2007-2011 in Zürich and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The result was approximated to two decimal places. The seats held by the two liberal parties FDP and LPS (or, in French terms, PLR and PLS) in Neuchâtel were combined in this calculation, as the two party branches merged in 2008 to form one party branch of the Liberal Democrats (FDP).

political level. All have cantonal party branches in the cantons included in this study. Although the Social Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the Swiss People's Party are all represented in the consociational government of Switzerland, their representative strength in the cantonal parliaments varies considerably (see Table 3).

What is more, these parties differ from each other with regard to their position on the left-right ideological continuum. In general, the parties included in this study can be subdivided into right-wing (or in Swiss terms, *bürgerliche)* parties (Liberal Democrats (FDP), Christian Democrats (CVP), Swiss People's Party (SVP)) and left-wing parties (the Greens (Grüne), Social Democrats (SP)) (cf. Ladner 2004: 144), while the Swiss People's Party is at the far right of the ideological continuum while the Liberal Democrats are generally considered centre-to-right. The Christian Democrats also form part of the political camp labelled as *bürgerlich* but are generally even more at the centre than the Liberal Democrats. However, in addition to these broad classifications, the federal political system of Switzerland allows for an individual positioning of the parties' cantonal politics and thus for nuances in the position of the cantonal party branches on the left-right ideological continuum. Thus, I have to draw on additional sources in order to determine the ideological position of the individual party branches. These are a survey from 2002/03 where cantonal party presidents were asked to assess their own party's ideological position (cf. Geser et al. 2003) and an analysis of the political profiles of candidates in the online voting advice application "smartvote" (cf. Ladner et al. 2008)[15]. The combination of those two sources gives us a more differentiated picture of the ideological position of the individual party branches. We should not pay too much attention to fine nuances present in the results, as the numbers displayed in Table 3 are the exact results of the mathematical combination of the data provided by Geser et al. (2003) and Ladner et al. (2008). It is not excluded, for example, that a 0.1 difference between two parties reflects a random measurement artefact rather than a real ideological difference. The

[15] Unfortunately, this was the most recent information available when writing this dissertation. While the political profiles that Ladner and colleagues (2008) analysed were filled out by candidates for the elections to the Swiss federal parliament (*Nationalrat*) in 2007, this data is nevertheless useful for my purposes, as these elections are organised in constituencies formed by the cantons and candidates specify which cantonal party branch they are active in. I thank Andreas Ladner for pointing me to these two sources.

important information is, however, that the cantonal party branches of the Social Democrats and of the Green Party, with values between 1.7 and 2.5 (0 marking the left and 10 marking the right end), are located at the left of the political spectrum. The Christian Democrats (values between 4.6 and 5.3) take a centre position. The cantonal party branches of the Liberal Democrats cover values between 6.3 and 6.9 and can thus be considered centre-to-right parties, while the Swiss People's Party's party branches are located at the right of the ideological spectrum (values between 7.1 and 7.4). For detailed results see Table 3.

Table 3: Causal conditions at the party level: Electoral strength and political position

Canton	Party	Percentage of seats[16]	Political position[17] 0 (left) – 10 (right)
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Christian Democrats	5	5
	Green Party	0	1.85[18]
	Liberal Democrats	40	6.42
	Social Democrats	6	2.5
Aargau	Christian Democrats	19	5.28
	Green Party	5	1.88
	Liberal Democrats	17	6.795
	Social Democrats	21	2.15
Bern	Christian Democrats	1	5.26
	Green Party	12	2.06
	Liberal Democrats	16	6.31
	Social Democrats	26	2.455
	Swiss People's Party	29	7.055
Neuchâtel	Christian Democrats	0	4.64
	Green Party	9	1.69
	Liberal Democrats	35	6.305
	Social Democrats	36	2.04
	Swiss People's Party	15	7.36
Zürich	Christian Democrats	7	4.955
	Green Party	11	1.775
	Liberal Democrats	16	6.87
	Social Democrats	20	1.835
	Swiss People's Party	31	7.4

[16] The table displays the percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament held by the cantonal party branch in the legislative period before the elections studied in this dissertation (as the cantonal parliaments have different numbers of seats, the absolute number of seats would be misleading). The percentage of seats was calculated based on the document "Kantonale Parlamentswahlen: Mandatsverteilung nach Parteien und Kanton", published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/02/blank/key/kantonale_parlemente/mandatsverteilung.html).

[17] Ladner et al. (2008) use an index representing political ideology in which 100 indicates the left ideological pole and 0 indicates the right ideological pole. The scale presented in Geser et al. (2003) ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating the right ideological pole. In order to make both scales comparable, the parties' values in Ladner and colleagues' study were subtracted from 100. Hence, the direction of the scale changed to 0 indicating a left ideological position. The values were then divided by ten. Finally, the arithmetic mean between the modified values from Ladner et al. (2008) and Geser et al. (2003) was calculated.

[18] Please note that neither of the two studies specifies a value for the Green Party in Appenzell Ausserrhoden. Therefore, an approximate value for this party branch was calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of the other four party branches of the Green Party. Before doing this, it was checked whether the values obtained by the cantonal party branches of the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats in Appenzell Ausserrhoden deviated in a certain pattern from the arithmetic mean of the values obtained by these parties in the other cantons. This could be an indicator that, for example, the ideological positions in Appenzell Ausserrhoden are in general more to the right than in the other cantons. The arithmetic mean of the other four party branches of the Green Party would then have to be corrected for this factor. However, this was not the case.

5. Methodological approach: Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This chapter presents the methodological approach to the data analysis of the study in hand. The data sheet resulting from the interviews and the content analysis was the basis for a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). As we remember from Chapter 3, I expect five explanatory factors to have an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation, or, to be more precise, to be causal conditions for campaign professionalisation. These factors are located at both the systemic and party level. Therefore, I expect that these factors could be interlinked and complement each other. The research interest of the present dissertation is thus dealing with potentially complex causal arguments with only a medium number of cases to consider (23 election campaigns). What is more, as we will see in greater detail in Chapter 8.1.1, the relation between the outcome (professionalised campaigns) and the five causal conditions can be modelled as subset/superset relations. For these reasons, I will perform a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). QCA is a set-theoretic method that has proved to be particularly valuable for analysing complex causal patterns in the presence of few cases (cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343). Its version fuzzy set (fs) QCA offers another methodological advantage for the analysis of explanatory factors behind different degrees of campaign professionalisation. It allows for the calibration of both the causal conditions and outcome. This means that we can refine both the set membership of the 23 cases in the outcome and in the causal conditions based on empirical and theoretical evidence, resulting in a multi value scale (we will see in Chapter 5.2 exactly what this means). This reflects the empirical reality of a database representing degrees of campaign professionalisation better than a dichotomous measurement that only differentiates between "professionalised" and "not professionalised" campaigns.

As the analysis performed along the principles and method of (fs)QCA is at the core of the empirical part of this dissertation, and because readers are probably less familiar with this approach, I offer a methodological introduction to (fs)QCA in this

chapter. However, as the application of the method is so closely linked to the results of the analysis, both can be comprehended much easier when presented in direct sequence. How the principles and method of fsQCA were utilised in the present dissertation will therefore be demonstrated when I present the results in Chapter 8. To be more precise, I will give the reader a general introduction to modelling causal relations as subset and superset relations in Chapter 5.1, while I will show how the professionalisation of election campaigns and the conditions influencing them are modelled as subset/superset relations within the framework of this dissertation Chapter 8.1.1. Similarly, Chapter 5.2 features a general introduction to the calibration procedure, while Chapter 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 shows how the outcome and the causal conditions are calibrated in the specific analysis performed in the present dissertation. The methodological principles that are outlined on a general level in Chapters 5.3 to 5.8 will be utilised again when presenting the results of the analysis in Chapters 8.2 and 8.3.

Since its first publication by Charles C. Ragin in 1987, QCA has been used by an ever larger number of scholars in order to "strike a balance between qualitative and quantitative methods" (Emmenegger 2011: 337) in comparative research. Comparative research has mainly sought to explore questions of causation with correlational techniques or by case studies. While these approaches have proved valuable, they are limited in regard to small and medium numbers of cases and tend to remain at the descriptive level respectively. QCA is, on the one hand, a variable-oriented approach in that it reveals necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome, deals with causal complexity by showing different combinations of causal conditions that lead to the outcome and aims at a causal analysis by making use of truth tables and the principles of logical minimisation (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 8f.). On the other hand, QCA is also a case-oriented approach due to the fact that, "familiarity with cases is a requirement before, during and after the analytical moment of a QCA" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 400) in order to identify relevant causal conditions, to select parameters of fit and to facilitate the interpretation of results. Scholars are advised, as a standard of good practice, to not simply report the obtained solution formulas as such and leave the rest to the reader, but to provide

"theoretically meaningful interpretations" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 402) of the empirical results.

With its foundations in set theory, formal logic, Boolean algebra and fuzzy algebra, QCA has a unique terminology from that of standard correlational analysis. As I mentioned earlier, the analysis will refer to (causal) conditions, which are comparable to explanatory or independent variables in standard or correlational analysis, and to the outcome, which is comparable to the dependent variable. The solution formula and the solution terms are the results of a QCA.

While a detailed introduction to fsQCA including its above mentioned theoretical and mathematical foundations would exceed the possibilities of this dissertation, the fundamental principles of fsQCA will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Where these principles apply not only to the version fsQCA but are valid for QCA in general, referring to "QCA" will reflect this.

5.1 Modelling causal relations as subset and superset relations

QCA can be considered the "most developed form of set-theoretic method" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 1). Its foundation in set-theory has two main implications. First, QCA models causal relations as subset and superset relations. While this may seem unfamiliar at first glance, Schneider and Wagemann have pointed out that, "(…) set theoretic notions are invoked in social science research more often than is usually recognized" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 2f). "The notion of sets and their relations is almost unavoidably invoked when forming concepts or when verbally formulating (causal) relations between social phenomena." (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 2f.) Sets represent nothing more than social science concepts. Let us look at some examples to clarify this. If we hypothesise, for example, that individuals with a low socioeconomic status use television as their main medium of information, this describes a subset relation. The set of individuals with a low socioeconomic status (a social science concept) that use TV as their main medium of information is a subset of the set of all individuals that use TV as their

main medium of information (another concept). This means that being an individual with a low socioeconomic status is a sufficient condition for choosing TV as the main medium, as we will see in Chapter 5.3. For the purposes of this study, this would mean that if I hypothesise that being organised in an urbanised canton is a causal condition for a professionalised campaign, campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons would be a subset of professionalised campaigns. Therefore, taking place in an urbanised canton would be a sufficient condition for a professionalised campaign.

The second implication of QCA as a set-theoretic method is that the data on which it operates are "membership scores of cases in sets which represent social science concepts" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 3). Set membership scores define *whether* – and in the case of fsQCA also *to which degree* – a case is described by a concept. This is the case for both the conditions and the outcome. Each case is assigned a membership score in the outcome and in each of the conditions. Crisp set QCA operates on dichotomous set membership and thus obliges the researcher to define for the set membership in the outcome and in each of the conditions, whether a case is either described by a set and will thus be assigned a set membership score of 1, or whether it is not and will be assigned a set membership score of 0. Crisp set QCA has been criticised for the obligation to dichotomise which leads to the loss of empirical information. Dichotomisation was also considered to "reduce the robustness of the results due to the sensitivity of QCA findings to decisions on where to put the threshold for dichotomization, as the latter is often subject to a relatively large degree of discretion" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 25). As a reply to these critiques Charles C. Ragin developed fuzzy set QCA, which allows for partial set membership. If, say, the election campaign of the Social Democrats in Aargau is assigned a set membership score of 0.8 in the set of professionalised campaigns, this means that the researcher has come to the conclusion that the campaign is mostly but not fully described by the concept of professionalised campaigns – or, in other words, that the campaign is mostly but not fully professionalised. The process of assigning the set membership score is called calibration and will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.

It is crucial to note that fuzzy set membership scores do not reflect a lack of empirical information on the cases. This means that the 0.8 membership score of the campaign of the Social Democrats in Aargau in the set of professionalised campaigns does not mean that we are not sure how professionalised this campaign really was and therefore assigned it a score of 0.8 as a rule of thumb estimate. Rather, fuzziness is a numerical expression of the non-sharp conceptual boundaries that are inherent in virtually all social science concepts (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 3f). A common example from political science is democracy. While there certainly are political systems, which can be defined as "democratic" and others that are "not democratic at all", the decision is less definitive for others. While most political scientists would not assign Russia the same democratic equivalence as, say, Denmark, not all would probably declare Russia "not a democracy at all". Campaign professionalisation, the central subject of this study, is clearly a concept with blurry boundaries, as there is no evidence or rule that defines that a campaign with, say, a score of 14 on an index for professionalised campaigning with a maximum score of 30 is not professionalised while another campaign with a score of 16 is.

A clear definition of the (fuzzy) sets that follow from the concepts guiding the investigation is of crucial importance for QCA. The definition of the sets has to be closely linked to and guided by the research question. Based on the same data, several different set definitions are possible, depending on the research interest. For some research questions, for example, it may be reasonable to define the "set of highly professionalised election campaigns" as the outcome, while for other questions the best definition outcome would be the "set of election campaigns that show at least a basic level of campaign professionalisation". Another example would be the definition of the set of poor people in a given country based on the household income. It has to take into consideration the general social economic situation in that country (as being poor is reflected by another household income in, say, Switzerland, than it is in the Dominican Republic), as well as the aspect of poverty that is to be studied (because being poor in the sense of suffering hunger is reflected by another household income than being poor in the sense of not having enough money to participate in social and cultural activities).

5.2 Calibration of the conditions and of the outcome

The calibration of set membership scores is a key concept of fsQCA and may be defined as the "process of using empirical information on cases for assigning set membership to them" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32). Through the calibration of set membership, fsQCA has proved to be, "especially appropriate for the study of diversity precisely because they capture both kinds of difference, qualitative and quantitative, in a single instrument" (Ragin 2000: 149f). In relation to the factors explaining professionalised campaigning this means that fsQCA allows for differentiation between cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised and not professionalised (i.e. a qualitative difference or a difference-in-kind) as well as between cantonal election campaigns that have full membership in the set of professionalised campaigns and cantonal election campaigns that are mostly, but not fully a member of the set of professionalised campaigns (i.e. a quantitative difference or a difference-in-degree).

There are three methods by which to assign calibrated set membership scores to the cases. The direct and the indirect methods of calibration have been introduced by Ragin (2008: 90ff) and can be applied if the database consists of interval or ratio scale data. Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 35) describe a more qualitative procedure based on the work of Emmenegger (2011). In all three procedures, set membership scores higher than 0.5 indicate that cases are described by a set while membership scores below 0.5 indicate that a case is not described by a set (qualitative differences between cases). Membership scores above 0.5 but below 1 indicate partial set membership. All cases with these membership scores are described by the set but to a differing degree (quantitative differences between cases). The same applies to membership scores below 0.5 but above 0 indicating partial non-membership. All cases with these membership scores are not described by the set but to a differing degree (quantitative differences between cases).

5.2.1 The direct method of calibration

The first step to calibrate membership scores with the direct method of calibration is the definition of three qualitative anchors. The threshold for full set membership is the empirical value that defines when a case can be considered a full member of the set (which is indicated by a membership score of 1). For example, if we have specified the set of countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as our outcome, we have to specify, based on theoretical and substantive knowledge, what it takes to warrant full membership in this set (cf. Ragin 2009: 93f). We may set the threshold – based on external knowledge, as we will discuss later in this chapter - at 50'000 USD per year. All cases in our sample of countries that have a GDP per capita equal to or higher than 50'000 USD per year would then be assigned a membership score of 1. The threshold for full non-membership in the set is the empirical value that defines when a case can be considered a full non-member of the set (which is indicated by a membership score of 0). Again, we have to specify, based on theoretical and substantive knowledge, what it takes to be warranted full non-membership in this set. In line with the example cited before, we could decide based on external knowledge to set the threshold for full non-membership at 2'500 USD per year. All cases in our sample of countries that have a GDP per capita equal to or lower than 2'500 USD per year would then be assigned a membership score of 0 in the set of countries with a high GDP per capita. The third qualitative anchor is the crossover point. This is the point where cases "cross" the line from membership to non-membership. It is also the point of maximum ambiguity (or maximum fuzziness), because the decision of whether a case is a member of the set or whether it is not is least clear-cut here. The researcher therefore has to evaluate what constitutes the maximum ambiguity and whether a case is more in or out of the target set (cf. Ragin 2009: 94). The crossover point is indicated by the set membership score of 0.5.

When working with the fsQCA 2.0 computer software the programme calculates the set membership scores for the membership of each case in each of the conditions and in the outcome by using a logistic function to fit the raw data inbetween the

three qualitative anchors that the researcher has defined for each set. For a detailed description of this procedure please refer to Ragin (2008: 89ff).

5.2.2 The indirect method of calibration

When applying the indirect method of calibration, the researcher initially groups the cases according to their membership scores, depending on his or her estimation of the cases' membership in the target set. Choosing the number of groups reflected by the number of set membership scores that are assigned is at the discretion of the researcher. A common grouping is by a six-value scheme: The value of 1 represents full membership in the set. A membership score of 0.8 indicates that the case is mostly but not fully a member of the target set. 0.6 is assigned to cases that the researcher considers to be more in than out of the set and 0.4 to cases that are, on the contrary, more out of than in the set. 0.2 means that the case is mostly but not fully a non-member of the target set and 0 indicates full non-membership. This is, however, only one possible scheme. More or less categories are possible. The decisive aspect is that each category has to be legitimised by substantive knowledge: "The stronger the empirical basis for making qualitative assessments of set membership, the more precise the calibration of the values of the interval-scale indicator as set membership scores." (Ragin 2008: 96) When the researcher has defined the preliminary membership scores, they are regressed against the raw data using a fractional logit model. The predicted values are then used as the membership scores. For detailed information on this procedure please refer to Ragin (2008: 96f).

5.2.3 The theory-guided method of calibration

Relying partially on statistical models, both the direct and indirect methods of calibration lead to fine-grained set membership scores. This level of precision has been criticised as misleading because it "usually goes well beyond the available empirical information and the conceptual level of differentiation that is possible" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 37). As Schneider and Wagemann have pointed out,

using the example of Emmenegger (2011), if the original values are close to qualitative assessments themselves "a complicated mathematical transformation, such as a logit function, might be a less appropriate way of reflecting the (partial) presence of a concept in given cases" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40). As an alternative to the semi-automated calibration strategies introduced by Ragin, they refer to Emmenegger's (2011) calibration as a good standard of calibration practice (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 35). Emmenegger's raw data consists of an additive index and he uses conceptual and case knowledge for imposing the qualitative anchors. For example, when calibrating set membership scores in the condition, "many institutional veto points", he assigns a membership score of 0 to all cases that have the same or a lower score than the United Kingdom, based on case knowledge about the country. Furthermore, he uses a prominent gap on the index between two raw values (5.05 and 6.75 on an index with a maximum score of 10) to establish the crossover point (point of ambiguity). The level of transparency makes it possible to follow Emmenegger's reasoning and if deemed necessary, to make specific suggestions for an alternative calibration (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 35).

5.2.4 The role of theoretical and substantive knowledge in calibration

The definition of the three qualitative anchors in the direct method of calibration and of the preliminary membership scores in the indirect method are the most important steps when calibrating set membership scores, even in semi-automated direct and indirect calibration techniques (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 419). As I have briefly pointed out earlier, it is the "responsibility of the researcher to find valid rules for assigning set-membership scores to cases" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32) and to present a rationale for each qualitative anchor. The calibration has to be based on the combination of theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence (cf. Ragin 2000: 150). Since the "fuzzy set membership scores do not simply rank cases relative to each other" (Ragin 2009: 90), a valid calibration may never systematically assign membership scores to cases based solely on empirical distribution. This also applies

to research in which raw data is measured with an interval scale. While it may appear convenient to transform the interval scale into fuzzy sets this procedure disregards standards of good practice in QCA and does not lead to valuable results. The decision of where to set the qualitative anchors has to reflect theoretical considerations and empirical information *external* to the data in hand. This may include obvious facts, generally accepted notions in the social sciences, and knowledge that the researcher accumulated in a specific field of study or specific cases (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32). The distribution of cases on the raw data can also be taken into consideration but the researcher has to make sure that it is "another piece of evidence, but certainly not the sole guidance when calibrating" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 33). Finally, especially when using a semi-automated calibration strategy, it is important to thoroughly check whether each case's membership score in each of the sets makes sense based on the researcher's theoretical concepts and specific knowledge about the cases. What is more, if theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that the intervals between membership scores are not even but different, this has to be included in the analysis. Thus, "it is perfectly fine if a fuzzy set shows membership scores of, say, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6 and 1, if theoretical considerations warrant it" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 29).

While the calibration decisions are based on the researchers' thorough reasoning and theoretical considerations, there is – inevitably – a certain margin of discretion for the individual calibration decisions. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the calibration procedure is made transparent to the reader: Where were the qualitative anchors set and which theoretic, conceptual or empirical reasoning were they based upon? A high level of transparency "allows readers to follow the reasoning behind calibration decisions and to either agree or to disagree and, if the latter, to make specific suggestions for change in the calibration" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 35).

5.2.5 Robustness of calibration

Given that there are several decisions concerning the calibration procedure that have to be taken by the researcher and that allow for a certain degree of discretion, how does this affect the robustness of the analysis? How much does the final calibration result (to reiterate, the assignment of membership scores to cases) depend on where the qualitative anchors are set, and is the solution formula that is produced the result of one specific calibration that would look completely different if the calibration had been different? Schneider and Wagemann assert that "as long as the locations of the qualitative anchors are carefully chosen and thus not subject to changes in the calibration strategy (theory-guided, direct, indirect, etc.) or the functional form used in the semi-automated procedures (logistic, quadratic, linear, etc.), then the differences in the set-membership scores will not be of major substantive importance" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 38). If a case's membership is altered slightly – as the result of the slightly different position of a qualitative anchor or a different assignment of a membership score in the indirect or theory-guided method of calibration – this will cause most results to "rarely vary in important ways" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40). In practice, analytical results derived from QCA are thereby generally robust in reaction to slight changes in the calibration method (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40).

5.3 Analysing necessary and sufficient conditions

As I have mentioned before, QCA is a set theoretic method and subset relations are linked to ideas concerning sufficient and necessary conditions. I will elaborate on the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in further detail in the following paragraph.

In set-theoretic reasoning, necessity and sufficiency are modelled as superset and subset relations respectively. For example, "being a democracy is a necessary condition for being a NATO member, for the latter is a subset of the former" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 4). The set of NATO members is smaller than the set

of democracies. This means that every NATO member is also a democracy and being a democracy is thus a necessary condition for being a NATO member. Let me visualise this in a more general way using the following Venn diagram (Figure 3). A stands for a set that is the outcome and B stands for a set that is a causal condition. Set A is smaller than set B and set B is thus a necessary condition for the outcome (set A).

Figure 3: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a necessary condition for set A



In the case of sufficient conditions, the subset-superset relations are exactly the opposite, as visualised in the following Venn diagram (Figure 4). Set A is still the outcome and set B is a condition. Now set A is bigger than set B and set B is thus a sufficient condition for set A.

Figure 4: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a sufficient condition for set A



If we assume, for example, that the set of voters of far-right parties is bigger than the set of inhabitants of rural areas, being an inhabitant of a rural area is a sufficient condition for being a voter of a far-right party. However, this condition does not

explain the entire outcome. Therefore, there must be other sufficient conditions for the same outcome.

This central principle of QCA is called *conjunctural causation*. Conjunctural causation means "single conditions do not display their effect on their own, but only together with other conditions" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 6). Modelling causal relations as subset/superset-relations also means that the researcher has to recognise "the existence of *equifinality*, i.e., a scenario in which alternative factors can produce the same outcome" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 5). Equifinality is the second central principle in QCA, as the final solution formula normally consists of several different combinations of sufficient conditions or, in other words, different causal paths that all lead to the same outcome. Emmenegger has pointed out that this makes QCA a very valuable method for research projects in which the theoretical arguments are interlinked, that aim to test whether there are different paths that lead to the outcome, and those where arguments are causally related to each other (cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343). The third principle is the *asymmetry* of concepts and causal relations. This means that once we have determined the conditions that lead to the outcome, we cannot automatically assume that it is the non-occurrence of these conditions that lead to the non-occurrence of the outcome (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 6). If we have found, for example, that one causal term that leads to being a voter of a far-right party is to be male and to live in a rural area, we cannot automatically assume that *not* being a male and *not* living in a rural area (i.e., being a woman from an urban area) will lead to *not* voting for a far-right party.

As a standard of good practice, "necessary and sufficient conditions should be analysed in separate analytical steps, with the analysis of necessary conditions going first" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 405). It is important – in QCA as in other methods – that the number of conditions included in the analysis, is kept at a moderate level. If the number of conditions tested is too high there will be a considerable number of combinations of conditions which are logically possible but for which there is no testable empirical data in the researchers' cases (so called "logical remainders" that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.4). Furthermore,

"with many conditions, QCA produces very complex results, making theoretically meaningful interpretations a daunting task" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 402).

5.3.1 Testing for necessary conditions

In fsQCA necessary conditions can be assessed "by hand" with the help of an XY plot. For each condition, the researcher has to plot all the cases' fuzzy set membership scores in the outcome (vertical axis) against the cases' fuzzy set membership scores in the condition (horizontal axis). A condition is necessary if all cases' set membership scores in the condition are larger than their set membership scores in the outcome or, in other words, if there are no cases located above the diagonal of the diagram.

Necessary conditions can also be assessed with the help of the fsQCA 2.0 software, which will add the two main parameters of fit to the analysis (consistency and coverage, which will be explained in Chapter 5.6). The existence of necessary conditions is expressed as follows in Boolean algebra (X is the condition and Y is the outcome): X --> Y (read: X is necessary for Y).

5.3.2 Testing for sufficient conditions: truth table minimisation

Sufficient conditions are assessed via truth table minimisation. Table 4 is a fictional example for a truth table with three conditions of A, B and C. The truth table has eight rows because each condition may occur either in its presence or in its absence. The total number of theoretically possible truth table rows is therefore calculated by the expression 2^k (with k being the number of conditions). It is important to note that when establishing the truth table the fuzzy set membership scores seem to disappear. 1 translates to cases having a set membership of 0.5 and higher and being members of the set (to a differing degree), 0 translates to cases having a set membership score lower than 0.5 and being not members of the set (again, to a differing degree). The fuzzy set membership scores will, however, not disappear

from the analysis and will be taken into consideration in the minimisation procedure by the computer software.

Table 4: Fictional truth table example

	Conditions					
Row	A	B	C	No. of cases	Consistency	Outcome
1	1	1	1	1	0.677863478	?
2	1	1	0	2	0.976563242	?
3	1	0	0	1	0.834625371	?
4	0	0	0	1	0.238748991	?
5	0	0	1	0	0.000000000	?
6	0	1	1	0	0.000000000	?
7	1	0	1	1	0.7856437654	?
8	1	0	1	0	0.0000000000	?

Each row of the truth table is a statement about whether or not the combination of conditions represented by it is a sufficient condition for the outcome. Note that the decision whether every combination of conditions is a sufficient condition for the outcome has to be taken by the researcher (indicated by the question marks in the column for the outcome). When performing the truth table minimisation with the help of appropriate software such as fsQCA 2.0 (which is recommended due to the complexity of the analysis), the software will provide the researcher with the information he or she needs to make that decision. This information is the number of cases and the consistency value. First, the researcher should eliminate rows that do not contain cases. While the combinations of conditions represented by these rows theoretically exist, there are no cases in the data where these combinations of conditions can be found (this makes them so called "logical remainders"). Which other rows should be considered logical remainders and thus be excluded from the truth table minimisation depends on the total number of cases. When the database consists of only small to medium number of cases (approximately 10 to 100 cases), combinations of conditions that are only found in one case are usually considered relevant (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 153). When the study is based on a larger

number of cases the threshold should be set to two cases (or even more). The second criterion is consistency, a parameter of fit in set theoretic methods. What this parameter stands for and which threshold should be chosen for including cases in to the truth table minimisation are explained in further detail in Chapter 5.6. Those rows that make the researcher come to the conclusion – based on a satisfactory number of cases and a high enough consistency value – that the combination of conditions represented by it is a sufficient condition for the outcome are then included into the logical minimisation of the truth table.

Table 5: Fictional truth table example

	Conditions					
Row	A	B	C	No. of cases	Consistency	Outcome
1	1	1	1	1	0.677863478	0
2	1	1	0	2	0.976563242	1
3	1	0	0	1	0.834625371	1
4	0	0	0	1	0.238748991	0
5	0	0	1	0	0.000000000	0
6	0	1	1	0	0.000000000	0
7	1	0	1	1	0.7856437654	1
8	0	1	0	0	0.0000000000	0

In our fictional example the researcher has decided, based on the number of cases and the consistency value, that rows 2, 3 and 7 contain the statement that this combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome (see Table 5). In Boolean algebra, this results in the following expression:

A*B*c + A*b*c + A*b*C <-- Y

The expression is read as follows: The combination of condition A AND condition B AND the absence of condition C OR the combination of condition A AND the absence of condition B AND the absence of condition C OR the combination of condition A AND condition B AND the absence of condition C are sufficient conditions for the outcome Y. This expression is then minimised based on the rules

of Boolean addition and multiplication. As I pointed out earlier, this should be done with the help of appropriate computer software (fsQCA 2.0 uses the so-called Quine-McCluskey algorithm for logically minimising the sufficiency statements applying the rules of Boolean algebra). For a detailed description of this procedure please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 104ff). The result of the minimisation is the solution formula (cf. Chapter 5.3.5).

5.4 Limited diversity and logical remainders

In Tables 4 and 5, there were three logical remainders: the combinations a*b*C, a*B*C and a*B*c are not represented in the empirical database of the fictional research project (or, to be more precise, there are not enough cases that have a membership score higher than 0.5 in that combination of conditions). Thus, no statements on whether these conditions are or are not sufficient for the outcome can be made. This is referred to as the problem of limited diversity. The higher the amount of limited diversity, the higher the number of logically possible combinations of conditions that cannot be tested in the analysis.[19] While researchers should keep limited diversity at a minimum level by including only a moderate number of conditions, a vast majority of truth tables will nevertheless contain logical remainders. Ragin (2008) suggests dealing with logical remainders by following the Standard Analysis. The Standard Analysis produces three solution terms. The first solution term is the *conservative* or *complex solution* and is produced by minimising the truth table without making any assumptions about the logical remainders. When producing the *most parsimonious solution*, the software allows the algorithm to include all assumptions about whether the missing combinations of conditions produce the outcome or not, under the only condition that they contribute to making the solution term more parsimonious, that is simpler. These assumptions are called "simplifying assumptions". There are two kinds of simplifying assumptions: the so called easy and difficult counterfactuals. Easy counterfactuals are, first, in line with the empirical

[19] Please note that limited diversity does not correspond to the concepts of degrees of freedom or missing values in correlational analysis. For a detailed discussion of limited diversity please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 152 ff).

evidence available. They are, second, also in line with existing theoretical knowledge that the researcher has on the effect of single conditions contained in the combination of conditions in the logical remainder on the outcome (for our fictional example, this would be the case when, for example, in all existing studies condition B has contributed to the outcome in its presence). The researcher's assumptions based on theoretical knowledge are also called directional expectations. Difficult counterfactuals are in line with the empirical evidence in hand, but not with the directional expectations (as long as these exist). While the most parsimonious solution can draw on both easy and difficult counterfactuals when minimising the truth table, the *intermediate solution* uses only easy counterfactuals (or directional expectations). The specification of the counterfactuals is decided by the researcher.

All three ways of dealing with limited diversity have advantages and disadvantages. The conservative solution often tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a theoretically meaningful or plausible manner. Depending on what the conditions included in the analysis are, the most parsimonious solution may rest on assumptions that contradict theoretical knowledge or common sense (think for example of untenable combinations of conditions like "pregnant" and "male") (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 175). When the researcher is dealing with an under-researched topic or when there has to date only been contradictory evidence on the effect of single conditions, it may prove difficult to make directional expectations for the intermediate solution.

While utilising QCA forces the researcher to deal with limited diversity in a very conscious manner (unlike other methods, cf. Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 157ff)) and to reflect on the different options to deal with it, limited diversity and logical remainders are neither specific problems of QCA as a method nor do they affect the empirical quality of the solution terms. As long as the researcher does not alter outcome values (from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1) for the empirically observed truth table rows, "no solution term that is produced by changing assumptions on logical remainders can ever contradict the empirical evidence at hand" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 175). Different assumptions on different logical remainders will produce different solution formulas, but "any solution term will be a superset of the

truth table rows that contain empirical information and that are sufficient for the outcome of interest" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 161). Researchers should make transparent to the reader "whether or not logical remainders exist in the truth table and, if so, what type(s) of logically possible 'cases' are not observed empirically" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407). Researchers should also reveal "explicitly which of the different strategies were applied for dealing with logical remainders during the logical minimization process" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407) and which directional expectations were used for the intermediate solution. This information is indispensable for researchers who want to reproduce the analysis.

5.5 The solution formulas

All three solution formulas (most parsimonious, intermediate and conservative solution) should be presented to the reader in a formal Boolean notation. However, "when it comes to the theoretical and substantive interpretation of the results, a researcher is free to choose which formula(s) to put into the center of attention" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 408). Most researchers will not use all three solution formulas extensively for substantive interpretation.

As I have mentioned before, the sufficient conditions for the non-occurrence of the outcome cannot be inferred automatically from the sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. If the researcher is interested in the conditions that lead to the non-occurrence of the outcome, a second analysis should be conducted for the negation of the outcome.

5.6 Parameters of fit: consistency and coverage

The crucial parameters of fit in QCA are consistency and coverage. Consistency is a measure of the degree to which the empirical data are in line with the subset relations the researcher specified. To be more precise, it "expresses the percentage of cases' set-membership scores in two sets that is in line with the statement that one of the

two sets is a subset (or superset) of the other" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 324). Coverage is a measure of the relation between the size of a condition set and of the outcome set. For the assessment of sufficiency this means that coverage expresses how much of the outcome is explained (or "covered") by the sufficient condition. In the case of necessary conditions, coverage expresses how relevant a necessary condition is for the outcome and also indicates whether a necessary condition is trivial.[20] Consistency should always be calculated first since there is no meaningful interpretation of the coverage of an inconsistent condition. Consistency and coverage can be calculated by hand, or with the help of appropriate software (like fsQCA 2.0). For the calculation by hand please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 123ff).

When performing QCA, consistency and coverage are important at several stages of the analysis. I already mentioned that when analysing necessary and sufficient conditions, the first step is to check whether there are necessary conditions for the outcome. When this is done with the help of fsQCA software, the programme will indicate consistency and coverage values for each condition tested. Only conditions that have a consistency value of 0.9 and preferably higher should be considered necessary conditions (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 278). If we think back to the Venn diagram for necessary conditions, the condition set is larger than the outcome set, or in other words, the outcome set is a perfect subset of the condition set. Thus, a consistency value of 1 indicates a perfect subset relation while values between 0.9 and 1 indicate an almost perfect subset relation.[21]

As I explained in Chapter 5.3, consistency is a crucial parameter when deciding which rows of the truth table are included in the minimisation and thereby contribute to the solution. When performing QCA with the help of the software fsQCA 2.0, a consistency value will be given for every truth table row. To reiterate, this value

[20] If we take the example of extreme-right voters, a trivial necessary condition for voting for a far-right party is "having brown hair". While the set of people that have brown hair is certainly a superset of people that vote for far-right parties (that would make it a necessary condition), the set of people that have brown hair is so much larger than that of the people that vote for far-right parties that it is a trivial necessary condition. This is indicated by low values for coverage. For a detailed discussion of trivialness please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 146ff; 233ff).

[21] For the possible implication of an almost but not fully perfect subset relation when assessing necessary conditions please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 143).

indicates how well the empirical reality matches the postulated subset relations, or, in other words, whether the empirical data confirm the assumption that the combination of conditions represented by the truth table row is a subset of the outcome (and thus a sufficient condition). While it can be assumed that consistency values between 0.0 and 0.75 indicate the existence of substantial inconsistency (cf. Ragin 2008: 136) and thus no consistency values lower than 0.75 should be accepted (cf. Ragin 2009: 118), there is no general rule as to where exactly the consistency threshold must be set. Researchers "cannot rely on commonly accepted thresholds that are applicable to any and all QCA" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 406). Rather, the appropriate consistency level when deciding which cases go into the truth table minimisation and which do not is research-specific. It depends on the knowledge the researcher has about the cases, on the quality of the data gathered, on the specificity of theories and hypotheses in hand and on the research aims (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 406). For example, a cut-off level of 0.85 and higher is recommended for macrolevel data. Again, the researcher has to specify which threshold value he or she has chosen and why (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407). Empirically, consistency values across all truth table rows often display a gap between very high and very low values. If this is the case, it can often be an appropriate choice to set the threshold between the two values that are separated by this empirical gap (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407).

In contrast to the 0.75 minimum threshold for consistency there is no lower threshold for coverage (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 139). The lower the coverage value is, the less of the outcome is explained by the respective condition or the solution formula. However, researchers have to keep in mind that "the empirical importance expressed by coverage is not the same as the theoretical or substantive relevance" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 139) of a sufficient condition or a combination of conditions. Paths that achieve a low coverage value might nevertheless be theoretically or substantively meaningful and interesting.

5.7 Linking the solution formulas back to the cases

As I proposed in Chapter 5.5, researchers should present the results of the truth table minimisation (parsimonious, intermediate and complex solution) in formal Boolean notation. This should, however, not be the finish point of the QCA. Rather, researchers have to link the solution formulas back to the cases by discussing "whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization make sense, both theoretically and empirically" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). For this purpose, researchers must be transparent about which specific cases are covered (i.e., explained) by which of the paths in the solution formula. As Schneider and Wagemann have pointed out, "only if the results are useful for understanding the cases has the primary goal of QCA been achieved" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). What is more, "the solution formula alone should not be taken as demonstrating an underlying causal relationship between the conditions and an outcome" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 412). The causal link or causal mechanism between the solution formula and the outcome should be explained and discussed with reference to the theoretical background of the analysis.

It should be noted that the "results first and foremost hold for the cases that have actually been examined" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 401). A generalisation of other cases is possible under the condition that the researcher clearly specifies scope conditions that have to be met by other cases if the causal relation examined is claimed to also hold for these cases.

5.8 Robustness

In QCA, solution terms can be deemed robust if they fulfil two conditions. First, necessary and sufficient conditions have to be similar across different model specifications. More specifically, this means that if "there is a clear subset relation between different solution terms, then results can be interpreted as robust, even if these solution terms look quite different on the surface" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 286). Second, consistency and coverage have to be roughly the same across

different model specifications. They have to be "too marginal to provide the basis for meaningfully different substantive interpretations" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 286).

Part III: Empirical Analysis

6. Professionalisation as a strategy of adaptation in the Swiss cantonal election campaigns

As we remember from Chapter 2. I proposed to draw on sociological neo-institutionalism as a theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of election campaigns. Hence, the professionalisation of election campaigns was defined as the process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and expectations from, the relevant environments for campaigning (constituted by the voters, the members, the media, and other parties) in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from these environments, and simultaneously, as the degree to which election campaigns are professionalised at a certain point in time. We also saw that the professionalisation of election campaigns can be considered a rational myth rather than being associated with efficiency or best practice, because it is, first, a manifestation of what parties consider an adequate adaptation to changes and institutional expectations in the most relevant environments, and it is, second, a way for parties to protect themselves against critique and the need for justification by complying with what they perceive to be state of the art campaigning. Several statements in the 37 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with the campaign managers of the 23 cantonal parties included in this study support that this theoretical conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation is reflected by the Swiss cantonal election campaigns.

First, several statements reflect the purpose of designing the campaign in accordance with acknowledged rules as a protection against criticism – as long as a campaign was designed in accordance with how it is generally perceived that a campaign should be managed, the result cannot be considered the fault of the campaign managers. One interviewee (who was both campaign manager and candidate for the Christian Democrats in Aargau) pointed out that he did everything he could, that he knew how good campaigning had to be done and that he studied the Obama 2008 presidential campaign and copied it as well as he could – within the scope of his resources. Hence, his disappointing result (from his perspective) could only be attributed to the fact that he is not from the region and voters only vote for locals. Another interviewee (a local campaign manager for the Liberal Democrats in Aargau) was

puzzled by the discrepancy between the campaign, which he was convinced was "state of the art", and the inexplicably poor result. Finally, a campaign manager and candidate from Bern (Christian Democrats) announced that he had invested all his accumulated campaign knowledge into the campaign, which nevertheless, brought a rather disappointing result. Hence, he declared that he had done all he could and that he would leave the campaign work to others who would obviously have to bring new ideas in order to succeed.

Second, several statements underline that from the perspective of the interviewees, demands and expectations for election campaigns have changed and heightened during the last two decades. Interviewees referred, on the one hand, to technological innovations in graphics and word processing and stated that leaflets and brochures such as those that were handed out twenty years ago would not be of any help today because expectations were much higher now, (Christian Democrats, Bern), especially in regard to professional appearance, graphic art and corporate design (Social Democrats, Bern). On the other hand, interviewees referred to the general style of campaigning and implied that parties have to work harder to make their messages reach the voters. Several elements of campaign communication that have worked before are no longer deemed effective (*"La grosse affiche où c'est mis 'Tous ensemble, solidaire', ça passe plus."* "The large poster saying 'All together, solidly united' doesn't work anymore"' (Social Democrats, Neuchâtel). Hence, the knowledge of volunteer campaigners no longer suffices and professional tactics are needed (Social Democrats, Neuchâtel). Similarly, campaigns are perceived to have changed with regard to the interest of the voters, who no longer participate in panel discussions or other events organised by the parties and have become extremely hard to motivate and mobilise, a development that one interviewee (Liberal Democrats, Aargau) deplored.

The issue of difficult mobilisation is frequently addressed by the interviewed campaign managers, both referring to the voters and their own members. Interviewees stated that even if potential voters are willing to go to the polls in principle, the large majority of them tend to forget to really go or have to be figuratively lured from their homes and pushed to the polls on Election Day (Swiss

People's Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Social Democrats, Bern). Interviewees also report that insistence is needed in order to make their own members go to the polls (Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Aargau; Social Democrats, Aargau). Several times during the campaign, parties appeal to their members not to stay home on Election Day and point out how important their participation is (Christian Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Liberal Democrats, Bern). This can absorb up to 70 per cent of their campaign budget (Liberal Democrats, Aargau). Mobilisation is considered the key problem in Swiss election campaigns (Christian Democrats, Aargau) and a common conclusion is that mobilisation efforts have to be increased even more in the next campaign (Liberal Democrats, Aargau). Two interviewees pointed out that it is a general problem of society that people no longer dare to confess to being a supporter of a certain party (Green Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Aargau).

Third, the interviews show that there is some uncertainty among the interviewees as to which communication channels are most effective for communicating with the voters. Interviewees stated, for example, that it is not known what is really effective and that opinions on this question differ considerably within the party (Social Democrats, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich). Hence, communication efforts are dispersed through a large number of diverse channels, hoping to reach potential voters via one of them (Green Party, Bern). As a systematic evaluation after the campaign is costly and complicated, one interviewee compared the current situation as a "shot into the fog" ("*So schiessen wir irgendwie im Nebel.*") and feared that the means of communication created are not of interest to the voters, and that communication channels are chosen which are not frequented by the voters (Liberal Democrats, Aargau). This uncertainty is not alleviated by media innovations as one interviewee pointed out by saying that she knew young people had to be addressed via the Internet, if she only knew how to do so (Christian Democrats, Zürich).

Fourth, the interviews showed that different means or channels of campaign communication differ from each other with regard to their degree of taken-for-granted-status and institutionalisation in the context of the cantonal election

campaigns included in this study. Several characteristics of campaign communication are institutionalised to a degree that they have a taken-for-granted-status, while some campaign managers cast doubts in their actual effectiveness for winning votes. This is the case for campaign posters and newspaper advertisements. As one campaign manager pointed out, a campaign clearly has to feature posters and newspaper advertisements and she would be astonished if a party decided to go without them. Personally, however, she doubts that voters would notice them (Green Party, Zürich). Rather, putting up posters is seen as a symbolic act to demonstrate that the party takes the campaign seriously (Green Party, Aargau). Another interviewee considered putting up campaign posters merely an act of duty (*"passage obligé"*, Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel) that the party will not give up as long as other parties stick to it. Similar statements were also made by several interviewees in regard to campaign booths, whose major function is perceived to be marking the party's presence. Nevertheless, the parties did not have the courage not to set up campaign booths, due to the long tradition and pervasiveness of this campaign activity (Liberal Democrats, Aargau; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel). Leaflets, which are sent to all households in the constituency, were similarly referred to as an indispensable element ("*élément incontournable*", Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel) that must be included in the campaign without knowing its impact. According to the interviewee, this logic is also applied to online campaigning (Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel).

Similar statements about online campaigning, especially with regard to the necessity of having a campaign website and a profile on Facebook, were made by several campaign managers. They perceive parties to be obliged to engage in online campaigning, even if few votes will be won via these channels (Liberal Democrats, Bern; Social Democrats, Bern) as the Internet in general is too anonymous a medium for political communication (Swiss People's Party, Zürich). The necessity of having a campaign website is taken for granted for several interviewees (Christian Democrats, Zürich; Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich, Green Party, Bern), as not even having a simple Web 1.0 website gives the party an image of being outdated ("*Wenn man das nicht hat, ist man definitiv hinter dem Berg*", Liberal Democrats, Aargau). Having a profile on Facebook was also deemed to be necessary (Liberal Democrats,

Aargau). Hence, campaign managers typically announced that online campaigning would be enforced in the next campaign, regardless of the fact that the general effect on the voting result was evaluated sceptically (Christian Democrats, Aargau). At the same time campaign managers pointed to the quick evolution of online campaigning and questioned whether it made sense from an economic perspective to invest in Facebook or other new media. Blogs had been the campaign "hype" in the last elections but then lost importance, while the current hype is Facebook (Green Party, Zürich; Green Party, Aargau). The campaign manager of the Social Democrats in Bern pointed out that there are features of campaign communication (like online campaigning) that have to be included into the campaign, because without them the campaign will not be taken seriously by the public ("*Sonst wird die Kampagne nicht für voll genommen.*"). What is more, by leaving out certain indispensable campaign elements campaign managers fear that they will provoke critique from the party members and other important persons (Social Democrats, Bern) – even if, in the case of online campaigning, the balance of expense and gain is not in favour of the former.

To sum up, the central parameters of the theoretical framework of this study are reflected in the interviews with the campaign managers, notably the conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation as a rational myth rather than a pure benefit-cost analysis, the general perception of changes in the environments for campaign professionalisation, and the perception of institutionalised expectations with regard to campaign communication and campaign organisation.

7. How professionalised are the Swiss cantonal election campaigns?

Before turning to the analysis of the conditions that explain the professionalisation of Swiss cantonal election campaigns in Chapter 8, this chapter presents the descriptive results concerning campaign professionalisation in the 23 campaigns included in this study. Chapter 6 shows how campaign professionalisation is used as a strategy of adaptation to environmental challenges from the perspectives of the campaign managers in the cantonal election campaigns included in the present study. Chapter 7 indicates to what degree campaigns are professionalised on an aggregate level (Chapter 7.1) and in relation to the four relevant electoral environments (Chapter 7.2). The results are discussed from the perspective of both the indicators (in order to determine which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in this study) (Chapter 7.3) and that of the campaigns (comparing the index scores that the individual campaigns achieved with regard to professionalisation as an aggregated concept and with regard to each of the four environments) (Chapter 7.4). Following the same approach applied in Chapter 2.3.1, the results are then analysed to determine which environments the cantonal election campaigns have been professionalised towards most intensively (Chapter 7.5).

7.1 Professionalisation as an aggregated concept

We remember from Chapter 4.1 that the maximum score a campaign can achieve on this aggregated index is 13. The results show that there is considerable variance in the degree of professionalisation as an aggregated concept within the 23 campaigns included in this study. The campaign with the highest score on the aggregated professionalisation index is the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel, which achieved a score of 12. It is followed by the campaign of the Social Democrats in Zürich with a score of 11 and the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Bern and by the Swiss People's Party in Zürich each of which reached a score of 10. Two campaigns reach a score of 9, another two a score of 8. A group of five campaigns were assigned 7 index points, two campaigns were assigned 6

points. In the lower half of the rank are eight campaigns that feature less than half of the campaign characteristics that were defined as indicators for professionalised campaigning. The complete results are presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Scores on the aggregated professionalisation index achieved by the campaigns

Nr.	Rank	Campaign		Score
		Party	Canton	
1	1	Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	12
2	2	Social Democrats	Zürich	11
3	3	Social Democrats	Bern	10
4		Swiss People's Party	Zürich	
5	4	Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	9
6		Green Party	Zürich	
7	5	Liberal Democrats	Bern	8
8		Liberal Democrats	Zürich	
9	6	Christian Democrats	Aargau	7
10		Social Democrats	Aargau	
11		Green Party	Bern	
12		Green Party	Neuchâtel	
13		Christian Democrats	Zürich	
14	7	Green Party	Aargau	6
15		Liberal Democrats	Aargau	
16	8	Swiss People's Party	Bern	5
17		Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	
18		Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel	
19	9	Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	4
20		Christian Democrats	Bern	
21	10	Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3
22	11	Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	2
23	12	Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0

Some patterns in regard to campaigns that took place in certain cantons and that were organised by certain parties seem to emerge from this picture. All campaigns that were organised in the small, rather rural and uncompetitive canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden are found at the end of the ranking. All campaigns organised in the large, urban, and also rather uncompetitive canton of Zürich reached over half of the 13 possible index points. In regard to the parties less obvious trends emerge.

However, three out of the four campaigns organised by the Christian Democrats – or, to be precise, by the cantonal branches in Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Bern und Neuchâtel – are found among the six least professionalised campaigns. These cantonal party branches are not represented in the cantonal parliament, have few seats and are located at the centre of the left-right ideological continuum. What is more, the fact that the first three ranks are occupied by campaigns organised by the Social Democrats casts some doubts on the hypothesis that being organised by a right-wing party is a causal condition for professionalised campaigning. We will see in Chapter 8 how these first trends fit into the larger pattern of causal conditions for campaign professionalisation.

7.2 Professionalisation per environment

7.2.1 Professionalisation with regard to the voters

The campaign with the highest score on the index measuring professionalisation with regard to the voters is the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Bern, achieving a score of 9 out of 11 possible index points. Table 7 presents the results for the remaining campaigns.

Table 7: Scores on the voters' index achieved by the campaigns

Nr.	Rank	Campaign		Score
		Party	Canton	
1	1	Social Democrats	Bern	9
2	2	Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	7
3		Swiss People's Party	Zürich	
4	3	Social Democrats	Zürich	6
5	4	Green Party	Bern	5
6		Liberal Democrats	Bern	
7		Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel	
8		Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	
9		Green Party	Zürich	
10	5	Christian Democrats	Aargau	4
11		Green Party	Aargau	
12		Green Party	Neuchâtel	
13		Christian Democrats	Zürich	
14		Liberal Democrats	Zürich	
15	6	Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3
16		Liberal Democrats	Aargau	
17		Social Democrats	Aargau	
18		Christian Democrats	Bern	
19		Swiss People's Party	Bern	
20	7	Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	2
21	8	Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	1
22		Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
23	9	Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0

7.2.2 Professionalisation with regard to the members

The campaign with the highest score on the index measuring professionalisation with regard to the members is the same campaign that scored highest in the voters' index. On this index the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Bern achieved a score of 9 out of 10 possible index points. Table 8 presents the complete results for the individual campaigns. Some trends that had already emerged from the results of the aggregate professionalisation index recur here, with campaigns organised by the Social Democrats occupying the first three ranks and campaigns organised in Appenzell Ausserrhoden being placed at the end of the ranking.

Table 8: Scores on the members' index achieved by the campaigns

Nr.	Rank	Campaign		Score
		Party	Canton	
1	1	Social Democrats	Bern	9
2	2	Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	7
3		Social Democrats	Zürich	
4	3	Liberal Democrats	Bern	6
5		Green Party	Zürich	
6		Swiss People's Party	Zürich	
7	4	Social Democrats	Aargau	5
8		Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel	
9		Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	
10		Liberal Democrats	Zürich	
11	5	Christian Democrats	Aargau	4
12		Green Party	Aargau	
13		Green Party	Bern	
14		Swiss People's Party	Bern	
15		Christian Democrats	Zürich	
16	6	Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3
17		Liberal Democrats	Aargau	
18		Green Party	Neuchâtel	
19		Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	
20	7	Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	2
21		Christian Democrats	Bern	
22	8	Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	1
23	9	Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0

7.2.3 Professionalisation with regard to the media

The results for campaign professionalisation with regard to the media differ more considerably from the previous results. A group of five campaigns reaches the maximum score of 2 by both mandating professionals for tasks related to the appearance of the campaign in the media and by offering training for candidates or volunteers that aims at ameliorating their performance in the media. Eleven campaigns featured one of these activities, while in seven campaigns no activities aimed at professionalising the campaign with regard to the media were included. Table 9 presents the complete results for every campaign.

Table 9: Scores on the media index achieved by the campaigns

Nr.	Rank	Campaign		Score
		Party	Canton	
1		Liberal Democrats	Bern	
2		Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	
3	1	Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	2
4		Green Party	Zürich	
5		Swiss People's Party	Zürich	
6		Green Party	Aargau	
7		Liberal Democrats	Aargau	
8		Social Democrats	Aargau	
9		Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
10		Christian Democrats	Bern	
11	2	Social Democrats	Bern	1
12		Swiss People's Party	Bern	
13		Green Party	Neuchâtel	
14		Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	
15		Liberal Democrats	Zürich	
16		Social Democrats	Zürich	
17		Christian Democrats	Aargau	
18		Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
19		Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
20	3	Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0
21		Green Party	Bern	
22		Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel	
23		Christian Democrats	Zürich	

7.2.4 Professionalisation with regard to the other parties

The results for professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by other parties indicate that in 15 out of 23 cantonal election campaigns, monitoring of the other parties' campaign activities did not take place at all. Six campaigns (among them are four of the five campaigns that were organised in Zürich) engaged in monitoring other parties' campaign activities. The campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats and the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel are the only ones that achieve the highest score of 2, because they not only monitored other campaigns but also reacted to their insights in a proactive way by adapting their own campaign activities. Table 10 presents the complete results for every campaign. A challenge for the subsequent analysis of the causal conditions for this outcome with fsQCA may

be that the outcome set is small with only two campaigns achieving the maximum index score of 2 and another six campaigns achieving an index score of 1. Hence, the empirical basis that can be drawn on in the truth table minimisation is very small.

Table 10: Scores on the other parties' index achieved by the campaigns

Nr.	Rank	Campaign		Score
		Party	Canton	
1	1	Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	2
2		Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	
3	2	Christian Democrats	Aargau	1
4		Green Party	Neuchâtel	
5		Green Party	Zürich	
6		Liberal Democrats	Zürich	
7		Social Democrats	Zürich	
8		Swiss People's Party	Zürich	
9	3	Green Party	Aargau	0
10		Liberal Democrats	Aargau	
11		Social Democrats	Aargau	
12		Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
13		Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
14		Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
15		Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	
16		Christian Democrats	Bern	
17		Green Party	Bern	
18		Liberal Democrats	Bern	
19		Social Democrats	Bern	
20		Swiss People's Party	Bern	
21		Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel	
22		Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	
23		Christian Democrats	Zürich	

7.3 Which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in cantonal election campaigns?

Considering these descriptive results from the perspective of the indicators and analysing which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in cantonal election campaigns it becomes obvious that mandating at least one professional in order to provide technical support seems to have been a "must have" in the cantonal election campaigns included in this study – this was the case in all but two campaigns. Also, sending direct e-mails as a means of so-called direct communication or narrow-casting to potential voters and/or members was very common (20 out of 23 campaigns).

Direct mail was sent in 17 out of 23 campaigns. The large gap between direct mail sent to voters and members can be explained by the fact that for sending direct mail postal addresses are required. While most party offices hold this information about their party members, parties would still have to purchase postal addresses from providers who offer these for commercial purposes or to go about collecting postal addresses of non-party members themselves (for example via sweep stakes). The latter seems to be a very common practice in order to gain personal e-mail addresses, but very uncommon with regard to accessing mail addresses. All campaigns that featured direct e-mails to the members also featured direct e-mails to other potential voters. Also, in three out of five cases in which text messages where sent, these were directed at potential voters. Direct mail, however, was very rarely sent to potential voters (three out of 17 campaigns).

The installation of a campaign headquarters, the setting up of a designated campaign team (17 campaigns) and the central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign (16 campaigns) were relatively widely-used organisational features. While using social networks as a means of online communication remained a characteristic of 12 campaigns, the remaining campaign characteristics can be found only in a moderate to small number of campaigns (see Table 11).

Table 11: Frequency of characteristics of professionalised campaigning

Campaign Characteristic	No. of campaigns	If specified: reference to environment	No. of campaigns
Mandating professional for technical support	21		
		Media	7
		Voters and members	4
Mandating professional for strategic/conceptual/ideological support	6		
Provide training for candidates and/or party members	16		
		Media	14
		Voters	5
		Members	1
Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign	16		
Installation of campaign headquarters or a designated campaign team	17		
Continuous campaigning	2		
Direct communication: Direct mail	17		
		Voters	3
		Members	17
Direct communication: Text message	5		
		Voters	3
		Members	4
Direct communication: Direct e-mail	20		
		Voters	20
		Members	20
Online communication: Social networks	12		
Online communication: Participative web content	6		
Online communication: Video clip/video channel	6		
Monitoring of other parties' campaigns	8		

7.4 Comparing the campaigns' performances on the indices

Switching the analytical perspective to the campaigns and comparing the performance of the campaigns on the differentiated professionalisation indices, the results show that the degrees of professionalisation of the single campaigns with regard to the different environments are similar in some campaigns, but are quite different in others. In general, some campaigns perform very poorly on all dimensions of professionalisation, notably those organised by the Social Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party in Appenzell Ausserrhoden (see Table 12). In the majority of the cases, however, the degrees of professionalisation with regard to the different environments seem to be unrelated. The campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Bern, for example, that has the highest scores among all campaigns with regard to the environments constituted by the voters and by the members, is not professionalised at all with regard to the environment constituted by other parties and achieves only a medium score with regard to the environment constituted by the media. On the contrary, the campaign organised by the Liberal Democrats in Neuchâtel achieves the maximum score with regard to the media and to other parties, but has only a medium degree of professionalisation with regard to the members and to the voters.

The same conclusion applies if we analyse the campaigns with regard to their performance on the aggregated professionalisation index and on the environment related indices. While there are some campaigns which perform either very well (notably the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel) or very poorly (again, these are the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party in Appenzell Ausserrhoden) from an aggregate and from a differentiated perspective, the degrees of professionalisation are more mixed in the majority of the campaigns. Taking the campaign organised by the Liberal Democrats as an example, this campaign achieves at least a medium degree of professionalisation as an aggregated concept, but performs quite poorly with regard to the environment related professionalisation indices.

To sum up, the fact that the professionalisation profiles (i.e., the degree of professionalisation as an aggregate concept and with regard to the different environments) are relatively differentiated for the majority of the cases can be interpreted as first evidence that an environmentally differentiated perspective on campaign professionalisation is a fruitful research approach.

Table 12: Comparison of index scores per campaign

Campaign	Aggregate	Media	Members	Voters	Other parties
Social Democrats, Neuchâtel	12	4	7	7	4
Social Democrats, Zürich	11	2	7	6	2
Social Democrats, Bern	10	2	9	9	0
Swiss People's Party, Zürich	10	4	6	7	2
Green Party, Zürich	9	4	6	5	2
Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel	9	4	5	5	4
Liberal Democrats, Bern	8	4	6	5	0
Liberal Democrats, Zürich	8	2	5	4	2
Social Democrats, Aargau	7	2	5	3	0
Christian Democrats, Zürich	7	0	4	4	0
Green Party, Bern	7	0	4	5	0
Christian Democrats, Aargau	7	0	4	4	2
Green Party, Neuchâtel	7	2	3	4	2
Green Party, Aargau	6	2	4	4	0
Liberal Democrats, Aargau	6	2	3	3	0
Christian Democrats, Neuchâtel	5	0	5	5	0
Swiss People's Party, Bern	5	2	4	3	0
Swiss People's Party, Neuchâtel	5	2	3	2	0
Christian Democrats, Appenzell Ausserrhoden	4	2	3	3	0
Christian Democrats, Bern	4	2	2	3	0
Social Democrats, Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3	0	2	1	0
Liberal Democrats, Appenzell Ausserrhoden	2	0	1	1	0
Green Party, Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0	0	0	0	0

7.5 With regard to which environment are the cantonal election campaigns most professionalised?

After having analysed how professionalised the 23 cantonal election campaigns are in general and with regard to the four relevant electoral environments, the results are analysed in order to discover which environments the cantonal election campaigns have been professionalised towards most intensively. This is achieved by following the same approach as that used in Chapter 2.3.1 in relation to existing studies of campaign professionalisation. With regard to the environment of the voters, all 23 campaigns together reach a score of 93, representing 37 per cent of the maximum score of 253. With regard to the environment constituted by the members, this percentage rises to 43 per cent (total score of 98 out of a maximum score of 230). The environment that the cantonal election campaigns included in this study have been professionalised most intensively towards is the environment formed by the media (46 per cent or 21 out of 46 index points). The election campaigns are least professionalised with regard to the electoral environment constituted by the other parties (22 per cent or 10 out of 46 index points). However, this comparison is not entirely reliable as the number of indicators measuring campaign professionalisation is different for each environment.

If we compare these results to the overall result from existing studies on campaign professionalisation focusing on cases from Germany, Sweden and Portugal (see Chapter 2.3.1), the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in the present study were most professionalised with regard to the environment of the media, while campaigns in existing studies were least adapted to the environment of the media in comparison to the other three environments. The campaigns in existing studies were most professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members, which is the environment that the cantonal election campaigns were adapted to second most intensively. Under the premise that the results from the present study and from existing studies are comparable – despite methodological differences – at least with regard to these rough tendencies, a logical yet speculative explanation for the discrepancy relative to the environment of the media could be the following: The indicators measure whether professionals were mandated for tasks related to the

appearance of the campaign in the media and whether training for candidates or volunteers that aims at ameliorating their performance in the media was offered. Therefore, the result might suggest that the environment of the media has gained importance in Swiss cantonal election campaigns only more recently than in the national campaigns analysed in existing studies. In this case, the cantonal party branches would require more activities that aim at adapting their campaigns to the changes and institutional expectations inherent in the environment of the media than would parties in an environment where the medialisation process has started earlier and where parties adapted their campaigns to this development earlier, hence already being used to the centrality of medialised campaigning. This interpretation seems more plausible than to assume that the media play a more important role in the cantonal election campaigns than in the national campaigns of Germany, Sweden and Portugal.

8. Explaining campaign professionalisation in Swiss cantonal election campaigns

In this chapter I will begin by explaining how the principles and method of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) are applied in order to extract causal paths that lead to professionalised campaigning in the 23 cantonal election campaigns of this study (Chapter 8.1). Chapter 8.1.1 provides the conceptual basis of the research design by outlining how the professionalisation of election campaigns and the conditions influencing it can be modelled as subset/superset relations. The subsequent chapters focus on the calibration of the outcome (8.1.2) and of the causal conditions (8.1.3). These chapters are included at this point of the study because, as the reader will see, the application of the method is so closely linked to the results of the analysis that both can be comprehended much easier when presented in direct sequence. Chapter 8.2 provides the results of the fsQCA analysis for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept, both reporting necessary (8.2.1) and sufficient conditions (8.2.2). Chapter 8.3 does the same for the four differentiated outcomes: necessary and sufficient conditions are reported for professionalisation with regard to the electoral environments constituted by the voters (8.3.1), by the members (8.3.2.), by the media (8.3.3) and by other parties (8.3.4). An overview over the results is given in Chapter 8.4 and the results are discussed in Chapter 8.5.

8.1 Applying fsQCA to explain campaign professionalisation

8.1.1 Campaign professionalisation in set-theoretic terms

As I outlined in Chapter 5.1, a key principle in QCA as a set theoretic method is that the relations between the causal conditions and the outcome can be described as subset/superset relations. The rationale underlying this study is that this principle is valid for the professionalisation of election campaigns. More concretely, I assume that the relation between each of the five outcomes of my analysis (campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and professionalisation with regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments) and the five causal conditions that

are assumed to produce professionalised campaigning can all be modelled as subset/superset relations. The empirical analysis will show which subset/superset relations can be confirmed by the empirical data from the 23 cantonal election campaigns (see also Chapter 3.4 for the role of the hypotheses in QCA analyses). *Logically*, the following subset/superset relations can be postulated:

- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *sub*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in large cantons.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *sub*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *sub*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in cantons with close competition in the cantonal parliament.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *sub*set of the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *sub*set of the set of campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties.

The subset/superset relation postulated in the first statement translates to: Being organised in a large canton is a *necessary* condition for professionalised campaigning. The second statement means that being organised in an urbanised canton is a necessary condition for professionalised campaigning, and so forth.

The same statements can be made for professionalisation with regard to each of the four relevant environments. For example, it could be assumed that the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment of the members is a subset of the set of campaigns that were organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament. This translates to: Being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament is a necessary condition for a campaign that is professionalised with regard to the members. Thinking back to Chapter 5.3, this latter subset/superset relation can be graphically illustrated as seen in Figure 5, with set A being the set of professionalised campaigns and B being the

set of campaigns organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament.

Figure 5: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a necessary condition for set A



Based on existing research, I hypothesised that there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to any of the four relevant environments. Hence, the subset/superset relations postulated above are logically possible and they prove that it makes sense to model the relation between each of the outcomes of my analysis and the five causal conditions as subset/superset relations. QCA is thus a useful approach for the research interest of this study. However, these subset/superset relations would most likely not be found in the empirical reality of the 23 cantonal election campaigns.

In addition to the subset/superset relations postulated above, the following are also logically possible:

- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in large cantons.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in cantons with a close competition in the cantonal parliament.

- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties.
- The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties.

The subset/superset relation postulated in the first statement now means that being organised in a large canton is a *sufficient* condition for professionalised campaigning. The second statement means that being organised in an urbanised canton is a *sufficient* condition for professionalised campaigning, and so forth.

Again, the same statements can be made for professionalisation with regard to each of the four relevant environments. For example, it could be assumed that the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment of the members is a *super*set of the set of campaigns that were organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament. This translates to: Being organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament is a *sufficient* condition for a campaign that is professionalised with regard to the members. This is depicted in Figure 6, with set A now being the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament and B being the set of professionalised campaigns.

Figure 6: Venn diagram indicating that set A is a sufficient condition for set B



As we can see in Figure 6 and as we remember from Chapter 5.3, set A does not cover set B entirely, or in other words, condition A (being organised in a canton with

close competition in the cantonal parliament) does not explain all of outcome B (a professionalised campaign). Hence, only the combination of several sufficient conditions, including condition A, would produce outcome B (as I outlined in Chapter 5.3, the phenomenon that single conditions do not display their effect on their own, but only together with other conditions is called conjunctural causation). For example, when formulating the hypothesis in Chapter 3.4 it was assumed that being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party are all sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. Translated back to set-theoretic terms, this means that the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament, the set of campaigns that were not organised by a right-wing party, and the set of campaigns that were organised by a catch-all party are subsets of the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. This can be illustrated as depicted in Figure 7. The green circle represents the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members, the red, orange and blue circles represent the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament, the set of campaigns that were not organised by a right-wing party, and the set of campaigns that were organised by a catch-all party respectively. The section were the three latter sets overlap represents those campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members that can be explained by the combination of the three conditions being organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party.

Figure 7: Venn diagram illustrating an outcome that is explained by the combination of three conditions



While the empirical analysis will show whether or not these and the other subset/superset relations implicated in the hypotheses can be verified with regard to the 23 election campaigns, they show that the relation between each of the outcomes and the five causal conditions can be modelled as subset/superset relations.

Based on this set-theoretic framework, two kinds of analyses will be conducted. On the one hand the outcome is the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns (to be precise, with professionalisation being conceptualised – as it has been done in existing research – as an aggregated concept measured with one single professionalisation index). On the other hand, I perform the analyses with the help of fsQCA with four different outcomes. These are:

- the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters,
- the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the members,
- the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the media, and

- the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to other parties.

As I have noted, the purpose of these analyses is to identify the causal paths that lead to professionalised cantonal campaigns in general, and those causal paths that lead to the professionalisation of the cantonal campaigns with regard to each of the four electoral environments constituted by the voters, members, media and other parties. The underlying theoretical framework is as follows: The general changes in the most relevant electoral environments for campaigning (the voters, members and media from the macro-sociological perspective of neo-institutionalism and other parties from the organisational perspective of neo-institutionalism) that were described in Chapter 2.2.3 equally affect all cantonal election campaigns included in this study (the fact that this assumption is valid for my sample campaigns was corroborated by statements from the interviews with the campaign managers (see Chapter 4.). Hence, the organising parties professionalise (i.e., adapt) their campaigns in order to find ways to cope with these environmental changes and to fulfil institutional expectations resulting from the changes (for example in adapting to changes in the environment of the media by initialising campaigning via Facebook or in adapting to changes in the environment constituted by the voters by including means of so-called direct communication or by ensuring that a voter recognises the same candidates and topics on all campaign posters he or she sees on the way to work). Parties do this with measures that they deem express the appropriate way to act (acquiring the necessary knowledge through their own reasoning, such as the standards set by professionals or from the examples of other parties) in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from the environments. For example, by sending so-called direct mail in order to address as many voters as possible as there is generally more to win and more to lose facing a more volatile and indifferent electorate. Due to confrontations with the same environmental changes and institutional expectations, as well as with the mutual monitoring and copying (resulting from uncertainty as to how to best react to changes), all campaigns should be professionalised in the same way, that is, with regard to the same environments and to the same degree. However, I assume, in line with sociological neo-institutionalism and based on existing

professionalisation research, first, that the influence that general environmental changes and resulting institutional expectations have on the campaigns differs according to on factors that are located at the party level and at the systemic level. We can assume, for example, that a catch-all party, which is more dependent on the media for addressing its large group of potential voters and its members, is affected more strongly by changes and pressures to adapt in the environment constituted by the media and will therefore professionalise its campaigns more strongly with regard to the media than a niche party. Similarly, a campaign that is organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament is under greater pressure to feature the monitoring of other parties campaigns and will thus be more professionalised with regard to this environment than other campaigns. As I proposed in Chapters 3.2 to 3.4, the five causal conditions included in this study can be assumed to have a different weight and impact in regard to the four environments. Therefore, the causal conditions leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept can be assumed to be different from those leading to campaign professionalisation with regard to the different environments, which for their part can be assumed to differ from each other. What is more, election campaigns are not necessarily professionalised to the same degree with regard to each of the four environments, as their organising parties can be expected to exercise a certain strategic choice in adapting to their institutional environments and to decide how intensively to adapt, depending on which adaptation is deemed to be most important. The latter estimation differs again, influenced by the five causal conditions at the party level and at the systemic level. As both the profile (i.e., with regard to which environment the campaign is professionalised) and the degree (i.e., how professionalised a campaign is) can be expected to differ from campaign to campaign, the causal paths leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and in regard to the relevant environments should be analysed separately and can be expected to differ from one another.

I also mentioned that the hypothesised relations between the conditions and the outcome, as well as the actual results of the analysis, are valid first and foremost under the scope conditions defined by the research design and the data underlying

the analysis. For the study in hand, this means that the formulated subset/superset relations are valid with regard to the campaigns that were included in the database of this study. As we can recall, these are the election campaigns organised by the respective cantonal branches of the Green Party, the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Swiss People's Party for the occasion of the elections to the cantonal parliaments in the cantons of Aargau and Neuchâtel in 2009, in the canton of Bern in 2010 and in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 2011 (see Chapter 8.5 for a discussion of the validity of the results beyond these scope conditions).

8.1.2 Calibrating the outcome

A challenge in calibrating the outcome sets of this analysis is that the data we have at hand, in order to assign calibrated membership scores to each of the 23 election campaigns, consists of the scores that the campaigns reached on the aggregated professionalisation index and on each of the differentiated professionalisation indices. As we recall, both the aggregated index and the differentiated indices consist of indicators that reflect qualitative characteristics of professionalised campaigning (1 characteristic = 1 point on the index) (see chapter 5.2). Two aspects make calibrating membership scores in these sets challenging: First, these are not "real world" data in the sense that there is no common sense concept or general understanding of what constitutes a professionalised campaign, or which characteristics a professionalised campaign at least needs to feature in order to be regarded as professionalised (in contrast to, say, calibrating the set of poor students, where I could draw on existing approaches to, or definitions of, what constitutes a "poor" person). I cannot rely on existing research either, neither by drawing on examples of how professionalisation has been calibrated in other studies based on fsQCA nor by referring to a minimal consensus or understanding of professionalisation used by researchers in qualitative or correlational analyses. Second, a theoretical argumentation is also difficult with this kind of data. The general approach will thus be the following: Incorporating a particular amount of professionalisation characteristics is considered a substantial

effort for the campaigns and their organising parties and it is assumed to be sufficient to be treated as an effort to adapt (i.e., to professionalise) the campaign to environmental changes and institutional expectations inherent in the environments. This particular amount is represented by the index score indicating the cross-over point. For example, it is argued for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept that incorporating seven or more professionalisation characteristics (or, in other words, indicators of professionalised campaigning) out of 13 possible indicators from the aggregated professionalisation index into the campaign is a sufficient effort to consider the campaign a professionalised campaign (i.e., having a set membership score in the set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) that is larger than 0.5). Following the same reasoning, it may be assumed that incorporating five or more professionalisation characteristics out of 11 possible indicators from the index measuring campaign professionalisation, with regard to the voters in the campaign, is a sufficient effort to consider the campaign professionalised with regard to the voters, and so forth.

In order to further substantiate the calibration based on this principle, I will rely on empirical gaps in the raw data, where these exist (see Chapter 5.2.3). In accordance with the standards of good practice in QCA, it will also be made transparent how the sets were calibrated and the raw data is provided in Appendix C), so that researchers can come up with alternative calibration propositions. Finally, the robustness of the results will be checked against an alternative, slightly different calibration.

Before I turn to the actual calibration procedure a second general remark on the qualitative anchors that will be presented for calibrating the outcome sets is in order. Readers may notice that the definition of the membership in the outcome sets may seem rather generous, for example, by declaring all cases that have a score of 10 and more out of 13 on the aggregated professionalisation index full members of the set of professionalised campaigns, by setting the qualitative anchor for full non-membership at 3 characteristics and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity at 6. However, I argue that opting for a rather inclusive set definition can be backed up theoretically and methodically. As we remember from Chapter 5.1, QCA requires that sets be defined in line with the research interest. As we have seen,

the empirical research interest of this study is, first, to capture the professionalisation of the Swiss cantonal election campaigns as adequately and as comprehensively as possible (descriptive results), and, second, to find out which causal paths lead to different profiles of professionalisation (explanatory results). If the outcome sets (i.e., professionalised campaigns in general and per environment) are defined very rigidly, there will be only a small number of cases (or, in my concrete case, of campaigns) in the outcome sets. The database on which it may be calculated via fsQCA which causal paths lead to the outcome may then not suffice to produce meaningful results. As we will see in Chapter 8.3.2, for example, only four campaigns achieve at least half of the 11 possible points on the index measuring campaign professionalisation with regard to the voters, with the number of campaigns rising to nine if we also count the campaigns that achieved five points. Hence, a rather generous and inclusive calibration of the outcome sets best serves the research interest of this dissertation. As is the case for every research project of this kind, we have to keep in mind how the outcome was operationalised and how set membership was defined when interpreting the results of the analysis – and especially when comparing them to results from other studies.

8.1.2.1 Calibrating the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns

As I have shown, the maximum score a campaign can achieve on the index reflecting professionalisation as an aggregated concept is 13. As I outlined in Chapter 5.2.1, three qualitative anchors have to be defined in order to calibrate the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns via the direct method of calibration for full membership in the outcome set, for full non-membership in the outcome set, and for the cross-over point. All cases that have a score of 10 and over are considered full members of the set of professionalised campaigns. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at 3 characteristics and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at 6. This results in the set membership scores, which are displayed in Table 13.

As a test of robustness the analysis is performed with a different calibration, following the strategy applied by Emmenegger (2011) (see Chapter 5.2.3), who directly assigns fuzzy set membership scores to the cases based on empirical information (which means, for our cases, based on the information of which characteristics of professionalised campaigning were included in the campaigns, or in other words, the index scores achieved by the campaigns). I opt for a six value fuzzy scale, in which a set membership score of 0 stands for full non-membership in the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns. All cases that achieve index scores between 0 and 3 are assigned this set membership score. A set membership score of 0.2 means that the campaign is mostly but not fully a non-member of the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns and is assigned to cases with an index score of 4. The set membership score of 0.4 is assigned to cases that have an index score of 5 and are thus more out of the set than in. 0.5 marks, as usual, the point of maximum ambiguity, where it is least clear whether the cases do or do not form part of the set, which is the case for campaigns with an index score of 6. A set membership score of 0.6 is assigned to cases with an index score of 7, suggesting that they are considered more in than out of the set. A set membership score of 0.8 is assigned to campaigns with an index score of 8, indicating that the case is mostly but not fully a member of the target set. The value of 1 represents full membership in the set of professionalised campaigns and is assigned to cases with index scores between 13 and 9.

Table 13: Set of professionalised campaigns: Raw data and set membership scores

Campaign		Index score	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software	Alternative calibration
Party	Canton			
Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	12	0.99	1
Social Democrats	Zürich	11	0.98	
Social Democrats	Bern	10	0.95	
Swiss People's Party	Zürich			
Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	9	0.9	
Green Party	Zürich			
Liberal Democrats	Bern	8	0.82	0.8
Liberal Democrats	Zürich			
Christian Democrats	Aargau	7	0.68	0.6
Social Democrats	Aargau			
Green Party	Bern			
Green Party	Neuchâtel			
Christian Democrats	Zürich			
Green Party	Aargau	6	0.5	0.5
Liberal Democrats	Aargau			
Swiss People's Party	Bern	5	0.27	0.4
Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel			
Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel			
Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	4	0.12	0.2
Christian Democrats	Bern			
Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3	0.05	0
Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	2	0.02	
Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0	0	

8.1.2.2 Calibrating the sets of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the four environments

In order to define and calibrate the sets of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the four environments constituted by the voters, the members, the media and other parties I draw on the differentiated professionalisation indices.

As we remember from Chapter 5.2, the degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to the voters is measured on an index with a maximum score of 11. In order to calibrate the set via the direct method of calibration, all cases that have an index score of 7 and more are considered full members of the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment

constituted by the voters. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 2 and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at an index score of 4. This results in the set membership scores displayed in Table 14.

Again, the analysis is performed with a slightly different calibration as a test of robustness. This time I opt for directly assigning set membership scores from a four value fuzzy scale to the campaigns as the raw data reveals less variance than was the case for professionalisation as an aggregated concept (where a six value scheme was chosen). The set membership score of 0 indicates full non-membership in the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters and is assigned to cases with index scores between 0 and 2. The set membership score of 0.33 marks cases that are considered more out than in the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters. It is assigned to cases with an index score of 3. 0.5 marks the point of maximum ambiguity, where it is least clear whether the cases do or do not form part of the set, which is the case for campaigns with an index score of 4. The set membership score of 0.67 is assigned to cases with index scores of 5 and 6 and indicates that these cases are more in than out of the outcome set. All cases that achieve index scores between 7 and 11 are considered full members of the outcome set, which translates to a set membership score of 1.

Table 14: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters: Raw data and set membership scores

Campaign		Index score	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software	Alternative calibration
Party	Canton			
Social Democrats	Bern	9	0.99	1
Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	7	0.95	
Swiss People's Party	Zürich			
Social Democrats	Zürich	6	0.88	0.67
Green Party	Bern	5	0.73	
Liberal Democrats	Bern			
Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel			
Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel			
Green Party	Zürich			
Christian Democrats	Aargau	4	0.5	0.5
Green Party	Aargau			
Green Party	Neuchâtel			
Christian Democrats	Zürich			
Liberal Democrats	Zürich			
Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3	0.18	0.33
Liberal Democrats	Aargau			
Social Democrats	Aargau			
Christian Democrats	Bern			
Swiss People's Party	Bern			
Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel	2	0.05	0
Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	1	0.01	
Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden			
Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0	0	

The degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to the members is measured on an index with a maximum score of 9. Applying again the direct method of calibration, all cases that have an index score of 6 and more are considered full members of the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 2 and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at an index score of 4. The resulting set membership scores are displayed in Table 15.

Once again, I run the analysis with a slightly different calibration as a test of robustness. I opt for a similar scheme that was used for the alternative calibration of

the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the voters. The set membership score of 0 indicates full non-membership in the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment of the members and is assigned to cases with index scores between 0 and 2. The set membership score of 0.33 marks campaigns that are considered more out than in the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment of the members. It is assigned to cases with an index score of 3. 0.5 marks the point of maximum ambiguity and is assigned to campaigns with an index score of 4. The set membership score of 0.67 is assigned to cases with an index score of 5 and indicates that these cases are more in than out of the outcome set. All cases that achieve index scores between 6 and 9 are considered full members of the outcome set, which translates to a set membership score of 1.

Table 15: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members: Raw data and set membership scores

Campaign		Index score	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software	Alternative calibration
Party	Canton			
Social Democrats	Bern	9	1	1
Social Democrats	Neuchâtel	7	0.99	
Social Democrats	Zürich			
Liberal Democrats	Bern	6	0.95	
Green Party	Zürich			
Swiss People's Party	Zürich			
Social Democrats	Aargau	5	0.82	0.67
Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel			
Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel			
Liberal Democrats	Zürich			
Christian Democrats	Aargau	4	0.5	0.5
Green Party	Aargau			
Green Party	Bern			
Swiss People's Party	Bern			
Christian Democrats	Zürich			
Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	3	0.18	0.33
Liberal Democrats	Aargau			
Green Party	Neuchâtel			
Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel			
Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	2	0.05	0
Christian Democrats	Bern			
Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	1	0.01	
Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	0	0	

The degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to the media is measured on an index with a maximum score of 2. This poses a theoretical and methodological challenge to my analysis based on fsQCA. Theoretically, I argue that campaigns that feature one out of two activities meant to professionalise the campaign with regard to the media can be considered members of the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the media rather than non-members of this set. They should thus have a membership score larger than 0.5. However, if we want to calibrate set membership scores via the direct method of calibration with the help of the fsQCA-software, the software only allows for whole numbers when

inserting the three qualitative anchors (for example, it is technically not possibly to set the cross-over point at 0.7). With a maximum index score of 2 the software would only allow the following qualitative anchors: 2 marking full membership in the set, 1 as the cross-over point and 0 marking full non-membership in the set. Hence, all campaigns with an index score of 1 would be located at the cross-over point, meaning that they are neither members nor non-members of the set. This contradicts my theoretical reasoning. For the purpose of the calibration procedure, the scores on the index are therefore doubled: Campaigns that achieve an index score of 2 are recoded to an index score of 4, campaigns with an index score of 1 are recoded to an index score of 2, and campaigns with an index score of 0 are left with the original score. The threshold for full membership is set at an index score of 4, declaring all campaigns full members (set membership score of 1) of the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media that would also be full members in the original data. With the help of this procedure, the qualitative anchor for the cross-over point can now be set at an index score of 1. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 0. The resulting set membership scores are displayed in Table 16.

As a test of robustness the analysis is replicated with a different calibration, in which all cases with an index score of 2 are considered full members of the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the media. Campaigns with an index score of 1 are assigned a set membership score of 0.67, indicating that they are more in than out of the outcome set. Campaigns with an index score of 0 are considered full non-members of the outcome set and are assigned a set membership score that is also 0.

Table 16: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media: Raw data and set membership scores

Campaign		Index score	Adapted index score	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software	Alternative calibration
Party	Canton				
Liberal Democrats	Bern	2	4	0.95	1
Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel				
Social Democrats	Neuchâtel				
Green Party	Zürich				
Swiss People's Party	Zürich				
Green Party	Aargau	1	2	0.73	0.67
Liberal Democrats	Aargau				
Social Democrats	Aargau				
Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Christian Democrats	Bern				
Social Democrats	Bern				
Swiss People's Party	Bern				
Green Party	Neuchâtel				
Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel				
Liberal Democrats	Zürich				
Social Democrats	Zürich				
Christian Democrats	Aargau	0	0	0.05	0
Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Green Party	Bern				
Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel				
Christian Democrats	Zürich				

An alternative procedure would have been to increase the number of indicators measuring professionalisation with regard to the media. However, this turned out to be impossible based on the data in hand. The same applies to the indicators measuring professionalisation with regard to other parties. Therefore, the same procedure is followed here: The degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to other parties is measured on an index with a maximum score of 2. Campaigns that achieve an index score of 2 are recoded to an index score of 4, campaigns with an index score of 1 are recoded to an index score of 2, and campaigns with an index score of 0 are left with the original score. In conformity with the calibration procedure applied to the set of cantonal election campaigns that

are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media, all cases that have an index score of 4 are considered full members of the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 0 and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at an index score of 1. This results in the set membership scores displayed in Table 17.

Again, as a test of robustness, the analysis is replicated with a different calibration, in which all cases with an index score of 2 are considered full members of the set of campaign professionalised with regard to other parties. Campaigns with an index score of 1 are assigned a set membership score of 0.67, indicating that they are more in than out of the outcome set. Campaigns with an index score of 0 are considered full non-members of the outcome set and are assigned a set membership score that is also 0.

Table 17: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties: Raw data and set membership scores

Campaign		Index score	Adapted index score	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software	Alternative calibration
Party	Canton				
Liberal Democrats	Neuchâtel	2	4	0.95	1
Social Democrats	Neuchâtel				
Christian Democrats	Aargau	1	2	0.73	0.67
Green Party	Neuchâtel				
Green Party	Zürich				
Liberal Democrats	Zürich				
Social Democrats	Zürich				
Swiss People's Party	Zürich				
Green Party	Aargau	0	0	0.05	0
Liberal Democrats	Aargau				
Social Democrats	Aargau				
Christian Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Green Party	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Liberal Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Social Democrats	Appenzell Ausserrhoden				
Christian Democrats	Bern				
Green Party	Bern				
Liberal Democrats	Bern				
Social Democrats	Bern				
Swiss People's Party	Bern				
Christian Democrats	Neuchâtel				
Swiss People's Party	Neuchâtel				
Christian Democrats	Zürich				

8.1.3 Calibrating the causal conditions

8.1.3.1 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in large cantons

As I proposed in Chapter 3.2, the theoretical argument behind this causal condition is that if the target group of the campaign is large and regionally scattered a large group of candidates have to be handled, a greater effort to organise a recognisable campaign in a large number of constituencies has to be taken and measures to centrally control the campaign are needed in a large canton. These circumstances lead parties to incorporate elements of professionalised campaigning in their campaigns in order to react to a changing environment for campaigning. While there is no existing research linking professionalised campaigning to a certain size of the audience of

campaign communication, I argue that there is a qualitative difference between Zürich, Bern and Aargau on the one hand, all figuring among the four largest cantons in terms of population, and Neuchâtel and Appenzell Ausserhoden on the other hand, while Appenzell Ausserrhoden has considerably fewer inhabitants than Neuchâtel. The crossover point must thus be located between Aargau und Neuchâtel. I set the three qualitative anchors as follows: The threshold for full membership in the set of campaigns organised in a large cantons is set at the population size of 900,000 inhabitants, based on the gap between Bern and Aargau. The threshold for full non-membership is set at 60,000, reflecting the gap between Neuchâtel and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The cross-over point is set at 500,000. These qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 18. As all campaigns that were organised in the same canton logically are assigned the same set membership score in the set of large cantons, Table 18 shows only the five different membership scores for reasons of clarity.

Table 18: Set of campaigns organised in large cantons: Raw data and set membership score

Canton	Population	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	53,000	0.1
Aargau	611,500	0.7
Bern	979,800	0.97
Neuchâtel	172,100	0.05
Zürich	1,373,100	1

8.1.3.2 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons

I assumed in Chapter 3.2 that there are more incentives for parties to incorporate elements of professionalised campaigning in their campaigns in an urban environment where they are confronted with a higher acceptance of online campaigning and with a more heterogeneous, less party affiliated or potentially more volatile electorate. What has been said for the size of the cantons also holds true for the degree of their urbanisation. While it can, theoretically, be argued that professionalised campaigning is of greater importance to the parties in a more urbanised environment where the recipients have a greater habit of relying on online communication for political information and participation and where the amount of

volatility in the electorate is potentially higher, there is no existing research on the degree of urbanisation as a causal condition for professionalised campaigning. I thus base the calibration on general external knowledge on the urbanisation of cantons in Switzerland. According to Ladner (2004: 407), Zürich, Bern and Neuchâtel can be considered urbanised cantons, while the cantons of Aargau and Appenzell Ausserrhoden are rather rural. Following Ladner's reasoning the cross-over point would be located between Bern and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. This can also be confirmed by the distribution of cases in the raw data by a considerable gap between the degree of urbanisation between the two cantons (40 per cent and 29 per cent respectively). I set the three qualitative anchors as follows: The threshold for full membership in the set of campaigns organised in an urbanised canton is set at a percentage of urbanisation of 50 per cent. The threshold for full non-membership is set at 20 per cent. The cross-over point is set at 35 per cent. These qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in

Table 19. Again,

Table 19 shows only the five different membership scores for reasons of clarity.

Table 19: Set of campaigns organised in urbanised cantons: Raw data and set membership score

Canton	Degree of urbanisation	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	29%	0.23
Aargau	19%	0.04
Bern	40%	0.73
Neuchâtel	53%	0.97
Zürich	66%	1

8.1.3.3 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in competitive cantons

To reiterate, I assume that a competitive situation between parties in the cantonal parliament (operationalised by the difference in seats claimed by the strongest and second strongest party in the legislative periods before the cantonal elections analysed in this paper) is a causal condition for campaign professionalisation, because the higher the degree of competition the more is at stake for the parties and the more important it is to win as many votes as possible. Similarly, the more is at stake for the

parties, the greater the feeling of uncertainty and the more important it becomes to monitor the campaign activities of other parties. In order to assess what can be considered a competitive situation, I draw on the results of the last two elections to the cantonal parliament and analyse the maximum changes in the voter shares of the parties. Since the maximum change in a voter share among the parties included in this study was 8.8 per cent in these elections, with the median being 4.4 per cent, I exclude the campaigns that took place in Aargau (difference between percentage of seats claimed by the strongest party and by the second strongest party: 11.34 per cent), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (29 per cent) and Zürich (11.1 per cent) from the set of campaigns that were organised in competitive cantons. The campaigns that took place in Neuchâtel (0.87 per cent) and Bern (3.13 per cent) can be considered members of the set. I therefore set the threshold for full membership in the set of campaigns organised in competitive cantons at a 5 per cent difference in seats claimed by the strongest and second strongest party, the threshold for full non-membership at 11 per cent and the cross-over point at 9 per cent. These qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 20.

Table 20: Set of campaigns organised in competitive cantons: Raw data and set membership score

Canton	Difference in seats claimed by strongest and second strongest party	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	28%	0
Aargau	11.43%	0.03
Bern	3.13%	0.99
Neuchâtel	0.87%	1
Zürich	11.1%	0.04

8.1.3.4. Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties

As I proposed in Chapter 3.3, I incorporate Gibson and Römmele's (2001) argument that campaigns organised by parties with a right-wing ideology exhibit higher levels of campaign professionalisation than campaigns organised by left-wing parties. We have seen in Chapter 4 that the positions of the cantonal party branches on the left-right ideological continuum were measured on a scale where 0 stands for the extreme left and 10 for the extreme right. In order to calibrate the campaigns' membership in

the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties, I set the threshold for full membership at a score of 7 on the left-right-scale, based on the reasoning that the Swiss People's Party can be considered a right-wing party while the Liberal Democrats are generally deemed a centre-right, but not fully right-wing party. The threshold for full non-membership is set at a score of 3 on the left-right-scale, backed by the widely accepted fact that the Social Democrats, whose highest score is 2.5, can definitively be excluded from the set of right-wing parties. The cross-over point is set at the numerical centre of the 0-10 scale (5), which is empirically supported by the fact that the score of 5 is occupied by a cantonal party branch of the Christian Democrats, who are generally considered a centre party. These qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 21. While the reader has been advised not to pay too much attention to nuances in the raw data (because a 0.1 difference on the left-right-scale between two parties might rather reflect a random measurement artefact than a real ideological difference), the fine grained differences in the resulting set membership scores are of no calculative relevance to the analysis (see Chapter 5.8) and will therefore not have an influence on the results.

Table 21: Set of campaigns organised by right-wing parties: Raw data and set membership score

Canton	Party	Political position 0 (left) – 10 (right)	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Christian Democrats	5	0.5
	Green Party	1.85	0.01
	Liberal Democrats	6.42	0.89
	Social Democrats	2.5	0.02
Aargau	Christian Democrats	5.28	0.6
	Green Party	1.88	0.01
	Liberal Democrats	6.795	0.94
	Social Democrats	2.15	0.01
Bern	Christian Democrats	5.26	0.6
	Green Party	2.06	0.01
	Liberal Democrats	6.31	0.88
	Social Democrats	2.455	0.02
	Swiss People's Party	7.055	0.96
Neuchâtel	Christian Democrats	4.64	0.37
	Green Party	1.69	0.01
	Liberal Democrats	6.305	0.88
	Social Democrats	2.04	0.01
	Swiss People's Party	7.36	0.97
Zürich	Christian Democrats	4.955	0.48
	Green Party	1.775	0.01
	Liberal Democrats	6.87	0.94

	Social Democrats	1.835	0.01
	Swiss People's Party	7.4	0.97

8.1.3.5 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties

As I outlined in Chapter 3.3, the theoretical argument behind this causal condition is that catch-all parties are encouraged to use as many media channels as possible in order to get in touch with their voters and that they benefit from their size with regard to financial resources. Hence, they have both more incentives and more possibilities for professionalised campaigning.

The definition of the set of catch-all parties has to be suitable for the cantonal political systems that are characterised by the presence of multiple parties. For the case of Sweden whose number of parties in the national parliament is similar to that of the cantonal parliaments included in this study, Strömbäck proposes "the status of being a catch-all party [to be] defined as 2 = 35 per cent or more, 1 = more than 20 but less than 35 per cent and 0 = less than 20 per cent" (Strömbäck 2009: 99). Applying this definition to the calibration of membership scores in the set of campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties, I set the threshold for full membership at a 35 per cent share of the electorate. The cross-over point is located at 20 per cent and the threshold for full non-membership at 19 per cent. This results in the set membership scores displayed in Table 22.

Table 22: Set of campaigns organised by catch-all parties: Raw data and set membership scores

Canton	Party	Percentage of seats	Result of direct calibration via fsQCA software
Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Christian Democrats	5	0
	Green Party	0	0
	Liberal Democrats	40	0.98
	Social Democrats	6	0
Aargau	Christian Democrats	19	0.05
	Green Party	5	0
	Liberal Democrats	17	0
	Social Democrats	21	0.55
Bern	Christian Democrats	1	0
	Green Party	12	0
	Liberal Democrats	16	0
	Social Democrats	26	0.77
	Swiss People's Party	29	0.86
Neuchâtel	Christian Democrats	0	0
	Green Party	9	0
	Liberal Democrats	35	0.95
	Social Democrats	36	0.96
	Swiss People's Party	15	0
Zürich	Christian Democrats	7	0
	Green Party	11	0
	Liberal Democrats	16	0
	Social Democrats	20	0.5
	Swiss People's Party	31	0.9

8.2 Results: Professionalisation as an aggregated concept

8.2.1 Necessary conditions

We remember from Chapter 5.3 that the first step in determining causal conditions is to test whether necessary conditions exist for the outcome set. As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.1), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept. This means that among the five causal conditions that have been included in this analysis none produces the outcome by itself.

8.2.2 Sufficient conditions

Turning to the analysis of the sufficient conditions, standards of good practice demand that the reader is provided, first, with the minimum number of cases that a combination of conditions had to be represented by, in order to be included in the truth table minimisation process. In accordance with standard practices all combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign

were included (see Chapter 5.3). Second, the consistency cut-off that was chosen to decide whether a combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome was set at 0.758794 in accordance with the minimum lower value for consistency and with the raw data. Third, there was – as is usually the case in fsQCA – a considerable amount of limited diversity in my data: 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not. In order to consult the truth table for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 1.

Finally, standards of good practice demand that all three solution formulas (complex, most parsimonious and intermediate; please refer to Chapter 5.5 to reiterate their characterisation) that were produced are presented in Boolean algebra. However, as I outlined in Chapter 5.5, "when it comes to the theoretical and substantive interpretation of the results, a researcher is free to choose which formula(s) to put into the center of attention" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 408). Therefore, all three solution formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 1. I chose to present and interpret the intermediate solution here as a valuable middle ground between the conservative solution, which tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a theoretically meaningful or plausible manner, and the parsimonious solution, which bears the risk of resting on assumptions about the logical remainders that contradict the theoretical reasoning underlying the analysis. When minimising the truth table, the intermediate solution relies exclusively on assumptions about the logical remainders that were specified by the researcher (i.e., the so called directional expectations; readers who might want to re-read these principles please refer to Chapter 5.4). Please note again that there is no difference between the three solution formulas in how they minimise the data that are at hand. All three solutions minimise the causal conditions represented in the empirical data set in exactly the same way. The only difference lies in the inclusion of the combinations of conditions that are *not* represented in the data (i.e., the logical remainders).

The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal conditions being organised in a large canton, in an urbanised canton, in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament, and

by a catch-all party are expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present. As existing findings on the influence of being organised by a right-wing party do not show a clear tendency, no specification on this condition was made (i.e., it could contribute to minimising the logical remainders either in its presence or in its absence).

In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. For reasons of clarity, the conditions are presented in a shortened wording: the condition "being organised in a large canton" is shortened to "large canton", and so forth. The tilde sign (~) translates to "not": "~catch-all party" means "not being organised by a catch-all party". To recall, "*" is the Boolean expression for "and", "+" is the Boolean expression for "or". "*" links single conditions together to a combination of conditions, "+" separates the solution terms that all equally produce the outcome. The two parameters of fit, the consistency value and the coverage value, are also indicated. The value for solution consistency is acceptable[22] (see chapter 5.6). As we remember from Chapter 5.6, in contrast to the 0.75 minimum threshold for consistency there is no lower threshold for coverage. Lower coverage values simply indicate that less of the outcome is explained by the respective condition or the solution formula.

~competitive canton*large canton +

~right-wing party*large canton +

~catch-all party*large canton +

catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton

(solution coverage: 0.905690, solution consistency: 0.825871)

This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust against slight changes in set membership scores (the same applies to the parsimonious and the complex solution formulas).

The following overview shows which cases are explained by which solution term:

[22] Please note that it is differentiated between acceptable and not acceptable consistency values. Hence, acceptable is not to be understood as a relativisation of "good".

- Campaigns that were organised in a large canton without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament: all campaigns organised in the cantons of Zürich and Aargau

- Campaigns that were organised in a large canton by a non-right-wing party: Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Social Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Social Democrats, Aargau; Green Party, Aargau

- Campaigns that were organised in a large canton by a non-catch-all party: Liberal Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Aargau; Green Party, Aargau; Christian Democrats, Aargau

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban and competitive but not large canton by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel

When we analyse which campaign was covered by which solution term, it becomes obvious that several of the campaigns are covered by more than one solution term and that there are overlaps especially between the first three solution terms (i.e., those involving the presence of a large canton). The campaigns organised by the Green Party and the Christian Democrats in Zürich and by the Green Party in Aargau, for example, are covered by all three solution terms, while several other campaigns are covered by two terms. Hence, these campaigns cannot exclusively be explained by one solution term. Only the campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats in Bern (~catch-all party*large canton) as well as those organised by the Social Democrats and by the Liberal Democrats in Neuchâtel (catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton) are explained by one term only.

The only case that is not explained is the campaign organised by the Green Party in Neuchâtel, which achieved a score of 7 on the aggregated professionalisation index (set membership scores of 0.68 and 0.6 respectively) but which is covered by none of the solution formula (hence, the coverage value is lower than 1).

To recall, extracting the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation does not tell us which conditions lead to the *absence* of campaign professionalisation – it could be, but is not necessarily explained by, the absence of conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation. In order to explain why the 2009, 2010 and 2011 cantonal election campaigns organised by the Swiss People's Party and the Christian Democrats in Bern, the Swiss People's Party and the Christian Democrats in Neuchâtel, and by all included parties from Appenzell Ausserrhoden were *not* professionalised, a separate analysis would have to be performed. In the framework of this dissertation, however, this has to be left open to future analyses as the focus and research aim here is on explaining the presence, not the absence of campaign professionalisation.

As I outlined in Chapter 5.7, presenting the solution formula is not the finish point of an analysis performed with fsQCA. Rather, researchers should explain the results based on in-depth knowledge about the cases and on the theoretical assumptions underlying the analysis. The presentation of the results should consider both the "case- and the condition oriented aspects of QCA" (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 280). I will account for both aspects by interpreting the solution formula obtained for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept both from the perspective of the cases and by interpreting the solution formula from the perspective of the underlying assumptions and hypotheses. I will proceed in the same manner when presenting the solution formulas leading to campaign professionalisation with regard to the four electoral environments in subsequent chapters.

I hypothesised in Chapter 3.4.1 that being organised in a large canton, in an urbanised canton, in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, by a right-wing party or by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for professionalised campaigning. If we analyse the solution formula from the perspective of these hypotheses, it becomes obvious that although it is not a necessary condition for campaign professionalisation, being organised in a large canton is a very dominant sufficient condition, as it is present in three of the four solution terms. Against the background of my theoretical assumptions the first three solution terms might be interpreted as follows. Being organised in a large canton is such a strong incentive for

leading a professionalised campaign that campaigns organised in large cantons became professionalised *although* they were organised in a non-competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a non-right-wing or non-catch-all party.

An alternative interpretation would suggest that the theoretical assumptions underlying the hypotheses were wrong in the first place: a competitive situation, being organised by a right-wing party and being organised by a catch-all party do not contribute to campaign professionalisation in their presence but in their absence. This interpretation seems plausible for the condition of being organised by a right-wing party as existing findings – especially those by Strömbäck (2009) and Gibson and Römmele (2009) (although they interpreted the leading position of the Social Democrats differently) – have already cast doubt on the positive influence of being organised by a right-wing party on campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 3.1). The absence of being organised by a catch-all party could suggest that campaign professionalisation is a strategy for mid-sized and small parties to compensate for their smaller size, smaller budget and/or smaller degree of popularity. This interpretation is, however, less self-evident, as the campaign activities included in the aggregated professionalisation index as indicators for campaign professionalisation (mandate professionals, provide training, perform a continuous campaigning, employ means of direct and online communication, monitor other parties) do require a certain amount of resources, be it financial or human resources. Also, existing findings (especially those by Gibson and Römmele (2009) and Tenscher (2007, 2011)) point to large resources being an advantage for organising professionalised campaigns rather than to professionalisation being a compensation strategy for small parties. However, it cannot be excluded that small parties can afford professionalisation activities relying on very active members and volunteers. While there might thus be viable explanations why being organised by a right-wing party or catch-all party contribute to campaign professionalisation in large cantons in their absence, the author cannot think of an interpretation as to why the absence of a competitive situation in large cantons should contribute to campaign professionalisation against the background of existing findings and empirical assumptions.

The fourth solution term covers the campaigns organised by the party branches of the Social Democrats and the Liberal Democrats that are catch-all parties in the urban and competitive environment of the small canton of Neuchâtel. The important role of close competition is confirmed by the interview statements of the campaigns managers of both parties, who frequently referred to the campaign activities of the other party in their interviews and brought up the close race between the equally strong left and right political camps. Also, the positive influence of an urbanised environment that is open to online and non-standard campaigning can be indirectly confirmed by the interviews. The campaigns of the Social Democrats and the Liberal Democrats featured some kind of online campaign competition between the two parties, centring on what might be called a video clip Ping-Pong between the two parties. Both parties were publishing video clips in which they responded to and/or mocked the other party's clips.

To conclude, the following substantive conclusions are drawn from the solution formula for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept. First, large cantons confront the campaigns that are organised in them with a large and geographically scattered campaign target group, large numbers of candidates and a generally larger effort to centrally organise and control the campaign communication and campaign activities, for example in order to create a campaign that is recognisable and memorable even for potential voters and members that live and work in different constituencies. These challenging conditions enhance the (real or perceived) pressures on parties to adapt their campaigns to changes in the environments for campaigning by including elements of professionalised campaigning. Campaigns in large cantons become professionalised even when the elections do not take place in a competitive environment, that is, when there is no competitive majority situation in the cantonal parliament. Campaign professionalisation is not reserved to catch-all parties, particularly, as we remember from Chapter 8.1.2, if we define campaign professionalisation rather inclusively and argue that campaigns with a score of 7 and more on a scale of 13 index points are (to a differing degree) members of the set of professionalised campaigns. Mid-sized parties (concretely, several parties with a percentages of seats in the cantonal

parliament between 11 per cent and 19 per cent) and small parties (percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament 7 per cent (Christian Democrats, Zürich) and 5 per cent (Green Party, Aargau)) organise professionalised campaigns when the campaign is organised in a large canton. Also, left-wing and centre parties seem to be more inclined to organise professionalised campaigns than right-wing parties – again, however, the condition not being organised by a right-wing party does not produce the outcome on its own, but in combination with the condition being organised in a large canton.

Despite the importance of the large size of the organising canton for campaign professionalisation it is not the only path leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept. Even when this condition is absent professionalised campaigns are organised as an adaptation to a changing environment for campaigning when a combination of other systemic incentives (*urbanised and competitive environment*) and incentives at the party level (*being organised by a catch-all party*) reinforce the pressures to adapt to these changes: when the organising party has to reach a large group of potential voters and members via as many media channels as possible in order to get in touch with them or when the party faces a competitive election in an urban environment where the electorate is potentially more volatile and more is at stake.

8.3 Results: Professionalisation per environment

8.3.1 Professionalisation with regard to the voters

8.3.1.1 Necessary conditions

As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the voters. None of the five causal conditions that have been included in this analysis produces the outcome by itself.

8.3.1.2 Sufficient conditions

When presenting the results for the sufficient conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the voters, I proceed in the same manner as in the previous chapter. All combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.763819. 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 2. All three solution formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 2. Following the reasoning that was presented in the previous chapter, I chose the intermediate solution for detailed presentation and substantive interpretation.

The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal conditions of being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and being organised by a catch-all party are expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present.

In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. The value for solution consistency is acceptable.

~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton +
~right-wing party*urban canton*large canton +
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton +
catch-all party*~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +
~catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +
(solution coverage: 0.796143, solution consistency: 0.829665)

This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust against slight changes in set membership scores (the same applies to the parsimonious and the complex solution formulas).

In the following, an overview is provided on which campaigns are explained by which solution term:

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a non-right-wing party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Green Party, Neuchâtel; Social Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Christian Democrats, Neuchâtel

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton by a non-right-wing party: Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Social Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Christian Democrats, Zürich

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban but not large canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Swiss People's Party, Zürich

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a non-catch-all party: Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern

We can identify some overlap in the solution terms: The campaign organised by the Green Party in Bern is covered by three of the solution terms. The campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Bern and Neuchâtel are explained by two solution terms. The remaining campaigns are exclusively covered by one solution term.

Four out of 14 campaigns are not covered by these five solution terms. These are the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Zürich, the Christian Democrats and the Green Party in Aargau and the Liberal Democrats in Zürich. Hence, it cannot be explained with these solution terms why these campaigns are professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters.

Turning to the case- and variable-oriented interpretation of the results, I hypothesised that being organised in a large canton, in an urbanised canton, in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters. These conditions do indeed contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to the voters – the explanative pattern is, however, more complex than this. Catch-all parties in urban cantons did organise campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters either when the canton was also large and had no competitive situation in the parliament (Zürich) or when the canton was not large but had a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament (Neuchâtel). Hence, the large size and the competitive situation in the canton may be interpreted as being complementary: One of the two had to be present in order to produce campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in addition to the conditions of catch-all party and urban canton. Non-catch-all parties organised campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in the large, urban, and competitive canton of Bern. The condition of being organised by a right-wing party contributed to campaign professionalisation with regard to the voters in its absence.

Non-right-wing parties organised campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters either in urban and large cantons (Bern; Zürich) or in urban and competitive cantons (Zürich; Neuchâtel).

To conclude, campaigns become professionalised with regard to the voters in several different circumstances. What emerges from the solution terms is that being organised in an urban canton always contributes to the outcome in its presence. I infer from this that professionalisation with regard to the voters is more important when the campaign faces a potentially more heterogeneous and more volatile electorate. Hence, an urban environment can be assumed to be a factor that enhances the urgency and the incentives to professionalise the campaigns with regard to the environment of the voters or in other words, to adapt the campaign activities to general trends of rising numbers of swing voters and late deciders, weaker party affiliations and a larger window of opportunity in this very important environment for campaigning. The incentives for professionalised campaigning are also stronger when campaigns are organised in a competitive canton and in a large canton, as reacting to changes in the environment of the voters becomes more urgent when every single vote counts in a close race and when a larger target group has to be addressed. These conditions, however, seem to complement each other, at least when the organising party is a catch-all party or a non-right-wing party.

At the party level there is a stronger incentive for catch-all parties to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters, as they have to address a large and diverse target audience, preferably via as many media channels as possible. Catch-all parties organised campaigns that were professionalised with regard to the voters in an urban environment and either when the canton was large and had no competitive situation in the parliament or when the canton was not large but had a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament. Non-catch-all parties seem to require stronger incentives to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters as all conditions at the systemic level have to be present: the campaign has to be organised in a large, urban, and competitive canton. Non-right-wing parties are rather inclined to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters than right-wing parties. Non-right-wing parties organised campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in an

urban environment either in a large canton or a canton with a competitive situation in the parliament.

8.3.2. Professionalisation with regard to the members

8.3.2.1 Necessary conditions

As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the members.

8.3.2.2 Sufficient conditions

All combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.757895. 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for more detailed information please refer to Appendix D), section 3). All three solution formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 3. For the same reasons as in the previous analyses, I chose the intermediate solution for detailed presentation and substantive interpretation.

The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3): The causal conditions of being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and of being organised by a catch-all party are expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present. Being organised by a right-wing party is assumed to contribute to professionalisation with regard to the environment of the members in its absence.

In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. The parameters of fit are acceptable.

~right-wing party*~urban canton*large canton +

~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +

catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton

(solution coverage: 0.762862, solution consistency: 0.864299)

This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust against slight changes in set membership scores. The same applies to the parsimonious and the complex solution formulas.

In the following, an overview is provided on which campaigns are explained by which solution term:

- Campaigns that were organised in a large but not urban canton by a non-right-wing party: Social Democrats, Aargau; Green Party, Aargau
- Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament: all campaigns that were organised in the canton of Zürich
- Campaigns that were organised in an urban and competitive canton by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel; Social Democrats, Bern; Swiss People's Party, Bern

It stands out from the solution that there are no overlaps between the three solution terms: every campaign is exclusively explained by one solution term.

Four out of 15 campaigns are not covered (i.e., explained) by these three solution terms. These are the campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party in Bern, the Christian Democrats in Neuchâtel and the Christian Democrats in Aargau.

In Chapter 3.2, I assumed that being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. These assumptions are partly mirrored in the solution formula. However, the solution is more complex than these three assumptions. Being organised by a catch-all party in a competitive canton indeed contributed to campaign professionalisation with regard

to the members, but only if the canton was also an urban one (Bern; Neuchâtel). Also, even if the situation in the cantonal parliament was not competitive, campaigns became professionalised with regard to the members when they were organised in a large and urban canton (Zürich). Non-right-wing parties did indeed professionalise their campaigns with regard to the members when the campaigns took place in a large but not urban canton (Aargau).

The following substantive conclusions are drawn from these results: First, adapting the campaigns to the changes in the environment constituted by the members (which are similar to those concerning the voters and include declining numbers of party members and more difficult mobilisation) is more important for non-right-wing parties than for right-wing parties. Left-wing and centre parties might have a stronger orientation towards the inside of the party than right-wing parties and be more dedicated with regard to internal communication and organisation, especially in a relatively rural environment and when they have to handle a large and geographically dispersed group of members. Second, for catch-all parties with a large group of members but who also have to target a broad general electorate, the members become a more important asset and adaptations aimed at gaining on-going support and legitimacy by the members are more urgent when the campaign is organised in a competitive and urban environment. In general, campaigns become professionalised with regard to the members when the canton in which the election takes place is not only urban but also large, that is when a large and geographically dispersed group of members has to be mobilised and animated to go to the polls and when the campaign has to convince a potentially more heterogeneous and volatile group of potential voters (in which the members are included), even when there was not a competitive situation.

8.3.3 Professionalisation with regard to the media

8.3.3.1 Necessary conditions

As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the media.

8.3.3.2 Sufficient conditions

All combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.804082. 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 4). All three solution formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 4. Again, the detailed presentation and substantive interpretation are provided for the intermediate solution.

The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see Chapters 3.2 and 3.3): The causal conditions of being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urban canton and being organised by a catch-all party are expected to contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to the media when they are present.

The intermediate solution in Boolean algebra reads as follows. The parameters of fit are acceptable.

~right-wing party*~competitive canton*large canton +
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton +
catch-all party*urban canton*large canton +
right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton
(solution coverage: 0.705255, solution consistency: 0.892100)

The results can be considered robust. When performing the analysis with the set membership scores resulting from the alternative calibration strategy (see Chapter 8.1.2), the last three solution terms depicted above are exactly the same. The first

solution term differs inasmuch as the solution term reads ~right-wing party*~not competitive canton*large canton*catch-all party for the alternative calibration. However, as this is a superset of the term ~right-wing party*~not competitive canton*large canton resulting from the data obtained with the direct method of calibration, this is not a breach of robustness (see Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 286).

The following campaigns are explained by the respective solution terms:

- Campaigns that were organised in a large canton without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by non-right-wing parties: Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Social Democrats, Aargau; Green Party, Aargau

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel; Swiss People's Party, Bern; Social Democrats, Bern

- Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton by a catch-all party: Swiss People's Party, Zürich; Swiss People's Party, Bern; Social Democrats, Bern

- Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a right-wing party: Swiss People's Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Bern; Christian Democrats, Bern

The campaigns organised in Bern by the Swiss People's Party and the Social Democrats can both be explained by two of the solution terms. All other campaigns are exclusively explained by one solution term.

Five out of 16 campaigns are not covered by these four solution terms. These are the campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats in Aargau, the Christian Democrats in Appenzell Ausserrhoden, the Green Party in Neuchâtel, the Swiss People's Party in Neuchâtel and the Liberal Democrats in Zürich. Hence, it cannot be explained

with these solution terms why these campaigns were professionalised with regard to the environment of the media.

I assumed in the hypotheses that being organised in a large canton, an urbanised canton, and by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media. The combination of these conditions is indeed one of the solution terms (to be precise, the second term enlisted above). However, the complete solution formula is more complex. Catch-all parties also adapted their campaign to the media when the campaign took place in an urban and competitive environment (Neuchâtel; Bern). Right-wing parties professionalised their campaigns with regard to the media in the competitive, urban and large canton of Bern. Non-right-wing parties, on the other hand, professionalised their campaign with regard to the media in large cantons without a competitive situation (Zürich; Aargau).

I conclude from these results that, first, catch-all parties adapt to changes in the environment constituted by the media and institutional expectations resulting from these changes (broadly speaking, giving the media a central role in campaign communication, adapting to the logic of the media and incorporating new forms of mediated communication via the so-called new and social media) rather than non-catch-all parties. This might be the case because their prospects of getting media attention and coverage are higher than those of the smaller parties and because they are more dependent on mediated campaign communication in order to address a broad range of potential voters and a large group of members. This is especially the case when the campaign is organised in an urban context (where so-called new media are more widely accepted and used as a means of political communication than in rural areas) and either when the campaign is organised in a large canton, that is when the media have a key role for reaching an audience that is geographically more dispersed and many voters have to be addressed, or in a competitive environment, that is when every viewer or reader that is convinced by mediated campaign communication counts.

Second, non-right-wing parties in large cantons professionalise their campaign with regard to the media when the canton where the campaign takes place is large and, hence, a large and dispersed audience has to be addressed, even if there is no competitive situation in the cantonal parliament. Right-wing parties, on the other hand, seem to require more environmental incentives in order to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the media. They have to be faced with a competitive situation in an urban environment, targeting a large audience in a large canton.

8.3.4 Professionalisation with regard to other parties

8.3.4.1 Necessary conditions

As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the other parties.

8.3.4.2 Sufficient conditions

As it has been the case in the previous analyses, all combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.938596 due to a large gap between the second highest (0.938596) and third highest (0.775956) consistency value (see Appendix D), section 5.2). 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 5). All three solution formulas are presented in Appendix E), section 5. In analogy with the procedure in the previous chapters, the detailed presentation and substantive interpretation are provided for the intermediate solution.

Again, the directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal condition being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament is expected to contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by other parties when

it is present. The causal condition of being organised by a catch-all party is expected to contribute to the outcome when it is absent.

The intermediate solution in Boolean algebra reads as follows. The solution consistency value is acceptable.

catch-all party*~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton +
catch-all party*right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton
(solution coverage: 0. 258890, solution consistency: 0.962963)

The following campaigns are explained by the respective solution terms:

- Campaigns that were organised in an urban but not large canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel

- Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a right-wing party: Swiss People's Party, Zürich

As I briefly addressed in Chapter 7.2.4, a particular challenge for the analysis of the sufficient conditions for this outcome lies in the fact that the outcome set is small (with only two campaigns achieving the maximum index score of 2 and another six campaigns achieving an index score of 1). Hence, the empirical basis that the truth table minimisation can draw on is very small. This is reflected in the results of the minimisation procedure: Only two out of eight campaigns are covered by the two solution terms provided by the analysis (hence, the low value for solution coverage).

My hypothesis had been that being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and *not* being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties. However, the obtained solution terms show (limited as their coverage may be) that even catch-all parties are not "immune" against competition and hence professionalise their campaign with regard to other parties when the campaign takes place in a competitive and urban environment. This is the case in large cantons, as the case of the Swiss People's Party in Zürich shows, but

also in small cantons. The case of the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel also confirms the statements from the interviews which were already alluded to in Chapter 4.: The campaign managers of both the Social Democrats and the Liberal Democrats frequently referred to the campaign activities of the other party in their interviews and brought up the close race between the equally strong left and right political camps. Also, a kind of online campaign competition developed between the two parties. Admittedly, the causal conditions tested in this analysis do not provide an explanation as to why the Liberal Democrats professionalised their campaign with regard to other parties. While the competition with the Social Democrats probably had an influence on their campaign, this condition alone did not produce campaign professionalisation with regard to other parties by itself or in combination with the other conditions tested in this analysis, but probably in combination with other conditions that have not been included in the present analysis.

To sum up, the results obtained for professionalisation with regard to other parties solve only a small piece of the puzzle. For the remaining campaigns, no explanation as to which conditions contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to other parties can be provided based on my fsQCA analysis. As a methodological conclusion, I propose to note that when the outcome set that the research project aims to explain is small, the truth table minimisation reaches the limits of its performance range due to fsQCA's version of the *too many variables too few cases* problem – in this concrete case, the relation was eight cases to five conditions (this aspect is discussed in further detail in the conclusion).

8.4 Overview of the results

Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised on an aggregate level are organised

- in large non-competitive cantons,
- by left-wing or centre parties in large cantons,
- by small or mid-sized parties in large cantons,
- or by catch-all parties in competitive, urban and not large cantons.

Figure 8: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns on an aggregate level



Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters are organised

- by left-wing or centre parties in competitive and urban cantons,
- by left-wing or centre parties in urban and large cantons,
- by catch-all parties in competitive, urban and small or mid-sized cantons,
- by catch-all parties in non-competitive, urban and large cantons,
- or by small or mid-sized parties in competitive, urban and large cantons.

Figure 9: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with regard to the environment constituted by the voters



Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members are organised

- by left-wing or centre parties in large and non-urbanised cantons,
- in urban and large cantons without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament,
- or by catch-all parties in urban cantons with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament.

Figure 10: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with regard to the environment constituted by the members



Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media are organised

- by left-wing or centre parties in large cantons without a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament,
- by catch-all parties in urban cantons with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament,
- by catch-all parties in urban and large cantons,
- or by right-wing parties in urban and large cantons with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament.

Figure 11: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with regard to the environment constituted by the media



Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties are organised

- by left-wing or centre catch-all parties in small or mid-sized urban cantons with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament
- by right-wing catch-all parties in large and urban cantons with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament

Figure 12: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with regard to the environment constituted by other parties



8.5 Discussion of the results

Are there different causal paths leading to the different outcomes?

As we have seen in the previous chapters the causal paths that lead to the aggregated and to the four differentiated outcomes are indeed quite different from each other. The results confirm the assumption that there are substantively different paths that produce the five different outcomes that were included in the fsQCA analysis. Referring back to sociological neo-institutionalism, the results underline that conceptualising campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to changing electoral environments for campaign communication and organisation is a logical and valuable theoretical conceptualisation of the so far under theorised campaign professionalisation research. However, the results confirm convincingly that while campaigns and their organising parties are generally under pressure to adapt (i.e., to professionalise) their campaigns to the changes and to the institutional expectations resulting from them, there are different conditions that reinforce these pressures with regard to the different environments. Therefore, professionalisation as an aggregated concept and professionalisation with regard to each of the four electoral environments are explained by different patterns of conditions. Campaign professionalisation as a strategy to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from the relevant electoral environments is shaped by different factors in the different environments.

Comparing the results of the empirical analysis with the hypotheses I formulated in Chapter 3.4, it becomes obvious that the general assumptions that were made on the impact of the five causal conditions on the different outcomes are mostly correct. What is more, the theoretical arguments used to formulate the hypotheses (Chapter 3.2 and 3.3) proved to be very useful in order to discuss whether or not the results generated by the fsQCA make sense, both theoretically and empirically, and to find that indeed the results can be interpreted in a theoretically and empirically useful way. However, the empirical reality is more complex than may be assumed. Most of the conditions contribute to the outcomes in the hypothesised way but they interact more often with other conditions than has been hypothesised.

Open questions and constraints

Apart from the generally positive evaluation of the theoretical assumptions underlying this analysis and of the empirical results of the analysis with the help of fsQCA, there are some open questions and constraints that crystallise from the results. First, it became obvious that for all of the outcomes except campaign professionalisation with regard to the members, there was a certain amount of overlap between the solution terms. This means that for certain cases or campaigns it is not possible to name just one combination of conditions that produced its professionalisation profile – rather, all solution terms are valid explanations for the professionalisation of the campaign. If we take, for example, the case of the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel, the fact that this campaign was professionalised with regard to the voters might be either due to this campaign being organised in an urban canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a *non-right-wing party* or to being organised in an urban canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a *catch-all party*. Both explanations are valid and we cannot point just to one of them. A possible further step of research, which has to be left open to future research in the framework of this dissertation, might be to conduct further interviews with the campaign managers which focus on the circumstances and conditions (both at the level of the canton and on the level of the party) in which the party was organised, in order to gain insight on whether one of the solution terms is more plausible for the specific case.

Second, I have shown that the reported solution formulas explain the vast majority of cases of professionalised cantonal election campaigns, but do not account for all campaigns. There are two possible explanations for and conclusions that may be drawn from this. First, other causal conditions at the systemic and party level that I have not taken into account here might contribute to campaign professionalisation. Hence, more causal conditions should be identified based on theoretical reasoning and existing empirical insights may then be systematically tested. The second explanation is that the identified causal conditions are exhaustive and that the unexplained cases are influenced by conditions, which are specific to the single campaigns making them diverge from the explanative pattern. For example, there

could be contingent circumstances like a specific internal event, a windfall profit for the party, or an unusually independent campaign manager, etc. (see Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200 who describe this possibility for organisations in general and who cite specific factors like age and history, micropolitical interests, convictions and opinions of the involved persons, functional requirements and routines). The methodological consequence of this explanation would be to identify what we could call the deviant cases, analyse these cases in further detail and probably conduct further interviews in order to identify factors and explanations specific to the single cases. In the framework of this dissertation, it has to be left open to future research to balance and to validate the two explanations and to undertake further research steps.

Scope conditions

As we remember from Chapter 5.7, the results of an analysis based on QCA "first and foremost hold for the cases that have actually been examined" (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 401), i.e., for the election campaigns organised by the respective cantonal branches of the Green Party, the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Swiss People's Party for the occasion of the elections to the cantonal parliaments in the cantons of Aargau and Neuchâtel in 2009, in the canton of Bern in 2010 and in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 2011. However, applying a generalisation to other cases is possible under the condition that the researcher clearly specifies scope conditions that have to be met by other cases if the causal relation examined is claimed to also hold for these cases. Based on these principles I argue, first, that the solution formula obtained based on the 23 campaigns included in this analysis can be transferred to other Swiss cantonal election campaigns. While there may be considerable differences between the 26 Swiss cantons with regard to their political systems, socio-economic structures and political legacies, they are all part of the same political, socioeconomic and cultural national framework of Switzerland. More importantly, the cantons that were included in this analysis do not differ systematically from the remaining cantons, nor do they represent deviant or particular cases among the Swiss cantons. I therefore

argue that the results can also claim validity for the campaigns of the party branches of the five parties that were included in this analysis in the remaining Swiss cantons. What is more, I argue that the results are also transferrable to campaigns organised by cantonal party branches of other parties, under the condition that they are comparable in size, voter share, and political position on the left-right political spectrum to the party branches that were analysed here.

In general, the reported results were obtained under the following scope conditions. I analysed elections to the parliaments of the administrative entity below the national level in a federal state. These sub-national entities are small (ranging from 15,700 to 1,408,200 inhabitants) but have a large range of political sovereignty. The political system is democratic and a multi-party system. Amateurism and volunteering are important elements of the political culture; political expertise is – as in other European countries – sought inside the party rather than outside. Paid political advertising on television and on the radio is forbidden; the parties do not receive direct funding from the state. As we have seen in Chapter 2.3.3, these conditions can be assumed to affect campaign professionalisation in Switzerland in general and in the Swiss cantons in particular. Therefore, I argue that the more international cases conform to these scope conditions, the more these results can claim validity for these cases. However, it remains an open issue for future research to definitely review and possibly revise this conclusion.

Conclusion

Key findings and their theoretical and practical implications

The "bigger picture" behind campaign professionalisation: Professionalisation as an adaptation to a changing environment for campaigning

I have shown in the present study based on sociological neo-institutionalism that the professionalisation of election campaigns is the process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and expectations from, the most relevant environments for election campaigning in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from these environments. Parties professionalise (i.e., adapt) their campaigns in order to find ways to cope with real and perceived changes that are going on in the environments constituted by the voters, by the members, by the media and by other parties and to fulfil institutional expectations resulting from the changes.

Campaign professionalisation is a "rational myth" and should be measured differently in different contexts

Parties professionalise their campaigns by taking those measures that they consider the appropriate way to act, acquiring the necessary knowledge from own reasoning, from the standards set by professionals or from the examples of other parties, in order to fulfil environmental expectations. Campaign professionalisation is a "rational myth", a survival strategy that parties turn to in order to cope with environmental changes and expectations. It is thus not a pre-existing phenomenon, but rather a subjective construct that is created at the interface of campaigning parties and their environments. As such, it depends on the perceptions and decisions by the parties and their leading actors, which are for their part influenced by the structural circumstances that the campaign takes place in and by the characteristics and interests of the party that organises the campaign. Campaign professionalisation as an object of research is therefore insufficiently captured by asking which campaign is "most professional" and by determining the degree of professionalisation from a score on a universally applicable professionalisation index. What is "professional" in

the sense of what is an adequate means to strive for success at the polls and for creating support from relevant environments cannot be determined without taking the context of the campaign into consideration.

Hence, in order to understand campaign professionalisation, its origin and its variations, analysing campaign professionalisation has to go beyond counting campaign characteristics and concluding that the campaign which achieves the largest score is most professional. The analysis of campaign professionalisation should take the context in which a campaign was organised into consideration, both when establishing the measurement instrument and when interpreting the results. Coming back to the questions brought up by Tenscher, stating that "theoretically and empirically, it is unclear if an additive index adequately reflects degrees of professional campaigning" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165) and putting up for question whether single components of professionalisation indices may "have to be weighted accordingly – or perhaps intentional withdrawing of components may sometimes be a better indicator for professional campaigning than adding up the elements" (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165), the theoretical and empirical results of the present dissertation clearly indicate that the answer to the latter question is yes: Researchers should opt for an emic measurement that is adapted to the context in which the campaign takes place and which leaves out indicators that are not adequate (if we think for example of television advertisement which is forbidden for parties in some countries).

This does not mean, however, that campaign professionalisation as it is conceptualised in the framework of this study has no value to comparative research. Comparing the degree of professionalisation between campaigns from different regions or countries is still possible when a similar context allows for using the same measurement instrument.

The degree of professionalisation differs between environments and should therefore be measured separately

The results of the present study show that the degree of professionalisation is not homogenous throughout the environments constituted by the voters, by the

members, by the media and by other parties in the majority of the campaigns. In other words, a campaign can achieve very high degrees of professionalisation with regard to certain electoral environments but score very low with regard to others, or achieve at least a medium score on the aggregated professionalisation index but score rather lowly on the differentiated indices. Therefore, measuring campaign professionalisation exclusively with an aggregated index obscures how the amount of professionalisation is distributed between the different environments and thus gives as inaccurate impression of the campaign's degree of campaign professionalisation. The empirical results suggest that campaign professionalisation should be considered a differentiated concept and hence be measured with differentiated indices.

Parties cannot escape the pressure to adapt, but they can chose how and how intensively to adapt – a blessing or a curse for internal party democracy?

Parties are confronted with challenges resulting from changes in their relevant environments, for example with the rise of new media and with a general tendency of declining membership rates and with a (perceived) difficulty to mobilise the remaining members. Based on the sociological neo-institutionalism, the present dissertation has argued that while parties cannot escape the pressure to adapt to environmental expectations (for example resulting from the above mentioned changes) in order to ensure on-going support for a longer time, their response to the challenges is not predetermined: Parties exercise a certain strategic choice in adapting to their institutional environments and as to how intensively to adapt, depending on which adaptation they deem to be most important. This is particularly relevant for parties confronted with a tight budget.

The present dissertation allowed for the possibility that parties place greater emphasis on a specific environment due to their specific situation and their campaign interests. However, no general emphasis was placed on a specific environment. It was assumed that in principle and overall, all four environments for campaigning (the voters, the members, the media, other parties) can have the same importance and that there is not one environment that has to be weighted higher than the others for all the campaigns. From a theoretical-democratic perspective and adding to the recurrent

discussion on the role of the members in modern parties, it could be asked, however, whether the members should not be the most important point of reference for a party. What implications does it have for the internal democracy of a party when professionalising the campaign with regard to the media or the general public is considered more important than putting all efforts in maintaining the support by the own members? On the other hand, is it really reasonable to assume that the other environments have the same importance than the environment constituted by the voters when – in the long run – every party strives for success at the polls? These considerations have to be left open in the present study, but should be given more thought in similar research in the future.

The strategies of adaptation differ between parties: Left-wing and centre parties are more prone to professionalise their campaigns

Parties of different political couleurs and different sizes have different strategies to cope with challenges induced by their environments. The present study has corroborated existing doubts on the assumption by Gibson and Römmele (2009) that right-wing parties organise more professionalised campaigns than left-wing parties. The empirical results add to evidence that right-wing parties are not more inclined to organise professionalised campaigns than left-wing or centre parties – on the contrary, left-wing and centre parties seem to organise professionalised campaigns more than right-wing parties – both with regard to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and also with regard to the environments constituted by the voters, members and media (in the described combinations with other variables). Where this difference between right-wing and non-right-wing parties stems from can only be speculated about at this point – it might be the case that the members of certain non-right-wing parties (especially the Green Party) are on average still significantly younger than those of right-wing parties (for the case of the Swiss cantonal parties cf. Knocks & Fraefel 2013: 27) and more open to mediated campaign communication in general or at least to online campaign communication. Non-right-wing parties might also feel a stronger need to ensure that their campaign communication represents the party in such a way as gives them a modern image, which might not be so important to conservative parties.

Each environment for campaigning provokes a different way of adaptation

The results of the present study show that although campaigns and their organising parties are generally under pressure to adapt (i.e., to professionalise) their campaigns to the changes and to the institutional expectations resulting from them, there are different conditions that reinforce these pressures with regard to the different environments. As each environment presents different incentives and expectations for a campaign, each provokes a different way of adaptation. Therefore, the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and to campaign professionalisation with regard to each of the different environments are not the same but differ from each other. Hence, not only the measurement instrument for campaign professionalisation should differentiate between environments, so should the analysis of the reasons behind it.

Large size of the organising canton comes close to a "one size fits all"-explanation, but there is more than one explanation for professionalised campaigning

From a methodological point of view all reported solution formula, that is the one for the aggregated concept of professionalisation and those resulting from the differentiated concept, are correct. Their substantive interpretation and evaluation depend, however, on the specific research interest. If we are interested in a "one size fits all" encompassing explanation for campaign professionalisation in the Swiss cantons, drawing on the solution formula for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept makes most sense, suggesting that the general changes in the relevant environments in campaigning affect those campaigns most severely that are organised in large cantons (by non-right-wing parties, by non-catch-all parties or in a non-competitive environment) and that when the condition of a large canton is absent, professionalised campaigns are organised by catch-all parties facing a competitive election in an urban environment. The large size of the organising canton came close to being a necessary condition, but did not fulfil the required threshold value for necessary conditions. It is therefore not the only factor explaining campaign professionalisation overall, but clearly shows that the environmental pressures towards adapting and professionalising the campaign are intensified when a

large and geographically scattered electorate has to be targeted and campaign communication has to make use of mediated communication to reach a maximum number of voters, when a large group of candidates has to be handled and the campaign has to be recognisable in a large number of constituencies.

The explanation for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept does, however, not tell the whole story behind the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation.

Professionalisation with regard to the voters is especially important in urban environments

An urban environment is a key incentive at the systemic level for organising a campaign that is professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters. Adapting the campaign in order to ensure the support of the general electorate is a survival strategy that campaigns turn to when the campaign faces a potentially volatile and diverse electorate that is concentrated in a rather confined regional area and that can thus be reached rather conveniently. On the party level, left-wing or centre parties, who in general tend to professionalise their campaigns rather than right-wing parties, also professionalise their campaigns with regard to the environments constituted by the voters. Assumptions that right-wing parties might be more electorate-oriented and left-wing or centre parties more oriented towards members are thus not confirmed. Catch-all parties and small or mid-sized parties equally professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters, indicating that the general electorate is thus not exclusively important to catch-all parties.

The environment of the members is especially important when there is a close competition and when targeting the general electorate is little promising

Professionalising the campaign with regard to the environment of the members is a strategy that parties turn to, first, when the circumstances that the campaign takes place in are rather competitive (urbanised canton, close competition in the cantonal parliament) and the members are thus a more important asset. Second, parties professionalise their campaigns with regard to the members when they are not likely to achieve gains at the polls by targeting new voters in the general electorate. This was the case, taking the example of the campaigns included in the sample of the

present dissertation, for left-wing or centre parties in rural cantons where right-wing parties predominate, and in urban, large and non-competitive cantons where it is sufficient for the dominant party to mobilise its members and it is little promising for the other parties to target new voters.

Pressures to adapt to the environment of the media are higher when campaigns target large and scattered or urban electorates

The environmental pressures to professionalise the campaign with regard to the media are particularly strong when a large and geographically scattered electorate has to be reached and successful campaigning via the media is more important. Also, campaigns are professionalised with regard to the media in urban settings where expectations for a campaign to have a modern appearance might be higher, while traditional campaigning elements like posters or gatherings in pubs and restaurants might still be accepted and effective in rural environments. Also, the plurality of media can be expected to be higher in urban settings and to call for a more elaborated strategy facing diverse channels and technologies.

Professionalising the campaign with regard to the media is a strategy that is rather applied by catch-all parties that have to reach a larger group of members and supporters and that might hope on larger chances to be invited in and reported in the traditional media. Unfortunately, the measurement instrument applied in the present study does not differentiate between the type of media (so-called traditional or new media) that the campaign was adapted to. From a democratic-participatory point of view, it would make sense to assume that mid-sized or small parties adapt their campaigns more strongly to online media in order to reach their members and the electorate because these do not pose the same barriers of entry than traditional media. This assumption cannot be confirmed based on the present study. Besides the lack of differentiation between traditional and online media this might, however, be due to the fact that the database this study is from 2009 to 2011 and online media in general were not yet very popular in the cantonal election campaigns, as the interviews suggested (see chapter 6.; cf. also Knocks & Fraefel 2013). The results

might be different if the study was replicated with newer data that differentiated between online and traditional media.

Few parties have professionalised their campaigns with regard to other parties - Catch-all parties are not immune against competition from other parties

The analysis of the cantonal election campaigns in the present study has shown that only few parties engaged in actively observing other parties and even fewer adapted their own campaigns as a result of their findings. It cannot be excluded that this result is at least partly influenced by a certain social desirability effect, as parties might be reluctant to reveal that they engaged in opposition monitoring. The causal conditions for professionalising the campaign with regard to other parties could hence only be determined for very few cases and should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, it became clear that catch-all parties are not immune against competition from other parties, given that other circumstances are present that enhance the pressure to professionalise the campaign.

Campaign professionalisation can only be explained by the interaction of systemic and party features

The results strikingly confirm the assumption from existing research that causal conditions (or, in more general terms, influence factors for campaign professionalisation) at the party level and at the systemic level are interlinked and interact with each other. Campaign professionalisation, neither as an aggregated concept nor with regard to different environments, can be explained by the systemic environment that a campaign takes place in or by the features of the party that organises the campaign alone. This empirical result confirms the theoretical conclusion that campaign professionalisation is produced at the interface of parties' considerations and actions and environmental changes and expectations.

Adapting the "selling process" of election campaigns to environmental expectations – good, enough, too much?

The present dissertation has shown that campaign professionalisation is a process by which parties try to keep up with changes and challenges in their relevant environments and ensure their ongoing support. Parties do this by adapting the way

they try to *sell* their products (their manifesto, their agenda for the time after the election, their visions and aims), that is by adapting their campaign organisation and their campaign communication. Adapting the selling process, to stick with this metaphor for a moment, is, on the one hand, a legitimate and justifiable aim. It is a logical consequence of parties' interest to getting voted for and, in the long run, to take on political responsibility as well as to maintain their bonds with the electorate and with their members. It is in the parties' interest that the society and the voters perceive them as fit and adapted to stand up to modern societies' tasks and challenges, as acceptable and worth to be voted for, as important. The concept of professionalisation as it was developed in the present dissertation thus relies on a purpose-rational perspective on parties and their environments. However, this perspective is not sufficient in order to analyse and evaluate the parties' roles and actions in the society and vis-à-vis their relevant environments. It does not reveal how parties perform in absorbing and processing needs and ideas from the society and in creating and shaping societal processes and changes in contrast to merely responding to them. A desideratum for future research lies thus in elaborating on other theoretical and analytical dimensions that complement the perspective of professionalisation as an adaptation and optimisation with regard to relevant environments and that embrace political parties' roles as initiators and organisers of political and social processes.

Methodological conclusions: FsQCA as a method for analysing causal conditions for campaign professionalisation

The assumed strengths and advantages of fsQCA as a tool for data analysis did indeed prove to be very useful for analysing causal conditions for campaign professionalisation. First, the method did allow me to test five potential causal conditions from two different levels (party level, systemic level) together in one research model. It is striking how the obtained solution formulas show how these factors are strongly intertwined and how they interact in producing the different profiles of campaign professionalisation. Second, the calibration of the set

membership scores of the 23 cases in the outcomes and in the causal conditions allowed us to capture the empirical reality of the data in hand more precisely than a dichotomous measurement that only differentiates between "professionalised" and "not professionalised" campaigns. What is more, the reader should be aware that the notion of "causal conditions" may indeed be accepted at face value: fsQCA allows for establishing causal relations between the outcome and the conditions. We can be absolutely sure that the obtained solution caused the outcome and the influence of other conditions can be excluded (this has a flipside as we will see below).

On the other hand, there are some features that may be considered to be the disadvantages or inconveniences of the method. First, the method is not immune to the so-called *too many variables, too few cases* problem, or, in other words, it is stretched to its methodological and mathematical limits when the outcome set is small. This is, strictly speaking, not a disadvantage of the method but rather a fact that researchers should be aware of. I was confronted with this feature when analysing the causal conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by other parties, where the outcome set turned out to be small with only two campaigns achieving the maximum index score of 2 and another six campaigns achieving an index score of 1, representing a relation of eight cases to five conditions. This resulted in a solution formula with a low coverage value that did not perform well in the robustness test. While it is at least questionable whether a similar situation can be avoided in the research process in the first place, researchers should pay special attention when planning their endeavour.

A second characteristic of fsQCA as a method of data analysis is that the results are valid first and foremost for the cases that were included in the analysis, that is in the case of the present dissertation for the 23 election campaigns studied here. This is the flipside of fsQCA's potential to demonstrate causal relations between the outcome and the conditions: we gain causality but we lose a direct applicability of the results to other contexts and cases. There are, however, ways to assess and eventually claim that the results are valid also for other cases and contexts (see next paragraph).

To sum up, fsQCA, like any other method for data analysis, offers many advantages – having said that, every advantage brings possible pitfalls. Whether fsQCA is a valid method or not depends – again, this is the case for every method – on the specific research interest in hand. If the researcher is willing to cope with the inconveniences that were described above or if she or he decides that these are not relevant for his or her specific research interest, fsQCA is a very fruitful approach for studying and analysing campaign professionalisation, mostly for its potential of testing logically intertwined combinations of conditions and revealing complex causal paths, but also due to its potential to calibrate the set membership scores in the outcome and in the causal conditions. For the research interest of this dissertation, fsQCA has therefore proven to be a very valuable method of data analysis.

As a subjective methodological conclusion I may add, first, from the experience of the present dissertation, 23 election campaigns and 37 semi-structured interviews with campaign managers are at the upper end of the number of cases that a research project similar to the present dissertation can handle when the researcher wants to gain in-depth knowledge on each case, as is in line with standards of good practice in QCA. Second, it became obvious during the research process that when a campaign manager reflected on the campaign and the circumstances by which it was organised in the interviews, these interviews were a useful source for additional in-depth information on the campaigns (as readers might have noticed, this was especially the case for the campaign managers of the Social and Liberal Democrats in Neuchâtel). On the contrary, the amount of additional in-depth knowledge that could be gained from the interviews was rather small when campaign managers did not take the time to reflect but merely reported campaign activities. Researchers who might want to opt for similar research designs and questions should thus find ways to encourage interviewees to provide additional in-depth information on the subject of the interview (e.g. by making sure that there is enough time for in-depth and context-related questions).

Limitations of this study

First, the theoretical and empirical reasoning of the present dissertation is certainly not sufficient to consider the question of whether campaign professionalisation has to be considered a differentiated concept and measured with different indices a closed case. Further empirical analyses from different contexts and based on other methods will have to show whether this result can be substantiated or has to be revised.

Second, an aspect that could potentially pose a challenge for future studies that adopt the differentiation between the four environments is the fact that the differentiation between the environments constituted by the voters and by the members might be difficult for certain campaigns, especially for those organised by very small parties or with a very low budget. During the coding process of the present dissertation it became obvious that some of the communication activities launched by the cantonal party branches in this study were directed both at the voters and at the members and that the parties did not always differentiate between the two target groups – mostly for economic reasons. While the data analysis, with the help of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, revealed that there are different paths that lead to campaign professionalisation with regard to the members and to the voters and therefore underlined that the two environments are indeed differentiable, future studies might have to check whether there is an overlap between the communication strategies directed at the two environments, evaluate if this could have an influence on the research strategy and on the results, and find solutions for this challenge (for example, as has been done in the present case, by adding more variables that contribute to differentiating the environments).

Furthermore, other links to, or advancements of, existing findings on the factors influencing campaign professionalisation are unfortunately rather difficult to make from the perspective of the present dissertation. This is due, first, to the fact that the results gained with fsQCA are rather complex, second, to the fact that the present study analyses causal conditions for campaign professionalisation in a differentiated manner and finally introduces new explanatory variables that have not yet explicitly

been tested in existing studies. These research features allowed the gaining of new perspectives and insights on the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation yet at the same time they act as an obstacle to linking them to existing findings.

Finally, as in all comparative research and especially with regard to a rather "fuzzy" social science concept like campaign professionalisation the comparability of empirical results on this concept depends heavily on its operationalisation. Researchers are always advised to carefully check how the object of research was operationalised before directly comparing and linking the empirical results from different studies. This advice most definitely applies also to the present dissertation, especially because I opted – for the reasons described in Chapter 2.3.2 – for an emic measurement and because – as was explained in Chapter 8.2.1 – campaign professionalisation was defined in a somewhat encompassing and permissive manner in order to adequately gather all facets of campaign professionalisation in the cantonal election campaigns included in this study.

Future research perspectives

On the one hand, there are several research desiderata that directly emerge from what has to be left open in the framework of this dissertation due to the constraints of time and space. First, it was not possible for certain campaigns to name just one combination of conditions that produced its professionalisation profile due to a certain amount of overlap between the solution terms. Rather, several solution terms can be assumed to have led to campaign professionalisation in certain cases. This overlapping is inherent to all solution formulas except for the outcome campaign professionalisation with regard to the members. In the concerned campaigns, all solution terms are valid as explanations for the professionalisation of the campaign and we cannot point just to one of them. A possible further step of research might be to conduct further interviews with the campaign managers which focus on the circumstances and conditions (both on the level of the canton and on the level of the party) in order to gain insight on whether one of the solution terms is more plausible for the specific case.

Second, we have seen that the reported solution formula explain the vast majority of cases of professionalised cantonal election campaigns, but they do not account for all campaigns. There are two possible explanations for, and conclusions from, this. First, other causal conditions at the systemic and at the party level that I have not taken into account here might contribute to campaign professionalisation. Hence, more causal conditions should be identified based on theoretical reasoning and existing empirical insights and be systematically tested. The second explanation is that the identified causal conditions are exhaustive and that the unexplained cases are influenced by conditions, which are specific to the single campaigns so that they diverge from the explanative pattern. These could, for example, be contingent circumstances like a specific internal event, a windfall profit for the party, or an unusually independent campaign manager, etc. The methodological consequence from this explanation would be to identify what we could call *deviant* cases, analyse these cases in further detail and probably conduct further interviews in order to identify factors and explanations specific to the single cases.

On the other hand, there are two more general perspectives that are of future interest and importance. The first concerns campaign professionalisation as a rational myth. The theoretical foundation suggests that parties perceive professionalised campaigning to be the best and most adequate way to adapt to changing circumstances for election campaigning. The empirical results of this dissertation confirm that campaign professionalisation, in its different profiles (i.e., with regard to the different electoral environments) is indeed a strategy that parties turn to in order to master the challenges that they are confronted with by their most relevant electoral environments. From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, the parties perceive it to be most rational to choose these forms of adaptations – influenced and inspired by other parties, professionals and the perceived expectations of the environments rational myth. But are these strategies really promising in order to adapt to changes and challenges in the relevant environments? Coming back to the apprehensions I already addressed in the introduction, impersonal or indirect communication (e.g. so-called direct mail, direct email, telephone banks), which is part of nearly all existing operationalisations of professionalised campaigns and

which is also relied on in the Swiss cantonal election campaigns studied in this dissertation might actually be one of the reasons for many of today's campaigns' problems rather than being their cure. As empirical results addressed by Green and Smith (2003: 332) indicate, "it remains to be seen whether future investigations turn up similar effects, but the tentative conclusion seems to be that the staple of modern campaigning, direct mail, is considerably less efficient than more personal campaign tactics". While being referred to as means of "direct" communication (direct mail, direct e-mail) or narrow-casting, communication tactics which aim at addressing a large electorate with minimum financial resources and as quickly as possible are in fact indirect and impersonal means of communication, compared to so called "pre-modern" campaign tactics like personal chats when distributing party flyers. Rather than being a promising strategy when dealing with a more volatile electorate and with the resulting pressure to address more potential voters, impersonal "direct" communication hence might not be the cure for a more difficult mobilisation of potential voters but might rather be the cause, or at least reinforce, the alienation of the electorate from the parties. A slightly different concern is expressed by Maarek, who argues that "direct marketing by mail, telephone and other ways of reaching the voter at home often leads to the paradoxical result that, having given a credit card number by phone to donate for a politician's campaign or for a party, the individual will feel that he has done enough" (Maarek 2004: 220). He assumes that this is a significant cause of the decrease in voting turnouts, as "over-informed through the excessive efficiency of professionalized political communication, the citizen will not go to the polling station on election day" (Maarek 2004: 220). To sum up, from both an organisational perspective focusing on the parties and their need to mobilise voters as well as from a democratic or participative perspective focusing on the citizens, it is crucial that the different elements of professionalised campaigning are not uncritically welcomed as the long desired cure for mobilisation problems, but have to be critically examined with regard to their effectiveness for political mobilisation and voting turnout.

Finally, an important challenge both from the perspective of the parties as well as from the perspective of campaign and professionalisation research is the fact that

campaign strategies and choices of communication channels for political communication have developing degrees of institutionalisation. Zucker's cornerstone article made it clear that an institutional status is not simply present or absent, but that there are different degrees of institutionalisation and that the efficacy of institutionalised rules can differ throughout time (cf. Zucker 1977). Applying her results to the use of communication channels in election campaigns, this means that channels or means of communication which are taken for granted now may become dispensable and insignificant over time, others may have the status of a "nice to have" now and may become a "must have" in a few years. This dynamic applies, first and most obviously, to the means of online campaigning. While Facebook was still considered a trend that may have passed quickly and that was thought of as not worth investing in by some of the campaign managers that were interviewed for this dissertation, the degree of institutionalisation of Facebook as a campaign tool may have risen by now, bringing a perceived pressure to integrate this "must have" into the cantonal election campaigns. Other interviewees referred to blogs, which were perceived to have been a "must have" in the previous election but which were – in the perception of the campaign managers – becoming more of a "nice to have" in the campaign studied in this dissertation as the main trend of having a blog was already over. Second, changing degrees of institutionalisation affect also more traditional channels or means of campaign communication. As several interviewees stated, the efficiency of campaign posters for mobilising voters is more and more questioned – yet, they are institutionalised to a degree that no campaign manager would dare to organise a campaign without posters. However, his might change in a few years and the institutional status of campaign posters may change from indispensable to dispensable. Also, if trends of low turnout rates and high degrees of volatility in voters' behaviour continue and scientific evidence for the low efficiency of campaign communication via direct mail and e-mail is substantiated, campaign professionals may start to recommend, or innovative parties may start to use, more personal means of campaign communication. To sum up, the professionalisation of election campaigns, either if researchers are interested in following its development over time or determine its degree at a single point in time, as has been done in the present dissertation, is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon. As the environmental

challenges and expectations for campaigns change and as the degree of institutionalisation of the means of campaign communication changes, parties find ways to adapt their campaigns to these developments, depending on their systemic environment and their profile. Both, for the sake of political communication research and for democratic and participatory interests, the challenge for professionalisation research will thus be to comprehend, track and measure a moving target: the dynamic and ever evolving phenomenon of campaign professionalisation.

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Appendix

A) Meta-analysis of existing studies

Gibson, R. K., & Römmele, A. (2009). Measuring the Professionalization of Political Campaigning. Party Politics, 15(3), 265–293.

Voters		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside target groups	12	8
Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups	12	9
E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates	12	10
Continuous campaigning	12	6
Use of computerized databases	12	9
Use of opinion polling	12	11
Use of outside public relations/media consultants	12	7
Total score	84	60
Percentage		**71%**

Members		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside target groups	12	8
Presence of an internal Internet communication system	12	9
Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups	12	9
E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates	12	10
Use of outside public relations/media consultants	12	7
Total score	60	43
Percentage		**72%**

Media		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of outside public relations/media consultants	12	7
Percentage		**58%**

Other parties		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Conducting opposition research	12	10
Use of outside public relations/media consultants	12	7
Total score	24	17
Percentage		**71%**

Strömbäck, J. (2009). Selective Professionalisation of Political Campaigning: A Test of the Party-Centred Theory of Professionalised Campaigning in the Context of the 2006 Swedish Election. Political Studies, 57, 95–116.

Voters		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of telemarketing	21	3
Use of direct mail	21	18
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters	21	11
Continuous campaigning	21	11
Use of computerised databases	21	6
Use of opinion polling	21	11
Use of external public relations/media consultants	21	5
Use of focus groups	21	7
Research of one's own party or campaign	21	0
Total score	189	72
Percentage		**38%**

Members		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters	21	11
Use of telemarketing	21	3
Use of direct mail	21	18
Use of external public relations/media consultants	21	5
Research of one's own party or campaign	21	0
Total score	105	37
Percentage		**35%**

Media		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of external public relations/media consultants	21	5
Research of one's own party or campaign	21	0
Total score	42	5
Percentage		**12%**

Other parties		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Opposition research	21	7
Use of external public relations/media consultants	21	5
Total score	42	12
Percentage		**29%**

Tenscher, J. (2007). Professionalisierung nach Wahl: Ein Vergleich der Parteikampagnen im Rahmen der jüngsten Bundestags- und Europawahlkämpfe in Deutschland. In F. Brettschneider, O. Niedermayer, & B. Weβels (Eds.), Die Bundestagswahl 2005. Analysen des Wahlkampfs und der Wahlergebnisse (pp. 65–95). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Voters		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Campaign duration	18	0
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization	12	12
Degree of externalization	18	12
Nature and degree of feedback	12	9
Degree of targeting	18	10
Degree of narrowcasting activities	24	19
Total score	102	62
Percentage		**61%**

Members		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Differentiation of internal communication structures	18	15
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization	12	12
Degree of externalization	18	12
Nature and degree of feedback	12	9
Degree of targeting	18	10
Degree of narrowcasting activities	24	19
Total score	102	77
Percentage		**75%**

Media		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Relevance of paid media	30	24
Relevance of free media	36	31
Relevance of talk shows	12	9
Degree of event and news management	12	9
Degree of personalization	12	8
Degree of privatization	12	1
Negative campaigning	12	4
Degree of externalization	18	12
Total score	144	98
Percentage		**68%**

Other parties		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Degree of opposition research	6	4
Degree of externalization	18	12
Total score	24	16
Percentage		**67%**

Tenscher, J. (2011). Defizitär - und trotzdem professionell? Die Parteikampagnen im Vergleich. In J. Tenscher (Ed.), Superwahljahr 2009. Vergleichende Analysen aus Anlass der Wahlen zum Deutschen Bundestag und zum Europäischen Parlament (pp. 65–95). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Voters		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Campaign duration	18	8
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization	12	9
Degree of externalization	18	12
Nature and degree of feedback	12	12
Degree of targeting	18	13
Degree of narrowcasting activities	36	20
Total score	114	74
Percentage		**65%**

Members		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Differentiation of internal communication structures	30	25
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization	12	12
Degree of externalization	18	12
Nature and degree of feedback	12	9
Degree of targeting	18	10
Degree of narrowcasting activities	36	19
Total score	126	87
Percentage		**69%**

Media		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Relevance of paid media	30	18
Relevance of free media	36	30
Relevance of talk shows	12	8
Degree of event and news management	12	11
Degree of personalization	12	6
Degree of privatization	12	1
Negative campaigning	12	1
Degree of externalization	18	12
Total score	144	87
Percentage		**60%**

Other parties		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Degree of opposition research	6	6
Degree of externalization	18	12
Total score	24	18
Percentage		**75%**

Lisi, M. (2011). The professionalisation of Portuguese campaigns: parties and candidates in the 2009 general elections. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, (2), 105–122.

Voters		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of telemarketing	15	4
Use of direct mail	15	7
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters	15	13
Continuous campaigning	15	11
Use of computerised databases	15	6
Use of opinion polling	15	1
Use of external public relations/media consultants	15	5
Use of focus groups	15	3
Total score	120	50
Percentage		**42%**

Members		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters	15	13
Use of telemarketing	15	4
Use of direct mail	15	7
Use of external public relations/media consultants	15	5
Total score	60	29
Percentage		**48%**

Media		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Use of external public relations/media consultants	15	5
Percentage		**33%**

Other parties		
Indicator	Max. score	Score achieved
Negative campaign (= opposition research, cf. Chapter 2.2.4)	15	0
Use of external public relations/media consultants	15	5
Total score	30	5
Percentage		**17%**

B) Questions from the Semi-Structured Interviews[23]

Role of the interviewee in the election campaign

- Which role did you have and which tasks were you responsible for in the latest election campaign?
- Why did you have this role and these responsibilities?

The party during the election campaign: structures, processes and persons

- Please describe the internal organisation of and the distribution of competences in your party during the latest election campaign. Who elaborated central campaign elements like the slogan, the corporate design, etc.?
- Did you employ professionals (e.g. PR agents, website specialists, etc.) in your campaign? If yes, which tasks did they have?
- (How) did you prepare candidates and volunteers for their tasks during the campaign?

Campaign communication

- Which channels, which means of communication did you use in order to communicate with your electorate (including "traditional" means of communication, online communication, so-called direct communication or narrow-casting (if not understood: e.g. direct mail, direct e-mail and text messages)
- Which channels, which means of communication did you use in order to communicate with your members?
- Why (based on which information, based on which reasoning) did you choose these channels or means of communication?
- Which channels or means of communication did prove to be effective from your point of view? Which did not?
- Which are the main differences between campaign communication and your internal and external communication outside election campaigns?

[23] Selection of questions that are relevant for the aspects discussed in the present dissertation.

C) Raw data

Party	Right-wing[24]	Size[25]	Urbanisation[26]	Competition[27]	Strength[28]	Professionalisation index	Media index	Members index	Voters index	Other parties index
Social Democrats, Bern	2,455	979800	40	3,13	26	10	2	9	9	0
Social Democrats, Zürich	1,835	1373100	66	11,10	20	11	2	7	6	2
Social Democrats, Neuchâtel	2,04	172100	53	0,87	36	12	4	7	7	4
Liberal Democrats, Bern	6,31	979800	40	3,13	16	8	4	6	5	0
Green Party, Zürich	1,775	1373100	66	11,10	11	9	4	6	5	2
Swiss People's Party, Zürich	7,4	1373100	66	11,10	31	10	4	6	7	2
Liberal Democrats, Zürich	6,87	1373100	66	11,10	16	8	2	5	4	2
Christian Democrats, Neuchâtel	4,64	172100	53	0,87	0	5	0	5	5	0
Social Democrats, Aargau	2,15	611500	19	11,43	21	7	2	5	3	0
Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel	6,305	172100	53	0,87	35	9	4	5	5	4
Christian Democrats, Zürich	4,955	1373100	66	11,10	7	7	0	4	4	0
Green Party, Bern	2,06	979800	40	3,13	12	7	0	4	5	0
Green Party, Aargau	1,88	611500	19	11,43	5	6	2	4	4	0
Christian Democrats, Aargau	5,28	611500	19	11,43	19	7	0	4	4	2
Swiss People's Party, Bern	7,055	979800	40	3,13	29	5	2	4	3	0
Swiss People's Party, Neuchâtel	7,36	172100	53	0,87	15	5	2	3	2	0
Liberal Democrats, Aargau	6,795	611500	19	11,43	17	6	2	3	3	0
Christian Democrats, Appenzell A.	5	53000	29	28,00	5	4	2	3	3	0

[24] Arithmetic mean between the modified values from Ladner et al. (2008) and Geser et al. (2003)
[25] Number of inhabitants
[26] Percentage of the population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants
[27] Difference in the percentage of seats claimed by the strongest and the second strongest party in the cantonal parliament
[28] Percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament held by the cantonal party branch in the legislative period before the elections studied in this dissertation

Green Party, Neuchâtel	1,69	172100	53	0,87	9	7	2	3	4	2
Christian Democrats, Bern	5,26	979800	40	3,13	1	4	2	2	3	0
Social Democrats, Appenzell A.	2,5	53000	29	28,00	6	3	0	2	1	0
Liberal Democrats, Appenzell A.	6,42	53000	29	28,00	40	2	0	1	1	0
Green Party, Appenzell A.	1,85	53000	29	28,00	0	0	0	0	0	0

D) Truth tables

1. Professionalised campaigning as an aggregated concept

1.1 Truth table – raw version

fssize1[29]	fsurban1[30]	fscomp1[31]	fsright1[32]	fscatch1[33]	number	fsprof1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.390879	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.697917	0.402062	0.585153
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.857143	0.571429	0.5625
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.955102	0.930818	0.73125
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.758794	0.533981	0.611336
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.117647	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.832117
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.525974	0	0.5
0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.830508
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.863388	0.456522	0.535593
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.955224	0.884615	0.609524
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.927374	0.867347	0.672065
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.970874	0.965909	0.869565
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.846512	0.641304	0.596721

[29] Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition "being organised in a large canton".
[30] Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition "being organised in an urbanised canton".
[31] Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition "being organised in a canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament".
[32] Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition "being organised by a right-wing party".
[33] Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition "being organised by a catch-all party".

1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.780142
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.515789	0	0.5
0	0	0	0	1	0		0.8125	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	0	0		0.680328	0	0.5
0	0	1	0	0	0		1	1	0.512195
0	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.529412
0	0	1	1	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	1	0	0	0	0		0.434783	0	0.5
0	1	0	0	1	0		0.571428	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	0	0		0.72093	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	1	0		0.3	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	1	0		0.769231	0	0.5
1	0	1	0	0	0		0.875	0.571428	0.552632
1	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.693548
1	0	1	1	0	0		0.833333	0.375	0.531915
1	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	1	0	0	1	0		0.955882	0.941176	0.792683

1.2 Truth table – edited version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsprof1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.780142
0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.830508
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.832117
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.970874	0.965909	0.869565
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.955224	0.884615	0.609524

1	1	0	0	0	2		0.955102	0.930818	0.73125
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.927374	0.867347	0.672065
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.863388	0.456522	0.535593
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.857143	0.571429	0.5625
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.846512	0.641304	0.596721
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.758794	0.533981	0.611336
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.697917	0.402062	0.585153
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.525974	0	0.5
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.515789	0	0.5
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.390879	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.117647	0	0.5

2. Professionalisation with regard to the voters

2.1 Truth table – raw version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsvoters1	raw consist	PRI consist	SYM consist
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.355049	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.791667	0.487179	0.571429
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.557823	0	0.5
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.857143	0.705882	0.625
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.763819	0.5	0.59144
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.105882	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.808511
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.448052	0.114583	0.543307
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.846939	0.758065	0.697479

1	0	0	0	0	1		0.688525	0	0.5
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.38806	0	0.5
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.73743	0.096154	0.509653
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.961165	0.955056	0.876106
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.897674	0.755556	0.606918
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.769231
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.421053	0.017857	0.506329
0	0	0	0	1	0		0.541667	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	0	0		0.614754	0	0.5
0	0	1	0	0	0		1	1	0.512195
0	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.529412
0	0	1	1	0	0		1	1	0.508197
0	0	1	1	1	0		1	1	0.52
0	1	0	0	0	0		0.445652	0	0.5
0	1	0	0	1	0		0.523809	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	0	0		0.813954	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	1	0		0.266667	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	1	0		0.692308	0	0.5
1	0	1	0	0	0		0.925	0.709677	0.555
1	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.716667
1	0	1	1	0	0		0.9	0.100001	0.503106
1	0	1	1	1	0		0.756757	0.1	0.509091
1	1	0	0	1	0		0.941176	0.904762	0.711111

2.2 Truth table – edited version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsvoters1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.769231
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.808511
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.961165	0.955056	0.876106
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.897674	0.755556	0.606918
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.857143	0.705882	0.625
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.846939	0.758065	0.697479
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.791667	0.487179	0.571429
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.763819	0.5	0.59144
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.73743	0.096154	0.509653
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.688525	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.557823	0	0.5
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.448052	0.114583	0.543307
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.421053	0.017857	0.506329
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.38806	0	0.5
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.355049	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.105882	0	0.5

3. Professionalisation with regard to the members

3.1 Truth table – raw version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsmembers1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.407166	0.066667	0.527426
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.625	0.414634	0.634921
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.564626	0.015385	0.50303
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.963265	0.939597	0.710843
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.723618	0.56	0.66055
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.105882	0.012987	0.529412
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.838235
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.532467	0.225806	0.573427
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.938775	0.916667	0.779661
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.857924	0.518519	0.548951
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.940298	0.904762	0.715909
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.921788	0.833333	0.634615
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.961165	0.955556	0.883929
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.730233	0.382979	0.564748
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.814815
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.757895	0.08	0.507042
0	0	0	0	1	0		0.791667	0.565217	0.603175
0	0	0	1	0	0		0.622951	0.021277	0.503311
0	0	1	0	0	0		1	1	0.531646
0	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.580645
0	0	1	1	0	0		1	1	0.516667
0	0	1	1	1	0		1	1	0.541667

0	1	0	0	0	0		0.48913	0.020833	0.505618
0	1	0	0	1	0		0.523809	0.090909	0.52381
0	1	0	1	0	0		0.837209	0.125	0.507042
0	1	0	1	1	0		0.266667	0.043478	0.533333
1	0	0	1	1	0		0.692308	0.2	0.529412
1	0	1	0	0	0		0.816667	0.592592	0.597561
1	0	1	0	1	0		1	1	0.754386
1	0	1	1	0	0		0.755556	0.521739	0.607143
1	0	1	1	1	0		1	1	0.513889
1	1	0	0	1	0		0.941176	0.925926	0.820513

3.2. Truth table – edited version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsmembers1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.838235
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.814815
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.963265	0.939597	0.710843
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.961165	0.955556	0.883929
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.940298	0.904762	0.715909
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.938775	0.916667	0.779661
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.921788	0.833333	0.634615
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.857924	0.518519	0.548951
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.757895	0.08	0.507042
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.730233	0.382979	0.564748
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.723618	0.56	0.66055
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.625	0.414634	0.634921

1	0	0	1	0	2		0.564626	0.015385	0.50303
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.532467	0.225806	0.573427
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.407166	0.066667	0.527426
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.105882	0.012987	0.529412

4. Professionalisation with regard to the media

4.1. Truth table – raw version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsmedia1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.449511	0.146465	0.558704
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.609375	0.380165	0.62234
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.62585	0.438776	0.652482
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.804082	0.701863	0.701068
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.974874	0.95283	0.675958
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.152941	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.838235
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.681818	0.484211	0.640244
0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.867257
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.808743	0.635417	0.629787
1	0	0	0	1	1		1	1	0.632075
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.642458	0.443478	0.642458
1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	0.85124
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.660465	0.215054	0.537879
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.670732
1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.683453

0	0	0	0	1	0		0.875	0.333334	0.518519
0	0	0	1	0	0		0.795082	0.509804	0.577381
0	0	1	0	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	0	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	1	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	1	0	0	0	0		0.608696	0	0.5
0	1	0	0	1	0		0.714286	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	1	0	1	1	0		0.4	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	0	1	0	0	0		0.816667	0.241379	0.518519
1	0	1	0	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	0	1	1	0	0		1	1	0.56962
1	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	1	0	0	1	0		1	1	0.60177

4.2. Truth table – edited version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsmedia1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.683453
1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.670732
1	1	0	1	1	1		1	1	0.85124
0	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	0.867257
0	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	0.838235
1	0	0	0	1	1		1	1	0.632075

1	1	1	1	0	2		0.974874	0.95283	0.675958
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.808743	0.635417	0.629787
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.804082	0.701863	0.701068
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.681818	0.484211	0.640244
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.660465	0.215054	0.537879
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.642458	0.443478	0.642458
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.62585	0.438776	0.652482
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.609375	0.380165	0.62234
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.449511	0.146465	0.558704
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.152941	0	0.5

5. Professionalisation with regard to other parties

5.1. Truth table – raw version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsotherp1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.299674	0.027149	0.516854
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.255208	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.557823	0.336735	0.625954
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.530612	0.285714	0.607477
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.673367	0.414414	0.603604
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.152941	0	0.5
0	1	1	0	1	1		0.938596	0.923913	0.829457
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.24026	0	0.5
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.153061	0	0.5
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.775956	0.57732	0.622807
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.253731	0	0.5

1	1	0	1	0	1		0.614525	0.4	0.632184
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.174757	0	0.5
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.706977	0.519084	0.644068
1	1	1	0	1	1		0.336364	0.064103	0.536232
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.947368	0.901961	0.671642
0	0	0	0	1	0		0.354167	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	0	0		0.42623	0.041096	0.514852
0	0	1	0	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	0	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	1	0	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
0	1	0	0	0	0		0.413043	0	0.5
0	1	0	0	1	0		0.714286	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	0	0		0.581395	0	0.5
0	1	0	1	1	0		0.4	0	0.5
1	0	0	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	0	1	0	0	0		0.666667	0.354839	0.57971
1	0	1	0	1	0		0.488372	0	0.5
1	0	1	1	0	0		0.755556	0	0.5
1	0	1	1	1	0		1	-1.#IND00	0.5
1	1	0	0	1	0		0.338235	0	0.5

5.2. Truth table – edited version

fssize1	fsurban1	fscomp1	fsright1	fscatch1	number	fsotherp1	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	1	1	1		0.947368	0.901961	0.671642
0	1	1	0	1	1		0.938596	0.923913	0.829457
1	0	0	0	0	1		0.775956	0.57732	0.622807
1	1	1	0	0	1		0.706977	0.519084	0.644068
1	1	1	1	0	2		0.673367	0.414414	0.603604
1	1	0	1	0	1		0.614525	0.4	0.632184
1	0	0	1	0	2		0.557823	0.336735	0.625954
1	1	0	0	0	2		0.530612	0.285714	0.607477
1	1	1	0	1	1		0.336364	0.064103	0.536232
0	0	0	0	0	2		0.299674	0.027149	0.516854
0	1	1	0	0	2		0.255208	0	0.5
1	0	0	0	1	1		0.253731	0	0.5
0	1	1	1	0	1		0.24026	0	0.5
1	1	0	1	1	1		0.174757	0	0.5
0	1	1	1	1	1		0.153061	0	0.5
0	0	0	1	1	1		0.152941	0	0.5

E) Solution formulas

1. Professionalised campaigning as an aggregated concept

Complex solution[34]:

large canton*~competitive canton*~catch-all party +

large canton*urban canton*~catch-all party +

large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party +

large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party +

~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party +

large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party +

urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party* +

(solution coverage: 0.848792, solution consistency: 0.858833)

Parsimonious solution:

large canton*~catch-all party +

large canton*~right-wing party +

large canton*~competitive canton +

urban canton*~competitive canton +

~right-wing party*catch-all party +

~large canton*urban canton*catch-all party +

~large canton*competitive canton*catch-all party +

(solution coverage: 0.915822, solution consistency: 0.791246)

Intermediate solution:

~competitive canton*large canton +

~right-wing party*large canton +

~catch-all party*large canton +

catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton

[34] For reasons of clarity, the conditions are presented in a shortened wording: the condition "being organised in a large canton" is shortened to "large canton". The tilde sign (~) translates to "not": "~catch-all party" means "not being organised by a catch-all party". To recall, "*" is the Boolean expression for "and", "+" is the Boolean expression for "or". "*" links single conditions together to a combination of conditions, "+" separates the solution terms that all equally produce the outcome.

(solution coverage: 0.905690, solution consistency: 0.825871)

2. Professionalisation with regard to the voters

Complex solution:

urbancanton1*competitive canton*~right-wing party +
large canton*urban canton*~right-wing party*~catch-all party +
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~catch-all party +
~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party+
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all party
(solution coverage: 0.761249, solution consistency: 0.832329)

Parsimonious solution:

urban canton*~right-wing party +
large canton*competitive canton*~catch-all party +
urban canton*~competitive canton*catch-all party +
~large canton*urban canton*catch-all party +
~large canton*competitive canton*catch-all +
large canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all
(solution coverage: 0.808999, solution consistency: 0.740336)

Intermediate solution:

~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton +
~right-wing party*urban canton*large canton +
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton +
catch-all party*~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +
~catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +
(solution coverage: 0.796143, solution consistency: 0.829665)

3. Professionalisation with regard to the members

Complex solution:

urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party +
large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party +
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*~catch-all party +
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party +
(solution coverage: 0.685691, solution consistency: 0.870408)

Parsimonious solution:

urban canton*~competitive canton +
urban canton*catch-all party +
competitive canton*catch-all party +
large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party +
large canton*~urban canton*~right-wing party
(solution coverage: 0.776527, solution consistency: 0.813817)

Intermediate solution:

~right-wing party*~urban canton*large canton +
~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton +
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton
(solution coverage: 0.762862, solution consistency: 0.864299)

4. Professionalisation with regard to the media

Complex solution:

urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party +
large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party*~catch-all party +
large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party +
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*right-wing party +
large canton*urban canton*right-wing party*catch-all party
(solution coverage: 0.687738, solution consistency: 0.910282)

Parsimonious solution:

urban canton*catch-all party +

large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party +

large canton*competitive canton*right-wing party

(solution coverage: 0.716679, solution consistency: 0.860146)

Intermediate solution:

~right-wing party*~not competitive canton*large canton +

catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton +

catch-all party*urban canton*large canton +

right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton

(solution coverage: 0.705255, solution consistency: 0.892100)

5. Professionalisation with regard to other parties

Complex solution:

~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party*catch-all party+

large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all party

(solution coverage: 0.258890, solution consistency: 0.962963)

Parsimonious solution:

~large canton*~right-wing party*catch-all party+

large canton*competitive canton*right-wing party* catch-all party

(solution coverage: 0.271693, solution consistency: 0.789256)

Intermediate solution:

catch-all party*~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton +

catch-all party*right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton (solution coverage: 0. 258890, solution consistency: 0.962963)